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Research Topic
 The empirical research that led to the writing of this dissertation began in 
2002, when a series of decisions at Arcada, the institution where I teach, led 
the multimedia team there to plan what, at the outset, we called a "virtual 
world". We launched the first version of this in 2003, at a time when Second 
Life had only just opened its doors. We ran the "world" initially as an exper-
imental project with no defined long term goals; in the belief that we would 
develop specific maps as we became more familiar with the territory.
The focus of the project narrowed as it progressed, and as we began to make sense 
of our initial discoveries. The empirical research concluded in 2009. I then 
began to draw the various threads of the project together in order to docu-
ment, and to better understand, all we had learned. This developed into a 
further phase of theoretical reading and research which, in turn, led to the 
development of ideas for further projects aimed at proving a set of hypothe-
ses arising from the work to date.
This dissertation thus documents a decade of research into possible pedagogical 
uses for so-called "virtual worlds". The initial activity, the world-building, 
formed a creative endeavour in its own right, albeit one that laid foundations 
for empirical research and then concluded with desk research into philos-
ophy, psychology and consciousness studies. The research itself began as 
open-ended experimentation, and then developed through the creation of 
tentative hypotheses that suggested unexpected directions for theoretical 
study. The studies have thus moved across disciplines and this, in turn, has 
raised issues concerning the nature of the final dissertation.
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The nature of doctoral dissertations varies greatly according to subject, and the 
requirements to fulfil them vary accordingly. Robert Paul Woolf has stated 
that in
Microbiology or Anthropology or History, a doctoral dissertation is a 
research report, which is to say a report, in stylized form, of research 
that the candidate has been carrying out under the guidance of a Direc-
tor. In Philosophy, a dissertation is The Defense of a Thesis. 
(Wolff, 2010: online)
The interdisciplinary aspects of this work, and the fact that I seek to abduce 
hypotheses from theoretical reflections occasioned by an analysis of empir-
ical research, mean that my dissertation falls somewhere outside the two 
options posited by Woolf. I shall therefore outline here a topic, a research 
question, and a thesis that I wish to defend.
Dissertation Topic
The topic of the dissertation concerns the underlying nature of open-ended 
multi-user worlds and their possible uses. The dissertation documents one 
project from creative and pedagogical perspectives, offers a theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the meanings of our activities, and proposes a 
set of hypotheses with practical outcomes for further testing.
Research Question
My research question therefore asks: what human faculties do immersive 
worlds extend; what might they tell us about ourselves; and how might this 
affect our concepts and practices of learning?
The Thesis
I can state the thesis that I wish to defend in one sentence (Wolff, 2010), as 
follows.
Ambiguity and complexity form an increasing part of our lives, and immer-
sive worlds can offer a powerful tool for training ourselves to deal with 
these while optimising our abilities to achieve "authentic happiness" 
(Seligman, 2004).
About the Author
I grew up in Birkenhead on Merseyside in England, where I participated in 
the Merseyside poetry scene as a published teenage poet. I attended the 
University of Keele.
As an undergraduate I achieved a degree in English literature and sociology, with 
history and computer science as subsidiary subjects. I subsequently worked 
as a community artist in Brixton, south London, for fifteen years.
The computer science I studied at the University of Keele involved programming 
simple FORTRAN routines which technicians turned into punched cards 
and then fed into a mainframe computer. The results of calculations that 
my twelve year old daughter could have performed on her smart phone 
came back to us three weeks later on long sheets of paper which we spent a 
morning analysing for programming errors.
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My experience of autonomous personal computing began in 1981 when I purchased 
a Spectrum 48K in order to learn to programme in Basic. In 1986 I first used 
Adobe PageMaker on an Apple Macintosh with 1 megabyte of RAM.
These decisions eventually led me into a career as a software trainer specialising in 
desktop publishing and HyperCard, and later as a programmer and designer 
for cd-roms. I published a personal and group information manager called 
Workers Control as a set of HyperCard Stacks, and I developed a prize-win-
ning poetry generator called Slim Vol. I also created, and subsequently led, 
a one year training course in multimedia for Lambeth College.
I mention this history here because this dissertation represents a significant mile-
stone on a lengthy journey, and some information about the route that I 
have taken might help to make sense of both my choice of research topic 
and the particular analytical approaches that I shall bring to bear on it.
Publications
I wrote a book called Community, Art and the State (Kelly, 1984), which sum-
marised my view of the practice and philosophy of radical community art-
ists in Britain in the 1980s. Thirty years later this book remains required 
reading on a number of degree courses in England and Australia.
I co-wrote Culture and Democracy (Kelly, Lock, Merkel, 1986), the manifesto for 
an international conference entitled Another Standard, held in Sheffield in 
October, 1986.
In 1995 The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation commissioned me to research and 
document the growing use of digital technology by artists. This resulted in 
a book called Digital Creativity (Kelly, 1996), which the Gulbenkian Founda-
tion continues to make available online.
I have created work online since 1996, on a web site which I have used for creative 
projects, documentation and experiment. Originally this could be found at 
golgonooza.org. Since 2006 my site has lived at owenkelly.net, where you 
can currently find a range of essays and notes.
In recent years I have contributed chapters to several books including Mashup Cul-
tures (Sonvilla-Weiss, ed, 2010), Serious Educational Games Design (Annetta 
& Bronack, eds, 2011), and Transforming Virtual World Learning (Hinrichs & 
Wankel, eds, 2011). 
About Arcada
In 1996, in Helsinki, Finland, the Swedish Institute of Health Care Education 
(Sjukis), the Swedish Institute of Commercial Education (Lilla Hanken), the 
Institute of Technology (Verket) and the Folkhälsan Institute of Social Edu-
cation merged to create Arcada, a university of applied science.
In 1998 the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture mandated Arcada to "pro-
mote Finnish-Swedish language and culture, taking into particular consid-
eration the educational needs of young Finns of Swedish origin".
Originating from three different institutions (business administration, technol-
ogy and health care), situated at different locations in Helsinki and Espoo, 
Arcada moved into its own building in Arabianranta, Helsinki, in 2004 and 
so created the foundation for one campus.
In 2013, Arcada had 190 members of staff and 2,700 students. It offered 16 Bach-
elor's degree programmes, three in English, as well as 6 Master's degree 
programmes, with two taught in English.
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Academic Ethos
From its beginning Arcada has had an academic ethos, albeit with a voca-
tionally-directed bias.
Because of its size, teaching in Arcada usually takes place in groups that seem small 
even by European standards. The four-year BA course in online media, for 
example, accepts 12 students each year, while the Film & Television School, 
within which it belongs, accepts a total of 38 students.
This unusually low teacher/student ratio has a positive effect on the creation of 
course plans and lesson plans; the flexibility within courses; and the forms 
of assessment used. Many classes contain fifteen or less students, and 
thus class goals can often be supplemented, and in some cases completely 
replaced, by individual learning plans. Assessment takes place primarily 
within project work, and may take the form of self-assessment and discus-
sion during and after courses.
I should note from the outset that although students may, from time to time, fill in for-
mal questionnaires, the low numbers in each group mean that statistical anal-
ysis of the results of these exercises necessarily has a limited scientific value.
Constructivist Approach
From its inception Arcada has adopted an active-learning, social construc-
tivist approach to education, which recognizes each student as a unique 
individual, understands that learning occurs socially, and believes that stu-
dents learn best through discovery. These principles held especially true 
within the Media Department (subsequently renamed the Film & Television 
School), where first year students begin working on practical projects within 
a few weeks of enrolling.
Staff have devised methods of instruction to complement ongoing practical work, in 
ways that will challenge students by proceeding ahead of their development 
and alongside their current project; in line with the suggestions of construc-
tivist theorists that learning occurs within a zone of proximal development, 
defined as "the distance between the actual developmental level as deter-
mined by independent problem solving and the level of potential develop-
ment as determined through problem solving under ... guidance, or in col-
laboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p86)
In practical terms the views of learning within the department resemble those of John 
Holt, who declared that he never saw himself as practising the cello, only as 
playing it badly in the hope of later playing it better (Holt, 1978). Students 
participate in successive projects with the intention that each one will develop 
their skills further until, by graduation they can think and act at a professional 
level. More formally, the department draws upon the revised Bloom taxon-
omy, as amended and updated by Anderson & Krathwohl, where the original 
noun-based formulation becomes a matrix of verbs, with a consequent move 
from learning objects to learning processes (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001).
At the time when we first began to work on the Marinetta Ombro project Tore Ståhl, 
a colleague at Arcada, had recently undertaken research into the relevance 
of the Bloom taxonomy to virtual learning environments. He concluded 
(Ståhl, 2004) that the optimal use of virtual learning environments would 
"require a dynamic and not necessarily a linear use of different spaces dur-
ing different phases of the educational process, a strategy already used e.g. 
within problem-based learning".
Later, in developing the Marinetta Ombro project, the online media team moved to 
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a position closer to the framework that Andrew Churches would propose 
(Churches, 2007). In this, Churches sought to find a place within the work 
of Bloom and Anderson for the new (and typically digital) activities such 
as 'bookmarking' and 'podcasting' that have come to constitute important 
means within the taxonomy of learning processes.
Digital Multimedia
The Digital Multimedia course formed one of the five strands of the Media 
Department and had an intake of twelve students per year. In 2002 it had 
two full-time staff members, Owen Kelly and Camilla Lindeberg, as well as a 
number of part-time and sessional teachers.
In 2006 Camilla Lindeberg left to join Miltton, a start-up in Helsinki that has since 
grown considerably and achieved international success. Jutta Törnqvist 
replaced her and helped steer the final years of the project described here.
When I talk about "we" in the sections that follow I therefore refer to Camilla Linde-
berg and me for events between 2002 and 2006, and Jutta Törnqvist and me 
for events in the years after Camie left.
Methodology
The Marinetta Ombro project began through a process of open-ended explo-
ration. Only through this early exploration did research questions arise, and 
only through further exploration did these research questions become more 
specific and focused. The initial exploration formed a ground upon which 
a series of creative works grew. The project did not begin as research and 
never became the kind of research project aimed solely or primarily at gen-
erating results. Nonetheless results arrived, and as the project progressed 
we became clear that we needed to codify and formalise these results in 
order to further the creative elements of the project.
This section describes in outline the methodological strategies that we adopted. It 
contains three sections, which approximate each of the main stages of the 
project. Each stage of the overall work used different methodological tools 
which, taken together, should allow me to mount an argument that draws 
together the empirical and theoretical aspects of the research, and provides 
convincing answers to my research question, while successfully defending 
the thesis put forward. I have included a fuller explanation of these method-
ological tools and techniques below.
I should add that I do not intend to produce a theory of either ambient learning or 
memetic self-reflection here, but rather to put forward a set of hypotheses 
that, taken together, lay out suggestive evidence for the theoretical neces-
sity and practical possibilities of such theories, and a practical set of tools 
to pursue the search for evidence to support them.
Empirical Observations
We began the initial empirical project as an artistic and educational work 
within which we had no specific long term goals but, instead, assumed that 
we would find these as we moved into new territory. We used a bottom-up 
approach that I had experienced directly when working with Peter Small as 
part of an online learning cafe that he created to enable him to write a book 
(Small, 1999). In this process, goals arose from the process of generating 
and experimenting with ideas, and could change as the need arose. The 
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nature of the project meant that our work constituted first person research 
and so we made much use of work by the social psychologist Kenneth Ger-
gen, who has suggested a methodology for framing first person research in 
a scientifically respectable manner (Gergen, 1981 & 1993).
Arcada does not have a large enough student body to enable us to conduct mean-
ingful quantitative research, and we therefore relied on qualitative methods. 
We began to view our activities as creative as much as analytical and the 
results as art works in various forms. As the empirical projects progressed 
we therefore began to see much of our research as primarily literary-critical 
and hermeneutical. 
We collected and analysed the research data that we gathered from the exper-
iments and practical projects we carried out using a standard range of 
approved action-research methods (Zuber-Skerrit, 1992).
Theoretical Tools
The second section looks at our methodological approach to the next phase 
of the overall project, which began when we stepped back from the creative 
work in order to undertake more formal research. We needed a set of tools 
that would let us formalise our observations and then build upon them.
We viewed our process as abductive, in the sense that the American logician 
Charles Sanders Peirce used this term. "Peirce's construction of abduction 
essentially describes a process in which the subject is confronted with an 
observed fact which needs explaining and which seems important. In order 
to explain the observed fact, he/she needs to come up with a "known law or 
rule of nature or other general truth" which will both explain the fact retro-
actively and hopefully reveal its relevance as well. Abduction is the step in 
between a fact and its origin; the instinctive, perceptual jump which allows 
the subject to guess an origin which can then be tested out to prove or dis-
prove the hypothesis. Abduction is a theory developed to explain a pre-ex-
isting fact" (Harrowitz, in Eco & Sebeok, 1983, p182) Since our research did 
not permit us to pursue quantitative methods or to generate our own sta-
tistics we relied instead upon Peirce's suggestions concerning diagramming 
and diagrammatic thinking. 
We defined our approach in relation to what the American philosopher Daniel Den-
nett has labelled heterophenomenology. He regards this as an application of 
the intentional stance, in which "first you decide to treat the object whose 
behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent; then you figure out what 
beliefs that agent ought to have, given its place in the world and its purpose. 
Then you figure out what desires it ought to have, on the same considera-
tions, and finally you predict that this rational agent will act to further its 
goals in the light of its beliefs. A little practical reasoning from the chosen 
set of beliefs and desires will in most instances yield a decision about what 
the agent ought to do; that is what you predict the agent will do" (Den-
nett, 1987, p17). Because we regarded our work as both artistic research 
and cultural research we moved between autophenomenology, in which 
we found facts from which to abduce, and heterophenomenology in which 
we observed other subjects in order to make valid observations. Dennett 
describes the area within which we moved as follows:
Lone-wolf autophenomenology, in which the subject and experimenter are 
one and the same person, is a foul, not because you can't do it, but 
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because it isn't science until you turn your self-administered pilot 
studies into heterophenomenological experiments. It has always been good 
practice for scientists to put themselves in their own experimental 
apparatus as informal subjects, to confirm their hunches about what it 
feels like, and to check for any overlooked or underestimated features 
of the circumstances that could interfere with the interpretations of 
their experiments. But scientists have always recognized the need to 
confirm the insights they have gained from introspection by conducting 
properly controlled experiments with naive subjects. As long as this 
obligation is met, whatever insights one may garner from 'first-person' 
investigations fall happily into place in 'third-person' heterophenom-
enology. Purported discoveries that cannot meet this obligation may 
inspire, guide, motivate, illuminate one's scientific theory, but they 
are not data - the beliefs of subjects about them are the data. Thus if 
some phenomenologist becomes convinced by her own (first-)personal expe-
rience, however encountered, transformed, reflected upon, of the exist-
ence of a feature of consciousness in need of explanation and accommoda-
tion within her theory, her conviction that this is so is itself a fine 
datum in need of explanation, by her or by others, but the truth of her 
conviction must not be presupposed by science. 
(Dennett, 2003, p24)
For the reasons that Dennett states I do not believe that our process of research 
amounted to a scientific enterprise. It remains what I intended when I 
began: a document of a creative process, framed in such a way as to define 
an area of interest that other people might wish to follow up.
Documentation
The theoretical reflections led us in surprising directions and we ended up 
with a model of consciousness that offered explanations of what we had 
witnessed and a set of practical conclusions from both the initial observa-
tions and the subsequent reflections. 
In documenting the results in this dissertation, I have used Stephen Toulmin's 
model of argument to structure my approach. He states that an argument 
begins when "we make an assertion, and commit ourselves thereby to the 
claim which any assertion necessarily involves". He further argues that an 
argument should properly contain not just a set of data and a set of conclu-
sions, but also a warrant, which he defines as "general, hypothetical state-
ments, which can act as bridges, and authorize the sort of step to which our 
particular argument commits us (Toulmin, 1958, pp97-98)". I have set out 
my conclusions at the end of the dissertation as a series of numbered par-
agraphs, and these paragraphs together form both a synopsis of the overall 
narrative of the thesis and constitute a full version of the claim that I make 
in the thesis. I elucidate the support or ground for this claim step-by-step 
in the main chapters of the thesis, with the warrants spelled out explicitly in 
the Hypothesis section in the final chapter.
I have adopted E-Prime as a mode of writing throughout the dissertation in order 
that the concerns with human agency that arise during the argument 
emerge as situated observations of mine, as they ought to, rather than aris-
ing in the text as apparently external and objective truths. 
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E-prime, abolishing all forms of the verb "to be," has its roots in the 
field of general semantics, as presented by Alfred Korzybski in his 1933 
book, Science and Sanity. Korzybski pointed out the pitfalls associated 
with, and produced by, two usages of "to be": identity and predication. 
His student D. David Bourland, Jr., observed that even linguistically 
sensitive people do not seem able to avoid identity and predication uses 
of "to be" if they continue to use the verb at all. Bourland pioneered in 
demonstrating that one can indeed write and speak without using any form 
of "to be," calling this subset of the English language "E-Prime." Many 
have urged the use of E-Prime in writing scientific and technical papers. 
Dr. Kellogg exemplifies a prime exponent of this activity. Dr. Albert 
Ellis has rewritten five of his books in E-Prime, in collaboration with 
Dr. Robert H. Moore, to improve their clarity and to reap the epistemo-
logical benefits of this language revision. Korzybski felt that all humans 
should receive training in general semantics from grade school on, as 
"semantic hygiene" against the most prevalent forms of logical error, 
emotional distortion, and "demonological thinking." E-Prime provides a 
straightforward training technique for acquiring such semantic hygiene.
To understand E-Prime, consider the human brain as a computer. 
(Note that I did not say the brain "is" a computer.) As the Prime Law of 
Computers tells us, GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT (GIGO, for short). The wrong 
software guarantees wrong answers. Conversely, finding the right software 
can "miraculously" solve problems that previously appeared intractable.
It seems likely that the principal software used in the human 
brain consists of words, metaphors, disguised metaphors, and linguistic 
structures in general. The Sapir-Whorf-Korzybski Hypothesis, in anthro-
pology, holds that a change in language can alter our perception of the 
cosmos. A revision of language structure, in particular, can alter the 
brain as dramatically as a psychedelic. In our metaphor, if we change the 
software, the computer operates in a new way. 
(RA Wilson, in Bourland & Johnston, 1991, p23)
The use of the passive voice in conjunction with the verb “to be” can have a par-
ticularly pernicious effect, akin to the sleight of hand used by stage magi-
cians. For all but the most alert reader a sentence beginning “For many 
years it has been accepted that…” can achieve a spurious authority just 
through its mode of construction. It does not impart a clearly argued mean-
ing so much as nudge the reader down one particular rhetorical path while 
deflecting their attention.
I have an additional and related concern which I have attempted to deal with in 
this text by writing transparently. I am troubled by the shadowy agents that 
populate much discourse and stand between the reader and the author, 
pleading on the author’s behalf without ever being identified. “Most psy-
chologists would argue…” “It is commonly accepted within the field of biol-
ogy that…”  These kind of sentences imply a certain authority on the part 
of the author who, the reader must presume, knows enough psychologists 
to make this assertion, and has a detailed enough grasp of current trends 
within the field of biology to know what biologists do and do not accept”. 
In this kind of argument the author avoids providing evidence and instead 
implies an undefined insider-status, which serves to place the reader at a 
disadvantage when it comes to criticising the author’s argument.
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I have thus replaced all occurrences of apparently agentless utterances such as 
"It is believed that..." with phrases containing named agents such as "My 
uncle and I believe that...", and all phrases such as "John was wrong" which 
implicitly declare wrongness as an inherent property of John with phrases 
like "I did not believe John" which marks John's wrongness as a belief of 
mine. I have also attempted to avoid claiming an authority I may not pos-
sess by removing or replacing sweeping generalisations.
In addition, I illustrate several of the arguments in Part 3 with tetrad diagrams 
in order to map out some of the implications of synthetic and immersive 
worlds, and in order to create diagrams showing how they can be related to 
human capacities and human needs. I have borrowed these from the work 
of Marshall McLuhan. Marshall and Eric McLuhan describe tetrads as "not 
sequential but simultaneous facets of media effects" (McLuhan & McLuhan, 
1988, p127). They constitute an exploratory tool for unpacking the effects 
of a medium and locating it in a wider media landscape. They argue that
Insofar as the tetrads are means of focusing awareness of hidden or 
unobserved qualities in our culture and terminology, they act phenome-
nologically. From Hegel to Heidegger, phenomenologists have engaged in 
an attempt to get at the hidden properties or hidden effects of language 
and technology alike. In other words, they have tackled a right-hemi-
sphere problem using left-hemisphere technologies and modes of cogni-
tion. With the tetrads the dilemma is resolved. 
(McLuhan & McLuhan, 1988, p128)
McLuhan argued that every medium displays four characteristic facets. It enhances 
some previous ability; it retrieves come older custom or skill; it makes a pre-
vious medium obsolete; and, if taken to extremes, it reverses into something 
else. He intended tetrads to provide a way of schematising these facets, in 
order to provoke dialogue.  “The laws of media in tetrad form belong prop-
erly to rhetoric and grammar, not philosophy. Our concern is etymology 
and exegesis. This is to place the study of technology and artefacts on a 
humanistic and linguistic basis.” (McLuhan & McLuhan, 1988, p128) I use 
them here in that spirit.
Caveat Lector
This dissertation covers a wide range of topics in the course of the argu-
ment that it proposes. In order to focus on the overall thesis, I have made 
no attempt to cover every topic in exhaustive detail. Where necessary I have 
tried to point the reader towards more detailed analyses.
Similarly, the history of the empirical research has many complexities that seem to 
me irrelevant to the thrust of the argument. I have therefore made efforts to 
simplify these, and to omit them altogether where possible.
In three particular areas, the thesis does not attempt to treat issues in full detail.
Elision of Historical Details
Camilla Lindeberg and I began what we came to see as empirical research 
in 2002. Jutta Törnqvist and I completed the research in 2009. During this 
eight year period Arcada went through a number of academic and adminis-
trative changes. These continued, and indeed, as I write, Arcada has entered 
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a further period of development and growth.
In 2002 I taught multimedia in the Media Department. During the research "mul-
timedia" became known as "digital multimedia", "digital media", "online 
media", and finally "online media and art direction".  The content of the 
course similarly changed, as the media landscape altered, and new phe-
nomena such as mobile devices and social media appeared.
The department also changed identities several times during this period, becoming 
for a time the School of Film & Television. In January 2014 it changed again 
to become Kommunication och Kultur, housed in one of Arcada's five new 
institutes.
These changes in terminology and administrative relationships have no direct 
bearing on the arguments that I advance in this dissertation, and I have 
therefore tried to ignore them. I have chosen to refer to the students as mul-
timedia students even though, in the later years of the project, they officially 
studied "digital media" and now study "online media". In a similar vein I 
refer to the degree course as "the multimedia course" and the department 
as the Media Department.
Additionally, at an early stage of the project, we decided to define our terms. For 
reasons that I discuss in detail in Chapter 13, we abandoned the term "vir-
tual world" in favour of two other terms: we began to refer to the whole 
class of such objects as "synthetic worlds", and a specific subset that inter-
ested us as "immersive worlds". For the sake of clarity I use those terms 
everywhere, except for the very beginning of the dissertation, even where I 
describe events and activities that took place before we had this discussion.
Technical Issues
During the development of the project we faced a number of challenging 
technical issues. In earlier drafts of the dissertation I went into consid-
erable detail about these. I have now removed these on the grounds that 
they introduced an unwarranted degree of complexity in several areas that 
remained peripheral to the main arguments.
We spent almost two years wrestling with software called SCOL (an acronym 
for Standard Cryonic Online Language). The fact that we failed to get to 
grips with this led us to discover Second Life, where much of the empir-
ical research took place. The reasons that we failed, in the end, to get to 
grips with SCOL have no bearing on the outcome of the story, although they 
would bear telling in a different context. Between SCOL and Second Life we 
worked hard for a year attempting to adapt 3D Game Studio, an excellent 
game engine, to our needs. We did not succeed, although we did make some 
technical discoveries that we later imported into Second Life.
I regard all these aspects of the research as interesting in their own right, while 
feeling that a discussion of them here would detract from the arguments I 
wish to advance.
Philosophy & Cultural Analysis
This dissertation makes much use of certain aspects of the work of the 
nineteenth century American logician Charles Sanders Peirce. It does not, 
however, provide either an exhaustive analysis or a detailed commentary 
on his philosophy.
Peirce himself talks about the need to adopt a common-sense approach, an 
approach that adopts a fallabilist stance. I have tried to treat his writings in 
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this way here. I have tried to use them as practical tools to unlock certain 
puzzles that arose while thinking about the research. I have made little or 
no attempt to locate his arguments within a broader history of philosophy.
I have adopted a similar approach with the work of the philosopher Daniel Dennett, 
and with the media ecologists Marshall McLuhan and Neil Postman. In McLu-
han's own term I borrow ideas from them to use as "probes". I have under-
stood from the outset, for example, that many people regard Dennett's views 
concerning consciousness as controversial, or else (like Jerry Fodor) simply 
dismiss them. I do not attempt here to justify my use of them by demon-
strating why Dennett's arguments stand where Fodor's arguments fall. That 
would produce a manuscript of inordinate length. Instead, at each important 
stage in the overall argument, I point to the original sources in the hope that 
the interested reader will seek them out and make up her own mind.
I likewise ignore the long-standing controversies around the philosophical objec-
tions to the theory of memetics, choosing instead to use it as a tool for 
exploring certain ideas. I understand the disagreements between sociobiol-
ogists and those pursuing meme theory, and between both these groups 
and others who claim that the concept of evolution cannot have any rel-
evance at all to the study of the history of culture, but do not regard them 
as having any relevance to the arguments presented here, in the context in 
which I present them. For those interested in understanding these contro-
versies I recommend the detailed discussion in Chapter Two of The Electric 
Meme (Augner, 2002). You will also find a more partisan description of these 
arguments scattered throughout Memetics: memes and the science of cultural 
evolution (Tyler, 2011).
Order out of Chaos
Finally, the reader should take notice that the very structure of the disser-
tation conspires to lie about the research process. I have tried to lay out the 
material in many different forms and in the end I have opted to lay it out 
in the form that you read now. I have done this because I wish to advance 
an argument and all my attempts to capture the creative chaos of the orig-
inal process while maintaining an intelligible argument failed. In truth, the 
research process did not follow anything like the tidy path implied here. The 
practical and theoretical work overlapped and occurred in untidy clumps. 
The projects that comprise the empirical research themselves overlapped 
and influenced each other. We never proceeded in the kind of one-step-at-
a-time way the narrative that follows might suggest. This dissertation, then, 
offers a mighty fiction based on a true story, in which the underlying truths 
remain true, but many of the details line up in service of the narrative rather 
than where they would stand if viewed in a day-by-day diary.
I make no apologies for this since the dissertation itself stands as an artefact within 
the narrative of Rosario that it describes, and both point towards the same 
set of conclusions.
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This part of the dissertation describes the empirical re-
search which took place, for the most part, on an island 
in Second Life.
Beginnings (28)
Devising a Suitable Framework (31)
Creating a World (37)
Discovering an Island (45)
Understanding Rosario (49)
The Geography & Natural History of Rosario (56)
Archaeology & Narrative (61)
Entering Second Life (70)
Creative Interference (76)
Narrative, Clothing & Assessment (83)
Semano Semano (89)
Endings (95)
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At the beginning of the 2002-2003 academic year at Arcada, Lars Lundsten, 
the new head of the media department, made a decision that we should 
move from "working with projects inside courses to working with courses 
inside projects". He asked for proposals for constructing one or more 
over-arching projects within each subject in the department, and pointed to 
one existing project, TV Borgå, as a model that we should investigate.
1.1. TV Borgå
The television course leaders had created TV Borgå by renting an unused 
local cable channel in a small city fifty kilometres to the East of Helsinki. 
The station that transmitted on this channel only broadcast for a few hours 
each week, and only ever showed a maximum of thirty minutes of new 
programming per week, accompanied by curated repeats. However, even 
though the channel had very few viewers, it shaped almost all aspects of the 
students' studies. Every activity that they undertook served a dual function 
as a learning exercise and as a contribution towards the broadcast sched-
ule. Each deadline for an assignment or project became an inflexible com-
mitment to fill a certain time-slot on a certain date, and much of the course 
thus acted as a kind of virtual work experience.
Staff encouraged students in their belief that the small programmes that they made for 
this tiny, little-known channel would ensure that one day they would make big 
programs for a large, publicly acknowledged channel. From the perspective of 
social constructivism, the design and complexity of the learning environment 
precisely reflected "the complexity of the environment that the learner should 
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be able to function in at the end of learning" (Knowles et al, 2005).
This channel acted as an over-arching project-based framework for the film and 
television students. It provided practical technical challenges and guided 
their thinking about television. In analysing how it functioned we came to 
believe that we too should create a project that people would recognise out-
side the school, and that we could use as the basis of both practical and 
theoretical classes.
1.2. The Initial Challenge
According to the initial project documentation (Kelly, 2010) the specifica-
tions we agreed for the multimedia project required it to "act as a laboratory 
within which students could test their ideas; improve their planning, design 
and programming skills; and then watch as their experiments had real and 
lasting effects". In addition to work in the classroom, we knew that our stu-
dents needed and expected work experience as an important part of their 
course. In 2002 the first internet bubble had burst, and the Finnish multime-
dia industry had imploded with the result that, for several years, students 
would have much less opportunities to work as interns. We therefore felt 
that we would have to prepare to find ways of simulating some of that expe-
rience in-house within the planned project.
In order to relate closely to the main threads of the course, the umbrella project 
needed to
1. allow students to maintain a complete and complex web presence with a 
real user base;
2. force them to create innovative web applications to service the users 
and increase traffic to the site;
3. compel them to address theoretical issues concerning usability, user 
interface design and the possibilities of cross media integration.
The project also had to enable the students to work within the kinds of situations, 
and under the kinds of constraints, that they were likely to encounter upon 
graduating. It had to act as a training tool for both the skills they would 
need after graduation and the kind of working habits that they would need 
to develop.
We began by drawing up a set of criteria to help us conceptualise and steer the pro-
ject. In doing so we decided to adopt a completely open-ended approach, 
bolstered by Albert Einstein's assertion (quoted in Mitchell & Jolley, 2010, 
p84), that "if we knew what it was we were doing it would not be called 
research, would it?"
1.3. The Criteria
After graduation, our students usually entered the media industries in Fin-
land and sometimes Sweden. They went on to create advertising, to manage 
brands, and to design book jackets, cd-roms, interactive videos, posters, 
web sites, and more. We needed a framework that could embrace all these 
possibilities and challenge students to step out of themselves.
We decided that we needed an environment that acted as much more than a pri-
vate classroom; by which we meant that the environment had to have a 
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use value of some kind to people other than the learners and instructors. 
The programmes shown on TV Borgå received occasional feedback from 
viewers, both positive and negative. This happened often enough to keep 
the students aware that they had an audience who chose, for their own 
unknowable reasons, to watch what the students produced. We recognised 
that this effect had formed an important part of TV Borgå's success.
We decided that, whatever form the project took, it should:
1. create an environment that we could use for both education and 
entertainment;
2. provide a framework that we could use to develop distance learning 
initiatives;
3. offer opportunities to work with the Departments of Media Technology 
and Computing, and other departments in Arcada, to create new and inno-
vative kinds of modules and courses;
4. lay the foundations for introducing students to services such as 
online banking, shopping, etc., both as developers and consumers;
5. facilitate partnerships with other organizations to further develop 
the project; to train students; and to provide employment opportunities 
for graduates.
1.4. The Initial Process
We set an initial three year period of exploration with the intention of con-
ducting an assessment at the end of it. We agreed that during this period we 
would, as far as possible, proceed by a series of small, incremental exper-
iments. We would pose questions and then observe what resulted from 
students' attempts to answer them. We would allow the outcomes of one 
experiment to influence or determine the next question.
Our initial plans for constructing such experiments consisted of aligning the many 
practical projects within existing classes in such a way that we could aggre-
gate these projects into a larger whole. The constructivist-based instruc-
tion at the heart of Arcada's programs meant that almost all classes would 
conclude with a practical project designed to demonstrate the students' 
mastery of the course learning outcomes. We hoped to devise projects that 
would serve to demonstrate these learning outcomes while at the same time 
moving one aspect or another of the emerging "virtual world" forward.
I had had previous personal experience of a bottom-up design methodology, where 
the final product emerged from a series of explorations that developed 
organically. I had participated in a series of virtual cafés that Peter Small 
had created as part of the process of writing Lingo Sorcery (Small, 1998). 
These had begun with almost no predefined agenda and yet, through a 
careful designed process, had become powerful forums that decided topics 
to explore and ways to explore them - and produced the results that Peter 
needed to demonstrate his theory. I had seen him use these same bottom-up 
techniques later to identify an interest group with a genuine unmet need, 
and then, using the same open-ended processes, produce both a software to 
meet that need and a book documenting the whole procedure (Small, 2002).
We began the process by devising the first research question which we addressed 
to both staff and students. This question asked what sort of framework pro-
ject we should build.
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Faced with the task of devising a framework to unite the various elements 
of the course we agreed that we would make the construction of the frame-
work a part of the project itself. We therefore began by working out a strat-
egy for bringing the framework to life. We decided that we would
1. involve the students as soon as possible in the process;
2. keep the students involved at every stage; and
3. inform other staff members, and other departments, of the initiative 
with a view to encouraging them to join in the process.
We sent out an email that included a brief synopsis of the aims and purposes of the 
intended project, and concluded with a specific research question to which 
we asked people to respond. We invited people to send us short free-form 
submissions suggesting the form such a project could take. We asked them to 
include an outline of their idea, an explanation of how they thought the idea 
would work; why they felt that people would find it interesting (both inside 
and outside Arcada); and how it would fulfil the criteria that we had set out.
2.1. Research Question
In order to ensure that people responded in a ways that we could later com-
pare, and to ensure that people addressed the topic we needed to address, 
rather than a superficially similar topic that they wished to tell us about, we 
wrote a short paragraph that stood as our initial research question.
TVBorgå ties most elements of the film and television courses together, while pro-
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viding students with a simulated work environment.  Given the nature of the 
current curriculum, and the existing demands on staff and students' time, 
what kind of activity, object or project might we create that would provide a 
similar, equally relevant experience for the students studying on the digital 
multimedia course?
2.2. Description of Activity
We received over twenty suggestions outlining the form such a project 
might take. These ranged from the very sketchy to the very detailed. The 
suggestions fell into five broad categories:
1. A website
Several people suggested that we build a web site of one kind or another. One 
suggestion involved the creation and maintenance of a web site for Arcada's 
students. Another suggested that we create a history site for Arcada where 
staff and students had their own profiles which remained once they had left 
or graduated, thus building a living history of the institution as it grew.
2. A wiki
A second category involved the creation of a wiki. The Wiki Way: Quick Col-
laboration on the Web (Leuf & Cunningham, 2001) had recently been pub-
lished. The ideas in it had fuelled considerable discussion, and some stu-
dents lobbied for us to adopt its principles and develop our own version.
3.An online game
Several students suggested that we should make a large online game that 
we could run commercially.
4. Digital publishing
The digital multimedia students had produced a number of cd-roms for 
external clients, and some suggested that we should form a publishing 
imprint, create a publishing schedule, and try to become a leading player in 
the Nordic "edutainment" market.
5. A "virtual world"
The final category of suggestions concerned "virtual worlds", which had 
begun to form a subject of discussion at this period. A number of early 
worlds had been launched on the internet, and had garnered a small 
amount of press interest. In addition the cult novel Snowcrash (Stephenson, 
1992) had become popular among a sizeable number of students.
Three students pointed to the sudden availability of cd-roms containing small ver-
sions of such worlds at retailers in Helsinki, to indicate that such an idea 
would fit in with developments elsewhere.
2.3. Observations
We took all of the responses seriously, and the process of sifting through 
them helped us home in on some essential aspects that would prove impor-
tant for the long-term development of the project. The ideas presented 
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ranged from the too-small to the too-big but only through examining each 
idea in detail could we begin to establish what scale a project of the right 
size might have.
We grouped the submissions and went through each category, itemising the advan-
tages as presented and adding additional elements that occurred to us. We 
then went through and itemised all the potential disadvantages of each sug-
gestion. In the end we agreed on a course of action.
1. A website
We rejected this because we felt that maintaining it would too easily become 
a chore, and because it would all too easily become just another site on the 
web, and not necessarily one that students would choose to visit.
2. A wiki
We rejected this because we did not feel that we would find a topic that we 
could elaborate indefinitely, while keeping it useful and interesting to the 
students, and because other staff members expressed misgivings about the 
possibility that we would lose control of the content and put Arcada in the 
position of becoming the publisher of material that it could neither endorse 
nor even countenance.
(In passing, I will acknowledge that the subsequent, rapid and unprecedented 
development of Wikipedia from a good idea into a global phenomenon sug-
gests that this idea might have provided the basis for a project at least as 
good as the one we finally developed. My concern remains, however, that 
such a project would either have failed to attract enough interest and gone 
into an endless half-life, or succeeded and overwhelmed us.)
3. An online game
While this would certainly have met most of the criteria we had set for our-
selves, we encountered an unexpected issue when we canvassed the idea: 
games proved a very divisive subject. Some students saw themselves as 
gamers while others took pride in the fact that they had never "wasted their 
time" playing computer games. One student said, "I am at Arcada to learn 
a profession, not to play". Another claimed that "my younger brother and 
his friends play computer games. I don't have time for that kind of thing 
anymore".
We therefore put this suggestion aside on the grounds that its divisiveness would 
prove an insuperable obstacle. TV Borgå united the film and television stu-
dents because they saw themselves as working professionally in the tel-
evision industry. Only some of our students saw the games industry as a 
desirable career path.
4. Digital publishing
We rejected this option precisely because students had already produced 
cd-roms for clients - and we had seen the problems involved at each stage 
of the process. Authors had often rejected all advice, made impossible or 
contradictory demands, and then later insisted on radical changes to the 
finished work when they finally saw what their demands had resulted in. 
The students involved had finished each project feeling more like indentured 
servants than designers who had enhanced their skills and enlarged their 
portfolios.
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We felt that this option would, in the medium and long terms, serve to lower group 
morale, unless we had the resources to create and publish multimedia on 
our own terms. We did not believe that we had either the time or the budget 
for this.
5. An online world
We knew less about this suggestion than any of the others. Following the 
students' suggestion, we purchased several of the small online SCOLWorlds 
kits that appeared at this time in shops in Helsinki, and experimented with 
them. We showed several groups of students, in particular those who had 
shown negative attitudes towards gaming. None of them regarded what 
they saw as a "computer game", although not all of them expressed any 
great enthusiasm for what they saw. We also looked online for other exam-
ples of such worlds, finding ActiveWorlds, which seemed both interest-
ing and successful; and had apparently been in existence since version 1 
launched in June 1995.
At the end of this process of deliberation we decided that we needed to think more 
deeply about the idea of creating an online world. We took our original cri-
teria as a starting point, and then added in factors that we had agreed as 
important during the subsequent exploration and research.
We distilled these into four clear long-term goals. We decided that, in order to 
provide the same kind of stimuli as TV Borgå, a unifying framework based 
around an online world must offer:
1. a new kind of environment for self-directed learning
Almost all the online environments that we have seen suffer from the fact 
that they are designed for one single purpose. Some are designed for dis-
tance learning; others are designed for entertainment such as role-playing 
games. The real world does not work like that. People walk the same streets 
and sit on the same train for very different reasons.
Our intention is to create such a multi-purposed world: a world in which distance 
learning is one of the many possible activities that takeplace. We believe 
that this will provide a much richer and more appealing environment that 
allows for spontaneous interaction between the inhabitants.
The learning areas in the world should have facilities for streaming live lectures, and 
for replaying pre-recorded material. The lectures should stream into lecture 
theatres within which those attending can chat to each other and the lecturer.
The interface should have a panel that allows the display of web-pages or Flash 
movies which will allow lecturers to provide materials and demonstrations 
while they stream their lecture.
Normally users will represent themselves on the island by using a 3D avatar. How-
ever, smaller groups should have the ability to hold fully interactive tutori-
als in private rooms where everybody can use a web-cam to communicate 
directly with everyone else.
2. a laboratory for cultural studies
If the environment that we create becomes rich enough then the uses that 
people put it to will prove unpredictable. Learning how people use the envi-
ronment and what people want from it will provide students with valuable 
experience in the fields of monitoring and marketing.
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Within the environment itself we should provide opportunities to undertake mar-
keting assignments and then monitor the results. For example we might 
create, or encourage others to create, a number of rival brands within the 
world, with the express intention of allowing to students to gain experi-
ence in developing brand strategies, including package design and adver-
tising material.
The use, and public awareness, of the project should provide the basis for many 
kinds of thesis work. If we believe or accept that ideas get transmitted as 
memes across the internet then perceptions of the project might become the 
subject of fruitful scrutiny, for example.
3. a test-bed for application development
We will design the project so that it becomes as open-ended and flexible 
as possible in all aspects, including the database structure for the user 
accounts that uses an XML schema designed to facilitate expansion.
The initial applications planned include a radio station streaming to subscribers 
as long as they are logged in to the world; an in-world messaging system; 
buddy lists; an island stock exchange that allows users to buy and sell 
shares in the businesses on the island; and a number of job-themed games 
that enable residents to earn Rosarian lira.
4. a framework for in-house apprenticeships
Once we launch the world it will act as an external client. A small govern-
ment consisting of relevant staff members, and student representatives, will 
create job briefs that mimic exactly the kinds of briefs students will be likely 
to get upon graduation.
One of the boxed SCOL worlds sold in supermarkets in Helsinki in 2002.
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Students accepting briefs will receive credits in the form of work 
experience weeks as they would if they carried out work experience at a 
commercial company. We will expect them to carry out the briefs in the 
same way too. They will work on their own initiative, seeking help and 
tuition as they feel they need it. 
(Kelly, 2010)
Finally we held a series of informal presentations in which we presented the four 
goals before demonstrating one of the small worlds we had purchased. 
Everyone present offered positive reactions to the idea of creating an explor-
atory world, although some expressed reservations about the practicalities.
2.4. Outcomes
The responses to the demonstration and road-map encouraged us to make 
a definite choice.
We began by approaching the Finnish distributor of SCOL Worlds. Their enthu-
siasm about the possibility that we would involve ourselves with SCOL, 
and their willingness to offer us assistance with the technical aspects of 
world-building, led us to make a final decision. We decided to create an 
online "virtual world". That choice determined the nature of the framework, 
and thus the nature of the subsequent research.
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We explained our ideas for the online world project to staff and students. 
We broached the idea of attempting to create a coherence and predictability 
for the world in order that it might serve as a pedagogical framework within 
which we could house projects.
We put out a call for suggestions for starting points. We received approximately 
twenty submissions which almost all fell into one of three categories. We 
rejected all of these, either because they failed to meet the aims we had 
set out, or because they contained important pedagogical flaws. Finally we 
took one of the least-formed alternatives and spent a long time with several 
student groups completely reworking it.
3.1. Research Question
We have decided that we will create an online "virtual world" as our umbrella 
project. We believe that this world needs to have an internal logic and a rec-
ognisable consistency, in order for us to use it for learning purposes.
What sort of world shall we build, and how will this world meet our aims? What 
role (or roles) will the users have within the world?
3.2. About Synthetic Worlds
We addressed these questions primarily to the digital multimedia students 
whose interests lay in the areas of conceptual and graphic design. We 
intended to make them focus on the context within which that design would 
take place.
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The first question, and the subsequent research that it spawned, kept the mul-
timedia students occupied for a full academic year. The year began with 
discussions about definitions. Before we could discuss what sort of online 
world we wished to build we needed to decide precisely what we meant by 
the term "virtual world".
Everybody realized quite rapidly that this term had many different (and sometimes 
contradictory) interpretations. We felt, however, that we could usefully pull 
the phrase apart, examine it, and then put it back together again. Richard 
Bartle, the originator of the first MUD, had done just that. He defined the 
terms as follows:
virtual: that which isn't, having the form or effect of that which is.
world: in this context, a world is an environment that its inhabit-
ants regard as being self-contained. It doesn't have to mean an entire 
planet: It's used in the same sense as 'the Roman world' or 'the world 
of high finance'.  
(Bartle, 2003)
From this we drew a clear distinction between 'virtual worlds' and 'virtual spaces', 
and this distinction lay behind many of the later steps taken in the develop-
ment of the project.
We defined a virtual space as an illusion projected onto a computer screen by spe-
cialised software. This kind of illusion provides a set of visual cues that ena-
ble a user to imagine that they can look into, or actually move around inside, 
a three dimensional environment. Usually this illusion appears detailed 
enough to enable the viewer to describe this environment by reference to the 
real world, and to differentiate one such environment from another.
As late as 2012, companies such as Teleplace or Venuegen still tried to provide 
this kind of virtual space, and promote their spaces as alternatives to video 
conferencing. These spaces appear generic in design and isolated from 
each other. Users can rent an office space, or a lecture theatre, or an arena. 
The companies have designed each space to appear realistic enough not to 
cause users any distraction. Users can interact in the space, access previ-
ously uploaded media and, in a subdivided space, move from one virtual 
area to another. Users cannot usually leave the building, though, because 
the virtual space has no 'outside' and does not form a part of anything 
larger than itself. By design, the space does not lend itself to exploration 
and chance occurrence, but rather it exists to facilitate a pre-made and pur-
poseful interaction between known groups of people with a shared agenda.
We defined a virtual world, on the other hand, as analogous to something like 'the 
Roman world' or 'the world of high finance', since it consists of much more 
than its geometry. The 'world of fashion', for example, exists as more than 
just a collection of clothes. The 'world' evoked here includes interlocking 
sets of aspirations and attitudes; a wide range of actors from designers to 
models to journalists; as well as calendar events and the various venues at 
which these events take place. Later, for reasons explained in Chapter 13, 
we dropped the term 'virtual world' altogether and replaced it with the term 
synthetic world, which suited our purposes better.
From this perspective a reconstruction in a 'synthetic world' of the Cite de l'architec-
ture at Place du Trocadero, one of the key venues for the Paris Fashion Week, 
and the creation of suitable clothing to put in it, would not by itself consti-
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tute the creation of a virtual 'world of fashion'. The reconstruction would 
simply offer viewers a virtual space with a particular kind of decoration. To 
create a 'world of fashion' would require a much more complex operation. It 
would involve creating or invoking a virtual culture within which the cloth-
ing, the events, and the venues, made a self-contained sense (Kelly, 2004).
From this discussion came the decision that we would attempt to create a virtual 
culture: a culture which the students would enter as foreigners. We intended 
this virtual culture to appear coherent (that is, to make consistent sense once 
one accepted its axioms), and for students to have opportunities to engage 
with this as they would engage with any new and unfamiliar environment.
We expected this sense of 'otherness' to form a key feature of the project, and so we 
decided that we would not begin to actually create an online 'world' of any 
kind until further research had told us what we could expect to find there.
3.3. Description of Activity
The students divided into groups and engaged in a series of discussions and 
brainstorming sessions. We encouraged them to find examples of "worlds" 
that appealed to them and to pitch these to the members of their team. Out 
of this process some groups evolved a consensus, while other groups failed 
to agree on a common theme. In this case we told the members to form 
smaller groups or pursue their own individual idea.
At the end of the process each group or individual submitted a written outline of 
a proposed virtual world that they believed would meet the criteria we had 
presented to them. These fell into three broad categories, with a fourth set 
of one-off ideas.
Proposal 1: a virtual Arcada
The most popular proposal suggested that we should create a "virtual 
Arcada", and this had the backing of many members of staff. One submis-
sion proposing this claimed that
a virtual Arcada will raise our profile globally as it will draw in view-
ers from across the world. It can offer potential applicants especially 
from abroad a way of understanding something of the place before they 
arrive... It could offer guest lectures in order to attract viewers, and 
some classes for students could be held in the virtual college, pro-
gressing our goal of innovative distance learning. 
(Kelly, 2002)
Other submissions went into considerable detail about which parts of the campus 
should feature in the simulation, and what activities should take place there.
Proposal 2: a galaxy far, far away
The second proposal arrived in several different forms, although these dif-
fered more in their detail than in their core idea. In each case the core idea 
derived in one way or another from the people and places depicted in epi-
sodes of Star Wars, Star Trek, Stargate or Babylon 5. The most detailed sub-
mission explained that
Omega is an artificial world, a huge spaceship really that stays in a 
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stationary position at the middle point between three star systems. One 
system is controlled by the Alpha who are fierce and....The second system 
is controlled by the Beta who are peaceful but...The third section is 
the Wild, which contains many different peoples who are continually 
fighting each other. Omega is a neutral trading place where people from 
each of the systems can buy and sell, and make negotiations... 
(Kelly, 2002)
Other submissions in this category differed in their descriptions, but all had the 
same kind of relationship to the criteria we had presented; that is, they all 
had approximately the same strengths and weaknesses.
Proposal 3: a cave far below the surface of the earth
The third set of submissions drew their inspiration from Dungeons & Dragons, its 
many computer game offspring, JRR Tolkein's trilogy The Lord of the Rings, and 
Edgar Rice Burroughs' The Lost World. One submission described it like this:
There exists a huge network of tunnels under a volcano. There is only 
one entrance. The tunnels lead to larger and larger caverns as tall as 
apartment blocks. A race of dwarfs work in smaller caves where nobody 
else can go making things. Tools, furniture, everything that you need 
for living. They also have underground farms where they make food and 
drinks. The cave dwellers dress like Romans or Incas and live a largely 
peaceful life. They have pets like tiny dinosaurs and ride larger dino-
saurs the size of horses. The tunnels seem to go on forever and some of 
them are still unexplored. There are all kinds of rumours about what is 
in the tunnels. 
(Kelly, 2002)
In some ways this appeared similar to the previous proposal. It took a known and 
long-standing cultural meme and twisted it slightly in an attempt to make it 
fit our purposes. It seemed to appeal to a different group though, which we 
later learned correlated to the groups' favourite books and television series 
during late childhood and early adolescence.
Proposal 4: other proposals including a desert island
We received several other proposals ranging from "a sports stadium in 
which we can challenge teams from other colleges to play games, and try to 
get the other students to come and watch" to
a tribal camp where the tribe gathers and tells stories and makes, buys 
and sells tools. Sometimes the camp could move to another part of the 
deserted continent. Perhaps sometimes members of another tribe could 
arrive, bringing gifts with them, or wanting to start a war.  
(Kelly, 2002)
One of these miscellaneous proposals envisaged
a desert island where the population seems to be people who have pre-
viously been washed ashore from shipwrecks. The culture is a strange 
mixture of different parts of the world, and over hundreds of years the 
people living there have formed into a number of tribes. Every year the 
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multimedia students are shipwrecked there, and have to work out what to 
do when they get to the shore. The island also has some unexplored areas 
where there are surprises to be found. 
(Kelly, 2002)
This proposal contained considerably less detail than the others that we consid-
ered. In fact, it contained very little more than the quotation above and 
although, in retrospect, we can easily fill out the details if only because the 
idea seems very similar to the original inspiration for the television series 
Lost, at the time it seemed no more than a sketchy suggestion.
3.4. Observations
We examined all of the proposals in detail in terms of their advantages and 
disadvantages.
Observation 1: a virtual Arcada
We first rejected the proposal that we should create a "virtual Arcada".
We rejected the proposal on a number of grounds. Firstly, we felt that the task of 
creating a detailed and recognisable virtual Arcada would prove formidable, 
if not impossible. Unless the representation felt exactly like the real envi-
ronment, then the students building it would receive endless criticism and 
feel under constant pressure. We did not believe that this would engender 
or sustain their enthusiasm.
Secondly, we could not work out how or why the culture of a virtual Arcada would 
differ from the culture of the real Arcada. Even supposing that students did 
manage to create a perfect simulation, what would it achieve? We intended 
students to feel part of an epic struggle to build something, not to feel that 
they had (merely) rebuilt what already existed.
Furthermore, the only clear descriptions we had received of its possible use sug-
gested that a virtual Arcada would act as an advertisement or a recruitment 
tool; that it would "offer potential applicants especially from abroad a way 
of understanding something of the place before they arrive". Analysing why 
this made us feel uncomfortable proved extremely beneficial. It forced us to 
clarify an issue that would remain important for the entire life of the project.
This description contained a clear, albeit implicit, role for the project as a quasi-of-
ficial mouthpiece for the institution. Not only would the proposed virtual 
Arcada act as an online representation of the real Arcada, it would also 
represent Arcada to the world-at-large. That would mean that it would need 
to achieve certain minimum standards of excellence at every point in its 
development and that, in turn, would mean that we could not easily run 
experiments that might fail. Since we had already stated openly that we 
did not know what problems we would meet or what steps we would have 
to take to solve them, we felt that we simply could not promise to achieve 
excellence to order.
In rejecting this proposal, then, we became very clear that the project must act 
as a research laboratory where we did not just accept failure but actively 
expected and embraced it. We also became clear that this meant that, as 
an institution, Arcada should take pride in our creation of an innovative 
online laboratory, and not on whatever month-by-month results that it 
might generate.
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Observation 2: a galaxy far, far away
The second proposal seemed, on the surface, to meet many of the criteria that 
we had set out. It offered an environment that students would have to jointly 
imagine and it offered a culture (or many cultures) that the students would 
need to define and create. It also offered many programming possibilities.
We felt, however, that it contained one obvious, and several more subtle, problems. 
In discussion, it became obvious that some students had grown up as fans of 
one or more science fiction series while other students had either missed or 
deliberately avoided them. Students therefore almost all had strong opinions 
about science fiction, and about science fiction fandom; but not the kind of 
shared opinions that would necessarily lead to harmonious working groups.
That fact, on its own, might not have deterred us. However, we also realised that 
we would face serious problems with the nature of the proposed world, in 
terms of the students' roles within it, and our desire to use it for in-house 
work experiences.
We tried to map out an extended period of time in the life of a trading station on the 
edges of three galaxies, and we produced several variations. Each of them 
seemed to require that surprising things happened on a regular basis. We 
could not manage to escape from the shadow of Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, 
the television series that ran for seven series beginning in 1993 and which 
took place on a space station at the very edge of the "Third Quadrant", with 
diplomatic, military and trading factions living and working on board.
The series succeeded because Deep Space Nine lay at a specific point where different 
civilisations interacted, and thus at a point where unexpected events could 
occur every week. In other words, its position, and the events that occurred 
as a result of its position, formed a key part of the experience of living or 
visiting there. Anyone visiting such a place would naturally find themselves 
surrounded by unfolding chains of surprises, coming face-to-face with dan-
gers, and participating in events larger than themselves.
This might form an ideal setting for a role-playing game but, if we viewed our stu-
dents entering a virtual world as figures acting in a given background then, 
in this case, the ground seemed altogether too active and distracting.
We found a further problem with regard to our need to set assignments within the 
world. We had thought about assignments ranging from designing adver-
tisements for in-world products to actually manufacturing examples of 
those products using graphic and 3D modelling software. In order to set 
such assignments, we would need to establish clear criteria for success 
and failure. If, for example, we asked students to imagine that the Finnish 
soft drinks company Hartwall wished to launch Dr Pepper in Finland, we 
could easily create suitable criteria for the project. We could ask students to 
describe which segment of the population the new product would address, 
we could ask them to produce a campaign or single advertisement, and 
we could ask them to produce a presentation comparing it to other, cur-
rent campaigns aimed at the same market segment. All of this would pro-
vide useful pre-work experience that would remain relevant in subsequent 
courses and after graduation.
On the other hand, if we asked students to engage in such an exercise inside the 
world of Deep Space Nine, or somewhere similar, then it would all too easily 
turn into an amusing debating game with little or no real-world relevance. 
The more able students would produce more amusing pastiches and par-
odies, and would attempt to argue that whatever they had done met the 
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Klingon or Romulan expectations exactly. Presenting assignments would 
become a very entertaining activity but it would have little or nothing to do 
with work life on Earth.
We recognised that including some elements like this within the world we built 
might well add to its delights. However, a world that consisted entirely of 
this would simply not meet our pedagogical goals.
Observation 3: a cave far below the surface of the earth
In some ways this appeared similar to the previous proposal. It differed, 
however, in that it replaced the need for continuous background action with 
the idea of rumours which need only very occasionally lead to anything 
actually happening. Despite its obvious links to Dungeons & Dragons, we 
found it much easier to imagine how this world might evolve without exist-
ing as part of a role-playing game.
We found it harder to imagine what roles the students might adopt there. We had 
suggested that the users would exist in the virtual world as visitors, or for-
eigners, and this world seemed, almost by definition, hostile to visitors and 
most unlikely to encourage tourism. The longer we thought about it, the 
more convinced we became that, to make this world work, students would 
need to adopt the roles of the cave-dwellers themselves.
This, in turn, prompted us to look again at our idea that students should exist 
in the world as visitors. We originally suggested this because we wanted 
students to have to interrogate the world in order to arrive at an under-
standing of it. We had concerns about the way in which many (but not 
all) students seemed unwilling to raise questions during assignments, but 
instead tried to find ways to operate within their comfort zone; to twist the 
assignment to match their self-assessed strengths. Challenged to imagine 
that Hartwall wished to launch Dr Pepper in Finland, the majority of stu-
dents would almost immediately open Photoshop and start designing a 
poster. This poster would inevitably reflect how little questioning had gone 
into its design, and would resemble a generic poster for a canned soft drink. 
The same would happen if we asked students to design a web site for a ser-
vice for old people. Many would think briefly about which aspects of web 
design reflected their strengths best, and then design a site that demon-
strated these strengths regardless of their conceptual relevance to the brief 
they had received.
We had three intentions. Firstly we hoped to establish a world with a culture of 
its own that showed internal coherence. Secondly, we intended this culture 
to appear foreign enough to the students that they could not immediately 
believe that they "knew the rules", but had to stop and think at each stage. 
Thirdly, we wanted the students to feel that their worked contributed to 
building this culture: that the work they produced would enter the world 
and became part of the puzzle that the following year's students would 
have to figure out.
Upon reflection, we reaffirmed our original decision because we continued to 
believe that this process would fail if students lived as natives, and therefore 
played the people who themselves made up the rules. Once again we would 
create a situation in which debating replaced discovery, whereas we wanted 
to encourage both. It would also risk generating a world which became 
increasingly divorced from reality and generated its own inspiring but peda-
gogically irrelevant mythology.
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Observation 4: a desert island
The miscellaneous group of ideas almost all had obvious and fatal flaws. 
They relied in the main on the co-operation and participation of unidenti-
fied groups who may have no interest in the idea, and may not, in the end 
even exist. The flimsy proposal for a desert island, however, proved a very 
useful suggestion.
The creation of a remote island seemed both useful and practical. In practical terms 
it set specific borders to the simulation and it provided a logical explanation 
for why users could not travel beyond these borders. This would make the 
virtual world easier to build, and focus attention on making the user expe-
rience in the playing area richer rather than making it larger. The idea that, 
for some reason, the culture of the island had developed as a jumbled mix-
ture of remnants from other cultures also served our purposes well. It could 
mean that individual elements of the island's culture would seem familiar, 
but the social rules governing the ways in which they got put together would 
need exploring and would take time to resolve. The environment would thus 
appear foreign without seeming completely alien. We could use it to gener-
ate assignments that resembled or paralleled real life, while still containing 
unexpected and challenging elements.
We felt less happy with the admittedly slender back-story and with the idea of 
staging a mock shipwreck every time we needed to bring new students to 
the island. This also seemed impractical as a mechanism for opening the 
island to a wider public. We therefore decided to adopt the idea of a some-
what mysterious island, while defining a more practical back-story that 
would enable us to invite people to the island, and also to draw elements 
from the other proposals that we had considered seriously.
We appreciated the idea of a place that existed at the edge of different worlds and 
thus straddled different cultures. We liked the idea of a world filled with 
rumours, most of which did nothing more than enrich the ambience. We felt 
that we could turn all of these into useful pedagogic tools.
3.5. Outcomes
We drew up a description of the world that we now proposed to build. We 
based this on the short description of an island, and made various sugges-
tions that drew elements from the other proposals. We suggested that the 
island might have an educational institution that we could compare and con-
trast with Arcada: that we could use to explore and play with ideas of training 
and instruction. We suggested that the island might have different factions.
We received mostly positive reactions to the description. Since no group had obvi-
ous ownership of the idea it had no immediate champions. Many people 
described it accurately as vague. We acknowledged this as a factor we 
should include in the next experiment.
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We had long experience of students retrenching to their comfort zones 
when faced with challenges. We also had experiences of our students' pref-
erences for practical activity rather than contemplative thought. We there-
fore looked for a mechanism that would inspire the students to create an 
island that would stretch their abilities and inspire them.
Once we had decided to use the idea of a remote island as the basis for the world 
we intended to build we also agreed that we wanted the island to exist 
somewhere in the real world. This would provide a link to that might prove 
useful in terms of defining projects that had pedagogical value. Having 
decided this, we did not feel that we could site the island fifty kilometres off 
the Finnish coast, or the English coast, since this would clearly label it as 
make-believe. If we located the island somewhere in the Nordic area every-
one would immediately recognise it as fiction, and might reasonably expect 
it to offer amusing, insightful or parodic commentaries on Nordic life. We 
might therefore find ourselves producing an ongoing entertainment that dis-
tracted from our overall goals.
We agreed, therefore, that we needed to situate the island somewhere isolated, but not 
too isolated; and that this isolation would need an explanation of some kind.
4.1. Research Question
The island that we will build exists somewhere on Earth, in the present day. 
This "somewhere" needs to fit in with the criteria that we have been devel-
oping. Where should we position the island and why?
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4.2. Description of Activity
We did not intend this as lengthy project and we therefore asked a group of 
students to spend a week or so looking at maps and searching on the web to 
find suitable locations.
During this process we had held meetings with members of other departments at 
Arcada to determine whether they would have any use for a simulated world 
in their own courses. One of the earliest enthusiasts, Henry Clay Ericsson 
(then leader of the international business department, and now Associate 
Professor at Arcada) had developed simulation games that he used with 
his students in order to give them practical experience of business deci-
sion-making. He had created fictitious business environments and the stu-
dents played turn-based games in which they created a business, submitted 
their data to him, and received back the information they needed for their 
next turn. He immediately saw the possibility of using an imaginary island 
both to provide consistent data for these games and to give the students a 
way of visualising the environment within which they were working. He 
therefore joined in the process of locating the island.
We received a number of suggestions, but a consensus built up around the idea 
that we should locate the island somewhere in the Mediterranean. Several 
students then looked in detail at maps of the Mediterranean, and suggested 
that we locate the island almost precisely half way between Crete and Malta, 
above the Libyan coast. This placed it at the edges of Europe and Africa 
while making it remote enough for most people to have no fixed ideas about.
One student then presented a website promoting holidays in Gozo. Neither we, nor 
anyone else in the room, had ever heard of Gozo (a small semi-independent 
island that forms part of the Maltese archipelago), and this clearly demon-
strated that, from a Nordic perspective, some real-life aspects of the Medi-
terranean did appear indeed isolated - but not too isolated.
We held informal tests and satisfied ourselves that our potential target groups (pri-
marily young Finns, Swedes, Britons and Americans) had only the flimsiest 
grasp of the geography of the southern Mediterranean. Nobody we talked to 
had ever heard of Gozo, and some believed that we had made it up. We felt 
that hiding our island there should not prove difficult.
Henry Ericsson then calculated a precise geographical location for the island: a 
longitude and latitude of approximately N35° 40' E19° 30'. We now had 
almost everything we needed to begin the process of imagining and building 
the island.
The precise nature of the island emerged from the fortuitous discovery of an old 
and out of copyright magazine story, Sexton Blake and The Time-Killer, first 
published in Union Jack, issue 1,071, on 19 April 1924; and subsequently 
republished in Shadows of Sherlock Holmes (Davies, 1998).
SextonBlake.co.uk describes Time-Killer as a story in which "Sexton Blake encoun-
ters a ghostly hound on London's underground, is commissioned to find 
stolen microbes, searches for a lost Lord and a Trade Union Leader, and 
ends up on a very mysterious island". The story takes place partly in Lon-
don, and partly on a Mediterranean island called Rosario. The anonymous 
author described the island in sufficient detail to provide a basis for an 
online world, while leaving enough more than enough gaps to allow the 
designers to work creatively.
The story's convoluted, and somewhat ham-fisted, plot revolved around a Welsh 
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scientist who has invented a zeta-ray which slows down the perception of 
time. He has fled to Rosario in pursuit of an English Member of Parliament, 
and both subsequently need rescuing by Sexton Blake, a cross between 
Sherlock Holmes and an action hero who, at the time of publication, com-
manded as much popular attention as Holmes.
When Blake arrives in Rosario, with his young assistant, "Tinker was reminded 
vaguely of the mean quarters of Veracruz, or the native bazaars of old 
Damascus. The shops were huddled together in astonishing confusions. 
There did not seem to be any windows, although great piles and pyramids 
of apples, golden oranges and luscious purple grapes lent vivid patches of 
colour to their sombre background." (Davis, ed, 1998, p301)
The small village that serves as Rosario's unnamed capital had "the straggling 
native quarter of the Rue Scribe" where Blake "neared a garishly painted 
cabaret, sandwiched between a dingy-looking cafe and a curiosity shop. 
Over the door, in letters of faded gold, were the words, 'Fan-tan Saloon'. 
Blake entered. The place was full of evil-looking Rosarians of the lower 
class, and the air was thick with clouds of rank tobacco smoke". (Davis, ed, 
1998, p308)
The island exists only as an exotic backdrop for a story of little consequence. None-
theless the writing provides definite clues as to the nature of the place with 
its faded air and suggestions of grumbling and ineffectual hostility. These 
provide a starting place for communal imagination - a starting place that 
none of us would have devised by ourselves. As such it seemed ideal for our 
purpose.
4.3. Observations
Situating the island in the southern Mediterranean immediately created a 
lot of opportunities. It meant that students would have definite climates, 
geography and wildlife to research when designing the island. It gave objec-
tive boundaries for possible answers to questions such as "what animals 
live on the island?" and "what weather does the island experience in win-
ter?" It also gave us neighbours, including not only countries in southern 
Europe but also Libya to the immediate south of the island. These would 
also provide boundaries when we asked the students to flesh out the online 
world by imagining life on the island.
Our complete ignorance of Gozo opened up the possibility that we might present 
our island as "real"; that we might situate it on the border between fact 
and fiction. We felt certain that we could use this to trigger discussion and 
debate in a number of media theory courses.
The discovery of Sexton Blake and The Time-Killer completed our conceptual toolkit. 
It gave the island a name and, more importantly, it gave us a bible that we 
could refer back to whenever a student tried to turn the project into some-
thing easier or closer to home. If we accepted the descriptions of the island 
in the story as canonical then we had an almost objective mechanism for 
rejecting ideas that could not fit into the canon. If students wanted to create 
a Rosarian space programme, because they were science fictions fans, then 
we could refer back to the story and challenge them to explain how these 
people on this island could possibly develop, or afford to develop, such a 
thing. We could then challenge them to find another, more plausible, sci-
ence fiction-based concept that they could fit into the canon.
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In this way, tying the development of the project to an obscure and out of copyright 
external source, would give us a resource that we could use to stimulate the 
students' imagination and direct their thinking away from the mundane and 
conventional.
4.4. Outcomes
We decided that the geographical location of Rosario, and the description in Sexton 
Blake and The Time-Killer, would form the starting point for our thinking. 
Now that we had agreed them, they would become non-negotiable and all 
our ideas must make sense within the parameters they set.
The position of Rosario in the southern Mediterranean
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We invited a group of students to read the Sexton Blake story we had dis-
covered. The story takes place in 1923, and we asked them to imagine how 
the island had developed since then, and to create a tourist map of the 
island as it exists today.
We told them that the map should contain objects and places that they them-
selves would both want to build as designers, and look forward to visiting 
as tourists. Since they would form part of the building team they should 
take care to make certain everything on the map fitted into both categories. 
They should not, for example, include a race-track on the island unless they 
themselves would agree to assist in solving the problem of how to build 
moving vehicles.
The exercise took two weeks and produced a series of maps, none of which worked 
as a blueprint that everybody could agree with. However, from another per-
spective the exercise constituted a triumphant success. It served to enthuse 
the students, most of whom became committed to the island during the 
course of the exercise. It also brought a series of conceptual problems into 
focus in an extremely clear way. Once these had caught our attention it 
seemed clear that we would need to attend to them before even considering 
moving on to attempting to model the island.
These issues included:
1. the problems of starting with a tabla rasa;
2. the specificity of place;
3. questions of scale;
4. the desirability of complete vs partial representation;
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5. the relationship of the representation to the 'real' world.
These had nothing at all to do with "building a 3D world", but we felt that we 
needed to address them before we started building anything, in order that 
we understood exactly what we intended to build, and why.
5.1. Research Question
We intend to create an island named Rosario, situated in the southern Med-
iterranean. We will use this within many projects in your course over the 
next three years. We will only have time to build it once. What do we need 
to understand, and what do we need to decide, before we begin the process 
of building the island, in order to give ourselves the best possible chance of 
building it successfully?
Please note: we will deal with questions about software and programming sepa-
rately. This question concerns itself solely with problems relating to con-
cept design.
5.2. Description of Activity
We addressed the questions within a course designed to explore issues that 
might arise within professional concept design. We presented this project 
as a brief from a client and suggested that the students attempt to order the 
questions and then work through them sequentially. The students opted to 
begin by trying to determine the size of the island.
Questions of scale
Sexton Blake and the Time-Killer offers few clues as to the size of the island. 
Since Blake describes it as having a "main village" it obviously contains at 
least two or three smaller villages. However, we cannot take the term "vil-
lage" uncritically, since the story appears imbued with a nineteen twenties 
sense of British national superiority. A modern reader could justifiably read 
the term "village" as an example of Blake's smug dismissiveness, rather 
than as a literal description.
Students read the story once more and then analysed all the maps of the island 
that they had jointly created. Some students had created islands that could 
scarcely provide shelter for more than fifty people, yet somehow contained 
an art gallery, a museum and a cinema. Others had produced islands that 
might have contained the entire populations of France and Germany and 
still had room for more. Their sketches also varied greatly in their implied 
population densities. Some suggested small, highly populated places like 
Malta or Hong Kong. Others suggested large masses of land with small pop-
ulations thinly spread out, like northern Finland.
The students realised that they needed to clarify both the size of the island and the 
size of the population before they could begin to imagine the nature of the 
island in any detail. Once we had established these as axioms we could cal-
culate further data such as the population density, and from this we could 
begin to create a workable map.
The students researched the existing islands of the Mediterranean online, and, 
through a process of comparison and averaging, concluded that Rosario 
would have a landmass slightly smaller than Malta, and a population half 
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as dense. It would cover approximately 280 kilometres square, and have a 
population of approximately 200,000.
Complete vs partial representation
Two of the students had created maps, not of the island as requested, but 
of the "main village". During the discussion that followed several other stu-
dents suggested that, although they appeared to have got the assignment 
wrong, they might have actually spotted a flaw in the assignment and pro-
duced a better solution to the underlying problem. Could we really model the 
entire island, they asked, or should we concentrate on just part of the island?
They eventually arrived at a consensus. We needed to know about the entire island, 
and to have it mapped out, although we would concentrate, in the begin-
ning, on creating only one part of it. If we did not map out the whole island 
then the town or village that we designed would inevitably start to build up 
inconsistencies over time. To give one simple example: road signs leading 
out of the town should display both destinations and distances in a consist-
ent manner. If different students created improvised road signs for different 
courses, then they would soon cease to seem believable, even as items in a 
make-believe world.
This belief arose in part from the knowledge that Gene Rodenberry oversaw the 
production of a 1,000 page bible for the original Star Trek television series, 
before filming even began. This detailed hundreds of background "facts" 
about Klingon and Romulan culture and history, and about their chang-
ing relationships over time. It also contained hundreds of facts about the 
Federation, its expansion into space and its first meetings with other races. 
Much of this information never made an appearance in any actual epi-
sodes. Rather, Rodenberry intended that it would serve to provide consist-
ency within the Star Trek universe by providing a single source of canonical 
answers to questions writers might have while plotting individual episodes. 
As the series progressed the events depicted in each episode got added to 
the bible so that the writers of later stories could refer back to them.
The students argue that this should form the basis of our working methods too. 
From this grew the idea that the overall project would become self-docu-
menting. We would house the growing number of facts about the island in a 
library on the island itself.
The specificity of place
We had asked students to familiarise themselves with one or more versions 
of the example SCOL Worlds. After playing with these they raised questions 
about their apparently generic nature. The urban street scene, for example, 
did not seem to depict a street corner from any specific city, but rather to con-
tain elements that referenced cultural clichés about urban street corners. One 
comment suggested that it resembled "an old Finnish man's idea of a New 
York ghetto, if he had never been to New York". The scene contained graf-
fiti, but the writing said nothing offensive or incomprehensible. Our ability to 
understand the graffiti disturbed the students. "When you go somewhere and 
look at tags on walls then it is all in local slang or says things about gangs 
and fights and territories that you don't know about. If you want to know 
what it means then you have to ask someone - and usually you don't".
We then gave the students a research exercise investigating what kind of "virtual 
worlds" already existed on the web. We gave a group of about 16 students 
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a list of URLs and asked them to report on their feelings about the worlds 
they found there.
We expected them to return with a shopping list derived from technical compari-
sons. We expected comments such as "can we have animated avatars? Can 
users choose the clothes for their avatars?" Instead we received back our 
first philosophical conundrum. The students, almost without exception, 
reported that they felt something missing from the worlds. They seemed 
unable to describe this feeling at all specifically; they simply agreed that the 
worlds "didn't feel right".
We sent the group to explore more. and asked them to try to find precise descrip-
tions for what they meant. Eventually we got two enlightening answers. 
Firstly two students claimed that they experienced something "hollow at 
the heart of the worlds". Secondly, another group explained that they felt 
as though they had wandered around stage sets for a play about a world, 
rather than experiencing a feeling of having wandered around a world.
A consensus formed that the worlds felt like cardboard boxes painted in one way or 
another. As one student said, "When I went to the Venice world there was 
no Venice-ness about it".
We spent considerable time trying to understand how designers might generate this 
feeling of Venice-ness. Eventually we realised that the problem lay not in 
the particular method of generating the world. but rather in what the world 
consisted of. In the real world, even in cultures affected by globalisation, 
every place has specific factors that help define it and help differentiate it 
from other places. Graffiti provides one small example. Others might include 
characteristic sounds and smells, and specific visual formations and con-
junctions.
 We therefore asked ourselves: in what do we find the Paris-ness of Paris or the 
Espoo-ness of Espoo? We drew up lists and created mind maps to show the 
relationships. We looked to find patterns that we missed in existing online 
worlds with a view of seeing if we could introduce them in our world. Some 
elements, the smell of croissants, for example, we put to one side, because 
we recognised that we simply did not have the technical ability to simu-
late them. Others we compiled into a set of targets for the project. Taken 
together they served to corroborate our belief that we needed a rich and 
coherent backstory, and a visible context for the objects found in the world. 
They also underlined the fallacy of beginning with a tabula rasa; of attempt-
ing to start drawing an island on a blank sheet of paper.
The problems of starting with a tabula rasa
People and objects live in time as well as space. This may seem a banal 
observation but we came to realise that it has vital consequences for any 
attempt to design virtual worlds. People age and as they do a lot of incon-
venience becomes attached to the process. Sportsmen like boxers, for 
example, attempt to change their approach and style to cope with their 
diminishing speed, in the hope that experience can compensate for dwin-
dling power. Landscapes, the collection of objects that together comprise a 
specific place, age in an analogous way, generating inconvenience for their 
inhabitants as they do. People then attempt to change their behaviour and 
their habits to accommodate these inconveniences.
The Dutch architect NJ Habraken has explored this process at great length and in 
great depth in his book The Structure of the Ordinary: form and control in the 
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built environment. Here he looks at the way several cities have changed their 
form over several hundred years. He points out the ways in which the siting 
of objects like churches in the past has forced later development to fit itself 
around them.
In most European cities and towns streets do not line up in the grid-like fashion 
found in cities like New York, but instead wind around churches, market 
halls, palaces, courts and old landmarks. The result of this forms a specific-
ity which we encounter as one of the essential factors in, for example, the 
'Brussels-ness' of Brussels.
The beliefs, habits, customs and laws that determine how and where objects get 
built in a specific place, and who may or may not decorate them and to 
what extent, form a key part of the culture of that place, if we also include in 
our definition the cumulative effects of the decisions made over time which, 
taken together, may seem muddled or contradictory. This kind of learned 
culture acts "like a lens which filters all the information we perceive through 
our senses; sensory information passes through this lens of culture and 
is filtered, or interpreted, into a recognizable pattern that has meaning." 
(Miraglia, Law & Collins, 1996)
The presence of a learned culture, being contended and extended, gives a place its 
specificity, and creates the feeling of "what it is to be" there. By way of an 
example, we might look briefly at the controversy of General Mannerheim's 
statue in the not-too distant past in Helsinki. The plans for Kiasma, the 
modern art museum in Helsinki, included a proposal to move the statue of 
General Mannerheim some short distance. This provoked a large and unex-
pected public controversy, and for a time it looked as though the entire pro-
ject would prove unacceptable. To understand this controversy an onlooker 
would need to know something of Finnish culture, and specifically some-
thing about the totemic importance of Mannerheim in that culture. Without 
that very specific knowledge, for a foreigner operating outside that culture, 
the strength of the argument, and the reasons for it occurring at all, would 
seem absurd and meaningless. The totemic significance of Mannerheim in 
the story of Finland forms a key point in the Finnish-ness of Finland and 
moreover the consequences of this significance play a determining part in 
the physical shape of Helsinki.
We realised that we would need to find a way to simulate this historical process, at 
least in outline, if we wanted to avoid creating another hollow world.
The relationship of the representation to the 'real' world
We had decided to set our world on a fictitious Mediterranean island. We 
now needed to decide on the status of this world. We realised that we needed 
to start by positing a culture but we had yet to agree whether we wanted 
this defined as a work of fiction, or as something else. From a pedagogical 
perspective we wanted the students to take the existence of the world with 
some seriousness: to view it as an interesting experiment and not just as "a 
bit of fun". We felt that, to many students, a fictitious island available online 
might easily seem trivial, childish, and not worth bothering with. TVBorgå 
had an audience of indeterminate size, who knew nothing about who made 
the programmes, and how. We realised that we still lacked the equivalent of 
this element. We therefore decided to add another layer to the project.
A group of students suggested that we treat the initial research as part of the over-
all project by asserting that the project had already begun sometime in the 
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recent past; a time when Arcada had taken on the Rosarian government as 
an external client. The entire project would therefore function as an inter-
national partnership (Kelly, 2003, p1) designed to fulfil the Rosarian govern-
ment's brief.
The government of Rosario wished to raise their profile, for reasons that we did not 
wholly understand. We therefore needed to move from a position of almost 
complete ignorance to a deep and sympathetic understanding of contempo-
rary life on the island. We would begin by bringing into existence the geog-
raphy and history of Rosario, and publishing them in English translations.
We would introduce the needed additional layer by adding an element of hoaxing 
to the project. We would aim the project into the grey area between fact and 
fiction, with the intention of having the island appear as real as possible. 
We looked again at the web site for Gozo and asked whether, and how, 
we could deduce from the site that Gozo actually existed. We decided that 
we could not: we could only attempt to determine its existence by looking 
elsewhere and seeing if we could uncover other references to it. We decided 
that this would give us a reason for staff and students to take the project 
seriously. We would produce a real web presence for an island and a culture 
whose authenticity remained ambiguous and that required the user to carry 
out her own process of verification.
This gave us some interesting and useful limitations for the overall project. The island 
did not have a public profile, and the rest of the world knew nothing about 
it. It must therefore appear to have an unexceptional culture that seemed too 
dull or too quiet to capture any public attention. The interesting parts of its 
culture must somehow lay hidden from view, by accident or design.
An early map showing the main landmarks on Rosario
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Rosarian web sites
After several brainstorming sessions the students agreed that the practical 
outcomes of the project should begin with a set of web sites. They began 
with the official government website of Rosario, and this should eventually 
contain an interactive 3D model of the island's capital city complete with 
chat facilities, working buildings and in-world banking. We also agreed that 
visitors to the site should feel like visitors to a foreign country.
5.3. Observations
This project laid the foundations for practical work that followed. We moved 
from a general idea to a plan for producing a quite specific creative work 
with clear pedagogical goals. Moreover we established an important prin-
ciple of self-documentation, in which we would create the documentation 
of the work as part of the project, and would make it available within the 
boundaries of the project.
5.4. Outcomes
The first, skeletal, version of this official web site publicly launched on Jan-
uary 22nd 2003 at www.marinetta.net and the organisation of the launch 
formed the outcome of a project for students training as cultural producers. 
According to notes posted on the site in February 2003, the project aimed to 
construct La Mentala Rosario, an online representation of the history, cul-
ture and commerce of the Mediterranean island of Rosario.
We intended it to explore the theoretical and practical pedagogical possibilities 
such a simulation might provide.
Later we would expand the project's web presence to include a wiki that docu-
mented two thousand years of the island's history in great detail, because, 
as we progressed, we found ways of incorporating more elements from the 
original suggestions. We followed this with La Voco, a newspaper-styled 
website that documented the development of the project as it happened, in 
the form of news items and reports from Rosario.
Finally a student group created a website posing as a bone fide tourism site. This 
provided details of the island's highlights and attracted several genuine 
inquiries from would-be tourists during its life-time.
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By this point we had developed a consistent methodology for running brain-
storming sessions, and creating assignments. We always sought to inject 
arbitrary limitations into any scenario we presented. We had discovered 
that constraints served to prevent students immediately retreating to safe 
ground and playing to their strengths.
We had also discovered that constraints which appeared arbitrary or ridiculous 
served to level the playing field. Given a blank piece of paper some students 
started leapt forward while others shrank back. Given a seemingly ridicu-
lous limitation the group usually united in outrage or mirth, and thus felt 
less vulnerable in proposing ways forward.
In proceeding in this way we had, in effect, begun to uncover the method of work-
ing that Jane McGonigal termed "pilot experimentation" almost a decade 
later, and described as "the process of designing and running many small 
tests of different strategies and solutions in order to discover the best course 
of action to take" (McGonigal, 2011, p298). We would continue to use and 
refine this method throughout the life of the project.
At this point we knew where to find Rosario on a map and we had determined a set 
of criteria we needed to meet in order to make the online depiction of Rosa-
rio appear as more than just a generic set of buildings in a generic envi-
ronment. We now needed to map the island and create a list of important 
features that a visitor would expect to find there. There would include both 
natural landmarks and human artefacts.
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6.1. Research Question
We now know where to find Rosario, and we know a little of what we might 
find there. We have established a set of issues we need to keep in mind as 
we fill in the gaps in our knowledge about the island. What, then, does 
Rosario look like? Specifically:
1. What does a map of Rosario look?
2. What natural features would a tourist see?
3. What animals and plants can you find on the island?
4. How does the island relate to the sea?
6.2. Description of Activity
The students began by sketching various maps of an imaginary island. 
These all included different configurations of the main landmarks and ser-
vices that students expected to find: an airport, a beach, hotels and restau-
rants, and so on. On observing their progress, we brought the exercise to a 
premature end and asked the group to consider what they had done so far. 
It appeared to us that they had based their maps on an amalgamation of 
memories from their own experiences and their experiences of absorbing 
information from media. Each island seemed to map no more than a sample 
of one young adult's personal reminiscences. Moreover, each island had the 
perfect size and shape for whatever it contained. Each island resembled an 
architect's sketches for a planned theme park.
Fortunately Habraken's writings (Habraken, 1998) about the historical develop-
ment of cities suggested a way forward. In the real world people had neces-
sarily used their surroundings to determine what they built, how they built 
it, and where they sited it. These decisions, in turn, had helped to deter-
mine the bases from which each specific civilisation grew. Individuals found 
themselves living within a pre-existing culture, and made the best lives they 
could in the circumstances in which they found themselves.
The Rosarians must have done the same.
The shape of Rosario
We needed to find a way to create an island that we had not designed with 
our own ulterior purposes in mind and then, following Habraken's lead, we 
needed to work out how a population might have developed there. After 
several attempts to sketch such an island I realised that any attempt to do 
this would, almost by definition, prove impossible. I could not step out-
side my own assumptions and preconceptions, any more than the students 
could. I therefore decided to take an existing island from a world map and 
borrow that. I decided not to take another Mediterranean island, since that 
would allow for simple duplication or plagiarism, but instead to take some 
other landmass and move it to the Mediterranean.
I looked at an online world map and, for no predetermined reason at all, copied 
the continent of Africa into Photoshop. I flipped it upside down and then 
stretched and rescaled it to the approximate physical dimensions that Henry 
Ericsson had indicated the island should have. This produced an island with 
a very specific shape: with contours, with mountains and valleys, and bays. 
The island bore no resemblance to any of the islands that any of us had 
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sketched. Its coastline did not contain suspiciously convenient bays placed 
exactly where we might want them, and the hills and valleys did not fit 
neatly around flat areas where cities might grow. In fact, the map contained 
a large number of problems and inconveniences that might take an island 
people several thousand years to negotiate and surmount.
Mountains and valleys in Rosario
Although the island did indeed have hills and valleys, we had no immediate 
way of determining their height and depth. This became the next exercise, 
and we used it to develop our historical research method. We had already 
determined that the island could not appear too unusual, since we wished 
it to appear plausible. It must seem the kind of place (like Gozo) that had 
maintained a level of obscurity through having no obviously extraordinary 
characteristics. We therefore reasoned that in general Rosario must have 
features that reflected regional averages.
The students researched the key features of the land areas in the southern Medi-
terranean and northern Africa, and from their results we derived a contour 
map of the island. It had hills and plains but only one feature that anyone 
could reasonably describe as a mountain.
Climate in Rosario
We reasoned that we could also determine the likely climate of the island by 
comparing it to its neighbours and averaging the resulting figures. We could 
then use the same process to determine its seasonal variations. By this 
method a team of students created a meteorological profile of the island, 
and this, in turn, gave us significant clues as to what animal and vegetable 
life we might find there.
Plant and animal life in Rosario
The meteorological profile formed the basis for determining the vegetation 
on the island. If a plant grew in Crete and Malta and Libya then it almost 
certainly grew on Rosario. If it only grew in one or two of the neighbouring 
countries then we needed to investigate further.
Once we had established flora and fauna, we moved onto birds and animals, using 
the same process.
Although we did not intend, at this stage, to examine the lives of the Rosarian peo-
ple, it became clear that sardine fishing must have formed an important part 
of their livelihoods.
6.3. Observations
Several students asked why we needed to work in such detail. For them, 
the process seemed unnecessarily laborious, and a very roundabout way 
of making an online world. Other students found the process interesting in 
its own right, and expressed no such reservations. By way of response, we 
pointed out that the project had a minimum projected lifespan of three years 
and that we intended to use the world within future multimedia courses. 
We therefore needed to treat its creation with a degree of seriousness and 
attention to detail because any contradictions or logical flaws would render 
the world incapable of bearing the weight of future assignments.
We gave several examples. Imagine, we said, that
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in one year's time we ask you to design a marketing campaign for Rosa-
rio's leading brand of beer. Perhaps it might draw upon the national 
animal or plant for a logo, as a Canadian beer might use a moose or a 
maple leaf. That, in turn, implies that either you know what forms the 
national symbols of Rosario take, or that we allow each of you to make 
up your own national symbols. If we follow the second course then the 
project will have no value of the kind that TV Borgå has, because it 
will not impose any external constraints. It will just be something that 
we make up as we go along.
So we will follow the first course, which means that we need to have a 
lot of background information to hand, and that information has to have 
an internal coherence. We need to create that information from a firm 
foundation, and that means we need to understand the island, in terms of 
its geography and history, before we create its present day life. 
(Kelly, 2002)
The geography of the island inevitably formed the ground from which the Rosar-
ian culture grew, and therefore required careful consideration. Once created 
it would become axiomatic and increasingly difficult to change. The reali-
sation by several students that sardine fishing must have had a historical 
importance on the island clearly demonstrated both that the background 
would have a direct bearing on how we developed the narrative of the island 
and that, once decided, it would become difficult to alter retrospectively, 
without making a nonsense of the work done up to that point.
One of the initial range of eBooks chronicling the island’s history
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6.4. Outcomes
These exercises proved an interesting exercise in comparative analysis in 
which everybody, including the staff involved, emerged knowing consider-
ably more about the spread of life throughout the southern Mediterranean. 
By the conclusion of this project we had a clear idea of the nature of the 
island, and of the features of the island that must have shaped the culture 
of the Rosarians.
We had a set of detailed maps, and we published the first of a series of eBooks, 
documenting the geographical and botanical aspects of the island. This 
formed part of our programme of self-documentation. In line with an ear-
lier decision, we published the information we had gathered as the English 
translation of a Rosarian handbook with the intention of using our internal, 
background research as part of the project's public narrative.
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By this point we had moved from a decision to build an online world to a 
clear understanding of what form this world would take. We knew what 
shape the island world would have and where we would find it. We now 
needed to understand about the inhabitants of the island, and we soon dis-
covered that constructing a coherent history of the Rosarian people would 
involve a much lengthier process.
The students decided that we should continue to use the method of comparative 
analysis. They set out to derive the initial and most general historical and 
geographical information by comparing the histories and geographies of 
Malta and Crete, with some reference to southern Italy; and the history and 
geography of Libya, with some reference to Tunisia and Egypt.
They proceeded by averaging these. They did this through a process of desk 
research, using books and online resources, in which they drew up tables of 
similarities and differences between the histories and cultures of their target 
countries. They used these as the basis for a series of brainstorming sessions 
in which they aimed to decide whether, at each point in the island's develop-
ment, which parts of Europe or Africa had most influence, and in what ways.
Using this methodology the students produced a very general view of almost two 
thousand years of Rosario's development.
We developed this approach in order to provide a consistent and useful backdrop 
to the world. We recognised that all cultures have certain defining myths 
concerning their origins, the growth of key institutions, and about why ele-
ments of their culture have the form they do. These myths characteristically 
take the form of historical events whose status has become elevated. The 
myth of Englishness, for example, would almost certainly start with a pass-
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ing reference to Queen Boadicea and King Alfred, but begin in earnest with 
the Battle of Hastings, before moving on to the Crusades, the Elizabethan 
age and the Civil War. These form some of the core elements in many popu-
lar histories that seek to define a form of "Englishness".
Myths of Finnishness, in contrast, cover a shorter time span and, to some extent, 
artists have composed them retrospectively. Eliot Lönnrot composed the 
Kalevala (in 1835 and 1849) as a self-conscious attempt to create a Finnish 
national identity from elements of Finnish and Karelian folklore.
The students saw themselves as, in some ways, following in Lönnrot's footsteps. 
They too intended to create a national identity by weaving together ele-
ments from an imaginary past. In their case, however, this history would 
serve an imaginary present.
7.1. Research Question
We gave the students a set of five interlinked research questions.
1. How would Rosarians today describe themselves?
2. What national characteristics do Rosarians display?
3. How did these characteristics arise?
4. What historical events played important roles in creating Rosarian 
national identity?
5. What institutions support these?
7.2. Description of Activity
The initial research proceeded smoothly. However it rapidly became clear 
that we would need to create historical events to explain elements of 
national identity, and that we could not create these at will without making 
it obvious that we had made the whole thing up: something we had previ-
ously agreed should remain a matter of doubt for the casual viewer.
To the process of averaging we therefore added another tool. This involved look-
ing for genuine gaps in official historical records and then attempting to 
insert Rosario into them in a convincing manner. One student, for example, 
sought to find a reason for a link between Swedish culture and Rosario, in 
an attempt to find a reason for Arcada's involvement with the island that 
appeared more than arbitrary. He argued that Arcada should have a clear 
reason for interesting itself in Rosario rather than any other small insignifi-
cant island, and that the only obvious reason would involve some historical 
link between Rosario and either Finland or Sweden. His work in pursuing 
this idea illustrates the approach that the group developed.
After much research, he found that in
859 a Viking expedition under the command the sons of the legendary 
Ragnar Lodbrok, left Sweden for the Mediterranean Sea with 62 ships. At 
first they were beaten by Christian and Moorish armies, but at Gibraltar 
their luck turned and they plundered the city of Algericas and then con-
tinued to the Moroccan coast and Balearerna ... They returned to Sweden 
in 862, after further battles, with only 20 of the 62 ships remaining. 
(Weckström, 2004)
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An eighteen month gap genuinely exists in the historical record, in which the 
Vikings' activities remain unrecorded. Using this historical fact he carefully 
managed to insert elements of Swedish culture into Rosarian history in a 
way that would seem completely convincing if Rosario actually existed.
Through this technique we uncovered many other events linking the development 
of Rosario to development in the wider world.
The Importance of the Mighty Fiction
It became very clear in the early stages of the research that, for much of the 
island's history, most people on Rosario must have had hard lives. They had 
access to few resources and lived mainly on fish and vegetables, with milk 
and cheese from the small herds of muffalo. We wondered how they coped, 
given their isolation. This became a subject of discussion and research as 
we explored possible coping mechanisms.
We finally realised that their culture had prioritised story-telling, and in particular 
the telling of tall tales. Much like us, they delighted in walking the tightrope 
between fact and fiction, between bitter truth and entertaining lies. The 
Rosarians conceived the idea of the "mighty fiction", a story so plausible 
and uplifting that people drew comfort from it, and then later, when they 
discovered the truth, drew comfort again from the realisation that some-
body on the island had had the wit to create such a magnificent untruth. 
Through this mechanism they told themselves stories about their existence 
that served to make their existence bearable and served to make them feel 
the most fortunate people on earth.
The idea of the mighty fiction also served our needs well. The students had opened 
a wiki where anyone could create an entry about an event in Rosarian his-
tory, or a famous historical character. Inevitably some contributors failed 
to grasp the subtleties of the story and attempted to add threads that made 
the island an obvious hoax. For example, someone did indeed insert entries 
about the Rosarian space programme, famous Rosarian astronauts, and the 
fact that the Rosarians landed on the moon ten years before the Americans. 
As explained earlier, both to the students and here, these did not fit the pro-
ject for the simple reason that any attempts to launch rockets from a small 
island in the Mediterranean would have rendered the island globally visible. 
The Rosarians would have achieved the international status of North Korea, 
rather than the near-anonymity that had clearly become their fate.
Quite reasonably the students acting as editors of the wiki wanted to delete these 
entries. The concept of the mighty fiction, however, gave us a third option, 
other than letting them stand or removing them. We had the ability to 
reframe them; to say that, yes, Rosario had celebrated its astronauts return 
from the moon, and yes the government had ordered a plaque to celebrate 
their adventure, but only because the "space programme" constituted the 
best mighty fiction that anyone on the island could recall. Superficially, the 
plaque celebrated the astronauts' return; at a deeper level, it celebrated their 
mastery at the traditional Rosarian skill of "almost getting away with it".
The home of conspiracies
Two students extended this idea in a remarkable way. They suggested that, 
far from simply being a way of passing the time, the concept of the mighty 
fiction might have had a solid foundation in history. They suggested that 
the position of the island, and the presence of hardy but over-imagina-
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tive natives, might have made it an ideal trading post for information, from 
the Roman Empire onward. They pointed out how the island stood on the 
fringes of many widespread historical events, and would have offered an 
ideal haven for deserters, rebels, and plotters. They pointed out that the 
Sexton Blake story we had used as our starting point implicitly suggested 
that the island operated like this. They argued that, when thinking about 
the island in modern times, we should use something like the atmosphere of 
shifting intrigue that prevails in the movie Casablanca as a template.
They suggested that perhaps the scientists in Sexton Blake and the Time-Killer had not 
chosen this island by chance. Perhaps other renegade scientists had used 
it, such as followers of Nikola Tesla, and perhaps the concept of the mighty 
fiction also served as a cover for genuine conspiracies and 'secret science'.
This added another layer to the story of the island that, sadly, we never had the 
time or resources to explore as fully as we would have liked. Nonetheless, it 
contributed considerable extra depth to the island's official history.
The Tripartite Church
One way in which this idea assisted us concerned the nature of worship 
on the island. All recorded cultures have had their development affected 
and constrained historically by the superstitious or religious beliefs of their 
members, and the culture of Rosario could not have proved an exception.
We needed to know whether the Rosarians had churches, temples or mosques 
when we came to build the 3D world. We needed to know what gods they 
worshipped when we listed their festivals and holidays. Did people cele-
brate Christmas on Rosario? Or Passover? Or Eid? While, on the one hand 
we wanted to know these things, on the other hand we did not want the 
project to collapse because the online world had become the target of an 
offended religious group who had access to more resources than we did.
We therefore took the idea of the island as a nexus of regional conspiracies and 
asked what happened to the Gnostic gospels once the early Christian 
Church had outlawed them. We knew that the Church had outlawed them 
in 325AD, at the First Conference of Nicaea. We knew that Gnostics had 
buried some of them at Nag Hammadi and that locals had uncovered them 
in the 1940s (Pagels, 1979). Others, it made sense to say, might have landed 
by boat on a small island halfway between Europe and Africa, carried by 
some fleeing Gnostic believers.
From this starting point the Tripartite Church (should it exist) began, always 
remaining a shadowy, unacknowledged presence on the island: inform-
ing the islanders' behaviour without ever admitting its existence. We con-
structed a belief system for it that drew from the translations of several of 
the recovered Gnostic gospels, making it a religion that lived on the spaces 
between the major real-world religions. This enabled us to include religion 
within our narrative, but in a counter-factual way that neither mocked nor 
pilloried existing religions.
Technical Limitations & History
During the period in which we documented the foundations of Rosarian his-
tory, another group of students taught themselves how to modify existing SCOL 
worlds to meet our needs. They conducted experiments on generating avatars, 
on creating buildings, and linking modules together to form larger worlds.
Much of the developing narrative grew organically from its own logical roots. Three 
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ideas, once put together, formed a fourth, and so on. Sometimes, however, 
the technical limitations of the SCOL engine imposed themselves on the 
story. Large spaces seemed problematic for the SCOL engine. The group 
exploring the technical aspects of world-building became convinced that 
we could best create the first version of the online world by linking small 
3D modules together using teleportation gates to create the effect of a large 
world. When a user touched one of these gates the engine would trans-
port them to the equivalent location in another space. Travelling north, for 
example, the gate at the north end of Module A would transport the user to 
the south end of Module B, from where they could continue walking north.
We had to decide what these gates would look like. If they literally looked like 
gates then this would mean that the city would have the form of a series of 
small, walled chambers, which did not fit with the results of our historical 
research. We canvassed suggestions, and the solution that we eventually 
chose surprised everyone, as it also solved a number of other issues as well 
as giving us an unexpected genesis story.
We had already decided that one of the mountains on the island housed a not-
quite-extinct volcano. A student proposed that this had erupted in the Mid-
dle Ages, leaving the island covered in impenetrable fog for nine weeks, dur-
ing which most of the population had died, from hunger, from getting lost, 
or from falling into the sea. At the end of this, when the fog had dispersed, 
the island had effectively started again. However, because the idea of mighty 
fictions had become dominant in their culture, they had embellished this, 
and it had subsequently become a demarcation line in the island's history: 
a beginning from which the modern Rosario arose under the tutelage of the 
current monarch, Princess Ilana.
Since then the island had experienced several minor eruptions of the gas: not 
enough to cause damage but enough to embellish the legends still fur-
ther. The gates that we needed for technical reasons existed in the nar-
rative because a scientist in the early twentieth century had claimed that 
they could detect and dispel any further gas attacks. Whether they actually 
worked or not, nobody knew, but since they either constituted an important 
and impressive protection, or an even more impressive mighty fiction than 
the space programme, nobody ever suggested removing them.
At each point the students working on Rosario's history attempted to build any 
technical limitations into the overall narrative, and to find ways to include 
them so that they added to the feeling of consistency and credibility.
Culture and Media
Because we needed to interest the film and television students in the pro-
ject, and in subsequent years students from other departments entirely, we 
also attempted to build cultural artefacts into our history. The Fog gave us 
a clear break-point between the old prehistorical Rosario for which only 
patchy recorded evidence existed, and the modern island which Rosarians 
had documented since the time of Ilana.
Students drew up timelines of important cultural events in the island's history, 
carefully tying them into the cultural histories of Europe and Africa. They 
included mentions of famous Rosarian works of art, deliberately described 
in enough detail to make it possible for students to make (or remake) them 
in the future. During the life of the project, students provided us with exam-
ples of paintings, photographs, poetry and music.
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Some film students also proposed an iconic silent movie, created by a small and 
internationally ignored silent-film industry on the island. Like the original 
eight hour version of Greed by Erich von Stroheim, this movie had disap-
peared, although fragments remain. This idea fuelled a number of lively 
discussions. However, the possibility of actually creating these fragments 
never interested any film students enough for them to stage it.
Time on Rosario
Part of the process of this pseudo-historical research involved looking out 
for aspects of the real world that we might incorporate into the Rosarian 
story. One group of students seized upon Swatch Internet Time as having 
advantages for our narrative. Nicholas Negroponte had introduced the idea 
of Swatch Internet Time in 1998, at which point he said: "Cyberspace has no 
seasons. The virtual world is absent of day and night... Internet Time is not 
geopolitical, it is global... For many people real time will be Internet Time".
Swatch Internet Time had a meridian based in Basle, at the Swatch headquarters. 
It had no time zones, and divided the day into 1000 "beats". At the time we 
conducted our research, a number of programmers had produced small pro-
grammes and plugins that showed Internet Time on the computer screen. 
The role-playing game Phantasy Star Online had used it since its launch in 
2000 and in March 2001, Ericsson had released the T20e, a mobile phone 
with the option of displaying Internet Time. The question arose: should 
Rosario use Internet Time?
The idea seemed good in that it might provide a talking point when we launched 
the world. It also served to differentiate Rosario from the wider world. Not 
everyone agreed. Some felt strongly that the idea of Internet Time itself 
lacked any merit. In the words of one student, "it has just been invented to 
make money. If a group want to meet on the internet at the same time with-
out being confused they can just use the UTC time".
Having achieved a consensus, the issue still refused to go away. Another student, 
keen to produce a clock programme, researched and found the Rational 
Calendar. This differed from Swatch Internet Time in that it had a genuine 
history, a genuine purpose, and seemed to offer an interesting solution that 
came to nothing due to superstition and organised religion (Waugh, 1999).
We accepted his proposal and agreed that Rosario had indeed adopted the Rational 
Calendar at the point when other countries had had the chance. This enabled 
two students to devote some time to producing a small calendar application 
that converted the computer's clock time into the time and date in Rosario.
It also served to give us the island's end of year festival.
Questions of language
We conducted the research using primarily English language sources, and it 
wrote and published it in English. However, as evidenced above, we needed 
to have "native language" terms for important events and ideas. As work 
progressed on the 3D world it became clear that we needed a consistent 
language for signage too.
Initially some staff and students suggested that we could muddle through by using 
Italian and sprinkling some Spanish or Greek words into the mix. Several 
short experiments showed that this would not work; or rather, it would only 
work if we went to the trouble of compiling a dictionary of Rosario show-
ing how it differed from Italian, which Spanish words were used, and how 
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they were treated grammatically. Without this, no two people could com-
plete even the simplest task of writing signs for shops or text for advertis-
ing hoardings without introducing inconsistencies that rapidly revealed the 
truth: the designers had made the language up as they went along.
We then tried Esperanto, on the grounds that we could use it consistently and 
yet it would appear foreign to anyone entering the world. We faced two 
major problems. Firstly, Esperanto does not resemble any Mediterranean 
language. It looks like the creation of a Hungarian speaker, and indeed its 
creator, LL Zamenhof, did come from Bialystok, then part of the Russian 
Empire. Secondly, and possibly as a consequence of the previous point, 
Esperanto uses a number of accented letters, including one letter that 
Zamenhof invented and which does not exist in any normal typeface or on 
any normal keyboard.
We struggled with this for some time, but changed track when a reading of the his-
tory of Esperanto lead us to the artificial language Ido,  created in 1906, by a 
group of etymologists who recognised the benefits of a "universal auxiliary 
language" but regarded Esperanto as suffering severe deficiencies. Ido has 
its basis in Latin, it has no accents, and it has an even simpler structure 
than Esperanto. More importantly, from our perspective: a sign or adver-
tisement written in Ido looks as though it belongs on the streets of a Medi-
terranean country.
We adopted Ido slightly by adding a couple of arbitrary rules, and wrote it into the 
history. The genesis of the language has a murky background involving alle-
gations of conspiracy and double-dealing, and we used this to suggest that 
much of the underlying structure originally came from Rosarians, and that 
Three eBooks providing a cultural and political history of Rosario
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subsequently the Rosarians had, in turn, used the carefully formulated rules of 
Ido to formalise their own grammar as part of a series of educational reforms.
The genesis of Marinetta
During this period our attention switched back and forth between develop-
ing the narrative of Rosarian history, and the technicalities of developing the 
online world. As a preliminary version of the world neared completion, and 
the web site team proclaimed it ready to launch, it became clear to us that 
others had already claimed all the usable URLs for Rosario. We dismissed 
the idea of obtaining a url like rosario-the-online-world.com because we 
felt that we would then start with an unnecessary disadvantage. We decided 
that we needed a short memorable URL that would not cause confusion.
We had already named the main village, the capital city, of the island Marinetta, 
for reasons that we had explained in the history. It seemed quite usual to 
name major projects after cities rather than countries. We therefore decided 
to make the official name of the project Marinetta Ombro (which translates 
as The Shadow of Marinetta), under the Marinetta Ombro project committee, 
led by Owen Kelly and Camilla Lindeberg from Arcada, and Mambo Milosz 
and Courtney Mojo from a committee formed by the Rosarian Government.
The web site declared that:
The current online world was inspired by the determination of Courtney 
Mojo, who provided a solution for the problems we were facing when she 
found inspiration in the writings of Piotr Miosz.
Describing the new phase she wrote that:
We will now attempt something altogether bolder. Some of you may be 
familiar with the work of Piotr Milosz at La Kolegio Ilana into mental 
mapping and psychic cartography. Twenty five years or so ago he asked 
Rosarians detailed questions concerning their feelings about the island. 
From this he produced a number of schematic diagrams, and the beginnings 
of a series of actual maps, showing "the psychic shape of the republic". 
By this means he constructed an actual picture of the island as its 
inhabitants imagine it.
Many things on this mental map are bigger than in real life and 
closer together; many things are smaller and farther apart; some things 
are missing altogether. This, he believed, is the Rosario that its cit-
izens inhabit mentally, and this is what we will model. Marinetta 3.0 
will be nothing less than La Mentala Rosario, as Piotr Milosz dreamed it 
- a vital first step towards making the shadow solid.
The map that Piotr Milosz produced has several surprising fea-
tures. Most Rosarians still regard La Kin Landi, the ancient original 
kingdoms, as important, and see the regions of Rosario as having five 
distinct characteristics. We will therefore follow this in building la 
Mentala Rosario. The relationships between the regions are not as they 
are on the real map, but rather they form an island in the shape of our 
dreams. This we will follow too.
People hanker for the simpler days that their great-grandparents 
told them stories about, for the days when the port was a tiny fishing 
village, and so this is how it shall be in in our imagined world.
(6
9
)
Using this as a starting point we abandoned our previous ideas of modelling Mari-
netta, the capital of Rosario, and expanded our vision to include the pos-
sibility of modelling a symbolic form of the entire island; something that 
would function diagrammatically, according to Charles Sanders Peirce's 
specific understanding of the term. (I discuss Pierce's methods of diagram-
matic reasoning in more detail in Chapter 13.)
7.3. Observations
The project generated a lot of questions, and created a lot of theoretical 
debate that would otherwise simply not have happened. It served to extend 
the range of questions that arose within concept design courses, and to 
show students both the range of depth of research necessary to conclude 
a project convincingly, and the kind of strategies that we might adopt. It 
also resulted in both staff and students making unexpected discoveries and 
using these to spark ideas. In this sense we could claim the project as a suc-
cess even before the launch of the 3D world.
The question of time on Rosario offers one example of a train of thought turn-
ing into genuine research that led to new knowledge with a practical out-
come. It resulted in students engaging in a much more thorough analysis 
of Negroponte's ideas, and debate about their lack of utility, than would 
otherwise have occurred since, for them, the debate had immediate practi-
cal consequences. The subsequent discovery of Rational Time by a student 
who refused to give up on his desire to program a clock application sparked 
further heated debate while also opening up a number of useful narrative 
possibilities.
This level of theoretical debate did not happen as a matter of course in our depart-
ment at Arcada, and it both surprised us and served to validate the project 
and our approach to constructing it.
7.4. Outcomes
This project formed the basis of the first student thesis to emerge from the 
project. Niki Weckström documented the methodology used to insert the 
history of Rosario into the "real" history of Europe, some of which I have 
outlined above.
We wrote up a version of the complete history of Rosario in a further set of three 
eBooks which we published on the web. In doing this, we made explicit 
our commitment to making all the documentation of the project a part of 
the project itself. We had a number of reasons for insisting on a self-docu-
menting project. Most importantly we feared that material would get lost as 
students moved on, and we felt that the best way to prevent that involved 
finding ways of keeping all the material in view at all times. The eBooks thus 
formed a key part of our strategy, because by turning the project documen-
tation into artefacts within the world, we enabled students to focus on them 
as creative projects.
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For a series of technical reasons, the details of which lie outside the scope 
of this dissertation, we decided to abandon using the SCOL engine before 
launching any public version of Rosario. After a period of seeking alter-
natives and experimenting with 3D Game Studio, a German game engine, 
we decided to build Rosario in Second Life. In October 2004, we purchased 
premium accounts in order to familiarise ourselves with the world, and 
later, when we completed the exploratory research described below, we 
purchased a private island. In the beginning this island included four con-
tiguous "sims", which we soon expanded to a three by three grid. (Linden 
Labs named their core unit of "virtual land" a “sim”. Each sim measures 64 
imaginary metres square.)
Our decision to house the Marinetta Ombro project in Second Life created a num-
ber of important opportunities, while also creating unexpected problems. 
We immediately gained a small, growing and lively community of peers: 
people who had also decided to commit their time to exploring the learning 
possibilities inherent in a social online world. We also gained an even larger 
number of "residents" (as Linden Labs called users of Second Life), who 
participated in the world for their own purposes, with no reason to either 
embrace, reject, or even notice our arrival.
We did not leap straight into Second Life. Instead we began a short and cautious 
period of exploration as most people do when they first enter Second Life. 
We wandered around the world, engaging in encounters with whoever we 
met. I bought a small plot of land in order to go through the process without 
reference to Arcada. I needed to find out whether Arcada would have legiti-
mate reasons not to involve itself before I officially involved the institution. It 
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quickly became clear that various student and staff members had very dif-
ferent initial experiences, and that these formative experiences had led them 
in different directions. Some people formed attachments early on while oth-
ers reported that they could find nothing and nobody of any interest. 
We therefore decided to map out the world in a consistent manner. We determined a 
set of research questions that we hoped would enable us to form a coherent 
set of opinions about whether or not we could usefully use Second Life to 
host the Marinetta Ombro project, and what changes, if any, we would need 
to make in order to come to terms with already existing norms and cultures. 
We did this before committing ourselves to purchasing any "land" there.
8.1. Research Question
We felt that we needed to understand a range of issues and drew up a list of 
research questions:
1. What kind of place does Second Life appear to model? How would we 
describe it to someone who had never seen it?
2. What observable uses do make people make of Second Life? Why do they 
choose to participate?
3. How do residents find out about other residents and activities?
4. How do residents form groups?
5. What relationship could we realistically have with (and to) other 
residents?
6. What relationship should the island of Rosario have to the rest of 
Second Life?
We formulated this list as a means to clarify our thinking.
When we had attempted to build stand-alone worlds using SCOL and 3D Game Stu-
dio we had clearly stated intentions. We intended to model a small Mediter-
ranean island, and to invite users to visit it. The makers of World of Warcraft, 
launched in 2001, intended to model a world loosely based on Tolkeinesque 
fantasy. The creators of Eve Online, launched in 2003, intended to model a 
universe loosely based on the space exploration and combat themes found 
in Star Trek and Star Wars. On the other hand Second Life promoted itself 
with the slogan "Your world. Your imagination". We wanted to clarify what 
this meant in practice, in terms of both the structure of the world and the 
activities that its users actually engaged in.
8.2. Description of Activity
Teams of students took one of the research questions and spent a series of sessions 
in Second Life. They observed the following procedure:
1. Each session lasted between two and four hours.
2. During each session they took screenshots.
3. After each session they made written notes.
After each set of sessions we held group meetings in which the teams shared infor-
mation. From these we began to build diagrammatic representations of our 
findings.
(7
2
)
8.3. Observations
This project raised a series of important and in many ways unexpected questions.
What does Second Life model?
Second Life differs from other online worlds in that it does not strive to 
model one specific scenario or setting. Instead it provides users with 
a customisable avatar, access to "virtual land" and a toolbox containing 
everything that they need to make objects ranging from clothes to buildings. 
For our purposes the ways that Linden Labs chose to implement this open 
approach had several important consequences.
Firstly users can create unlimited numbers of free objects using a very simple 
building process, although creating aesthetically pleasing objects can take 
considerable time and patience. The user's toolbox has a graphical inter-
face and includes modelling tools as well as a scripting language that can 
bring objects to life. To build an object the user opens the toolbox, chooses 
a primitive shape, drags it into the world, and then applies tools to bend, 
shape and twist it before applying one or more textures. Importantly this 
process costs nothing and Linden Labs imposes no limits on how often and 
how many objects users can create. An area of land may only contain a 
prescribed number of 'primitives', but an avatar's inventory may contain an 
unlimited amount.
Secondly, unlike World of Warcraft, and similar games, users cannot die or receive 
injuries inside Second Life. Falling from a high building or mountain triggers 
a cartoon-like 'splat'-like animation, after which the avatar acts normally. 
Scripted weapons can cause an avatar to shift position - to get knocked 
backwards, for example - but they cannot harm or damage the avatar.
Thirdly, avatars do not express appetites like hunger and thirst. They do not tire or 
need to rest or sleep. (In contrast, all of these occur in online role playing 
games such as World of Warcraft.)
As a result of these design choices users can regard all activities in the world as 
discretionary. They have nothing that they have to have achieved previously 
in order to accomplish something. Second Life offers endless free building 
materials that avatars can (almost literally) pluck out of thin air. Avatars 
have no physical needs or bodily appetites. They do not age, suffer injury or 
die. Linden Labs imposes no laws on them, except for very general terms of 
service such as one might find attached to any social space online.
We concluded that Second Life does not model any version of life as we know it. 
Rather, intentionally or not, it models an unspecified version of heaven.
What uses do residents make of Second Life?
We observed that residents tended to organise around three overlapping 
kinds of activity that we described as showing off, socialising and creating.
The first group tended to use Second Life to play what one student described as "an 
adult version of Barbie and Ken". They spent time and money dressing their 
avatars with the latest fashions, bought from the in-world designers and 
malls they had become familiar with. They often purchased "land" and then 
bought a house (or castle, or whatever form pleased them) before spending 
time making themselves an elaborate personalised space which they might 
model and remodel at frequent intervals.
The second group used Second Life as a traditional internet chat room with some 
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important additions. The communication channels in chatrooms suffer from 
being attenuated: users adopt evocative nicknames or handles, and then 
type text interspersed with emoticons. In Second Life the ability to dress up 
an avatar added a richer dimension of self-presentation to the mix. Users 
could shape and dress themselves as anything that they, or another resident, 
could imagine. They could seek out people who also wanted to look like 
cowboys, Egyptians, fairies, goths, steampunks, or wild animals; and then 
chat while making the kind of comments about others avatars that teenagers 
might make at parties. Social venues provided arenas which permitted a vir-
tual version of the social competitiveness that many people enjoy.
The third group used Second Life as a programmable Lego set, and spent their time 
creating virtual model railroad sets of their own design. This group played 
a vital role in the development of the social world, because this group pro-
vided much of the clothing, furniture, gadgets, vehicles and weapons that 
the others wanted. Some members of this group sold their creations and 
began to earn some, or even all, of their real income from inside Second 
Life. The lack of any global media in Second Life meant that they relied upon 
word of mouth to increase their business.
This, in turn, led to the creation of a fourth group of users: those whose interest 
lay mainly in trying to make money within the world. They acted as agents 
and organisers, setting up large malls and doing everything they could to 
increase traffic. Designers and builders paid to set up shops in the malls 
because their interest usually lay in the process of building and not in the 
subsequent marketing activities. The lack of planning regulations meant 
that people who purchased land from Linden Labs could have no idea what 
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would turn up next to them. They could log in to find their exquisite split-
level condo and pool suddenly next door to an amateurishly built space sta-
tion, or worse. The entrepreneurial group therefore began to buy land from 
Linden Labs and rent it out it with their own planning rules enforced. Thus 
users could, for example, rent space on an island that the owner had guar-
anteed would have a steampunk theme, with specific building and social 
rules tightly enforced.
How does news travel in Second Life?
The only certain way to find out about discretionary activities involved 
interacting with other avatars; either by exchanging information with them 
or by reading their profiles and seeing what places and events they had in 
their recommendations.
This had three primary effects.
1. Firstly the gathering and exchanging of information became an impor-
tant and time-consuming activity, especially for new users.
2. Secondly, users tended to begin by exploring, but soon settled into a 
regular pattern based on their initial successful contacts.
3. Thirdly, these ad hoc groups tended to solidify into longer-term 
clans. In other words, new users would start by looking for something 
to do; find a loosely knit group, based at a particular "place" in the 
world; and then attach themselves to this group, thus playing their part 
in helping it solidify.
How should we view our relationship with other residents?
We regarded the fact that users seemed prepared to spend a lot of time and 
(real) money dressing up, and adding accessories, ranging from surfboards 
to aircraft, to their virtual lives as a perfect fit for our project.
Our students spent much of their time at Arcada learning to understand client 
briefs, to develop concepts from them, to create prototypes, and to work 
with the client to bring the final product to completion. Their tools included 
applications such as Adobe Photoshop and Illustrator, and 3D modelling 
software, as well as scripting languages from HTML to JavaScript. Most cre-
ators in Second Life used Photoshop and Illustrator as integral parts of their 
workflow; and many aspects of Linden Scripting Language bore a strong 
resemblance to JavaScript. Every avatar in Second Life could potentially act 
as a client for our students, since every avatar wanted to purchase or obtain 
novelty in one form or another.
Most virtual goods in Second Life came in two flavours: free or paid for. Linden Labs 
provided basic free clothing, and some furniture and whimsical accesso-
ries such as campfires and lanterns. Other designers provided free goods 
as samples, or as a way of encouraging loyalty. We decided that Marinetta 
would contain shops offering goods that the students created, and that we 
would give these away free since we wished to encourage interaction, not 
to derive an income from the world. Every resident of the world constituted 
a potential customer, a potential client. They formed a natural resource 
within Second Life and we wanted to find ways of including them in the stu-
dents' learning experiences.
What do we need to understand before we commit ourselves to placing Rosario 
in Second Life?
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When we first entered Second Life, in 2005, it had very few global infra-
structures. It had an official currency, the Linden dollar, which users could 
purchase with a credit card and exchanged back into real currency using 
PayPal. However, it had no planning regulations, no in-world media, and 
no dominant communication channels. Together these factors exercised a 
great influence on the way users acted inside Second Life.
8.4. Outcomes
We arrived at these observations from our initial explorations. We under-
took these explorations not as anthropologists, or academic observers, but 
because we wanted to make sure we understood the nature of the terrain 
to which we had committed ourselves. We wanted to make certain that we 
understood all the "house rules", not as Linden Labs outlined them on their 
web site and in the Terms of Service, but as people actually experienced and 
expanded them inside the social world.
After this initial research, we decided to purchase a private island because we real-
ised from our private explorations and experiments that neighbourhoods 
on the mainland changed quickly and without any sense of consistency. 
Initially, as noted above, we purchased four sims which we later expanded 
to nine to allow the complete island to be modelled.
We also realised, after our research, that we would have to find ways of complying 
with existing norms and cultures, and that we needed to explore these in 
more detail.
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Within a short time of beginning to build the island in Second Life we 
decided to disallow flying and teleporting on Rosario. Linden Labs' decision 
to build a world in which users can teleport directly from anywhere on the 
universal map to anywhere else, or fly from one place to another where 
proximity renders teleporting unnecessary, effectively abolishes all experi-
ence of distance. This design decision limited the possibility of developing 
the equivalent of truck-stops and roadside diners on long highways: places 
that one might stumble across by accident while travelling.
One student described Second Life as "not like a world at all in many ways". She 
explained that
Everywhere is one jump from everywhere else which feels completely arti-
ficial and computer-like. Going somewhere is more like opening a file on 
a desktop than travelling. You just look at your desktop and choose any 
file you want to open, click on it, and there it is. You don't have to 
open a file about Sweden before you can get to a file about Denmark. But 
that is what you do when you travel. You have to go through Sweden or fly 
over it to reach Denmark, and it takes longer to get to Copenhagen than 
Stockholm. It doesn't take longer to get anywhere in Second Life because 
it is all just on a computer somewhere and you can open any place you 
want to go to.
We wished to reinstate this concept of distance. We wished to make the island explora-
ble, and to make the business of exploring the island rewarding, and so it made 
no sense to us to turn it into a set of hotspots whose layout did not matter.
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We realised that people would find the process of walking all over the island 
time-consuming and often dull (since the size of Rosario meant that add-
ing interesting features every couple of steps would take several years, and 
might never get finished). We therefore programmed la grizondi, a system of 
teleporting between nine designated stops on Rosario using Linden Script-
ing Language. (As noted elsewhere, LSL has some similarities to JavaScript 
and, unlike SCOL, most of our students felt comfortable with it, and rapidly 
gained competence in it.)
La grizondi enabled visitors to move between one place and another speedily, while 
still requiring them to experience various aspects of the island. We situ-
ated each grizondo stop a short distance from the place it served. The two 
stops for the town of Marinetta, for example, stood just outside the town 
and required the user to walk into the town from either the beach or from 
the long road that crossed the island.
To add interest and variety we also constructed a coastal highway around the 
island, with a road going over the mountains from one side to another. 
We built a shop that both sold and gave away working roller-skates which 
doubled or tripled the speed with which anyone wearing them could move. 
These became Rosario's preferred method of long-distance transport, and 
remained so for the entire life of the project.
9.1. Research Question
We needed to test our belief that switching off teleporting would have 
effects on visitors' behaviour, and that this in turn would impact on their 
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feelings. We therefore created a short research experiment to investigate 
this topic. We asked:
1. How do you experience the differences between teleporting from A to B 
in other areas of Second Life, and skating between A and B in Rosario?
2. What are the advantages and / or disadvantages of "enforced distance"?
We also asked students to talk with any visitors to the island, to ask 
them this question, and to note down their answers.
9.2. Description of Activity
To our surprise the research questions quickly proved irrelevant. The stu-
dents answered them and then moved onto exploring a new phenomenon 
they had inadvertently triggered. (I have listed the students' answers in the 
Outcomes section below.)
From the very beginning of the project we had had in mind an idea that we referred 
to as creative interference, but initially we had no idea how to bring it about. 
We intended this to counteract what we perceived as a major shortcoming 
in most of the educational worlds we had begun to see: namely that the 
designers had created them as educational worlds. In an early statement of 
intention we said:
Almost all the online environments that we have seen suffer from the fact 
that they are designed for one single purpose. Some are designed for dis-
tance learning; others are designed for entertainment such as role-play-
ing games. The real world does not work like that. People walk the same 
streets and sit on the same train for very different reasons.
Our intention is to create such a multi-purposed world: a world 
in which learning is one of the many possible activities that take place. 
We believe that this will provide a much richer and more appealing envi-
ronment that allows for spontaneous interaction between the inhabitants. 
(Kelly & Lindeberg, 2004b)
We found that the possibility of creative interference (and, indeed, the almost 
insuperable difficulty of avoiding it) offered one of the main advantages of 
moving the Marinetta Ombro project to Second Life. The world teemed with 
activity, with avatars whose owners might live almost anywhere in the real 
world. Within the first few months we met avatars claiming to hail from 
Africa, China, and India as well as America, Australasia and Europe. We 
could not know which of these told us the truth and which lied, and nor 
could we easily find out their motivations for entering the world and telling 
us these true or false stories. Of one thing we could feel certain, though: 
none of them had entered the world to participate in an educational exper-
iment conducted by a university of applied science in Helsinki. They had 
entered for their own inscrutable reasons and they had no reason whatso-
ever to show any interest in us at all. They therefore displayed most of the 
important characteristics of potential customers in the real world.
If we managed to engage some of them then Rosario would
therefore move from being centrally controlled to an unplanned amal-
gam of inter-related interests: work-related, educational and purely 
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for entertainment. Importantly, all of these will impact on each other, 
causing creative interference and increasing the richness of the total 
experience. 
(Kelly & Lindeberg, 2003b)
We recognised from the outset that many educators spent large amounts of time 
and energy trying to develop ways to shield their spaces from unwanted 
other users. We felt that they had missed the point. For us, the large body 
of users, dedicated only to having fun and experiencing novelty, formed the 
core resource that Second Life offered us. To attempt to hide from them 
would mean succumbing to timidity and limiting the experiment to the 
banal and already-known.
The decision to ask our students to engage actively with passing visitors to find out 
their opinions about enforced distance led to an increase in people visiting the 
island. This snowballed and although many visitors only came once and left, 
a few stayed and influenced our work in unexpected ways for better or worse.
Kindly strangers
Our decision to embrace the chaos of Second Life, rather than to try to cre-
ate a secluded ordered corner of our own, led to a number of interesting 
educational opportunities.
Several years passed before anyone wrote and published any books about design-
ing and programming in Second Life. Our students needed to learn these 
skills as soon as we began building Rosario. The only material available at 
the time revolved around Linden Labs' wiki, and a growing number of satel-
lite blog posts and video tutorials. Almost all of the writers published these 
under the names of their avatars, not their real names. We could therefore 
have no idea of the status or credentials of the authors who, for all we knew, 
might work as senior programmers in large corporations or study in the first 
year of high school.
We therefore found ourselves in a situation where we could only judge the utility 
of an article or tutorial by its results. If someone had programmed a com-
plex effect that worked as advertised, then we had to assume that they had 
the skills they claimed to have. If it failed to work as advertised then we 
had to work out whether the fault lay with us or with them. This, in turn, 
meant that we could have no way of knowing in advance whether a source 
of advice would turn out worth pursuing or not.
This conundrum became clearest when a small group of students found a kindly 
stranger who declared herself willing to teach them advanced building tech-
niques. The students' specific assignment involved learning how to build 
houses and furniture using the least amount of "prims" possible. (Prims 
formed the basic building blocks of all objects in Second Life. Every region, 
or plot of land, had a maximum number of prims it would support. Builders 
therefore needed to find ways of reducing the amount of prims in everything 
they built, and developed many techniques for doing this.)
One of the essential starting points for such a task involved exploring Second Life 
to see what other people had already done, in order to gain some idea of 
where the theoretical limits lay. When they had found an interesting object, 
students would often try to contact the builder to ask questions about 
the techniques used. Some people would answer, some would not. Some 
answers would appear curt and unhelpful; others would offer explanations 
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of various levels of depth. In this case, the builder offered to run a set of 
tutorial sessions to teach the students the techniques step-by-step.
Thus a stranger, who had a female avatar and claimed it represented her real-life 
gender, but would say nothing about her nationality or real-world status, 
came to teach a group of students advanced building techniques over sev-
eral two-hour sessions, and ended up doing most of the teaching on the 
course. (I should, perhaps, add that the course took the form of a set of 
workshops in which we expected students to explore given topics under 
guidance. The Kindly Stranger brought valuable additional material to the 
course. She did not replace any scheduled teaching.)
The masked newsagents
In a similar vein, three avatars approached us offering to establish a news 
stand on Rosario: a set of displays that, when touched, would link to some of 
the growing number of web sites and online magazines devoted to aspects of 
Second Life. After some discussion, we accepted the offer and for two years 
had a kiosk in Marinetta where citizens and visitors could go for a one-stop 
overview of fan-based news and information. At no point in this did we ever 
find out (or attempt to find out) the real life identities of these avatars. From 
our perspective it simply did not matter. They made a positive contribution 
to the creative interference we sought to promote; they brought new insights 
to our students; and we could in any case remove them from the island, 
instantly and permanently, at any time that we deemed it necessary.
Furry Squatters
We did not succeed in applying this rule in every case. At one stage, when 
we briefly opened the island's building permissions for a specific project, a 
group of furries built a camp in a relatively disused area of the island. Fur-
ries formed a distinct faction in Second Life. They had avatars that resem-
bled animals; usually cats or wolves or rabbits. They lived as their "animal 
selves" and had complex codes with external web sites dedicated to elu-
cidating them. We negotiated with the group who arrived, and gave them 
permission to stay for a limited period.
While they stayed they continued building, and this caused a controversy among 
the Rosarian building team. On the one hand, they built imaginative shelters 
to a high standard and made efforts to ensure that they blended in with their 
surroundings. On the other hand, they clearly belonged to a faction that had 
many more members than the island of Rosario and, as their friends arrived 
to visit and then stayed to petition us to allow them to build too, staff and 
students began to worry that they would overwhelm the project, leaving us 
as the downtrodden minority in one corner of a furry paradise. One student 
pointed out that it seemed very similar to a real-life infestation of rabbits on 
a farm, which led to others suggesting that we should get rid of them before 
we got overwhelmed rather than attempt to remove them after they had 
become established.
Reluctantly, I agreed and we asked the furries to leave at the end of their agreed 
period. I remain uncertain whether this worked to our advantage or not. 
They left with regret but no hostility. They did leave a plaque marking where 
they had built the camp, and I insisted that we leave that there, which we did.
The furries might indeed have overwhelmed us. Highly committed and very active, 
they visited the island more often, and for longer periods, than most of the 
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students. They held parties and brought numbers of friends over. I had sug-
gested building them into the Rosarian narrative, and they had shown some 
interest in joining in with this. Others felt that this would stretch the elas-
ticity of the project too far and place us in a similar position to the one we 
might have found ourselves in had we launched a world full of dungeons 
and dragons.
Since our team seemed scarcely large enough to carry out our existing plans I 
accepted this decision, although sad about the research opportunities we 
might lose. In the event, the disappearance of the furries became no more 
than one particularly interesting event on our journey. The island of Rosario 
and the town of Marinetta came to provide enough material to fill the con-
tent of a wide range of courses for almost five years. These included courses 
for our students; for the film and television students; for students from other 
departments; and for a large international project.
9.3. Observations
As noted above, this experiment served by accident to increase the amount 
of external visitors to the island. Some, as described, had benign and unex-
pected effects on the project. Others proved more problematic.
Within a month of beginning work on the island we decided to restrict the right to 
build on Rosario to a list of registered citizens. It had taken only a couple 
of days for a few people to find the island and start using it as a sand-
box: a place where they could practice building and create habitats of their 
own. Once this process it started it rapidly grew, as users presumably told 
in-world friends of the new sandbox they had found. After a week large 
parts of the island had a covering of abandoned experiments and other lit-
ter. It also had a number of dwellings into which people had moved.
Once we observed this we tried to find ways in which we could include it within 
our plans. We had people arriving on the island wanting to use the space, 
so surely we could find a means to incorporate them within our narrative. 
We talked with any incoming avatars that we found in-world at the same 
time as us. Although some displayed genuine interest and offered to work 
with us, many displayed outright hostility. Some responded by moving 
from using empty areas of the island to deliberately building in and over 
the work the students had begun. After several attempts to find a solution, 
we declared the island had entered a building phase and prevented anyone 
except those in a named list from building there.
We made the elementary mistake of explaining this in advance to the island's 
squatters which resulted in someone dropping some self-replicating objects 
onto the island in an attempt to crash the servers running our sims. In our 
first month in Second Life, then, we came up against a range of unexpected 
issues, and found ourselves having to reassess our aims and redefine our 
goals in the light of the prevailing culture we found there.
9.4. Outcomes
The original research questions yielded the following answers
1. The effect of the enforced distances differs markedly depending upon 
whether you travel on your own or with a companion;
(8
2
)
2. Travelling on your own makes the longer distances dull. If you have 
to do them twice for some reason then the second trip becomes very 
irritating:
3. If we plan on forcing people to skate across the island (which can 
take five "real" minutes) then we need to set up diversions: objects or 
events that travellers can take part in, watch or listen to;
4. Travelling with a companion makes it possible to turn the journey into 
a race, or to entertain each other by showing off your skating skills. 
(The skates had a set of built-in moves and stunts that one could prac-
tise and, with enough skill, combine into impressive routines.);
5. Visitors find not being able to fly irritating or interesting depending 
on what they want, and how they react to us. Those that stand and chat 
often ask where they can get the skates, get a pair when they realise 
that they cost nothing, and then come back to skate.
Beyond the benefit of gathering this information, the experiment strengthened our 
belief in proceeding through an open-ended, bottom-up strategy. If we had 
formulated our experiment tightly, and then insisted that students do not 
deviate from the intended purpose, then we would have received no more 
information than we had set out to find. We would have analysed a rela-
tively trivial problem while missing out altogether on discovering a bigger 
and considerably more interesting one.
Our experiences with our unknown collaborators also caused us to look hard for 
other ways in with we could make residents' "natural" behaviours in Sec-
ond Life work to our benefit, rather than against us. Because of what we had 
learned, we began to look in closer detail at how we might create situations 
in which students benefitted from engaging the pre-existing and "natural" 
desires of other residents.
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We had become aware that the learning outcomes of the Introduction to 
Photoshop course, which our first year students took, appeared to match 
closely the skills needed to make clothing in Second Life. Both seemed to 
require knowledge of, and practical capabilities in:
1. The whole range of Photoshop's selection tools;
2. Channels;
3. Saved selections and alpha channels;
4. Layers and layer masks;
5. Unusual file formats (.Targa in the case of Second Life).
We set out to translate this coincidence into a useful learning object.
10.1. Research Question
We told students to immerse themselves in Second Life for several days with 
the intention of bringing back answers to two questions.
1. What do avatars currently wear in Second Life? More specifically, can 
you discern any noticeable crazes, fashions or trends in Second Life?
2. What, in addition to what you already know, would you need to learn 
to make a set of this clothing?
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10.2. Description of Activity
The students brought back images and reports of different styles they had 
observed and that they claimed constituted current trends. What some stu-
dents claimed flatly contradicted what other students claimed, but they all 
had evidence to back up their statements, and so we accepted everything 
they said as true.
Reverse Engineering
We began by asking each student to pick one item of clothing from the 
images they had captured and make as close a copy as they could. To do 
this they needed to
1. load one of the pre-existing templates we had found into Photoshop;
2. use the template as the starting point for their own work;
3. save their finished work, and export it in the correct format;
4. load the exported file into Second Life;
5. try wearing it;
6. repeat the process until the clothing their avatar wore in Second 
Life closely resembled the item they had photographed originally.
Not all students managed this on their first attempt but all of them managed to 
complete the assignment within the given time.
Fashion Design
We then asked them to take a further step: to design their own clothing in 
the style they had cited as fashionable. We gave them explicit instructions. 
They had more or less cloned an existing item of clothing. They now had 
to analyse it and determine what made it desirable, and then make their 
own, recognisably different, version that they believed would prove even 
more desirable. While attempting this they had to keep in mind the avatars 
that wore the original clothes, the ones that they had copied, because these 
avatars, not the students themselves, needed to find the new designs more 
desirable.
In this way the students began designing for a potential market. Once they had 
produced a piece to an acceptable standard, and successfully attached it 
to their avatar, and once they believed that other residents would perceive 
their avatar as fashionable, we invited them to test this assumption by 
returning to the site where they had done their original research and asking 
the avatars they found there to comment on their clothing.
In order to produce acceptable clothing students had to move beyond mere imi-
tation and start addressing the question of why the various groups in Sec-
ond Life behaved as they did, and dressed like they did; and what roles 
their virtual clothing played in their social games. Many students noticed 
that residents of Second Life had constructed elaborate personae, which 
they expressed visually; and that they used these to tell a personal story. 
Because avatars did not have any means of exhibiting body language of any 
subtlety, clothing played a vital part in establishing an avatar’s character, 
and thus the role it played in the group’s ongoing narrative.
Only newbies wore the default clothing. Only relative newcomers wore the widely 
available free costumes. Most residents sought out specific places to obtain 
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clothing and other accessories, and developed loyalties to individual design-
ers, or to familiar locations.
Many residents used clothing as a very specific expressive code. They changed 
their avatar’s clothing to indicate their state of mind. Their avatar dressed 
one way if they wished to present themselves in-world as happy and 
another way if they wished to present themselves as angry or sad. Because 
emotions could not affect the avatar’s posture or facial expressions, cloth-
ing became a heightened indicator in the ongoing story of “who I am” and 
“what I am like” and “what you should think about me”.
In some cases this realisation led to a further round of fine-tuning, and in a couple 
of cases to a complete rethink. In the end all the students had items that had 
received positive feedback from other residents.
Mechanisms for selling goods in Second Life
By this point the village of Marinetta on the island of Rosario contained 
a number of shops that we used for various purposes, including the free 
distribution of the Skoop roller-skates that our students and others used to 
traverse the island. We had situated the shops close to one of la grizondi, 
and so we could easily create notecards that contained the address in a form 
that other residents could use to teleport to the right place on the island.
Purchasing anything in Second Life happened through pointing and clicking. One 
of the standard methods for putting this into practice involved creating dis-
pensers which consisted, in essence, of an image of the available product 
that, once clicked, would transfer a copy of the item to the avatar's personal 
inventory. These could contain scripts (using LSL) that programmed them to 
then transfer an amount of Linden dollars from the avatar to the owner of 
the dispenser. Alternatively they could skip this step, effectively giving away 
the items for nothing.
I programmed a set of dispensers, one per student, and arranged them in a row of 
shops. I then added additional dispensers in case we needed them. I set the 
dispensers to give away their contents for no cost. I also set them to record 
how many items they had dispensed, and the names of the avatars that had 
taken the clothing.
Fashion Festival
We announced that the course would conclude with a shopping festival. 
Students had two weeks to undertake their final assignment, which involved
1. going back into Second Life;
2. checking their findings, and recalibrating them if necessary;
3. making the best clothes they could in the light of their revised 
information;
4. advertising them among the groups they had identified as potential 
customers; and then
5. selling them in the shops I had set up in Marinetta, in a 48 Hour 
shopping festival.
In this assignment students had to design for an existing market that they had identi-
fied. They had to tailor their ideas to the apparent requirements of this market, 
as they had understood it. This closely paralleled the designer-client relation-
ship that our students would meet in the real marketplace, during praktik and 
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freelance work, and after graduation. The nature of the task prevented the stu-
dents from merely "expressing themselves" and imposed an external discipline.
At one level the exercise was technical, but at another level it was anthropological. 
To succeed the students needed to understand the technicalities involved 
in creating clothing using Photoshop. To succeed well they also needed 
to understand the narrative nature of Second Life, and the ways in which 
visual display stood in for much that gets conveyed with body language and 
posture in real life.
We showed the students how to use the dispensers; how to put their products into 
them and set them to give items away. We also gave them a date for the 
festival, and a set of notecards to distribute as advertisements. In addition, 
we made sure they all knew how to create their own notecards in case the 
groups they had contacted had their own rules or conventions and needed 
addressing in particular ways.
Students could have as many dispensers as they needed, provided that each dis-
penser held a unique item of clothing. So, if a student had created two 
shirts, one coat and a pair of boots, they could claim four dispensers. Most 
students had one or two dispensers, although some had three or four and 
one student required five. I added extra dispensers as necessary and, in the 
end, added one extra shop to the row.
The Assessment Procedure
The festival came and went. 167 residents visited the island during the fes-
tival. Most of them chose to take one or more items of free clothing. We 
published a set of figures that showed how many of each item had residents 
had taken, with time and date. We also made the names of the customers 
available to the students.
We now invited the students to assess themselves and each other. This assessment 
had three questions at its heart:
1. Are you satisfied with the amount of your clothing people chose 
to take?
2. What would you have needed to do to persuade more people to choose 
your clothes?
3. What grade do you think you deserve?
Students provided written feedback in the form of assessment notes. They first 
graded themselves, and wrote comments intended to justify their decision. 
They then wrote shorter notes on each of the other members of the course, 
commenting on their clothing and offering reasons why they had succeeded 
or failed in attracting customers.
Three students failed to attract any customers and we invited them to explain why 
they had not failed the assignment. One of them took us to the place in Sec-
ond Life where she had conducted her research and pointed out that her 
problem lay, not in the design of her clothing, but in her inability to persuade 
the avatars who lived there to come to the festival. She correlated the list of 
avatars present in the region over forty eight hours with the list of avatars 
who attended the festival and successfully demonstrated that the lists con-
tained no overlap whatsoever. She further argued that, within the constraints 
of the assignment, we could not reasonably have expected her to predict this.
She had, it turned out, chosen an area of Gorean roleplaying, and although the res-
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idents there did indeed like her bondage themed clothing, they had no inter-
est in coming to Rosario to avail themselves of it. However, once she had 
gone through the complex rituals needed to request permission to give her 
clothing away in the Goreans' own area, her clothing proved very popular, 
and she went on to create more outside the assignment for her own interest.
Without meaning to, she had chosen one of the more difficult sub-groups to work 
with, in that the Goreans possessed a very tightly defined set of elabo-
rate rituals based closely on the narratives laid out in the much-criticised 
sequence of thirty three novels by John Norman. These depict a fantasy 
counter-Earth with a mix of ancient and modern technology and the sort 
of sadomasochistic plotlines that the British author Michael Moorcock has 
described as “stuff that works to objectify women and suggests women 
enjoy being beaten”.
For the Goreans clothing formed a key part of the collective fantasy that they had 
constructed, and this fantasy restricted their movement or, more accurately, 
their interest in moving around the larger spaces of Second Life. To com-
plete her assignment the student had to move beyond understanding their 
clothing as an aesthetic and come to an understanding of the larger narra-
tive into which the Goreans had woven their clothing. 
In the end she passed the course, and received a grade of excellent. The other two 
students had no similar explanations and accepted that their clothing had 
not met the requirements of the market they had attempted to address. One 
of them repeated the exercise, by making a second set of clothing, advertis-
ing it and successfully giving it away. He passed. The other student failed 
the assignment.
A shop in Marinetta
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10.3. Observations
When challenged, the students duly noticed a variety of fashions, which 
they described as constituting the latest trends. Interestingly different stu-
dents noticed very different trends. We had asked them to include screen-
shots in their reports and these made clear that the disparity in their reports 
mirrored a set of very different second lives. It also became clear that some 
of these groups had no knowledge of (and no interest in) some of the other 
groups. Second Life, it appeared, housed many different "worlds", only 
some of which overlapped.
Some of these worlds had very specific reasons for existing, which ranged from a 
delight in steampunk and a resulting area in which buildings, dress and style 
of communication all reflected this, to the S&M devotees in the Gorean sub-
culture with their strict hierarchies and love of discipline and submission.
10.4. Outcomes
This experiment demonstrated that we could harness the desires of the 
other residents in Second Life in productive ways. By treating them as a 
market, or as a set of parallel markets, we could provide goods that they 
themselves wanted in a way that led our students to work in a way directly 
comparable to the ways a lot of them would work after graduating. With 
this experiment we felt that we had finally crossed a threshold. We now had 
many of the same important features within Marinetta Ombro that the film 
and television students had with TV Borgå.
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Very early in the project we had drawn up a list of calendar-based festivals 
in Rosario, in order to use these to provide deadlines and frameworks for 
student projects. One of these, Semano Semano, had a deliberately vague 
place in the calendar: we had left it as a floating Spring festival in order to 
make it usable for larger and more experimental projects that could take 
place in the final period of the academic year when many students do work 
practice and others require simulated work training.
In 2007, Helsinki hosted the finals of the Eurovision Song Contest, and Arcada 
applied to play a role in the media festivities. The television students pro-
duced a stream of non-stop broadcasts, some of which YLE, the Finnish 
Broadcasting Corporation, transmitted nationally. The others appeared live 
on Arcada's cable channel across Helsinki.
The multimedia students naturally wanted to participate too, and so we declared 
that in 2007 the Semano Semano festivals would occur in Second Life at 
exactly the same time as the Eurovision Song Contest occurred in Helsinki. 
A team of multimedia students from Arcada worked with four exchange stu-
dents from ITT in Dublin. We decided that we would adopt the same work-
ing methods as the film and television students, and so all of the multimedia 
students ceased all other academic activity for three weeks and devoted 
themselves solely to developing this project.
11.1. Research Question
We established two related clusters of research questions.
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1. What would a gigantic festival look like on Rosario? What events, 
facilities and equipment would such a festival need? Can we build such a 
festival in three weeks?
2. How would we attract crowds to a Semano Semano festival? Why would 
they come and why would they stay? Why would they spread the news to 
their friends?
11.2. Description of Activity
The students began by spending eighteen hours in Second Life in one con-
tinuous burst of activity.
They had decided, quite correctly, that different people from different parts of the 
world must participate in Second Life at different times of the Finnish day 
and night. They wanted to begin their research by mapping out this involve-
ment. Several of them then repeated this experiment in order to check their 
initial findings.
Global Involvement in Second Life
During this period Linden Labs never published comprehensive figures for 
Second Life usage in a form that bore close analysis. They tended to pub-
lish headline figures whose actual significance remained elusive. They pub-
lished impressive statistics for the total number of residents, and for the 
amount of new residents joining each month, but not for how long residents 
spent in the world, or how often they logged in.
Many observers suspected that Second Life suffered an enormous churn rate, with 
the majority of new residents joining, logging in once, and then never log-
ging in again. Since basic accounts cost nothing, and took just a couple 
of minutes to set up, anybody with even a passing interest in Second Life 
would almost certainly do this.
People also suspected that many of the committed users had more than one ava-
tar. Users would have several reasons to do this, and indeed we had sev-
eral avatars ourselves. Users, like us, who owned islands, would need to 
do this to test the level of permissions. Some parts of the Second Life infra-
structure had bugs and design flaws, and some aspects of the administra-
tor's dashboard suffered from a confusing and counterintuitive interface. 
The business of setting permissions suffered in precisely this way, and one 
of the only guaranteed ways to test that the settings you had applied had 
the effect that you intended involved entering the island as a stranger. I 
had therefore created an avatar with no permissions to do anything on the 
island. I used him in order to see exactly what a passing stranger would 
see if they landed on Rosario. I also used him to explore Second Life when 
I wanted to travel through the world anonymously. When some students 
eventually got to recognise him as me, I created a third avatar that I told 
nobody about so that I could observe activities in Rosario from the outside, 
and could explore the rest of Second Life in peace.
To my certain knowledge some of the students who became highly enthusiastic 
about Second Life did the same. They had "respectable" avatars that they 
linked to the Marinetta Ombro project, and other "private" avatars that they 
used to attend in-world parties, clubs, orgies and more; and used to partic-
ipate in the various in-world subcultures.
Because of this I suggested to the multimedia students that they should simply 
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ignore the overall population figures and concentrate on seeing how the 
usage varied over a twenty four hour cycle. They discovered that global 
involvement seemed to have a very uneven spread. Almost inevitably they 
found that the world had a lot of users during the times that North Ameri-
cans regarded as evening and late night. However they also found sizeable 
clusters of users from Britain and Germany, from Korea and Japan, and from 
Australia. In addition they came across groups of Spanish speaking users 
spread across time zones.
They seemed to find a low-level of activity in the world in Spanish (whether from 
Spain or South America) or from South East Asia any time they looked. 
Crucially, they found no points during the twenty four hour cycle in which 
activity ceased. Individual venues and individual places seemed often to 
spring into life for only two to six hours per day, but it always seemed possi-
ble to find at least some clubs or islands in use at any time.
It became clear during subsequent explorations that many of these pockets of 
activity had no communication whatsoever with other groups. Second Life, 
in effect, housed not "one world" but many different worlds that opened 
and closed sequentially, at different times of day and night. Places that had 
appeared deserted or abandoned every time we had visited them turned out 
to spring into life and flourish while we slept.
Structure of the Festival
These observations served to define the nature of the festival. The students 
suggested that, since we only intended on doing this once and for a fixed 
period, we should do it with the same manic energy that the television stu-
dents would put into their continuous broadcasts. They suggested that the 
festival should run continuously during the Eurovision Song Contest week-
end. One of the Irish students then suggested that we should run a twelve 
day festival and once he had explained what he meant the structure of 
Semano Semano fell into place.
Second Life has an idiosyncratic feature that most of its users ignore, and which we 
had tried to find uses for. The sun and moon have a four hour cycle, consist-
ing of three hours of daylight, a brief dusk, one hour of darkness, and a brief 
dawn. This means that the world has six in-world days for every real-life 
day. Since darkness presents no impediment to movement or vision both 
builders and users usually take no notice of this change in light.
We decided, whoever, that we would advertise the festival as taking place over 
twelve Rosarian days, and that we would structure it on that basis. We 
would organise a pattern of morning, afternoon, evening and night time 
activities. This would mean that different groups from different time zones 
would probably participate on different festival "days", but that each group 
would have the ability to participate in at least one full day's programming.
Programming the Events
The team sketched out a full range of activities for the twelve "days", and a 
schedule that would ensure that at least one team member acted as a host 
in Rosario at every point during the festival period.
Once the students had devised a draft programme they began gathering the objects 
that they needed to bring it to life. In many cases this meant designing and 
scripting new objects. In other cases it meant travelling Second Life to find 
objects that we could buy.
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The final list of activities included:
1. a daily race around the island on specially scripted Segway machines;
2. treasure hunts;
3. a parachuting contest, with scripted launcher and target;
4. free clothing dispensers, giving away t-shirts, dresses and a tradi-
tional Rosarian costume;
5. a synchronized national dance in full Rosarian national costume;
6. a meeting area in which we continuously streamed Arcada's live cable 
broadcasts;
7. a club area that remained open throughout the festival.
Building the Site
Finally the student team completely rebuilt a large, hitherto undeveloped, 
area of the island and named it La Moyena Valo. They reshaped the val-
ley, built stages, added a landing point, and embedded a variety of ambient 
sounds to provide a sense of atmosphere, even when the area lay empty.
Making Movies
The team decided that the whole idea needed a back-story of its own. We 
needed to have an answer to the question of why Rosario had any interest 
in the Eurovision Song Contest in the first place. They suggested that Rosa-
rio had tried to enter the contest but had suffered rejection at the hands of 
the organisers. The island would hold its own festival partly as an act of 
defiance and partly to draw attention to its effective ban.
In order to make this plausible they commissioned the creation of the Rosarian 
entry to the contest, sung (in Ido) by Marinetta's most famous pop star 
L'angelot. (In reality, Neil Thompson, an English musician who ran an inde-
pendent record label in Brighton, and who had previously lectured the stu-
dents on the benefits of using Creative Commons licences for artistic pro-
duction, composed, sang and played the song.) Titled Al Dek Manto in the 
honour of Dek Manto, the great Rosarian writer, the song had an accompa-
nying video in the form of a machinima movie filmed entirely inside Second 
Life, and then uploaded to YouTube. You can still find the song and video at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18BzfsbVCJA
To accompany all of this the students recorded a series of short documentary clips 
in which they tried to ask various people connected with the Eurovision 
Song Contest why Rosario had had no opportunity to submit an entry. They 
uploaded these as part of the country's campaign for recognition.
Second Life and Television
During the festival itself, the students recorded and edited videos from 
inside SL. These proved very useful for the television students running live 
television feeds for Arcada's cable channel, which broadcast 24 hours a day 
during the Eurovision week. The team provided them with quirky content 
that they could drop into gaps in the schedules, and re-use whenever they 
needed to.
They streamed non-stop television broadcasts live into La Moyena Valo, the festival 
valley in Rosario. They streamed video taken in the valley for broadcast on 
television in Helsinki, on the web, and over Finnish mobile phone networks.
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Publicising and Hosting
While creating La Moyena Valo, the students had also kept up a schedule of 
exploration, scouting not only for useful items but also for areas where they 
might find potential attendees.
During the forty eight hours before the festival the student team worked hard visit-
ing other areas in Second Life which they had identified as containing ava-
tars whom they could probably interest in the event. They arranged with 
other landowners to leave notecard dispensers advertising the event and 
giving a clickable set of directions which would teleport any avatar to the 
specially created festival landing point. They approached writers for vari-
ous Second Life blogs, explained the backstory and pointed them towards 
the videos on YouTube.
Once the festival began, the team ensured that visitors did not find an empty area 
when they arrived. One or two team members hosted the area at all times, 
and guided visitors to the clothes dispensers and the contests and games. 
They had developed some of the games specifically to provide one-person 
activity for avatars that arrived during a lull in attendance. Other games, 
like the parachuting and hang-gliding, worked best as small group games 
which the hosts would inaugurate whenever a group appeared.
11.3. Observations
During the twelve sessions of Semano Semano approximately 700 people 
participated in some sort of in-world activity. In terms of numbers attending 
events in Second Life at the time, this meant that it certainly counted as a 
Dance party at Semano Semano
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large and successful event. Many, more highly publicised, events attracted 
100 people or less.
The numbers varied wildly from session to session; partly because we failed to 
appeal to as many American residents as we would have liked, and (judg-
ing from conversations we had) partly depending on what else occurred in 
Second Life at the same time. Activities such as Terra Z races and skydiving 
proved popular, though, every time people we hosted them.
The eleventh session took place the hour before the contest itself began, and filled up 
almost from the outset. Because nobody wanted to leave, it simply carried on 
throughout the three hour televised contest. During this unplanned five hour 
party there were never less than thirty people in La Moyena Valo, and we esti-
mated that over 150 people were there for at least fifteen or twenty minutes.
The form of the project almost exactly mirrored the form of the television broad-
casts, in that it required extreme effort over a short period of time, with a 
clearly defined end-point after which the team could celebrate. This stood 
in stark contrast to much of our other work, which we had developed slowly 
and methodically with no real end in mind. A shop, once opened, needed 
maintaining and supplying with new products. A club, once created, needed 
staffing and hosting. These requirements never diminished and, indeed, if a 
shop or a club proved successful, then they grew over time.
The Semano Semano project, on the other hand, tapped a different kind of energy 
and required a different kind of commitment. The students had risen to the 
challenge, but we wondered whether this might in part result from the fact 
that the project had always had a clear finishing line; that we had intended 
from the start that the twelfth "day" of the festival would act as a finale.
11.4. Outcomes
Semano Semano became the largest project that we had ever organised in 
Second Life and it proved completely successful within its own terms. It 
achieved everything that we set out to do, and the numbers of people who 
attended the event far exceeded our expectations.
This had a completely unexpected effect. After the event, when we held a final 
debriefing meeting and celebration, everyone involved, both students and 
staff, felt that not only had we achieved what we set out to do, but that we 
might, for the moment, have exhausted the possibilities of Second Life as a 
learning framework. Someone raised the question "what can we do to top 
that?" and nobody could answer it.
This raised an important issue, because until this point every year that students 
got involved with the Marinetta Ombro project, we challenged them to find 
something to do there that would enlarge the culture of Rosario. We chal-
lenged them, in effect, to do better than the previous years’ students. We 
knew why we believed this necessary: if a group of students ever felt that 
their predecessors had done all the pioneering work, and had carried out 
all the interesting tasks, and that their role simply involved maintaining the 
world and perhaps tinkering at the edges, then that group would approach 
the project as a chore and not as an adventure, and at that point the project 
would cease to act as the framework we wanted.
Semano Semano happened in May, at the end of the academic year, and so we left 
for vacation wondering whether the Marinetta Ombro project had run its 
course, or if it still had a future.
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When we looked back at the Semano Semano project, at the beginning of 
the next academic year, we also looked at the wider context in which the 
Marinetta Ombro project had taken place. We looked at the students' pro-
fessional needs and acknowledged that they had begun to change. Online 
worlds had ceased to seem important. Second Life had not become the "three 
dimensional web", as its founders had intended, and instead Facebook had 
begun to assert a near-monopoly over the suddenly popular "social web".
During its brief period in the spotlight, the television series CSI:New York had run 
a plot thread through a whole series which took place simultaneously in 
New York and Second Life. We found it impossible to imagine that happen-
ing again. Many other online worlds had launched, failed to gain sufficient 
followers, and gone out of business, while others had sought out niche mar-
kets in which they could continue to remain viable. Google had developed 
an online world called Lively, which it launched in beta in July 2008, and 
then killed off in December 2008, just before its official launch date. Active-
Worlds seemed to have retrenched into operating as a little-discussed and 
little-used academic tool. Certainly nobody seemed to write about Active-
Worlds anymore in the mainstream, or even the computer, press.
Our new first year students expressed a keen interest in social games and mobile 
apps for phones. They seemed to have little enthusiasm for projects in 
online worlds which appeared to them as an old-fashioned and failed 
technology. Gamers used to World of Warcraft and Eve Online, expressed 
scorn at the graphics in Second Life, while others regarded it as point-
less. They felt that social activity belonged on social media where they 
could show off as themselves, rather than by assuming another identity. 
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We realised that many of the new start-ups had begun with teams of two 
or three, and many of them had begun while the team members studied 
and before they graduated. In this changed context perhaps we no longer 
needed to offer simulated experience; perhaps we should carry out real 
projects instead.
We spent the autumn in discussion. In January 2010 we formally closed the Mari-
netta Ombro project and (with one important exception discussed later in 
Chapter 19) carried out no further work on the island in Second Life.
12.1. Full Circle
We began looking at social gaming with the students. Many, if not most, of 
the games at that time presented themselves a card games, in one way or 
another, and based themselves on variations of the rules of paper-scissors-
rock, in which power A beats power B, power B beats power C, and power 
C beats power A. We examined the history of these games, from Magic: the 
Gathering through Pokemon to more recent incarnations based around fran-
chises such as Transformers. In doing this we realised that a complex back-
story formed a crucial element in each game, and that each game required 
the player to immerse themselves in, and gain an understanding of, this 
background in order to play the game well.
Pokemon offered a particularly well developed version of this. The video games, 
the animated television series and the trading card game all fitted together 
seamlessly. Whereas a poker player can learn everything they need to know 
about the game from playing and observing the game, because the logic 
of the game remains internal to the game, a Pokemon player will gain an 
advantage from a familiarity with the characters on the cards and their 
behaviours as depicted in the video games and cartoons.
We therefore found ourselves coming full circle. We had begun the Marinetta 
Ombro project by developing a world. We have done much of this devel-
opment work before we had any online representation of the world. Before 
we even launched the island in Second Life, we had discovered the complex 
history of Rosario, and familiarised ourselves with the leading players in 
this history. We now ran a game design course that finished with a group 
project in which the group developed a social game that would work partly 
online and partly offline. We needed a story for this game, and we found it 
by using the history and geography of Rosario as the backdrop for the game.
The students developed a game called Familia di Rosario that imagined three secret 
factions vying to control Rosario's destiny. Each player controlled a charac-
ter on the island that had membership of one or more factions. Each player 
tried to assist one faction to unmask the membership of the other factions 
while trying to remain anonymous. The game took place on a map of the 
island with the nine towns representing areas of potential control.
In this way the project ended as it had begun: as a set of interlinked narratives used 
to trigger creative thinking by providing a coherent framework within which 
such thinking could develop.
12.2. Lessons Learned
By the end of the active phase of the project we had learned more than 
we had originally intended. Creating and maintaining the project had led 
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us into unexpected areas and required us to address a number of complex 
theoretical issues.
Marinetta Ombro as mental mapping
The first stages of the Marinetta Ombro project had involved imagining 
aspects of the virtual culture we wanted to create. We had had to create the 
history and geography of the island. Concept design and branding courses 
form a key part of the digital online media students degree program, and 
we utilised those courses for this purpose. We located the island precisely 
halfway between Crete and Malta, and north of Libya, and challenged stu-
dents to answer questions such as: what animals and plants would live on 
the island, and what crafts would we find there? What happened to Rosario 
in the First World War? Do Rosarians feel primarily European or African? 
What god(s) have the Rosarians worshipped and why?
We further encouraged students to raise more general questions about the spec-
ificity of place and time, and the shorthand methods used to depict these 
in different media. What makes Paris Parisian? Where do we find the nine-
teen-fifties-ness of the nineteen fifties? How do we recognise these in films, 
books, radio broadcasts and postcards? We measured the success or fail-
ure of these exercises by circulating the initial results as e-books, and then 
devising presentations and lectures about aspects of life on the island.
A web design course then took this material as its starting point and built web-
sites designed to attract holidaymakers to Rosario. We launched these online 
using the URL www.marinetta.info and they remained online until the project 
closed. Students updated the sites annually as part of the web design course.
Arcada's media courses have always worked within a constructivist framework 
that, as far as possible, allows students to learn through doing. Students 
gain experience in designer / client relationship as early as possible, and 
the use of the data from the island of Rosario enabled us to place students in 
such a relationship much earlier than previously. Because we utilised "real" 
data, and because we had an existing site online that did need updating 
(and because we inserted a launch date into the process) students not yet 
ready to work in a live situation nonetheless simulated it with an uncanny 
accuracy, by working in a live albeit largely fictitious situation.
Working with mental maps
Not only had the media students participated in this way: we had also suc-
cessfully interested staff and students from other departments. The com-
munity health students had always had to work together to produce a com-
munity health plan as an important part of their course work. Previously 
they had done this as an entirely imaginary exercise, based on extrapolating 
data from publicly available information from municipalities in Finland. For 
three years after the inception of the Marinetta Ombro project, however, 
students produced health plans for different villages on the island, based on 
a complex series of population and economic data that we constructed for 
that purpose. These figures did not arise from thin air. We worked with our 
students to derive them by averaging the population figures for surrounding 
regions, allowing for the differences in geography and wild life, and then 
factoring in aspects of the different cultural and political histories.
We measured the success of this project anecdotally. The students enjoyed the 
exercise and could explain why. The attractions of creating a healthcare 
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plan for a village in Rosario proved quite similar to the attractions of playing 
Pokemon. Both have a set of established mythologies that you can consult 
outside the game, and both mythologies feed into, and serve to enrich, the 
experience of playing the game.
Being given a random set of figures and then told they represent a nameless town 
that needs a health plan seemed less engaging for the students than being 
given a set of e-books that relate to a country you can explore and explore, 
and being told that one of the villages you find there has a need for a health 
plan. Context seemed all, context proved engaging, and (at least in this lim-
ited sense) context enriched the learning experience. Both Pokemon and 
Rosario seemed to supply immersive context that drew students in.
We saw the same conclusions reached when the international business students 
became involved with the island. They had also previously engaged in sim-
ulations that had no real context. They had had to construct business plans 
for imaginary companies based on given sets of figures. When the staff 
decided to use the island of Rosario several things happened. Firstly, the 
starting point for the simulations moved several steps back; and secondly 
the students had to, in effect, invent their own simulations.
The business students received the figures on population density, age and gender 
spread, educational levels, and health issues that we and the community 
health students had collected. Their assignment involved analysing the fig-
ures and then looking at the geography and history of Rosario. From this 
data, they had to propose a business that they believed that they could start 
on the island; construct a business plan for the business; and then justify it 
in terms of the overall geographical and political context of the island.
Bizarrely, this resulted in the students making a three metre square papier mache 
model of the island which they displayed publicly at a number of confer-
ences. We therefore ended up with a real model of a so-called virtual world 
that demonstrated the imaginary businesses that the students had really 
situated there, based on the extrapolated figures they had received.
Marinetta as programming
The initial stages of launching the 3D online world meant that Marinetta 
became a topic for a number of programming courses. Here, as in the pre-
vious examples, this resulted in us refurbishing or upgrading the teaching 
exercises in existing courses. From being isolated examples proposed to 
make a specific point they became building blocks in a larger structure.
Digital online media students created a set of websites designed to make the pro-
ject self-documenting. A newspaper site at www.jurnalo.info enabled any 
students involved in any aspects of the project to report on their activities in 
the guise of newspaper articles.
A hub site at www.marinetta.org housed an online encyclopaedia, listing the 
ever-growing details of the island's history, with entries dating from 1452BC 
"when the Emperor Tutmosis III, husband of Queen Hatshepsut, ascended 
to the throne after her death in 1480 BC, and began the great territorial 
expansion of the Egyptian New Kingdom. Phoenicia and Palestine were 
conquered and the island of Rosario was subsumed into the Empire, serving 
as a convenient port and supply base".
This history, like the geography, carefully slotted any necessary fictions into con-
sensus reality - and the success of this proved one of the key measuring 
sticks during the early phases of the project.
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The very existence of the island online prompted two separate programming inter-
ventions from the Computer Science department at Arcada. The first looked 
at the question of security and caused students from the cryptography 
courses to take the SCOL engine to pieces, and propose a series of improve-
ments. The second resulted in John Packelen's thesis Virtuella Vårldar: Öppen 
källkod och icke-Öppna läsingar, which detailed his research attempting to 
construct a home-made 3D environment built in Macromedia Director 8 to 
compare the educational possibilities of working with Director as opposed 
to SCOL.
Subsequently, computing science courses have looked at developing ways of com-
municating in and out of virtual worlds: projects that resulted, for example, 
in one of the first instant messaging systems for Second Life.
Marinetta as design
The existence of the island online enabled us to expand and enhance a wide 
range of design exercises in several course. Again, we did not emphasise 
teaching "in a virtual world". Rather we attempted to use a synthetic culture 
as a learning object, to improve the quality of existing courses by making 
the exercises appear less arbitrary to the students due to the fact that they 
now slotted into a global context, a back story that students could play with 
while learning.
The introductory course in digital imagery provided one powerful example of this. 
We had designed this in order to make certain that students had a clear 
understanding of key Photoshop concepts and an ability to use Photoshop 
to practical effect. However, one cannot teach Photoshop without making 
images, and traditionally it had proved difficult to find a suitable range of 
images that students had a genuine interest in.
When we had moved Rosario into Second Life, we found several ways to solve this 
problem. We quickly realised that designing and manufacturing clothes in 
Second Life required students to understand and use almost everything that 
we were trying to get them to learn. They had to use layers and masks. They 
had to understand how to use transparency. They had to understand file 
formats. They had to make 3D images using 2D templates.
We did not need to assess the effectiveness of this course, statistically or diagram-
matically, because it became abundantly clear very early on that almost all 
students preferred making clothes for their avatars to colorizing photos of 
Elvis or any of the other previous "teaching exercises".
We soon built upon this by setting up a free clothes store on Rosario and advertis-
ing it inside Second Life. We invited students to assess their own, and their 
peers', work using one simple criterion: if you give it away and nobody 
takes it, how can you claim it has any value?
Our students train for a life as web designers, graphic artists, programmers: people 
(often self-employed) who will work to specifications set by clients. Under-
standing what the market wants therefore becomes one of the skills that 
they need to learn during their time at Arcada. By co-opting the other resi-
dents of Second Life as potential customers we could put the students inside 
a genuine working market.
The students' final Photoshop exercise did not simply involve making some clothes; 
it involved making some clothes that other residents would actually want. 
This meant that they had to do market research. They had to look round 
Second Life and see what people were wearing. Then they had to work out 
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what they could do that would attract residents. Then they had to make and 
market it.
And if you made it and nobody came then you had to offer a constructive self-as-
sessment.
Marinetta as interaction
The existence of the island of Rosario, and its capital village Marinetta, in 
Second Life prompted a series of interdepartmental and international pro-
jects that were based upon the interaction possible in a huge online envi-
ronment, and the creative interference that this can generate.
The tourism department at Arcada produced a detailed tourism plan, aimed at 
solving a real problem.
If the assessment methods seemed clear one could still argue that assessing the 
effectiveness of the clear-cut assessment methods proved less than clear-
cut. Some students revelled in what they saw as freedom to "really do it". 
A smaller number of students claimed that "it wasn’t fair". As a result of 
lengthy discussions with the students, individually and in groups, we dis-
covered that the students who objected to the exercise as unfair seemed all 
wanted "teaching", and appeared unhappy in any situation that they per-
ceived as self-led.
The whole Marinetta Ombro project reached its climax when Helsinki held the 
Eurovision Song Contest in 2007. I have described this elsewhere from the 
perspective of the people of Rosario, who:
...campaigned to be recognised by the organisers and allowed to sub-
mit an entry. Perhaps unsurprisingly the organisers remained unmoved, 
despite the viral videos that appeared on YouTube in favour of the 
campaign. 
Kelly (2010)
12.3. Conclusion
The existence of the island of Rosario enabled us to pursue a number of lib-
erating activities, and indeed still does.
We have based the ways in which we assessed the efficacy of the work the project 
has enabled on our belief that Second Life forms a tool not a geographical 
space, and one should analyse it as such. We have come to regard the best 
methods for this analysis as diagrammatic and not statistical. We have cre-
ated diagrammatic models that relate to things we think we know in order 
to find out more about those things, and more about what we think about 
them. These "things" have ranged from existing academic courses to more 
exploratory workshops.
However, some of the issues that emerged from the project allowed no easy res-
olution, and at the end we still felt unable to offer soundly based justifi-
cations for our claims. Programmatically and pragmatically the projects 
and courses described above had measurable successes, and the students 
involved claimed to enjoy them. However the reasons why the courses 
worked, and the reasons why they proved enjoyable, proved altogether 
harder to pin down.
I could find no obvious theoretical framework within which to place our work. We 
wanted to know that uses we could make of synthetic worlds that would 
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take advantage of the specific features that drew people to them, with-
out simply using them to paint over our current practices with a veneer of 
trendiness. To do this we needed to understand how such worlds worked 
as tools, and to understand this we needed to know more about people, as 
learners and as thinking beings. We realised finally that we needed, in fact, 
a theory that explained the human mind, the evolution of tools, and the cul-
tural relationships which people have with them.
The next part of the thesis will outline the understanding we reached about the 
human mind, and the third part will look at the evolution of cultural tools, 
before finally proposing a place in all this for synthetic worlds.

This part of the dissertation describes the outcome of a lengthy period 
of reading and reflection. It does this in a series of chapters that attempt 
to present the findings as a coherent argument. It goes without saying 
that the process of research itself happened in a much more chaotic 
way, with many detours and dead-ends.
Diagrammatic Inquiry (106)
Immersion, Augmentation & Detachment (116)
From Binary to Triadic (123)
Who does The Driving? (133)
The Consciousness Dilemma (148)
Meme Theory (158)
Stories And Truth (171)
The need for such reflection arose from the fact that, during the empiri-
cal research, we found ourselves struck by the trivial nature of much of 
the academic discussion about so-called "virtual worlds". Much of this 
seemed to leave the nature of the experience itself unquestioned, and 
concern itself solely with the alleged problems and issues around es-
tablishing suitable teaching methodologies for "virtual classrooms". We 
found that we had a number of concerns that appeared of little interest 
to others ostensibly pursuing the same path as us. These included:
1. the nature of the language people used to discuss Second 
Life, and other similar "worlds";
2. the ways in which people approached phenomena like 
Second Life;
3. the differing ways that they reacted once they entered 
Second Life;
4. what, if anything, these reactions revealed about the 
relationships between people's emotions and thoughts;
5. what, if anything, this indicated about "what it is like to 
be" a person; and
6. what all this evidence might suggest for the use of 
phenomena like Second Life for learning.
The chapters that follow will offer an answer to these questions 
through an argument that will, of necessity, roam over a wide territory. I 
trust that none of this wandering will, in the end, prove irrelevant to the 
conclusions that I draw.
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From the outset of Marinetta Ombro we had as much interest in, and con-
cern with, the form of the "world" as with its content. During the first part of 
our explorations in Second Life we had become increasingly concerned with 
the terminology used to describe both our project and Second Life in gen-
eral. We came to believe that, to a worrying extent, the terminology used to 
discuss the project determined the questions people asked of us and, there-
fore, the answers we sought and the directions we pursued. We therefore 
spent some time thinking about these issues with our students.
13.1. Where Can We Find Cyberspace?
From the earliest student reports in 2003 we realised the extent to which 
two terms had become accepted in journalism, academic writing, and 
research applications: "cyberspace" and "virtual reality". The ways that 
people used them both seemed, by accident or design, either confused, 
confusing or misleading.
The widespread adoption of the term "cyberspace" had had the effect of imposing 
a set of spatial metaphors on an area of activity that one could characterise 
as tangentially spatial at best. These metaphors, in turn, served to charac-
terize the way in which people approached work in this area, discussed it 
and thought about it. To take but one example, a website called CyberGe-
ography declared itself "an atlas of maps and graphic representations of 
the geographies of the new electronic territories of the Internet, the World-
Wide Web and other emerging Cyberspaces".
This claim struck us as simply nonsensical, unless the writer could support it with 
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an argument explaining why one should view these new "electronic territo-
ries" as territories; what kind of territories they actually form, and what fea-
tures they possess that one can reasonably describe as geographical. The 
term "cyberspace" then, introduced uncalled-for ideas of distance, geogra-
phy, neighbourhoods, frontiers, and more, into discussions that might more 
usefully concern themselves with the reception and interpretation of digital 
data. Its proponents implied that our use of the internet caused us to travel 
to a place that has the kind of intractable and non-negotiable reality that 
places have. Consciously or not, they implied that we 'go' to these places 
in a similar way to the way that we go to real places such as Melbourne or 
made-up real places like Legoland.
Admittedly, people make games or educational environments that exhibit persis-
tence by retaining information from one user session to the next, and there-
fore users might engage with an on-screen environment containing a narra-
tive which predates their personal involvement. These points only address 
our status with regard to the digital environment, though. They say nothing 
about our ontological relationship to it, which remains a coming together of 
a creative imagination and a set of ongoing relations.
13.2. Neither Real nor Virtual
If we cannot describe cyberspace as a place, then we should not view "vir-
tual reality" as either virtual or real.
The use of the word "reality" implies that we can view "the new electronic ter-
ritories" as an object, or a collection of objects, that "has the properties 
it has independently of any individual's arbitrary wish or desire". (Ketner, 
1993, p8). In practice, the on-screen experience has to be wilfully sustained 
by the user. Rather than an alternative reality, it appears much closer to 
William Gibson's original definition of cyberspace as "a consensual hallu-
cination experienced daily by billions... A graphic representation of data" 
(Gibson, 1984, p54).
At the start of a session, the user must suspend disbelief, and then during the ses-
sion work at keeping it suspended. At any time, deliberately or acciden-
tally, the user can lose focus, or have focus snatched away from them; and 
thus lose imaginative communion with the on-screen world. The process of 
engagement requires the user to remain wilfully insensitive to all activity at 
the fringes of their senses: the sound of traffic outside the window, the sight 
of a fly in the room, the smell of cooking from the restaurant downstairs.
We require no similar set of manoeuvres to remain in situ in reality. By definition 
you cannot lose communion with a geographical reality. However much you 
may wish to live as a solipsist, you do not exist in Legoland or Melbourne by 
force of will alone, and you cannot beam out of there by withdrawing con-
sent. Real objects, and real places containing real objects, have an existence 
that lies outside our interaction with them. We necessarily work within the 
limitations that they impose upon us.
One might argue at this point that nobody claims that what we see on screen "is 
real", only that it appears "virtually" real. However, the word "virtual" 
seems as bogus as the word reality. When we learn in a novel or newspa-
per that "the victim was virtually dead" or that "the company was virtually 
bankrupt when the new CEO arrived" we understand two things from this. 
Firstly we understand "virtual" as nearly synonymous with "almost": the 
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phrase meaning something very similar to "the victim was almost dead". 
Secondly we understand "virtual" to imply the real possibility of movement 
towards a final state. Therefore we regard the person as "almost dead and 
in a condition that might become real death at any moment". Similarly 
we understand "the company was virtually bankrupt when the new CEO 
arrived" as meaning that the company “was almost bankrupt and might 
have collapsed into actual bankruptcy in a matter of days". Freek Rijna 
describes this slightly differently, in that he notes a second use of the word. 
"In the English language "virtual" seems to have two meanings. The first is 
that of "as good as" or "similar to". "He was virtually dead." "The virtual 
absence of border controls made it easy to smuggle drugs into the country". 
The second way in which "virtual" is used is similar to "digital". This use 
has no clear boundaries and is quite vague"  (Rijna, 2007, p3).  However, 
we should regard this second use as a sleight of hand, intending to imply an 
equivalence that we will not find. This use of the word "virtual" gives us the 
term "virtuality", the proponents of which clearly intend to imply an onto-
logical equivalence with "reality" without ever quite specifying the details. 
This simply returns us to the first part of the argument above.
The phrase "virtual reality", then, seems to imply that what we immerse ourselves 
in might or might not "be real" now, but nonetheless contains the possi-
bility of the motion necessary to move it into a final state of actual reality. 
Nobody has ever provided any evidence whatsoever that shows this as any-
thing other than wishful thinking. It seems, at best, an optimistic fantasy 
and, at worst, a deliberate sleight of hand.
13.3. Pedantry and Snake Oil
We might wish to acknowledge that these terms seem unfortunate, and even 
that some people have deliberately misused them, while denying that we 
have anything we should concern ourselves about. I disagree. I believe we 
do have something to concern us. People have used these terms not simply 
to describe an (allegedly) new phenomenon. They have used them to direct 
attention and energy in specific directions, and to make certain activities 
appear self-evidently sensible, while marginalising others. By insisting on 
discussing digital activity in terms of geography and reality, "innovations" like 
Swatch Internet Time could seem important, as a way, for example, of making 
the information superhighway navigable. If cyberspace does not exhibit any 
of the attributes of a place, then we might rightly regard Swatch Internet Time 
as a badly flawed solution to a completely non-existent problem.
When Swatch launched it on October 23, 1998, Nicholas Negroponte, its chief 
architect and cheerleader, found the idea that we had discovered "new elec-
tronic territories" to explore very useful for his purpose. It suited him to take 
the metaphor literally, and to encourage others to do the same. He said: 
"Cyberspace has no seasons. The virtual world is absent of day and night... 
Internet Time is not geopolitical, it is global... For many people real time will 
be Internet Time".
This kind of language strives to make it appear as though we find ourselves work-
ing with objects that exist "out there", as though we have discovered some-
where new and unexplored, when in fact we work with processes, with 
relations, that we negotiate communally, every aspect of which oozes 
contingency. As I described in Chapter 7, this kind of concept proved very 
(10
9
)
attractive to some of our students, through its contrived novelty, and we 
began to analyse it in response to their interest.  We concluded that this 
kind of language, seductive though it appears, attempts to reduce a triadic 
relationship to a dyadic coupling: a logically impossible sleight of hand.
13.4. Objects and Relationships
We can describe the processes that we have explored in the Marinetta 
Ombro initiative as processes of immersion into a coherent set of pat-
terns that we intend to imagine as a world. We can describe the purpose of 
these processes, or relations, as learning through play, or perhaps as play 
through learning. We can regard the difference between process and place, 
between relation and object, though, as unbridgeable.
These relations have three characteristic facets that together we may label "engage-
ment": immersion, interaction and identification. Users become immersed 
in the activity on the screen to the extent that they can keep their atten-
tion focused there. Often the onscreen data enables them to interact with 
other users, while providing a mediating framework within which they can 
contextualise this interaction. Thirdly, users may identify with their own 
on-screen avatar, but more importantly, if their experience proves success-
ful, they will come to identify with the environment itself, with the rules, 
relations and events they find there.
13.5. World of Tools
The on-screen worlds that we create do not form "realities", for the rea-
sons that I have described, but I believe that we may fairly describe them as 
worlds, if we use that word in the limited (and metaphorical) sense implied 
by "the world of cinema mourned the death of Lauren Bacall", or "he strode 
the world of golf like a colossus". As discussed earlier, the use of "world" in 
this context has arisen from suggestions by Richard Bartle, among others 
(Bartle, 2003).
Used like this, the word "world" means a club, a group with insiders and specified 
laws and codes of behaviour; a group however that serves a public function 
involving outsiders. In this, and only this, sense, we can reasonably talk of 
on-screen worlds; to talk of "entering the world of" Ultima Online or Rebel 
Dawn, or Second Life.
We do not, and cannot, live in this sort of world. We do not eat and drink there; 
we do not give birth or die there; we do not make friends or enemies there, 
except insofar as we can and do the same things when we use a tool like a 
telephone. An on-screen world is a tool for facilitating complex interactions 
between people, sometimes by providing them with a backdrop in front of 
which they can move and talk, and sometimes by providing them with cre-
ated entities with whom they can practise or simulate interaction.
These worlds that we "enter" offer sophisticated communications techniques that 
bear a family resemblance to older tools like telephones. Both offer a shift-
ing figure and ground, and we can define both as cool media.
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio 
from a cool medium like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie 
from a cool one like the TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single 
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sense in "high definition". High definition is the state of being well 
filled with data. A photograph is, visually, "high definition". A cartoon 
is "low definition" simply because very little visual information is pro-
vided. Telephone is a cool medium, or one of low definition, because the 
ear is given a meagre amount of information. And speech is a cool medium 
of low definition, because so little is given and so much has to be filled 
in by the listener. On the other hand hot media do not leave so much to 
be filled in or completed by the audience. Hot media are, therefore, low 
in participation, and cool media are high in participation or completion 
by the audience. 
(McLuhan, 1988, p31)
When we work with immersive worlds we work with a low definition, cool medium 
and this has important implications for how we can best use them. I will 
argue later that we can best view and use them as both worlds of tools and 
worlds as tools.
13.6. Semeiotics
If we wish to resolve these doubts which, after all, constitutes the underly-
ing point of all scientific research (in other words, the inquiring activities of 
a scientific intelligence, "that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learn-
ing by experience"), we need a firm starting point for our investigation, a 
logical method for resolving doubt. As Ketner (1990) points out, "Logic is 
the fundamental academic discipline, basic to any academic subject which 
proposes to use an objective method" (p13).
I suggest we could do no better in this respect than to examine some of the con-
cepts proposed by the American philosopher, mathematician, and logician 
Charles Sanders Peirce. He wrote as a pragmaticist who did not believe that 
we could ever find an absolute starting point for our thinking. He stated that 
we "cannot start from any other condition than that in which we actually 
are ... We really believe many things, and, therefore, philosophic doubts 
upon such matters must be mere pretence and can result in nothing but a 
show of demonstration of things really taken for granted".
Peirce evolved a logical system, semeiotic, that took a triadic form. In line with 
his almost phenomenological belief that we have to start from where "we 
actually are", semeiotic "conceptions can be viewed as abstractions from 
common-sense practices, and as such are by no means infallible or eter-
nally valid." (Bergman, 2000, p134) Philosophers have described his work 
as triadic because he demonstrated that, while the conventional binary 
logic (yes-no, cause-effect) can adequately describe brute, natural events, it 
cannot adequately describe any relations that involve purpose: or in other 
words any events that involve, or derive from, human agency. Binary logic 
proceeds by writing intention or purpose out of the equation, which, from 
Peirce's perspective, misses the whole point!
He argued that "John gives the book to Mary" describes a single set of relations 
containing three elements. He demonstrated, mathematically and linguisti-
cally, that one cannot reduce this to sets of two, as proponents of sequential 
cause and effect would argue. "John holds out the book. Mary takes the 
book" does not convey the same meaning as "John gives the book to Mary" 
precisely because the former removes the element of intention.
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In terms of communication, we should also note that its "future-orientedness" 
(Bergman, 2000, p134) forms an important element of Peirce's semeiotic.
13.7. Diagrammatic Thought
For our present purposes, Peirce's key concept of diagrammatic thought has 
a particular relevance. Kenneth Laine Ketner explains this as follows. 
How then can we analyze thought, or signs, or communication? ... If 
"analyze" means "come to have a better understanding of x" then the 
answer seems to be that we must analyze signs (triadic relations) by 
means of other signs or triadic relations. In particular, if there is 
a matter about which we lack understanding, we can use a set of rela-
tions that we comprehend reasonably well to model the relations in the 
area of relative ignorance ... Stated in a very abstract fashion, this 
is Peirce's method of diagrammatic thought, a technique he originally 
developed out of mathematical considerations, but adapted for other 
problem areas. 
(Ketner, 1995, p248)
Peirce himself described this faculty of "abstractive observation" as one that 
ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of 
philosophy barely leave room. It is a familiar experience to every 
human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and 
to follow that wish by the question: "Should I wish for that thing just 
the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?" To answer that question 
he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I call an abstractive 
observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeletal diagram, or 
outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical 
state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then exam-
ines it, that is, observes what he has imagined, to see whether the same 
ardent desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at 
bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions 
as to what would be true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelli-
gence using them was scientific. 
(Buchler, 1940, p98)
Despite his clear and powerful arguments, and the demonstrable success of his 
method, people habitually ignore this method, assuming it “unscientific". 
Current theorists attempt to replace it with approaches such as Sassurean 
semiotics and structuralism: approaches that claim to analyse purpo-
sive relations in terms of dyadic concepts. Or people ignore it in favour of 
reductionist "quantitative" research which seeks to assert a near-perfect 
relationship between those sampled, their responses and their real opin-
ions; and between those opinions and the opinions of the larger population 
whom they allegedly represent.
Peirce's semeiotic differs radically (and very usefully) from these approaches, 
because it concerns itself explicitly with the analysis of triads, and so pro-
ceeds through diagrammatic mapping, which it views as a legitimate scien-
tific tool for resolving doubts.
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13.8. Mapping Relations
Unsurprisingly Peirce did not write a comprehensive philosophy of media 
theory, but others have subsequently drawn the major aspects of such a 
philosophy out of his books and manuscripts. Interestingly, we can justifia-
bly view his work as a direct precursor of the work of McLuhan, with many 
of the same themes and strategies observable in both.
Peirce, for example, explicitly stated that "whatever we know, we know only by its 
relations, and in so far as we know its relations". Indeed, he claimed that 
"in reality, every fact is a relation". In this he agrees with Marshall McLu-
han, who stated that "objects are unobservable, only relationships among 
objects are observable".
Both avoided statistical approaches to analysing relations, in favour of "abstrac-
tive observation". Peirce proceeded by constructing diagrams (or models, 
or artfully argued analogies). McLuhan talked of his approach as "building 
probes" that, he claimed, have no methodological point of view. He argued 
that his method resembled "that of a safecracker. In the beginning I don't 
know what's inside. I just set myself down in front of the problem and begin 
to work. I grope, I probe, I listen, I test until the tumblers fall and I'm in. 
That's the way I work with all these media." He describes himself thus: "I 
am an investigator. I make probes. I have no point of view. I do not stay in 
one position. I don't explain, I explore".
Thus we arrive at the heart of the matter: it will prove futile and self-limiting to 
look at on-screen worlds as objects, rather than discussing their charac-
teristic facets as the cultural production of repeatable dialogic relations. It 
will prove impossible to do this by amassing statistics. It may indeed prove 
impossible to do this by any means other than a process of mapping.
13.9. Movies, Immersion & Diagrams
We might begin to discuss the relations embodied in synthetic worlds by 
noting that these constitute a cool, low definition medium. In this, as McLu-
han (1964) himself noted, they behave very differently to a high definition, 
low participation medium such as movies. We can thus see the apparent 
similarities between the two, between movies and computer-generated 
worlds, as superficial and misleading. 
This means that we have no reason to presume that anything we know, or think 
we know, about the reception and interpretation of movies will necessarily 
have any relevance to the study of synthetic worlds. If we cannot use film 
theory for our purposes, then what can we use? Logically we should look to 
find a body of critical theory that deals with a related cool medium. I believe 
that we can find just this in literary theory.
In slightly different ways Peirce and McLuhan themselves point towards a literary 
critical approach to analysis, an approach that begins by creating explora-
tory models and then proceeds by discussing and debating the feelings and 
reactions these models engender. They both argue that we should view log-
ical analysis as a process of dialogue, not an operation of sifting facts and 
computing numbers.
We need a kind of dialogue that challenges; one taking place at the boundaries 
of narrative and the borders of language. We need a dialogue that begins 
where McLuhan began. In the words of Jonathan Miller, McLuhan believed 
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"that there is a point where apparently language is broken down in the 
lines of getting ideas across, and he is try to open up the possibility of not 
remaining silent, of being communicative by using new techniques which 
language has perhaps not provided".
13.10. The Fallacy of the Fracture
If we adopt a literary critical approach we will immediately see that we can-
not describe our work as either completely new, or unprecedented. It forms 
a continuation of work carried on for at least one hundred and fifty years. 
The idea that history has altered, that "everything you know is wrong", that 
today bears no relationship at all to yesterday, and that "virtual worlds" 
constitute a new way of teaching and learning stands revealed as just more 
of the self-appointed digerati's snake-oil salesmanship.
People have had the ability for centuries to experience all of the aspects of what I 
have termed engagement through the act of reading. Any novel invites the 
reader to engage with it in the same way as an on-screen "world", by using 
strategies that rely upon the willing engagement of the user.
As McLuhan has pointed out repeatedly, we do not live or work at the beginning of 
a revolution. Rather, the revolution began decades ago and we didn't notice 
it. The move from goods to information (from "atoms to bits", in Nicholas 
Negroponte's phrase) began with the widespread availability of electric-
ity, spread with the acceptance of movies, telephones and radio; gathered 
steam with the introduction of television; and ascended to ubiquity with the 
recent dominance of computers and networks.
The key to this, then, lies not with computers, but with electricity, "for electricity 
not only gives primacy to process, whether in making or in learning, but it 
makes independent the source of energy from the location of the process", 
which explains why McLuhan designated the current period the electronic 
age and not, for example the television age. (McLuhan, 1964, p370) The 
internet, and the 3D environments that we access through it, form the most 
recent and most powerful electronic tools available to us, but they operate 
as part of a lineage, a cultural history, that stretches back to the beginning 
of the twentieth century.
If we understand this, we can see why no newly discovered place called cyber-
space, where the rules of life behave differently or get somehow suspended, 
can exist. "Minimally all humans share one discursive universe, i.e. reality. 
This reality is a conception brought on by the fact that world refuses to con-
form to our will." (Bergman, 2000, p135)
From this perspective we can see the thread of continuity in our work that links us 
to the Dadaists, to Joyce and Burroughs, and we can see the ways in which 
our work fulfils the prophecies of Ted Nelson concerning hypertext (Nelson, 
1974), in ways he never intended.
13.11. Diagrammatic Worlds
Charles Sanders Peirce greatly preferred visual diagrams, arguing that the 
visual formed the most highly developed sense, although he adopted a lib-
eral attitude in his definition of "visual". He viewed algebraic equations, 
for example, as visual examples of the diagrammatic method. We can view 
on-screen worlds such as the Marinetta Ombro project as visual diagrams, 
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or more exactly as a lattice-work of visual diagrams woven together but still 
viewable discretely from different perspectives.
We can view this kind of on-screen world as a set of diagrammatic maps or texts that 
we may analyse most efficiently through the tools of literary criticism. The 
objects on the screen may not seem "text" in the sense of letters on paper but 
we can interpret them as cultural markers, and we can certainly see the rela-
tions between the users, the screen, and the on-screen "world" as textual.
When we use terms for the machinery (hardware and software) that does this, and 
for the outputs of that machinery, we need terms that describe process, not 
terms that conjure up an imaginary "out there" and insist on discussing it 
as though it really existed. The virtual-world-out-there does not exist; only 
our relationship to the shared fiction that it projects exists.
If we start from this position we shall avoid the pitfalls of pseudo-geography, and 
the traps laid for us by the elves of self-promotion. We will have the ability 
to start talking about our work in terms of its antecedents and its intended 
goals; in terms of analogies and diagrams, rather than dubious "realities".
We can now engage in dialogues that, in method as well as subject-matter, seem 
congruent with the constructed worlds whose narratives we wish to 
"write". From here we can develop critical tools, based on the similarities 
in approach between Peirce and McLuhan. We can, in fact, look for ways 
of explicating Peirce's trivalent logic and putting it to practical use as a key 
part of the foundations of a logical and objective system for analysing and 
understanding on-screen diagrammatic worlds.
13.12. Diagrammatic Worlds as Praxis
We developed the analytical approach outlined in the preceding sections 
over a period of approximately three years and we therefore (roughly speak-
ing) had it in place at the time when we launched a version of the island of 
Rosario in Second Life.
We used this as a framework not just for our research but also for assessment 
within the project. As noted in the introductory section Arcada's Media 
Department had too few students to allow us to use the standard tools of 
quantitative research. We had to face up to questions such as
1. Does it mean anything to say that 25% of a class of eight students 
felt like this while 50% felt like that? 
2. Why should we assume that two, or even twenty, students accurately 
represent students-in-general?
Peirce and his followers have advanced powerful theoretical arguments to suggest 
that this kind of approach contains inevitable flaws. These start by noting 
that statistical arguments have a dyadic form while all human relationships 
appear as triadic. (A full discussion of Peirce's concept of triads lies beyond 
the scope of this essay but you may find an illuminating introduction in 
Kenneth Laine Ketner's paper Novel Science or How Contemporary social sci-
ence is not well and why literature and semeiotic provide a cure.) Ketner (1993) 
has asked "how then shall we analyze thought, or mind, or communication, 
or literature, or society, or culture if these are essentially triadic?” (p54). He 
suggests that, following Peirce, "we must analyze triadic relations by means 
of other triadic relations" (p55).
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Since we did not, and do not, have a large enough pool of students to allow for 
control groups of any kind, nor to allow us to phrase results in terms of 
percentages with anything like a straight face, we approached the idea of 
assessment within the project in a frankly hermeneutical and literary way. 
We followed Peirce and Ketner in constructing diagrams of various kinds, 
including McLuhanesque tetrads to use as probes.
13.13. Benefits of a Revised Terminology
Revising our terminology might seem a relatively trivial activity but it 
revealed to us the extent to which we had become prisoners of our own 
vocabulary. Linden Labs had actively engaged in propagating the idea 
that Second Life constituted a new world ready for settlers and welcoming 
explorers. These terms had become standard in discussions about Second 
Life, both in-world and outside. Redefining our key terms in this way had a 
number of positive effects.
Firstly it brought our activities back into the field of media research. We could dis-
cuss, explore, research and work with online worlds as a medium of com-
munication and put notions of "exploring cyberspace" to one side. We could 
move from asking how we could "teach in cyberspace" to asking how the 
medium worked and how we could best make use of it. This had the effect 
of bridging an important gap between our activities and those of the rest of 
the Media Department.
Secondly it served to reframe our discussions about why we should participate in 
Second Life: to ourselves, to other people in Arcada, and to people outside.
Thirdly it signalled the importance of not taking the theoretical frameworks we 
used for granted, and underpinned the need to make the development of 
these frameworks an explicit part of the project. In particular it raised the 
possibility of approaching the research and its documentation from a posi-
tion that one could better describe as literary criticism than social science.
Fourthly it ended our use of the term "virtual world", since we felt this term gave 
people the wrong idea of what we intended in our work. Instead we began 
to use the terms "synthetic world" when we spoke in general about the 
whole range of online business and entertainment services in which the 
user moved an animated character that represented them around a simu-
lated environment. "Synthetic" has various definitions, none of them with 
the same problems as "virtual"; including its use in logic where The Oxford 
Dictionary defines is as meaning "having truth or falsity determinable by 
recourse to experience".
 Additionally, we began to use the term "immersive world" when we talked about a 
subset of online worlds in which users role-played characters who did not 
represent them but instead had their own dynamics. From this perspec-
tive World of Warcraft and Eve Online constituted immersive worlds, while 
Second Life offered its users a 'world' that they could choose to use immer-
sively, although many chose not to do so.
(1
1
6
)
When we first asked staff and students to join Second Life and assess its 
potential as a place to house the Marinetta Ombro project, we issued a set 
of guidelines. We asked people to create a persona for living on Rosario. We 
instructed them to read through the existing documentation and try to fit 
themselves into the narrative in a way that pleased them. At this time Lin-
den Labs ran an idiosyncratic naming system for avatars in which new users 
had to choose a surname from a dropdown menu of pre-defined names, and 
then create a first name of their own devising. We therefore asked everyone 
to try to choose a surname that sounded plausible as a family name on 
Rosario, and to create a first name that also sounded as though it would fit 
into the overall narrative.
14.1. Avatar Biographies
People responded to this request with different degrees of fidelity but, in all 
cases, we asked them to provide a short in-world biography of their avatar, 
in terms of their roles and status within Rosario. Where people had chosen 
a name that did not immediately sound like the name of a Rosarian native, 
we asked them to explain something of their family history.
Courtney Mojo, for example, described herself thus.
Born:1971
physicist, gymnast and theologian
The daughter of Andaro, she studied at UCLA and several institutes, 
receiving degrees in physics, dance and gymnastics. She worked for many 
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years on La Marofarmo, and was the instigator of the Marinetta Ombro 
project.
She then created an entry in the official history for her father, Andaro Mojo. (We 
had already defined and delineated the role of La Marofarmo, a Rosarian 
research station based on a floating island three kilometres from the shore 
of the main island, for another part of the overall project).
14.2. Augmentists & Immersionists
People’s responses to this request caused us to divide them into several 
distinct groups. We came to regard the first group as augmentists, because 
they seemed to see Second Life as a straight-forward extension of their "first 
life", and they behaved as though this constituted a natural and obvious 
assumption. When challenged, some asserted that they had not made an 
assumption at all: that this "was what Second Life was like"! One student 
responded that
Second Life is a chance to meet people from all over the world and to 
get to know people you would not normally meet. You can go to nightclubs 
with them and talk to them by messaging them while you dance.
In this way, members of this group viewed Second Life as a way to augment their 
contacts and add to the means through which they could socialise. They 
viewed it as an early version of what we would now call a social network.
We called the second group immersionists because they viewed Second Life as a 
chance to immerse themselves wholeheartedly in a new play-space - as 
somebody else. They variously regarded it as a role-playing game with no 
stated aims, or as a kind of improvised soap opera with lots of self-gener-
ated drama. One student in this group felt certain that
Linden Labs say that Second Life is not a game but it is. It is not 
something you have to do, and it is not real life, so it is something 
people do for fun. They play in there, and you can never know what games 
they are playing. You can never know who people in Second Life really 
are because they can say anything they want. I say that I am from Tokyo 
if anyone asks me. My [written] English isn't very good and that means I 
can write funny bad English and make them guess what I mean.
Clearly these two groups had the potential for large-scale misunderstandings, and 
indeed this happened regularly. In the examples above, the first user has 
decided to present herself as herself in Second Life, and regards her avatar 
as a set of clothing she has to wear to enter the space. Experience taught us 
that she may well become hurt or upset if she finds herself "treated badly" 
by other avatars. In the second case the user clearly regards his avatar as 
a character that he adopts or a part that he plays in the way that an actor 
plays a part in a television drama. He has approached the world as a game, 
and has even utilised the mechanisms for communicating with other users as 
tools for entertaining himself while in-character. He has a real life in Finland, 
and he has an avatar in Second Life, but he encourages other users to believe 
that this avatar has a completely different "real" life somewhere in Japan.
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These two groups exhibited incompatibilities at every level of their Second Life 
existence: in how they approached the world; how they acted towards other 
users; how they viewed the consequences of their actions in the world; and 
how they viewed the consequences of their interactions on other users. 
Augmentists tended to feel cautious and vulnerable, and to feel personally 
affronted if they felt that other users treated their avatar badly. They viewed 
their avatar as an extension of their public personality. Immersionists, on 
the other hand, tended to view the world as an adult playground in which 
users played a version of childhood dressing-up games: cops and robbers, 
GI Joe vs Cobra, the Powerpuff Girls against whoever. Mutual incomprehen-
sion arose often between members of these groups: when an augmentist felt 
hurt or upset the immersionists tended to respond with laughter or, if they 
stopped to consider, by puzzling about where the problem lay.
By attempting to import their own personality and feelings into the online world 
the augmentists demanded a level of honesty and transparency from other 
users. Their conversations often blurred the distinction between Second Life 
and reality. They might begin talking to somebody about places they had 
visited in Second Life and then slip comfortably into a discussion about the 
differences between Helsinki and Boston, having established where each 
other lived IRL. If they made friends then they would have as much inter-
est in sharing real life details as details of their adventures in-world. The 
immersionists behaved very differently. They regarded questions about real 
life as taboo and would react to them with hostility, or by simply teleport-
ing somewhere else. Their name cards might include slogans such as "My 
real life is none of your business. Don't ask because I won't tell." For them 
Second Life provided an arena where one could act as one chose, and where 
the consequences of one's actions would have no bearing on real life. They 
regarded Second Life in exactly the way that R&R Partners reimagined Las 
Vegas in their 2003 tourism campaign featuring the slogan "what happens 
here, stays here" (TheWeek.com, 2013):
The emotional bond between Las Vegas and its customers was freedom. 
Freedom on two levels. Freedom to do things, see things, eat things, 
wear things, feel things. In short, the freedom to be someone we 
couldn't be at home. And freedom from whatever we wanted to leave behind 
in our daily lives. 
Given that variants of this slogan have arisen in many exclusively male contexts, 
including touring sports teams and rock bands, it occurred to us that this 
difference in approach might relate to gender: that perhaps males gravitated 
towards immersionism while women sought to become augmentists. How-
ever, the evidence did not bear this out. In our admittedly limited sample, 
the split appeared approximately equal; with several male students devel-
oping negative reactions to Second Life after other users had treated their 
avatar badly in some way, while the avatars of at least two of Rosario's lead-
ing builders and in-world communicators belonged to female immersionists.
14.3. The Three Styles of Naming
We discovered that we could divide the staff and students into three catego-
ries, depending upon how they reacted to this exercise. We also discovered 
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that we could use these categories to predict, with a high degree of cer-
tainty, how people would react when they entered Second Life and began 
to explore it.
The first group of new users chose a surname as close as possible to their own 
surname, or to an aspect of themselves that they valued. The resemblance 
might seem obvious (if, by a lucky chance, somebody with the surname 
Smith found that they could choose Smithy from the dropdown menu); it 
might bring to bear a clear linkage (as when someone named Brown chose 
the name Gold); or it might represent a desired quality or characteristic (as 
with the surname Heart or Love). This group then chose a first name that 
used their actual first name, their nickname, or a gentle wordplay upon one 
of these. In this way Josephine Brown might enter Second Life as Jo Gold, 
Tom Smith as Tommy Smithy, and Susan Jones as Susi Dreamer.
Members of this group then spent a long time assembling an avatar that resem-
bled an idealised version of their real-world appearance, with hairstyles 
and clothing choices closely mirroring their own. Almost without excep-
tion these ended up looking like idealised versions of their twenty three 
year old self. The avatar would also have a back-story that reflected their 
own as closely as they could manage. If, for example, they had a long term 
and abiding interest in horse-riding or roller-blading then so would their 
in-world character. Their name card would read like a slightly blurred 
thumbnail description of the real student.
The second group followed our instructions with no apparent desire to recreate 
themselves in Second Life. They found Mediterranean-sounding surnames, 
or failing that, surnames around which they could construct an interesting 
narrative. They added a suitable first name, and then spent time modelling 
an avatar that they intended to bring to life the Rosarian character they had 
created. This character would have its own story and might not resemble 
its owner in any obvious way at all.  However it might, in some cases, bear 
more than a passing resemblance to an existing character from fiction, film 
or television. When asked, this group would indeed view their avatar as a 
character, and would talk about it in the third person. One student said, 
about his avatar
He is a smuggler. His father and grandfather were pirates and their 
family have a lot of stories and legends about what it used to be like 
hunting boats that sailed from Europe to Africa.
The third group did not ever seem to see their avatar as a person in any sense at 
all: neither as a projection of themselves nor as a character in a play. Rather 
they seemed to see it as a functional tool, in the way that they might view 
a "handle" for a discussion forum as a useful tool. They could not resist 
sneaking jokes into their character names. One student, given the option to 
choose White as a surname, called their avatar Blackand White, and spent 
a long time carefully dressing it entirely in monochrome outfits. This group 
seemed to see the avatar as just another element in the world to play with, 
and their avatars did not retain a constant appearance of any kind. They 
would delight in finding bodies that resembled monsters, robots, spiders 
and other shapes. Indeed, members of this group first alerted us to the pos-
sibility of completely invisible avatars.
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14.4. The Detached
Although immersionists and augmentists differed in their understanding of 
the underlying purpose of Second Life they shared some important features. 
They both accepted the existence of their avatar as a stable fixture within 
the world. Whether they regarded Tor Vixen as an extension of their real 
life personality or as a made-up character, they regarded him or her as 
their representative in the world. They felt good when other users began to 
greet her or recognise him, and they tended to give their avatar a consistent 
appearance precisely in order to enable and encourage other users to rec-
ognise them. Users of both sorts rapidly learned the importance of visual 
clues in Second Life and adopted recognisable and characteristic looks. 
They tended to seek out bodies and hair that would set them apart from 
others in their group and then change their clothing within self-created 
boundaries. In this way they maintained a consistency that allowed others 
to spot them from a distance, and thus facilitated the maintenance of con-
tacts, and increase the possibility of regular contact turning into friendship.
The third group, which we termed contrarians, did not share this view at all. They 
seemed to feel completely distanced or detached from their avatar, which they 
approached as simply another changeable facet of a changeable environment. 
They approached Second Life as experimenters with little interest in interac-
tivity, whether as reaching-out or as play-acting. In some cases they explicitly 
expressed distain for any idea of using Second Life for social interaction. They 
regarded the augmentists as naive and the immersionists as childish.
For them the avatar simply enabled more experiments. How large or small can we 
make this avatar? How will other users react to a talking car? What reac-
tions can we provoke by using an invisible avatar? This group never con-
tained more than two or three students at any one time, and they seemed 
to come from the students (male and female) who had most interest in pro-
gramming and system design. They made a number of exceedingly use-
ful technical discoveries but they never developed a long-term attachment 
to Second Life nor felt themselves members of a community there. If they 
noticed the other users at all they regarded them from an almost anthropo-
logical perspective. They might engage in activity to provoke a reaction, but 
once they had observed the reactions they would lose interest. Mostly they 
seemed to view Second Life as an interesting toy-box with the other users 
as possible subjects for occasional experiments.
14.5. Dimensions of Immersion
We originally made these observations in 2005, and only later discov-
ered that Henrik Bennetsen's paper Augmentation vs Immersion (Bennet-
sen, 2006). His purpose differed from ours since he sought to analyse the 
potential uses of Second Life, whereas we sought to develop a standardised 
approach to this new environment; to work out how best to adapt the Mari-
netta Ombro project to Second Life without it becoming overwhelmed.
Bennetsen suggests that Second Life gradually moved from being an immersive 
environment to one that promoted augmentation.
I think the notion of SL as a self-contained space started in the early 
days. LL was faced with selling people this Second Life thing that no 
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one really understood what was. If you looked at it you noticed the 
resemblance with a computer game and that is how it was marketed. Prom-
inent members of staff such as CTO Cory Ondrejka also came out of the 
game industry, so there was a game culture within the company.
In games the notion of the self-contained space is very central. 
This idea had a strong impact in the early days of SL. CEO Philip Rose-
dale would tell you that SL was about building a country -- with its own 
society and economy... There was something romantically compelling about 
the notion of SL as being something new and completely different...
I think the augmentation view slowly developed (and is being 
developed) as the possibilities and limitations of SL became clear to 
more people. Mitch Kapor described in his keynote at the SLCC how watch-
ing Susanne Vega perform live in SL had made him realize that we have to 
stop thinking about SL and RL as different spaces.  
Marinetta Ombro developed as a thoroughly immersionist project. We viewed our 
avatars as Rosarians, professionally devoted to building an online rep-
resentation of Rosario. Students who wished to explore Second Life "as 
themselves" started a second, separate account. We came to realise that 
our decision to embrace immersion in this way would lead us along very 
different paths to those travelled by other educators in Second Life, almost 
all of whom adopted one version or another of augmentism. It would also 
lead us in a different direction to that taken by Linden Labs. As Bennet-
sen implies, at the beginning of our period in Second Life residents almost 
always acted as immersionists in this way. Questions such as "Its 9pm here 
in Texas, what time is it where you are?" received hostile responses and 
many avatars would simply teleport elsewhere rather than respond. Long-
time users labelled such questions as the actions of newbies and discour-
aged them at every opportunity. However, by the time we left the consensus 
had clearly moved a long way in the direction of augmentation. Educators 
habitually included information in their name cards that identified them-
selves by their real names and real affiliation, and they held meetings in 
Second Life to talk in-world about their real-life research.
However, Bennetsen's analysis misses some important subtleties and his descrip-
tion of the movement from immersion to augmentation may need at least 
one more dimension. As the Marinetta Ombro project developed we noticed 
students making increasing use of their secondary avatars. When asked, 
one student said
The world seems much more real when I stop pretending to be someone 
else. I meet people and make friends, and we go places and do things. I 
have started to have flying lessons with a friend that I met at a club.
Flying, in this context, refers to learning to use and race the aeroplanes created 
by an avatar called Cubey Terra, and made available from an island called 
Abbott's Aerodrome. These represented some of the most complex and 
most enjoyable toys available in Second Life. Emotional engagement with 
these kinds of toys, and the activities that they spawned, did not seem 
to hinge upon a role-playing approach to immersion. On the contrary, it 
seemed possible to remain immersed in the world itself, and to socialise 
immersively, without maintaining a Las Vegas-like divide between Second 
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Life and the real world. It appeared that the process of immersion did not 
take the form of a global yes/no in which a resident of Second Life immersed 
herself or did not immerse herself. Figure and ground played a part in the 
process. Some people treated both immersively, while others rendered their 
avatars porous, allowing their real life identities to seep into Second Life, 
while dealing with the world itself immersively.
Users who treated both their avatar (and hence their identity) immersively, and also 
treated the world immersively, acted as role players. They involved them-
selves in in-world communities which developed their own social dynam-
ics and rules, sometimes modelled after something external and sometimes 
self-generated (Bäcke, 2011) People who used their real identities but treated 
the world immersively acted as explorers, rather like children let loose in a 
funfair. They made friends, and these friendships sometimes spilled out of 
Second Life into other online forums and into real life. Inside Second Life, 
however, they took the world at face value and bought bikes and boats and 
planes, and went out together looking for adventure. People who treated 
their avatar immersively, but treated the world as a painted backdrop used 
Second Life as a social network, viewing the world itself as equivalent to 
the network's page design. They focused their attention on their avatars, as 
children focus on Barbie and Ken; dressing them in the latest fashions and 
then going to clubs and other meeting places to interact with other Barbie 
and Kens. In this they played with their identity, living out fantasies and pri-
vate dreams. People who treated neither their avatar nor the world immer-
sively formed the small group we referred to as The Detached; and they 
used Second Life like a chemistry set or a box of building blocks. Everything 
in the world, including their own avatar existed for them to take apart and 
rebuild, and the idea of sociality held little interest for them, except insofar 
as they met others to share building and coding tips.
These different uses of the world had emotional engagement in common. They all 
represented aspects of play, rather than logical, intellectual or goal-directed 
activity. To understand why many adults found this kind of play so engag-
ing, and how this might relate to learning, and the use of immersive worlds 
in learning, we needed to understand the relationship between rationality 
and emotion. To do that we needed to understand how the human mind 
worked; to learn "what it is like to be" a person in an online world.
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rationality and emotion, has many historical starting points. Our initial inclina-
tion led us to ignore these and concentrate solely on contemporary research. We 
soon realised that the contemporary fields, in philosophy, social science and the 
neurosciences, suffered from fractures of all kinds, and that different groups of 
researchers did not even agree upon the questions they should research, let alone 
the answers they might find. We also began to realise that the neuroscience upon 
which much speculation depended did not have the robustness that many writers 
assumed. We discovered that "neuroimaging remains a crude technology, unable to 
meaningfully weigh in on assessments of guilt or innocence, especially on an indi-
vidual basis. Imaging methods make use of highly-processed blood-flow signals, 
which cover tens of cubic millimetres of brain tissue. In a single cubic millimetre 
of brain tissue, there are some one hundred million synaptic connections between 
neurons. So modern neuroimaging is like asking an astronaut in the space shuttle 
to look out the window and judge how America is doing (Eagleman, 2012, p48)".
We therefore decided to find a foundational point from which we could build an argument, 
and we opted to begin with Rene Descartes who appears "synonymous with the 
birth of the modern age. The 'new philosophers', as he and his followers were 
called in the seventeenth century, inaugurated a fundamental shift in scientific 
thinking, the effects of which are still with us today. Indeed, Rene Descartes was 
one of the principal architects of the very notion of 'scientific thinking' as we now 
understand it (Cottingham, 1986, p1)".
In 1644, Rene Descartes published Principles of Philosophy, which provided the template 
for the nascent scientific method, one of the most powerful investigative tools 
that humanity has created. He argued stridently against the prevailing beliefs that 
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different objects, from magnets to burning logs, contained mysterious and 
idiosyncratic properties within themselves, and in favour of a reductionist 
view that all objects arose from the same fundamental particles. He believed 
that we can explain everything we can see, hear, feel or touch using the 
same small set of fundamental principles.
Descartes wrote that
I recognize no matter in corporeal things apart from that which the 
geometers call quantity, and take that as the object of their demonstra-
tions, i.e. that to which every kind of division, shape and motion is 
applicable. Moreover my consideration of such matter involves absolutely 
nothing apart from these divisions, shapes and motions...And since all 
natural phenomena can be explained in this way, I do not think that any 
other principles are either admissible or desirable in physics.
In Principles of Philosophy [Part 4, article 187] he stated that
I have deduced the causes - which I believe to be quite evident - to 
these and many other phenomena from principles which are known to all and 
admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position and motion of particles 
of matter. And anyone who considers all this will readily be convinced 
that there are no powers in stones and plants that are so mysterious, and 
no marvels attributed to 'sympathetic' and 'antipathetic' influences that 
are so astonishing, that they cannot be explained in this way.
Descartes' success in propagating this belief played a major role in instigating the 
"fundamental shift in scientific thinking" that John Cottingham refers to.
15.1. The Mind / Body Split
Unfortunately, Descartes himself weighed down and hampered this shift in 
thinking because he always carefully inserted a qualification into his pro-
nouncements. The quotation above from Principles of Philosophy demon-
strates the subtle burden he placed on the scientific method, because it 
continues
In short, there is nothing in the whole of nature, nothing, that is, 
which should be referred to purely corporeal causes, i.e. those devoid 
of thought and mind, which is incapable of being explained on the basis 
of these self-same principles.
Here Descartes declared, in effect, that the world consisted of two kinds of ele-
ments. Because of his deeply-held religious beliefs, he found it necessary to 
postulate the existence of two entirely different kinds of matter: res extens 
and res cogitans. Res extens - extended substance - contains everything 
that we would today call 'matter'. It encompasses all the contents of the 
physical universe; everything that has shape and size, and that can thus 
extend in space in whatever direction.
On the other hand, Descartes believed that mind had very different properties. 
Minds consisted of res cogitans - thinking substance - and this had qual-
itatively different properties from 'matter'. Res cogitans stood apart from 
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the physical world as we can know it and so, by definition, the quantitative 
methods of science could neither analyse nor explain it.
Descartes did not invent the supposed split between the mind (or spirit or soul) and 
the body. The English theologian Don Cuppitt has pointed out that "St Paul 
says that 'whilst we are at in the body, we are absent from the Lord'. Just in 
case we haven't grasped the point, he adds that he would much prefer 'to 
be absent from the body, and present with the Lord'. Home is elsewhere and 
the body is what keeps us away from it. The body cuts us off from the Real" 
(Cuppitt, 1987, p160)
The dual nature of reality that Descartes posited therefore both arose from, and 
folded neatly into, his belief in an external God. However it also continued the 
Platonic belief that the physical world, far from being all that exists, should 
not even count as the most important part of all that exists. Descartes. like 
Plato, suggested that the most important part of reality, the part God loved 
best, would prove impervious to human calculation and exploration. Our 
discovery of res cogitans, like our awareness of Plato's ideal objects, made 
human beings different from all other animals and yet, because of its divine 
nature, it would lay forever beyond human understanding.
During the series of thought experiments which led him to declare that 'cogito ergo 
sum', Descartes became convinced, not only that minds differed in kind 
from anything else, but also that minds could, in principle, exist without 
bodies. He wrote that
I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body, and that there was 
no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for all that pretend 
that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the mere fact that 
I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evi-
dently and certainly that I existed; yet if I had but ceased to think, 
even if everything else I had ever imagined were true, this would have 
left me no reason whatever to believe I existed. From this I recognised 
that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is solely to think, 
and which does not require any place, or depend upon any material thing, 
in order to exist. 
(in Cottingham, Stoothhoff & Murdoch, 1985, p127)
A series of unanswerable questions arose almost immediately from this. How can 
we define or describe this second substance? What constitutes it? What 
form or forms does it take? How do the mind and body join or link? How 
does the non-physical mind exert any effect on the physical body? How do 
our physical sense organs pass information to our non-physical minds to 
tell them of perceptions that strike our sense organs, events that happen to 
our bodies, or actions that our bodies initiate?
Descartes felt acutely aware of these questions and the potentially fatal problems 
they posed for his project, but he could never offer final answers to more 
than one of them. To the question of where the mind and body joined, he 
argued that the pineal gland linked them. Even if this had proved correct, 
which it did not, it would have merely sidestepped the main issues, since 
suggesting a site for the meeting of mind and matter cannot provide an ade-
quate substitute for explaining how the meeting of physical and non-physi-
cal might actually work.
In his later writings Descartes tried to make clear that he regarded human beings, 
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in their everyday life-world, as necessarily comprising a mind and a body. 
However he continued to believe that "the certainty and truth of all knowl-
edge depends uniquely on my awareness of the true God, to such an extent 
that I was incapable of perfect knowledge of anything else until I became 
aware of him", and he continued to believe that, because God had the divine 
capacity to separate minds from bodies (since, by definition, God possesses 
the capability to divide anything), then "nothing else belongs to my nature 
or essence except that I am a thinking thing".
In the Sixth of the Meditations Descartes concludes that
I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am simply a 
thinking, non-extended thing, and on the other hand I have a distinct 
idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended non-thinking 
thing. And accordingly it is certain that I am really distinct from my 
body, and can exist without it.
Descartes satisfies himself, then, that the essence of humanity comprises a duality 
and moreover a split duality; by which I mean a duality comprised of two 
separable substances of different kinds, and of potentially different impor-
tance in the eyes of God, rather than a duality formed from a single phe-
nomenon with two aspects (such as the days and nights that together com-
prise the daily cycle).
15.2. Descartes' Three Claims
For our purposes we may note that Descartes does three things. Firstly, he 
makes a claim that duality resides at the heart of all human experience. 
Secondly, as a consequence of this, he underwrites the Platonic dualities 
at the heart of medieval Christianity and permits them to continue unana-
lysed alongside the new scientific method by placing them under the ineffa-
ble laws of res cogitans. Thirdly he enunciates additional specific dualities 
which will serve to further confuse and bedevil future inquiry.
Descartes not only posited the division between mind and body as a divinely 
wrought schism; he also declared the existence of a clear division between 
thought and feeling. In a letter to the French ambassador in Sweden, for 
example, Descartes makes a careful distinction between "the love that is 
purely intellectual or rational, and the love which is a passion". He writes 
that he regards the latter as "nothing more than a confused thought aroused 
in the soul by some motion of the nerves".
Although Descartes certainly did not oppose passion per se, and indeed wrote that 
"pleasures common to body and soul depend entirely on the passions", he 
nonetheless regarded the chief benefit of wisdom as "teaching us to be mas-
ters of our passions and to control them with such skill that the evils which 
they cause are quite bearable". For him, as for all those who followed him, 
the intellect clearly outranks the emotions and, used properly, offers the 
ability to keep them in check.
In this way Descartes not only divided mind and body; he then extolled the higher 
position of the mind over the animalistic body. Finally, he divided thinking 
and feeling, logic and passion, in both cases regarding the former as the 
rightful master of the latter.
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15.3. Russell's Paradox
From this starting point, Descartes ruled some of the most vexing questions 
about human nature off-limits to the new scientific method. In efforts to 
address these questions, and to explore what seemed, in principle, inca-
pable of being analysed, philosophers conjured a series of problems and 
worries out of thin air. As a result, A.N. Whitehead claimed,
modern philosophy has been ruined. It has oscillated in a complex manner 
between three extremes. There are the dualists, who accept matter and 
mind as on equal basis, and the two varieties of monists, those who 
put mind inside matter, and those who put matter inside mind. But this 
juggling with abstractions can never overcome the inherent confusion 
introduced by the ascription of misplaced concreteness to the scientific 
scheme of the seventeenth century. 
(Whitehead, 1927)
We might date the culmination of this "juggling" to Bertram Russell's discovery in 
1901 that possibly insoluble 'paradoxes' lay hidden within naive set the-
ory. Russell's journey from belief to dismissal marks the beginnings of a 
more general break with Descartes' legacy. At the start of his career Russell 
believed in the paradoxes he had discovered as genuine and objective par-
adoxes. He insisted that they represented problems in the real world, and 
that they urgently needed resolving. By the end of his career he regarded 
them as nothing more than nonsense. During the period in which he gradu-
ally changed position, the work of his student Ludwig Wittgenstein, of Mar-
tin Heidegger, and of many others, had begun to signal the beginning of the 
end of Descartes' baleful influence.
Russell had begun his career as a Platonist who felt that mathematics revealed 
eternal truths. He wrote that
I hoped that in time there would be a mathematics of human behaviour as 
precise as the mathematics of machines. I hoped this because I liked 
demonstration, and at most times this motive outweighed the desire, 
which I also felt, to believe in free will. 
(quoted in Monk, 1997)
The paradox that exercised Russell so much in his early career arises because naive 
set theory suggests the existence of two kinds of sets: 'normal' sets that do 
not contain themselves and 'abnormal' sets that do contain themselves.
We can make a simple example to demonstrate this as follows. We regard the set 
of red hats as normal, and assert that it does not contain itself, because we 
do not define the set of red hats as itself a red hat. On the other hand, we 
regard the set of "everything that is not a red hat" as abnormal, and assert 
that it does contain itself, because we do define the set of "everything that is 
not a red hat" as not itself a red hat.
The paradox arises when we try to ascertain whether S, the set of all normal sets, 
includes itself or not. If we define S as a normal set then it will be contained 
in the set of normal sets and will therefore be abnormal. If we define S as an 
abnormal set then it will not be contained in the set of normal sets - and will 
therefore be normal.
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The more popular formulation of this paradox, which Russell claimed he heard 
from an acquaintance, concerns a town in which all the men look clean-
shaven and "the barber shaves only those men in town who do not shave 
themselves". Using the previous example we might deduce that if the barber 
does not shave himself then he belongs in the set of men whom the barber 
shaves, and if the barber does shave himself then he belongs in the set of 
men whom the barber does not shave. Russell himself thought of the issue 
in this way, and he believed for many years that he could not complete the 
development of a coherent logic, the project with which he primarily con-
cerned himself, until he (or someone else) had found a solution.
15.4. Triadic Barbers
If we look at these 'paradoxes' from a different perspective, we may decide 
that they do not actually reveal problems in external reality, as Russell ini-
tially supposed, but rather demonstrate limitations in some of our concep-
tual frameworks and more specifically in some of our linguistic structures. 
When I say this I mean to suggest something more than the fact that lan-
guage can seem slippery, I mean to follow the suggestions of Korzybski 
and others (Korzybski, 1933; Bourland & Dennithorne, 1991) who propose 
that the structure of our language contains embedded assumptions, and 
that amongst these we might find a hidden bias towards the binary. We 
scarcely, if ever, notice this, any more than fish notice water, because this 
assumption forms part of the ground over which we move as figures, and 
the assumption therefore gets built into the view of our life-world that we 
absorb from infancy.
The ancient Greeks did not share our current world view, and they made very dif-
ferent assumptions about the relationships between the different aspects 
of their perceived world. The structure of their language clearly indicates 
this. Verbs in English, Swedish and Finnish, despite the major structural dif-
ferences between these languages, all delineate activity through the use of 
active and passive voices. In English, for example, I can use the active voice 
regardless of whether or not the action explicitly involves another actor. I 
can say "I hit the policeman" and I can say "I ran for three miles". If I stand 
as the recipient of an action I use the passive voice. I can say "I was struck 
by lightning". A linguist might point out that the active voice has two forms: 
when a verb has a direct object ("I hit the policeman") we should describe 
it as transitive, and when a verb has no direct object we should describe it 
as intransitive. Our linguist might further note that active transitive verbs 
become intransitive in the passive voice, so that "Mary kisses Samantha" 
becomes "Samantha was kissed by Mary", while one cannot directly recast 
active intransitive verbs into a passive form.
So, if I happened to attack myself in a drug-induced psychosis, I might later describe 
this in English by saying "I hit myself in the face with the baguette until I 
was bruised and bleeding". This compound sentence achieves its effect by 
using a combination of active and passive voices.
Classical Greek differs in form from English (and Swedish and Finnish) in that it has 
three distinct voices: the active, middle and passive voices. This difference 
does not merely reflect pedantry and over-zealous categorisation by modern 
academics. It indicates a profound difference in the ways that ancient Greeks 
categorised their own actions. The middle voice (also sometimes termed the 
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reflexive voice) speaks of actions which the speaker does to herself, or of 
events though which she receives the consequences of her own actions. A 
drug-addled Ancient Greek, should one have existed, would therefore have 
used the middle voice to describe both the processes of self-hitting and of 
consequently self-receiving some bruises. (Smyth, 1920, p890)
We should note that the middle voice does not simply provide a grammatical con-
venience; it also embodies a different manner of dividing activity in the 
world, and thus a different mode of reflecting upon both activity and the 
world, and activity in the world.
In classical Greek, then, actions, and reflections upon the actions of others, could 
proceed along three paths, and from this starting point the paradox of the 
barber simply does not arise, because every man in town, including the 
barber, can perform three possible actions with regard to shaving. He can 
shave-others, using the active voice. He can self-shave, using the middle 
voice. He can receive-shaving (from others), using the passive voice.
Freed from the apparent grip of binary paradox, the barber can now happily 
shave-others who do not self-shave. The fact that he himself likes to self-
shave simply has no bearing on whom in the town he does or does not 
shave-others - because, no matter how hard he tries, the innate structure 
of his language simply does not allow him to shave-others to himself under 
any circumstances.
We may note that, whatever else they may do, Russell's paradoxes serve as explicit 
formulations of the problems and limitations of applying binary logic to 
human affairs, and then imagining that the binary nature of classical logic 
reflects a 'natural' state of affairs; by which I mean that we could sensibly 
regard it as external to us and as pre-existing us.
Russell himself wrote that,
I think it is clear that you can only get around it by observing that 
the whole question whether a class is or is not a member of itself is 
nonsense, i.e. that no class either is or is not a member of itself, and 
that it is not even true to say that, because the whole form of words is 
just noise without meaning. 
(Russell, 1985)
Russell raises two important points here. Firstly he suggests that we can simply 
change the perspective from which we perceive something in order to get 
round the limitations of the first perspective. In this particular case he sug-
gests that we stop worrying about whether classes might include them-
selves, by declaring that this line of questioning makes no sense. Secondly he 
suggests that, in doing this, we should regard the question of whether a class 
can be a member of itself or not, in the end, as "just noise without meaning".
The middle voice of Ancient Greek should remind us that we do not necessarily 
need to divide our world into two, and that we may have very good reasons 
for not doing so. Indeed, the middle voice serves as an example of a social 
group or culture evolving a triadic rather than binary arrangement for an 
important aspect of their affairs.
The ancient Greeks regarded triadic arrangements as having a key role to play in 
human life and, in this regard, we may draw a continuous line between 
their thinking and modern dialectics, as conceptualised by Hagel. Dialectics 
formed a key part of ancient Greek philosophical discussions (Butler, 2011, 
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part 1) and took the form of an argument in favour of the question, an argu-
ment against, and a determination of the outcome. This process continued 
in medieval universities, where dialectic became one of the three compo-
nents of the trivium (along with rhetoric and grammar). In the early nine-
teenth century Frederick Hegel defined the process as an explicitly triadic 
one in which dialectic comprised an abstract, a negative and a concrete. 
Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus subsequently reformulated this into the more 
familiar classification of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.
15.5. Peirce and Triads
Charles Sanders Peirce, the American philosopher and scientist, spent 
much of his life developing triadic systems for logic and scientific research; 
because he came to believe that one cannot properly describe any act that 
involves human agency within a binary system. More specifically, he denied 
that a sentence such as "Bill gives the book to Terry" can mean carry the 
same meaning as the two sentences "Bill gives the book" and "Terry gets 
the book", because the original sentence contains three elements, all of 
which have specific relationships to each other in the action the sentence 
describes.
Peirce argues for the existence of distinct qualities of firstness, secondness and 
thirdness that arose from the triadic nature of the world. "Peirce insisted 
that any relation between two entities, be they persons, ideas, or nat-
ural forces, could not be understood in simple dyadic terms, but always 
required a third element, the framework or structure of meanings, truths, 
laws, assumptions and expectations within which the relationship occurs. 
Broadly speaking, the "third" is the structural framework that governs the 
relation, and, importantly, that may be an emergent structure that is called 
out by the exigencies of the relation." (Beauchamp, 1998)
Peirce himself described it thus:
By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute 
first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. 
The end is second, the means third. The thread of life is a third; the 
fate that snips it, its second. A fork in a road is a third, it supposes 
three ways; a straight road, considered merely as a connection between 
two places is second, but so far as it implies passing through interme-
diate places it is third. Position is first, velocity or the relation of 
two successive positions second, acceleration or the relation of three 
successive positions third. But velocity in so far as it is continu-
ous also involves a third. Continuity represents Thirdness almost to 
perfection. Every process comes under that head. Moderation is a kind 
of Thirdness. The positive degree of an adjective is first, the superla-
tive second, the comparative third. All exaggerated language, "supreme," 
"utter," "matchless," "root and branch," is the furniture of minds which 
think of seconds and forget thirds. Action is second, but conduct is 
third. Law as an active force is second, but order and legislation are 
third. Sympathy, flesh and blood, that by which I feel my neighbor's 
feelings, is third. 
(Peirce, 1931, III, 2, C, 1)
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A century later, the British mathematician and philosopher Daniel G Bennett took 
up a very similar argument. In The Dramatic Universe, he "worked to find a 
way to identify and understand the underlying pattern and structure of a 
particular thing -- be it an object, action, relationship, situation, process, 
or whatever -- by turning to the experienced quality of number". (Seamon, 
2008) In this schema he too related "action and relatedness" to the triad, to 
thirdness. In fact, Bennett writes, "without an understanding of the triad, it 
is difficult to make any real change in the world". (Bennett, 1993, p36)
Triads became central to Peirce's way of perceiving the world, and his work con-
tained many triadic schema. His scheme of logic, for example, admitted of 
"three canons of reasoning, to wit: deduction, induction and abduction (the 
latter term alternatively baptized retroduction or hypothetic inference)... 
He spells out the differences, which he claims to have "always" (since the 
1860s) recognized: first, deduction "which depends on our confidence in 
our ability to analyze the meaning of the signs in or by which we think"; 
second, induction "that depends upon our confidence that a run of one kind 
of experience will not change or cease without some indication before it 
ceases"; and, third, abduction "which depends on our hope, sooner or later, 
to guess at the conditions under which a given kind of phenomenon will 
present itself". (Eco & Sebeok, 1983, p1)
15.6. Triadic Thinking
Others (cf Wilson, 1990) have since shown that we may view many dyads 
better from a triadic perspective. "Yes" and "No", for instance, do not form 
a pair that someone must choose between, because in reality they always 
form two corners of a triangle, with the third corner labelled "Maybe" or "I 
don't know". Indeed, the Scottish legal system reflects the inherently triadic 
nature of decision-making by permitting a jury to return one of three ver-
dicts: guilty, not guilty, or not proven.
Robert Anton Wilson has pointed out that we spend much of our time in a state 
of "Maybe", even if we claim otherwise. For example, as we watch some-
one walking towards us we may wonder for some time whether we see our 
friend Kevin in the distance, or just someone who looks a bit like him, before 
we finally reach a decision and act upon it.
We might note the influential paper The Strength of Weak Ties, from the American 
Journal of Sociology, which argues, from a different starting point to Peirce, 
that we should view interpersonal relationships as essentially triadic. "If 
strong ties A-B and B-C exist, and if B and C are aware of one another, any-
thing short of a positive tie would introduce a "psychological strain" into 
the situation, since C will want his own feelings to be congruent with those 
of his good friend A, and similarly for B and his good friend A." (Granovet-
ter, 1973. p1362)
Triads seem to have exerted a little noticed attraction on the structure of religions, 
too. Christianity, although cited as an example of monotheism, has a holy 
trinity at the centre of its doctrines. The Catholic Church (along with many 
Lutherans and some Anglicans) has also expanded the dualistic concept 
of Heaven and Hell into a triad with the addition of Purgatory. In Islam, 
believers use a base-three system of counting while praying, to keep track 
of counting Tasbih to 99 or to 100 on a single hand.
Finally, we may note that triadic relationships occur frequently in nature or, more 
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exactly, in our relationships with nature. We can define primary colours, for 
example, in many different ways, but every system defines precisely three. 
Artists traditionally claim red, yellow and blue as primary colours. Printers 
use cyan, yellow and magenta. Computers and other digital equipment use 
red, green and blue, while Autochrome Lumière, an early colour photogra-
phy process, used orange, green and violet.
Of more direct relevance to the arguments presented here, Sigmund Freud's met-
aphorical division of consciousness involves three elements: the ego, the 
super-ego and the id. Eric Berne's more recent schema of Transactional 
Analysis, which we will consider in the next chapter, also incorporates a 
triadic division of the mind: into Parent, Adult and Child.
Descartes, we may conclude, introduced a pernicious dualism into the scientific 
method which, perhaps ironically, served to blind us to its own essential 
arbitrariness. Even today "yes" or "no" often seems like a reasonable choice 
to give somebody, and may actually strike that somebody as their only two 
options. This offers a small, everyday example of a much larger and more 
pervasive phenomenon which we will need to bear in mind as we consider 
the nature of human consciousness.
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housed in a body that operates as "simply an extended non-thinking thing". 
Today nobody accepts Descartes' hypothesis that the mind and body exist 
separately and communicate somehow through the pineal gland which, 
subsequent research has shown, actually functions to produce melatonin, 
a hormone that affects wake/sleep patterns and seasonal dispositions. 
Many people, however, continue to believe that the mind and body exist 
separately and therefore join somewhere, and may therefore decouple, as a 
locomotive decouples from a set of carriages.
This kind of belief appears not simply as "common sense": it fuels many current beliefs 
in the possibility of transhumanism and cryogenics. Ray Kurzweil, for exam-
ple, has claimed in The Singularity Is Near (Kurzweil, 2005) that by the middle 
of the twenty-first century, "humans will develop the means to instantly create 
new portions of ourselves, either biological or nonbiologicial," so that people 
can have "a biological body at one time and not at another, then have it again, 
then change it." In addition, he argued that "software-based humans" will "live 
out on the Web, projecting bodies whenever they need or want them, including 
holographically projected bodies, foglet-projected bodies and physical bodies 
comprising nanobot swarms."
However, much current research suggests that our feeling that we possess a single, 
unified consciousness acting as the controller of a surrounding body pro-
vides us with nothing more than a grand illusion. This belief provides an 
interesting and pervasive example of what Daniel Dennett has termed the 
'intentional stance' and it appears to have little more justification than the 
ancient world's belief in a panoply of gods and goddesses.
(1
3
4
)
16.1. The Self Has Not Always Existed
The self has not always existed. It appeared as a consequence of the inven-
tion of writing. As Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders observe,
most epochs got along without a self. There was no self in epic times... 
In oral cultures, one may retain an image of what has been - yesterday, 
at the time of the full moon, or last Spring, but the person then or now 
exists only in the doing or the telling, as the suffix comes to life only 
when it modifies a verb. 
(Illich & Sanders, 1988, p72)
In the same vein Marshall McLuhan notes that one "of the strange implications 
of the phonetic alphabet is private identity. Before phonetic literacy, there 
had been no private identity. There had only been the tribal group. Homer 
knows nothing about private identity".  (McLuhan, 2003, p229)
Our current feeling of selfhood arises out of language because every time we ask 
the question "am I thinking?" we will find that, at that moment, we can 
answer "yes"; and because every time we ask the question "what am I 
thinking about?" we will come up with an answer that satisfies us. How-
ever, it now seems that the very process of asking the questions causes us 
to make up the answers, and that when we don't ask "what am I thinking 
about now?" then we may not in fact think about anything.
We might conclude from this that we do not 'have' a consciousness that interacts 
mysteriously with a body. Rather, humans have evolved so that we can have 
higher order thought activities: we can think about thinking, we can reflect 
on our reflections, and we can feel something about the feelings we have, 
and about the feelings that others tell us that they have.
Our conscious activities enable us to have higher-order thoughts, whenever we 
need to reflect and make judgements. We do this when our immediate per-
ceptions provide us with a dilemma; when, for example, we do not receive 
enough information to tell whether we can see a large the object in the dis-
tance or a much smaller object much closer to us. We can then use these 
judgements to settle our doubts and provide ourselves with a provisional 
framework for action. Charles Sanders Peirce put forward a very similar 
argument in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, suggesting 
that the purpose of thought hinged upon the creation and maintenance of 
habit. He maintained that all questioning began with doubt and ended by 
fixing a belief: "the soul and meaning of thought...can never be made to 
direct itself to anything but the production of belief... The essence of belief 
is the establishment of a habit; and different beliefs are distinguished by the 
different modes of action to which they give rise. Thought in action has as 
its only possible motive the attainment of thought at rest". (in Buckler, 1940, 
p27) Thought, then, has the production of "habits of action" as its primary 
purpose. Indeed Peirce deems it impossible "that we should have an idea in 
our mind that relates but to conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of 
anything is our idea of its sensible effects". (in Buckler, 1940, p31)
Thought, in Peirce's terms, has the purpose of creating effects in the world, often 
(but not always) in the form of bodily activity. This activity may seem large 
or small, important or trivial. I feel hungry, for example. I think briefly about 
this and decide I would like something sweet. I walk to the fridge and open 
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it. The process begins and ends with the body, but my thinking informs 
the specific outcome. Opening the fridge, I become conscious of the vari-
ous possibilities available, and the need to make a choice. I have to make a 
judgement and, after a suitable pause, I opt for the fudge ice-cream rather 
than the cold pizza slices.
The body, as Shaun Gallagher points out,
sets the stage for action. Perhaps the claim should be a stronger one. 
Your body is already acting 'before you know it'. Certainly there is 
evidence that indicates one's body anticipates one's conscious experi-
ence. I reach to pick up a glass. Before I am aware of it - if I ever do 
become explicitly aware of it - my hand shapes itself in the best way 
possible for purposes of picking up the glass. If I had reached for some 
differently shaped object, I would find that my hand had already shaped 
itself accordingly. This is a general rule followed by the sensory-motor 
body. It anticipates its encounters in both instrumental and expressive 
contexts. Even in my encounters with others, prenoetically before I know 
it, I have a sense of how it is with them. 
(Gallagher, 2005, p237)
Knowing this we have to take only a small step to realise that our mental processes 
play only one (albeit very important) part in what we do, rather than dicta-
torially ordering our actions. Our reflections on what we have done serve to 
guide future activity by establishing mental habits. Neither our body nor our 
mind acts forcibly upon the other; rather, when we function well, both act 
in concert as components in an integrated physiological and psychological 
system. Our minds, lungs and kidneys all exert elements of control over our 
Being, but none of them play the role of the central scrutinizer, because that 
role has no place in the script.
We could view human awareness as comprising three levels. 
Firstly, we possess a range of instincts that all mammals possess in some degree. 
If we put our hand into a flame accidentally we withdraw it without any 
conscious will. If we hear a sudden noise behind us, our heart beats and we 
look round. Cats and dogs, foxes and mice, also behave in this way. 
Secondly, we have what Guy Claxton has termed an "undermind". (Claxton, 1998). 
He uses this term to refer to what we might otherwise call our unconscious 
mind, and he uses it because he rightly believes that "the unconscious" has 
become weighed down with various Freudian and pop-psychology refer-
ences, including the view that regards it as less important, or subservient to, 
consciousness. The undermind forms the perceptual system that Dennett 
claims does most of our mental work. It drives the car while we engage in 
an animated conversation with the passenger. It controls the movements of 
the tennis player during a match. It makes intuitive decisions, and makes 
them successfully on the basis of percepts not concepts. 
Thirdly, relating these two systems and arriving at judgements on the basis of their 
input, we have a narrative consciousness.
16.2. Benjamin Libet
To see why we should arrive at such an image of consciousness, we may 
start with the work of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues who, in the early 
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1980s, collected some of the most important and most challenging con-
sciousness-related data. Scientists have interpreted the results of their 
experiments in several different ways; but they have never ignored them, 
since they seem to have direct, and counter-intuitive, bearings on "what it 
is like to be" us.
Libet's experiments followed up work by Kornhuber and Deecke, who had 
researched self-initiated actions in the brain, and had discovered in 1964 
that an electrical potential becomes visible in the brain long before the sub-
ject initiates an action such as flexing a finger. They called this a "Bere-
itschaftspotential" or readiness potential. In trying to make sense of their 
results other researchers had speculated that somebody willing themselves 
to perform a physical action must proceed through three stages: firstly she 
must consciously will her action, or become conscious of her intention to 
act; secondly her brain must ready itself and thus the Bereitschaftspotential 
becomes visible; and thirdly, at the end of the sequence, the finger must obey 
the command and flex. Libet set out to find out the truth of this hypothesis.
In a series of cunningly designed experiments, Libet told patients, deliberately left 
conscious during invasive brain surgery, to flex their finger while looking 
carefully at a specially designed clock face. They were asked to say where 
on the dial the clock hand pointed to at the exact moment that they decided 
to initiate their action. In each case, Libet determined that the patient 
became aware of their decision to act approximately 300 milliseconds after 
the Bereitschaftspotential became visible, and thus the action had effec-
tively begun in the brain.
Since doctors no longer routinely perform the type of invasive brain surgery that 
Libet's experiments relied on, current experimenters cannot exactly dupli-
cate Libet's research. Nonetheless, almost all current experimenters agree 
that Libet undertook his experiments using sound methodology and carried 
them out with scrupulous care. If we exclude the possibility of catastrophic 
failures in the design of his experiments that have remained unnoticed for 
thirty years, we must accept that Libet clearly demonstrated that, contrary 
to our feelings about the order in which things happen, our decisions to 
carry out an action actually occur after our body has already started per-
forming the action.
Very few researchers question these results although no real consensus has devel-
oped about what they might actually mean. Some determinists have used 
the results to suggest free will does not exist and that, in effect, our con-
scious mind sits in the passenger seat watching while our body steers us 
along predefined routes. Others have suggested that the results, while accu-
rate in themselves, do not measure what Libet intended to measure. They 
suggest that decisions come in different types, and that these types form a 
hierarchy. The decision to move a finger therefore initiates a different and 
lesser kind of operation in our brain than the qualitatively more difficult 
decision involved in choosing between fudge ice cream and pizza.
Libet himself produced two explanations for what he observed. At first he sug-
gested that the brain relocated the decision back in time with the result that, 
although the objective measurable order of events began with the move-
ment and ended the subject's report that they had initiated it, the decision 
appeared to happen first at a subjective and experiential level. This struck 
many researchers and philosophers as wildly over-complicated and to raise 
many more problems than it solved. No experimental data existed to sug-
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gest that such time-shifting actually happened, and even if someone could 
show that it did, this would not address the question of whether the subject 
had any genuine reason to feel that she had willed or somehow caused her 
finger to move.
Libet subsequently argued that the
conscious will (W) does appear 150 msec before the motor act, even 
though it follows the onset of the cerebral action (1W) by at least 400 
msec. That allows it, potentially, to affect or control the final outcome 
of the volitional process. An interval 150 msec before a muscle is acti-
vated is the time for the primary motor cortex to activate the spinal 
motor nerve cells, and through them, the muscles. During this final 
5o msec, the act goes to completion with no possibility of its being 
stopped by the rest of the cerebral cortex.) The conscious will could 
decide to allow the volitional process to go to completion, resulting in 
the motor act itself. Or, the conscious will could block or "veto" the 
process, so that no motor act occurs. 
(Libet, 2004, p137-138)
For Libet then, our consciousness consists of our ability to decide not to do some-
thing that our body has already started doing. (This hypothesis become 
known, with various degrees of sarcasm as a belief in free won't.) He con-
cludes his book with a lengthy imaginary dialogue with Rene Descartes, 
in which they discuss this topic in the context of a chat about free will, 
but reach no real conclusion. Citing experimental evidence that the order of 
activity in a subject asked to invoke a physical action appears as 1. Bere-
itschaftspotential, 2. conscious awareness and 3. physical action, Benjamin 
Libet tells Descartes that
Yes. Conscious intention does appear about 150 msec before the motor 
act. That leaves sufficient time for the conscious function to inter-
vene in the process. It may provide a trigger to enable the volitional 
process to go to completion; however, there is no direct evidence for 
that. But there is evidence that the conscious will can stop or veto the 
process so that no act occurs. In such a case, free will could control 
the outcome. That it’s with our feeling that we can control ourselves, 
something that ethical systems urge us to do. 
(Libet, 2004, p220)
Rene Descartes replies: "I am glad to hear of that role for conscious will", before 
turning to discuss the possibility that "we really are automatons, com-
pletely subject to the natural physical laws of the universe".
In the concluding section of MindTime, Libet suggests that he differs from Descartes 
in the kind of duality that he believes in.
Neither self nor soul need be physical substances although they emerge 
from physical activities of nerve cells. The phenomenological feeling 
of their existence may be based on special kinds of neural processes. 
Feelings of self and soul can be destroyed by extensive neural damage, 
as in advanced Alzheimer's disease or in Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease. 
This may occur even when awareness has not been completely eliminated. 
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So, feelings of self and soul do require a sufficiently structured and 
functional brain. 
(Libet, 2004, p237)
While still maintaining that a subjective duality exists, and asserting that this dual-
ity has a basis in reality, Libet nonetheless accepts that it may involve a kind 
of emergent process in which the "phenomenological feeling of their exist-
ence" derive from specific ranges of activity in the brain.
16.3. Mind and Body, Body and Mind
If we accepted this as true (at least provisionally), then we should expect to 
find it possible to treat physical and mental problems from both directions. 
Mental problems should prove susceptible to physical treatments and phys-
ical problems should prove susceptible to mental treatments. From the early 
years of the twentieth century evidence began to accrue in support of just 
such a hypothesis.
In 1910 F. Matthias Alexander published Man's Supreme Inheritance, the first book 
about what became known as the Alexander Technique. He aimed to assist 
people to reduce bodily tension and he saw the techniques he developed 
as "a re-education of the mind and body". From the beginning, adherents 
claimed that the changes that it affected in the body produced additional 
and very noticeable mental effects. In the introduction to Alexander's third 
book, The Use of the Self, for example, the educationalist John Dewey, an 
early enthusiast, claimed that the Alexander Technique "bears the same 
relation to education that education itself bears to all other human activi-
ties". (Alexander, 1932, p7)
Dewey came to believe that the mind and the body did indeed form a single entity, 
and that judgements formed solely by the intellect gave us, at best, an 
incomplete picture. He wrote that "if our habitual judgments of ourselves 
are warped because they are based on vitiated sense material -- as they 
must be if our habits of managing ourselves are already wrong -- then the 
more complex the social conditions under which we live, the more dis-
astrous must be the outcome. Every additional complication of outward 
instrumentalities is likely to be a step nearer destruction: a fact which the 
present state of the world tragically exemplifies." (Alexander, 1932, p8)
Interestingly Dewey frames his arguments in terms of their educational potential, 
and indicates that he has come to believe that education too cannot rely 
simply upon the intellect if it wishes to achieve its goals. In this he antici-
pates many of the arguments that we will encounter later.
Education is the only sure method which mankind possesses for directing 
its own course. But we have been involved in a vicious circle. Without 
knowledge of what constitutes a truly normal and healthy psychophysical 
life, our professed education is likely to be mis-education. Every seri-
ous student of the formation of disposition and character which takes 
place in the family and school knows--speaking without the slightest 
exaggeration--how often and how deplorably this possibility is realized. 
The technique of Mr. Alexander gives to the educator a standard of psy-
cho-physical health--in which what we call morality is included.
(Alexander, 1932, p8)
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Other physiological approaches developed during the same period shared a belief 
that we had ignored the unity between all aspects of the human being in 
favour of an erroneous privileging of our rational and intellectual capaci-
ties. Ida Rolf developed Structural Integration - a ten-hour programme that 
became later known simply as Rolfing. In this she principally concerned her-
self with balancing the human body; with realigning the muscles to ensure 
that people worked with gravity not against it. In an article written for the 
Psychotherapy Handbook, Rolf explicitly made this point when she described 
Structural Integration as "an approach to the personality through the myo-
fascial collagen components of the physical body". (quoted in Rolf, 1978)
Rolf too argued that education should concern itself with the whole person and not 
just the small parts governed by rationality. "Rolfers are integrating some-
thing; we are not restoring something. This puts us in a different class to all 
the other therapists that I know of. It takes us out of the domain designated 
by the word 'therapy, and puts us into the domain designated by the word 
'education'. It puts our thinking into education: how can we use these ideas 
behind Rolfing? How do we put a body together so that it's a unit, an acting, 
efficient energy unit?" (Rolf, 1978)
Peirce and Dennett would almost certainly agree that we cannot distinguish 'think-
ing' from internalised talking, and equally that we cannot distinguish 'talk-
ing' from externalised thinking. If we pause to reflect we may recognise that 
this accords with many aspects of our own experience. On occasion, for 
example, we may first discover what we believe about a topic when we hear 
ourselves define our position in an unrehearsed conversation.
We often experience similar relationships between thought and bodily action. We 
seem to find out what we think, or how we feel, at the point when a bodily 
action of speech or movement draws it to our attention. We find ourselves 
yawning and only then realise that we must feel bored or tired. On the other 
hand, we very rarely, if ever, stop to deliberate about something that we 
have seen or heard, decide after a pause for consideration that it amuses us, 
and then burst out laughing. Instead we find ourselves laughing before we 
have thought either about what has amused us, or why we find ourselves 
amused. (This can, of course, mean that, at times, we find ourselves scolded 
by others for laughing at what they deem an inappropriate moment.)
We might now agree that much thinking activity takes the form of internalised talking 
(sometimes as monologues and sometimes as imaginary dialogues), with-
out agreeing that all thinking takes this form. However, research undertaken 
with flotation tanks suggests that we may have nothing more than talk at 
our disposal (cf Lilly, 1977; Kjellgren, 2008; Kelly, 2011). John Lilly originally 
invented the flotation tank in order to test the assertion that without any kind 
of stimulation the brain would simply shut down or go to sleep. Since then 
scientists have used it for various experiments, both mental and physical 
(Kjellgren, 2008), and sports people, therapists and teachers of yoga and 
relaxation have used it for many other purposes (Hutchinson, 2003).
In isolation tanks the sensory organs receive almost no external input: the user 
lies in complete silence, complete darkness, and in an environment kept 
at exactly body temperature, and the salt solution in which the user lies 
balances the body against gravity. In this environment Lilly found that, far 
from shutting down, the brain continued, albeit in a different way. In the 
environment of an isolation tank, cut off from external stimuli, one can only 
remember, think internally generated thoughts, or project internal data onto 
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an external environment of one's own making. These projections can take 
the form of visual or auditory hallucinations, and people may then experi-
ence them as external event. As one of the interviewees in the 2008 Swedish 
study reported, "I hear music, but there was no music, but I heard music." 
(Kjellgren, 2008)
Participants report feelings similar to those they might feel at the point just before 
they normally drift off to sleep. Thoughts pass through their minds without 
becoming fully-formed or logically connected chains. Importantly, for our 
purposes, people report this process of attenuation as a regression from 
conversation and monologue to chatter and overheard snatches. At every 
level mental activity in the flotation tank appears (or becomes remembered) 
as a form of verbalisation. Often, as in the quotation above, this becomes 
projected and happens subjectively somewhere "out there"; but nonethe-
less users report it as verbal. In profound isolation, when people have only 
their own internal workings to deal with, they still do not appear to come 
across any conscious mental activity that does not take the form of mon-
ologue, dialogue, conversation or half-heard whispers. Users who report 
hearing music, for example, report saying to themselves something like, "I 
can hear music. Where is it coming from?" Conscious mental activity, then, 
appears to consist of language all the way down.
This should not surprise us, since any alternative suggestion would involve the 
existence of another internal "language" in the brain: a mind-code of which 
we have no knowledge and about which we can find no evidence. Such an 
explanation would create an additional component for no obvious reason. 
We have no need to assume other than that sensory impressions, once they 
reach the brain, form the raw material for various parallel processes in the 
brain, and that once a process "wins" and thus gets "published", it gets 
published in the only language that we know (or in one of the only lan-
guages that we know): in the language that we currently use to self-talk and 
to talk-to-others.
I do not mean to suggest here that all brain activity takes place in English or Finn-
ish, or whatever native language you have. I simply suggest that all con-
scious thoughts, all the judgements that we consciously make, arrive in a 
verbalised form, whether or not that remains internal or becomes spoken 
aloud. The activities of our underminds have no need of language since, by 
their very nature, they form brain activities of which we have no conscious 
awareness. When our hand shapes itself to reach for a cup our conscious-
ness, as Shawn Gallagher pointed out, simply plays no part at all, and in 
such an action language has no part to play. If however we look intently at 
three upturned cups, because someone has told us that one of them covers a 
diamond, we will either make a quick intuitive choice, using our undermind, 
or we will pause for a long time, trying to recollect exactly how the magician 
moved the cups, in order to make a rational conscious decision. (In a situ-
ation like this, many experiments indicate that we will do better if we trust 
our instincts - our undermind - and make a quick intuitive "guess". (Claxton, 
1998) Rational decisions will not always beat intuitive snap-judgements, 
and this will have an important bearing on later parts of the argument.)
As Alexander and Rolf clearly demonstrated, mental and bodily activities both have 
a temporal dimension, by which I mean that they display time-related prop-
erties. We can usually observe or predict bodily consequences. If I fall off a 
ladder today you may safely predict that I won't play football on Saturday. 
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If I carry heavy sacks all day without paying attention to my posture you 
might reasonably predict that I will get backache. If I do it for a much longer 
period others may warn that I will cause myself permanent damage. Both 
the actor and those watching her can observe and predict these kinds of 
consequences. The consequences of thought activity appear somewhat less 
easy to observe and predict for both the thinker and those around her.
On the other hand, while we regard it as normal for our thinking activities to resur-
face at a later date as memories, we seem less aware that the same applies 
to our physical activities. Ida Rolf gives a clear example when she discusses 
treating the psychologist Fritz Perls, who became completely unconscious 
during the seventh hour of treatment. "When Fritz came round, the first 
thing he said was something that indicated he knew perfectly well that he'd 
been unconscious. He said that he had once been injured by an anaesthe-
tist in surgery... So, you see, when I got into his neck, I began to raise that 
whole trip." Rolf suggested that the traumatic memory of being injured 
under anaesthetic emerged spontaneously when she caused Perls to feel a 
similar sensation under treatment in the same part of his body. Perls did not 
will this and in fact he passed out before he became conscious of his reac-
tion. Only afterwards could he piece all the plot elements together and offer 
a rational explanation to Rolf.
Alexander and Rolf both attempted to forge useful knowledge in an area not yet 
available to the scientific method, and their work reached many people. 
However their work did not enter what we might call the cultural main-
stream, in contrast to the work of Freud and Jung, who concentrated almost 
exclusively on the mental. Both of their work entered into the cultural main-
stream, as Steven Johnson has noted.
All of us walk around with an operative theory of how the mind works. 
It's rarely a unified theory, of course: typically our models are cob-
bled together out of different disciplines and intellectual periods. 
We'll dabble in Eriksonian psychology and say that someone is having an 
"identity crisis;" we'll borrow from modern neuroscience and describe 
ourselves as "very right-brain"; we'll steal a page from the mystics and 
refer to the Jungian unconscious or the personality traits revealed by 
astrology. But while our popular theories of the mind are mostly mon-
grels, they invariably share one common ancestor: Sigmund Freud.
Freudian assumptions about how the mind works remain ubiquitous in our 
culture -- so ubiquitous, in fact, that we seldom even think of their 
original provenance. Freud's ideas are like coins that have been so long 
in circulation that the insignia stamped onto their surface has worn 
off. When you allude to repressing a distasteful memory, or joke about a 
revealing slip of the tongue, or you talk through your memory of a trau-
matic event to lessen its hold over you, or analyze a friend's dream for 
its hidden meaning -- when you do any of these things, you're speaking 
the language of Freud, using a grammar of psychological categories and 
relationships that he largely invented. 
(Johnson, 2004, p58)
Freud's theories changed and developed over the course of his life, and he never 
made the ontological status of this three main theories (or three main stages 
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of theorising) completely clear. Initially, for example, he appeared to regard 
the ego as a sense organ that dealt with both internal and external percep-
tion. Later, in 1926 in The Question of Lay Analysis, he claimed that it "is a 
hypothesis, like so many others in the sciences: the very earliest ones have 
always been rather rough. ‘Open to revision', we can say in such cases . 
. . the value of a 'fiction' of this kind . . . depends on how much one can 
achieve with its help."
Freud stated explicitly that, in thinking about the psychic apparatus, we should 
"leave entirely to one side the material line of approach", and not concern 
ourselves with how, or whether, his theoretical model had any physiological 
counterpart. He did not intend us to believe that three locatable areas of the 
mind actually existed: that the ego, for example, had the same qualities of 
reality as the appendix or liver.
Freud developed the triadic notion of the ego, the id and the superego as a diagram-
matic tool for modelling individual human behaviour onto theoretical tem-
plates. In their absorption into popular culture, however, many people seem 
to have ignored the hermeneutic nature of Freud's probes and misunder-
stood the ego, id and superego as actual 'things'; possibly as an updated, 
secular alternative to the soul. (At the time of writing a website, eoutofego.
com, currently offers an e-book that you will want after you "imagine your 
life if your EGO didn't get in the way!") Although Freud wrote that religion 
"is an illusion and it derives its strength from the fact that it falls in with 
our instinctual desires." the underlying structure of his diagrammatic world 
contains many quasi-religious elements that lay in the ground only slightly 
below the surface. He describes the id, for example, as an
inaccessible part of our personality, what little we know of it we have 
learned from our study of the Dreamwork and of the construction of neu-
rotic symptoms, and most of that is of a negative character and can be 
described only as a contrast to the ego. We approach the id with anal-
ogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething excitations.... 
It is filled with energy reaching it from the instincts, but it has no 
organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring 
about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs subject to the obser-
vance of the pleasure principle. 
(Freud, 1933, pp105-106)
J. Allan Hobson notes that, in constructing his psychoanalytical model, "Sigmund 
Freud picked up the distorted message idea and acted as the high priest 
whose psychological skills could tell the patient things he would not oth-
erwise know about himself". (Hobson, 2002, p16) He also points out that 
while "Freud was an avowed atheist - his rejection of religion was prac-
tically phobic - he fell back into the hidden agency idea with his belief in 
a dynamic unconscious mind that was in constant competition with con-
sciousness. (Hobson, 2002, p17)
If we read, and try to understand, Freud's work as a powerful narrative, rather 
than a description of "what it is like to be" us, we will find that it describes 
a fallen world in which life consists of an endless struggle against primitive 
urges that seek to drag us down in what we could fairly describe as a sec-
ular caricature of the medieval idea of sin. In this story, we live our lives as 
battles for which we have received no proper preparation, and over which 
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we can exercise little control. The very act of being born disadvantages us 
by throwing us into relationships with our mothers that will almost cer-
tainly prove unhealthy, and from which we will have to try to recover. More-
over this process mainly takes place in another realm to which we can have 
no direct access. Our id will remain forever closed to us, except possibly 
for the intervention of a therapist who will seek indirect access through the 
kingdom of Dreamwork.
Freud's schema may seem triadic from some perspectives - it divides the self into 
the ego, superego and id - but at root it describes the mind dualistically: as 
a battle between the rational and conscious mind and the dangerous and 
unknowable unconscious. This diagnosis continued the split emphasised by 
Descartes, while dressing it in different clothing.
Psychologists and psychotherapists did not universally accept this doctrine. Many 
began to view the mind as a mere part of a holistic body-mind entity. 
This led to renewed interest in Rolfing and the Alexander Technique, and 
an increasing interest in Gestalt Therapy, which Fritz Perls & Paul Good-
man had introduced in 1951. Perls, who described "the aim in therapy, the 
growth aim" as one in which you should "lose more and more of your 'mind' 
and come more to your senses" (Perls, 1976), had trained as a Freudian 
psychoanalyst in Berlin and Vienna, but had begun to differ from Freud 
in several important ways. While he accepted that most people suffered 
from the existence of hidden beliefs or habits, of which they remained una-
ware, he did not believe that these resulted from a general universal psychic 
apparatus, and nor did he believe that psychoanalysts should treat them 
by poking around in the patient's childhood memories. He came to believe 
instead that treatment should take experiential forms: that patients should 
act and experience, rather than merely talk about acting and experiencing. 
He therefore began Gestalt Therapy as a set of techniques that he regarded 
as existential-phenomenological therapy. Perls adopted a saying of Martin 
Buber as shorthand for its goals: "The I and thou in the Here and Now".
Perls stripped psychotherapy of the supernatural superstructure that Freud (and 
Jung, with his notion of the collective unconscious) had created. He did 
not insist that dreams held secret knowledge that an expert could interpret 
or that they served to hold repressed urges in check. Indeed, he scarcely 
talked about repression at all. Instead he talked about blockages, which 
developed individually and idiosyncratically, and could cease without any 
need to brood about dark deeds that may or may not have happened in the 
past. Perls believed in a direct connection between how we feel and how we 
act, to the extent that he would ask patients to monitor and work on their 
breathing and posture as part of their mental training. He argued, in effect, 
that if you learned to successfully adopt the body language of a relaxed and 
happy person, you would inevitably find yourself beginning to experience 
feelings of relaxation and happiness.
Perls argued that "in any biological or social-psychological investigation the con-
crete subject-matter is always an organism/environment field. There is 
no function of any animal that is definable except as a function of such a 
field. Organic physiology, thoughts and emotions, objects and persons, are 
abstractions that are meaningful only when referred back to interactions of 
the field." He points out an implication of this: all "perception and thinking 
are more than a mere response, and go out to as well as come from the 
field". (Perls, Hefferline & Goodman, 1951, p426)
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Perls felt that we should see ourselves as an ongoing process rather than a fixed 
entity. This process incorporated both our bodily and our mental processes, 
and privileged neither. Our problems could begin anywhere within our 
internal environment and extend over the whole terrain. He offered a series 
of techniques for identifying and overcoming problems that relied more on 
doing than thinking. He thought that people suffered from repetitive habits 
that they would benefit from dispelling.
Eric Berne developed a different, but complementary toolkit for people who found 
themselves drawn to, and sometimes controlled by, sets of mental habits 
that remained unknown to them. He developed the theory of Transactional 
Analysis, which regarded almost all human interaction as governed by 
socially learned games. Berne believed that, at the roots of human psychol-
ogy, laid the need for people, especially children, to feel handled with care, 
to feel "stroked"; and he believed that emotional deprivation could have 
potentially fatal physical as well as mental consequences.
Like Freud, Berne thought that most people get damaged in childhood. Unlike Freud 
he saw nothing mysterious or supernatural about this process. Like Perls, 
he regarded it as a relatively simple affair that arose from lack of knowl-
edge, lack of ability, lack of time, or a mixture of these. Berne regarded all 
people as exhibiting
three types of ego states. (1) Those derived from parental figures, 
colloquially called the Parent. In this state he thinks, feels, acts, 
talks and responds just as one of this parents did when he was little... 
(2) The ego state in which he appraises his environment objectively, 
and calculates its possibilities and probabilities on the basis of past 
adult experience, as called the Adult... (3) Each person caries within 
a little boy or little girl who thinks, feels, acts, talks and responds 
just the way he or she did when he or she was a child of a certain 
age...The Child is not regarded as 'childish' or 'immature' which are 
Parental words, but as 'childlike', meaning like a child of a certain 
age, and the important factor here is the age, which may be anywhere 
between two and five years in ordinary circumstances. 
(Berne, 1972, p30-31)
In Berne's view most human interaction becomes formalised, and he mapped these 
formalised interactions onto a series of games. "From the present point of 
view, child-rearing may be regarded as an educational process in which the 
child is taught what games to play and how to play them" (Berne, 1964, p52). 
In Games People Play, Berne lists thirty six games, giving a detailed exposition 
of each one and its likely consequences. They range from "Let's You and 
Him Fight" and "I'm Only Trying to Help You" to "Alcoholic", "See What You 
Made Me Do", and "Now I've Got You, You Son of a Bitch" (cf Berne, 1964).
Berne divided human interaction into three categories: activities, pastimes and 
games. In activities "the transactions are programmed by the material being 
worked with, whether it be wood or concrete or problems in arithmetic. 
Work transactions are typically Adult-to-Adult, oriented toward the exter-
nal reality, that is, the subject of the activity" (Berne, 1972, p42). Pastimes 
"have a certain repetitive quality and are in the nature of multiple-choice, 
sentence-completion interchanges such as take place at cocktail parties 
where people do not know each other very well" (Berne, 1972, p43). Games 
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form "sets of ulterior transactions, repetitive in nature, with a well-defined 
psychological payoff" (Berne, 1972, p43). They occur in types of first, sec-
ond, and third degree, which equals games deemed socially acceptable in 
the circle where people play them; games that the players would prefer to 
conceal but pose no real danger; and games that might seriously harm a 
person or relationship.
Berne describes all of these as ways of structuring time with the aim of avoiding 
boredom and maximising satisfaction. Additionally people have what Berne 
terms a "pre-conscious life script". Scripts develop from "childlike illusions 
that may persist throughout a whole lifetime, although in more sensitive, 
perceptive and intelligent people these illusions dissolve one by one leading 
to... various life crises". (Berne, 1972, p46)
Like Perls, Berne believes that a change in behaviour could arise through drawing 
a patient's attention to their current behaviour. He devised the matrix of 
games as a tool for capturing people's attention in a systematic way. Berne 
argued that games do not necessarily describe the totality of "what it is like 
to be" a person, because people have the ability to bring their scripts into 
consciousness, to analyse and pass judgement on them, and then to change 
them; and thus they can progress beyond games to autonomy, at which 
point they will discover that the "attainment of autonomy is manifested by 
the release or recovery of three capacities: awareness, spontaneity and inti-
macy" (Berne, 1964, p158).
16.4. The Nature of Consciousness Forms  
   the Key Issue
In many ways, we can view the gradual move from the dualist split to an 
acceptance that the mind did not rule the body but rather played an impor-
tant, though not necessarily leading, role in the lifework of process-like 
entity as a return to beliefs held previously, and held still in the East. Alan 
Watts explored these ideas from a spiritual perspective, with specific ref-
erence to Zen Buddhism. He proposed that we should always regard the 
world around us as ongoing processes rather than matter. He suggested 
that psychological
distress arises from what may be termed maya, to use the Hindu-Bud-
dhist word whose exact meaning is not merely 'illusion' but the entire 
world-conception of a culture, considered as illusion in the strict 
etymological sense of a play (Latin, ludere). The aim of a way of lib-
eration is not the destruction of maya but seeing it for what it is, 
or seeing through it. Play is not to be taken seriously, or, in other 
words, ideas of the world and of oneself which are social conventions 
and institutions are not to be confused with reality. 
(Watts, 1961, p9)
Watts articulated the same view that Dennett would later arrive at. Our "normal 
sensation of self is a hoax or, at best, a temporary role that we are playing, 
or have been conned into playing - with our own tacit consent, just as every 
hypnotized person is basically willing to be hypnotized". (Watts, 1966, p18) 
In a way that recalled General Semantics (Korzybski, 1933) Watts argued 
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that our limitations arise in part from the structures of our language which 
encourage us to view ourselves as actors acting upon external stuff "out 
there". "The basic problem is to understand that there are no such things as 
things; that is to say separate things, separate events. That is only a way of 
talking. What do you mean by a thing? A thing is a noun. A noun isn't a part 
of nature, it's a part of speech. There are no nouns in the physical world." 
(Watts, 2004) We never "reach an agreement" because an agreement is an 
abstraction that has no geography. Instead, as part of a process, "we agree" 
or possibly if the process turns into an extended one, we finally "agree to 
agree". Buckminster Fuller made a similar point when he declared "I live on 
Earth at present, and I don't know what I am. I know that I am not a cate-
gory. I am not a thing - a noun. I seem to be a verb, an evolutionary process 
- an integral function of the universe." (Fuller, 1970)
The suggestion that our view of ourselves contained fundamental flaws led to expe-
riential work of a more or less scientific nature. John Lilly developed the 
isolation tank (Lilly, 1977) in order to explore what happened when sen-
sory input became reduced to almost zero. Traditional wisdom suggested 
that madness would follow, but Lilly's experiments suggested that this fear 
arose from misunderstanding what the brain did and why it did it. In The 
Human Biocomputer (Lilly, 1967), based on a lengthy series of experiments 
using psychoactive chemicals in floatation tanks, Lilly makes some of the 
earliest attempts to conceive the brain in terms of programming. Unlike 
later researchers he does not claim that "the brain is a computer", merely 
that, for the purposes of the research he assumes it to have the charac-
teristics of one. He argues that the "human computer, within limits yet to 
be defined, has 'self-programming' properties, and other persons-program-
ming properties" (Lilly, 1967, p6). "The 'consciousness program' itself is 
expandable and contractible within the computer's structure within certain 
limits" (Lilly, 1967, p16). In these experiments, and the lengthy documenta-
tion that followed (Lilly 1967, 1972, 1975, 1977), Lilly provides experimen-
tal evidence to support the theories espoused by Perls and Berne, and offers 
a link to the views of consciousness that artificial intelligence and cybernet-
ics would later develop further.
Timothy Leary, another proponent of direct experimentation on consciousness, 
also drew early parallels between consciousness and digital computers, and 
specifically on the mutual effects each might have on the other. In 1987 
he wrote that "I was quite blind to the fact that the new young generation 
would grow up automatically processing digitized thoughts on home elec-
tronic screens. In short, I understood PSYber-world, but not CYBer-world. I 
had extensively explored the inner worlds of consciousness, navigated the 
limitless psy-universe of the brain. But I had no access to and understand-
ing of the Info-world, created by the electronic technologies which were 
just about to change us from mechanical-book people to quantum screen 
people." (Leary, 1987, p11)
This work all supports the view that we should not view human consciousness as a 
fixed entity; that we should regard thinking and talking as functionally iden-
tical; that we do indeed learn to make our own experiential realities - what 
Heidegger calls our umwelt - which we cannot properly communicate even 
to ourselves; and that this process of becoming ourselves grows out of, and 
revolves around, telling and being told stories.
Understanding that we develop by telling and hearing stories (sometimes in the 
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guise of formalised games with strict and limiting rules), then we might sus-
pect that we have our conceptions of ourselves and others backwards. The 
psychologist Kenneth Gergen, for one, would agree. He has argued that we 
need to develop inherently social conceptions of ourselves, and that, as a 
result, "the search for self is largely misconceived. It does not yield knowl-
edge in the traditional sense, but rather, provides a means of rendering action 
socially intelligible" (in Mischel, ed, 1977, p139). The "fact the emotions are 
singled out as part of oneself, the variety of emotions that we believe to exist, 
and the conditions under which they are attributed to self, are all based on 
socially derived conceptualization" (in Mischel, ed, 1977, p164-165).
Gergen argues that social facts have a negotiated character that depends not on 
their intrinsic qualities but on "the development of a community of agree-
ment" (Gergen, 1993, p81). He takes up the position adopted by Jurgen 
Habermas, that "in their underlying epistemology, positivist formulations 
obliterate the critical issues of social ethics... Thus, with fundamental ques-
tions of values obscured, the critical problem of ends is replaced with the 
relatively superficial concern with means; society is primarily left with 
problems of technical application" (Gergen, 1993, p86).
If it seems, then, as though we must see our conscious selves as inherently social 
processes subject to continuous renegotiation, and internalised as we 
author (or collate) our individual narratives, we may wonder about the 
nature of the social forces that operate upon us. If we no longer appear to 
ourselves as individuals having ideas inside the privacy of our own heads 
which we may then choose to broadcast, but as bounded but permeable 
entities acting primarily as receivers, then we may very well wonder where 
the transmissions come from.
To understand this we will need to look at some aspects of the theory of evolution.
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The philosopher David Chalmers has defined something that he terms the 
'hard problem'. He has explained that
There is not just one problem of consciousness. 'Consciousness' is an 
ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena. Each of these 
phenomena needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than 
others. At the start, it is useful to divide the associated problems 
of consciousness into 'hard' and 'easy' problems. The easy problems of 
consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard 
methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms 
of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that 
seem to resist those methods. 
(Chalmers, 1995, p200)
He defines the hard problem of consciousness as "the problem of experience". 
He suggests that when "we think and perceive, there is a whir of informa-
tion-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect."
17.1. What is it like to be a bat?
In 1974 Thomas Nagel produced an influential definition of this subjective 
aspect in an article entitled What is it like to be a bat? In this he broadly agrees 
with Chalmers, stating that consciousness "is what makes the mind-body 
problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the 
problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong". (Nagel, 1974, p435)
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He argues that we cannot reduce subjective experience to a description of the phys-
ical processes that evoke it, and that if "physicalism is to be defended the 
phenomenological features must themselves be given a physical account". 
By way of illustration he uses bats as an example. He says that "I assume 
we all believe that bats have experience. After all they are mammals". The 
essence of this belief, he argues, "is that there is something that it is like to 
be a bat". However the sonar by which bats locate themselves operates in 
a fundamentally different way from any sense apparatus humans possess 
and so "there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we 
can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the notion 
of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will 
permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, and if 
not, what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion".
Nagel concludes his paper with a suggestion that, to tackle the problem he has 
defined one might need to "devise a new method - an objective phenome-
nology not dependent on empathy or the imagination". He suggests that we 
"would have to develop such a phenomenology to describe sonar experi-
ences of bats". (Nagel, 1974, p448)
Chalmers, in turn, references Nagel's idea that "there is something it is like to be a 
conscious organism". He argues that this
subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience 
visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark 
and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go 
along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, 
the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to 
orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality 
of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What 
unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be 
in them. All of them are states of experience.  
(Chalmers, 1995, p201)
Chalmers suggests that subjective experience - "what it is like to be" you or me - pre-
sents us with a very different kind of problem to the 'easier' problems, such as 
"the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli" or 
"the deliberate control of behavior". Indeed Chalmers suggests that "what it 
is like to be" something forms the core of what we mean when we talk about 
consciousness, as opposed to mere awareness: "an organism is conscious if 
there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is con-
scious if there is something it is like to be in that state." (Chalmers, 1995, p201)
Chalmers states this as a philosopher, and for much of the past four centuries phi-
losophers and theologians have taken subjective experience and the 'prob-
lem' of consciousness to lie within their domains. Until the middle of the 
last century researchers uncovered little empirical evidence that might point 
towards a solution, or even indicate the general direction that we should 
look in order to find a solution. In the past fifty years, however, neurolo-
gists and psychologists have begun to obtain empirical data that appears to 
indicate clear correlations between subjective thought processes and objec-
tively observable activity in the brain. Philosophers can no longer confine 
themselves to thought experiments of the kind that Descartes engaged in, 
and which continue today in discussions about bats and worlds full of zom-
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bies, but must now take account of some quite surprising data. We may 
now have the ability to test Chalmers’s assertions.
17.2. Dennett in the Cartesian Theatre
The philosopher Daniel Dennett agrees with Libet's idea that being con-
scious consists of experiencing the results of emergent processes in the 
brain. He arrives at this conclusion by providing the most parsimonious 
explanation available for the strange and counter-intuitive order of events 
observed by Libet. He recommends, in effect, that we simply take the results 
at face value. He can recommend this because he believes that most people 
have inherited from Descartes the idea of consciousness as a kind of "Car-
tesian Theater", and that he can show, both logically and experimentally, 
that in reality consciousness simply does not work in that way.
Dennett defines the Cartesian Theater as a view of the mind that regards
perceptual systems as providing 'input' to some central thinking arena, 
which in turn provides 'control' or 'direction' to some relatively 
peripheral systems providing bodily motion. This central arena is also 
thought to avail itself of material held in some relatively subservient 
areas of memory.  
(Dennett, 1991, p39)
Dennett suggests that
the very idea that there are important theoretical divisions between 
such presumed subsystems as 'long-term memory' and 'reasoning' (or 
'planning') ... prevents theorists from seeing that their models still 
presuppose that somewhere, conveniently hidden in the obscure center of 
the mind/brain, there is a 'Cartesian Theater', a place where 'it all 
comes together' and consciousness happens.
(Dennett, 1991, p39)
He argues that the real problem lies not in the fact that "I" decide something after 
"my body" has already begun doing it, but in the fact that I begin my anal-
ysis by imagining that I contain both an operator and a subject that gets 
operated upon; and that I therefore contain more than, and exist somehow 
separated from, my body.
Dennett approaches Nagel's assertion that there must “be something that it is like 
to be" a bat by using the heterophenomenological method, described ear-
lier, to attack its logical basis. He argues that Nagel's test may not prove as 
simple as Nagel appears to think. He argues that we "should be interested in 
what we can know about the bat's consciousness (if any), not whether we 
can turn our minds temporarily or permanently into bat minds” (Dennett, 
1991, p442), and that Nagel confuses the two options. He suggests that 
we can build up a heterophenomenological narrative by asking questions 
and undertaking the kind of research that will lead us to an account of the 
bat's perceptual and behavioural world. He produces evidence of existing 
research that he claims goes a long way in helping us build this narrative.
Some have criticised Dennett's use of heterophenomenology for doing less than he 
claims. Dan Zahavi, for example, comes from a background of traditional 
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Husserlian phenomenology and has written that
contrary to Dennett’s claim, classical phenomenology already combines 
the resources of auto- and heterophenomenology. To put it differently, 
not only do the classical phenomenologists stress the interdependency 
of auto- and heterophenomenology, contrary to what Dennett himself is 
doing; in their numerous analyses of how foreign subjectivity manifests 
itself in gestures, expressions and bodily behavior, they have also pro-
vided us with a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of how to 
heterophenomenologize than Dennett has done.
(Zahavi, 2007, p39)
However, I would argue that Zahavi either misses or misunderstands Dennett's 
central claim, which amounts to the fact that, although we feel conscious, 
we do not experience consciousness in the ways that we usually think we 
do, and that therefore we should not ask whether or not classical phenome-
nology provides techniques for the first person exploration of consciousness 
but rather whether we possess a first-person consciousness at all.
Dennett argues that when "we arrive at heterophenomenological narratives that 
no critic can find any positive grounds for rejecting, we should accept them 
- tentatively, pending further discoveries - as accurate accounts of what it 
is like to be the creature in question. That, after all, is how we treat each 
other." Anticipating an objection he concludes by pointing out that he “is 
not shifting the burden of proof, but extending the normal, human, burden 
of proof to other entities". (Dennett, 1991, p442-3).
Dennett regards this argument as important because he believes that Nagel has 
asked a subtly circular question in which its premises make assumptions 
about crucial aspects of the consciousness that it intends to investigate. 
Trying to imagine "what it is like to be" a bat implies that we can point 
to other entities that we can successfully imagine "what it is like to be", 
and yet this appears to Dennett unwarranted and extremely unlikely. Can 
I know "what it is like to be" you experiencing the colour green, or tasting 
sushi for the first time? Even closer to home, can I genuinely imagine "what 
it is like to be" me tasting sushi for the first time twenty years ago? Dennett 
thinks not, and I think that the model of consciousness that Dennett pro-
poses in place of the Cartesian Theater explains why.
17.3. The Problem of Vitalism
Dennett adopts a specific kind of eliminativist position, through which he 
claims that he simply has less to explain than most people imagine. He 
argues that, although we correctly regard ourselves as conscious, and 
although we undoubtedly have thoughts and feelings, we do not experience 
consciousness in the way that we usually assume we do, and our thoughts 
and feelings do not arise in the ways that folk wisdom suggests. When we 
experience ourselves as conscious we simply experience "what it feels like 
to be" creatures whose brains perform certain functions; and that to con-
ceive these experiences as something additional to brain functions requires 
us to invent an imaginary extra component which we will subsequently 
hunt for and fail to find. According to Max Velmas, this aspect of Dennett's 
position has descended from, and appears similar to the position adopted 
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by the British philosopher Gilbert Ryle. "For him, terms like 'mind' and 'con-
sciousness' are nothing more than attributions that we make on the basis 
of observed behaviour. They are essentially fictional attributions which may 
be quite useful to make in ordinary life, but they do not correspond to any-
thing real either in brains or in machines". (Velmans, 2009, p91)
Dennett offers historical parallels for his position, citing vitalism, “the view that 
living things contain some special physical but equally mysterious stuff -- 
élan vital" (Dennett, 1996, p24), as one important example of attempting 
to explain something by inventing an extra and invisible component in the 
system, that subsequently fails to turn up. Galen of Pergamon first promul-
gated the idea in AD200, believing that living creatures breathed in a mys-
terious vitalist substance from the air. In Dennett's view, vitalism "-- the 
insistence that there is some big, mysterious extra ingredient in all living 
things -- turns out to have been not a deep insight but a failure of imagina-
tion". (Dennett, 2005, p178)
Investigators have made many such attempts to explain phenomena by adducing 
an additional factor. Johann Joachim Becher published Physical Education 
in 1667, and proposed the phlogiston theory. Phlogiston, he argued, had the 
capacity to cause things to burn, and different materials either contained it 
or did not. Flammable materials held phlogiston in differing amounts, and 
inflammable materials lacked it completely. This theory remained influential 
until the end of the eighteenth century, although over time the conception of 
phlogiston gradually shifted from that of a substance to that of a 'natural prin-
ciple'. No amount of tinkering or adjustment saved the theory, because neither 
the imaginary substance nor the feebler 'natural principle' proved necessary.
17.4. The Cutaneous Rabbit
Dennett suggests that almost all of our current models of consciousness fol-
low from the central duality proposed by Descartes, and almost all offer a 
version of what he terms the Cartesian Theater. These models do not all fall 
into the trap that Gilbert Ryle termed "the ghost in the machine". They do not 
all posit a homunculus inside the head receiving, and acting upon, informa-
tion from the senses. Most people understand and reject the infinite regres-
sion implied by this. However, most models of consciousness still imply the 
existence of a real or conceptual time and place at which something "enters 
consciousness"; they imply that we can in principle time the exact moment 
when you become aware of something happening, and we can in principle 
locate an exact place in your brain where this awareness manifests.
This, Dennett says, we can define as Cartesian materialism, which "is the view that 
there is a crucial finish line or boundary somewhere in the brain, marking a 
place where the order of arrival equals the order of 'presentation' in experi-
ence because what happens there is what you are conscious of". (Dennett, 
1991, p107) This view contains as fundamental a flaw as a belief in the ghost 
in the machine, albeit wrapped somewhat differently. We can fairly judge a 
belief in a single place where "everything comes together", where input from 
the senses combines with memories and the results of cogitation to generate 
a sense of consciousness, to mean one of two things. It may mean that this 
person believes that experimentation will eventually locate a specific place 
in the brain where this happens. In this case we can judge Descartes correct 
in his hypothesis and merely unlucky in his choice of the pineal gland for 
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the location of the process. Unfortunately, however, no research to date has 
pinpointed such a place or even suggested any likelihood that such a place 
exists. The more we learn about the functioning of the brain the less central-
ised it appears. Alternatively we may take it to mean that this person does 
not believe that the finishing line exists in a specific area of the brain, but 
rather that it has a non-material existence. Such a belief, however, would 
simply resurrect the Cartesian Theater; emptied of it’s previously audience, 
the homunculus, and now playing to an empty house.
A wide range of experiments other than Libet's have raised both logical and prac-
tical difficulties with this model, or any model resembling it. Psychologists 
Paul Kolers and Michael von Grünau created one such test, the so-called 
color phi experiment in which subjects view two images in quick succes-
sion. The first image displays a blue dot near the top left of the screen and 
the second shows a red dot near the bottom right of the screen. When the 
subjects view the two images in succession for 150 milliseconds each, with 
a 50 millisecond gap between them, they report that they see a single dot 
moving from the top left to the bottom right of the screen. Moreover they see 
the spot changing colour when it reaches the centre of the screen.
Like Libet's alleged time-shifting this experiment raises important questions about 
the relationship between perception and consciousness. The subjects report 
the dot moving diagonally down to the right and changing colour in the cen-
tre of the screen - which means, in effect, that they claim to have observed 
the colour of the dot changing before they have seen the second dot.
The "cutaneous rabbit" experiment, reported in 1972 by psychologists Frank Geld-
ard and Carl Sherrick, produced a set of similarly counter-intuitive results. 
In this experiment the arm of the subject
rests on a table, underneath synchronized mechanical "tappers". When a 
sequence is initiated, the machines deliver a series of taps in rhythm 
on certain points on the subject's arm - for example, three at one point 
on the wrist, then two at the elbow, and then two on a single point on 
the upper arm. Intervals between the stimuli could be anywhere between 
50 and 200 milliseconds, so that any one sequence might last from less 
than one second to two or three seconds.
The effect as reported by the subject is astonishing: rather than "feel-
ing" each of the taps where they occurred, subjects report an equidis-
tant series of taps "hopping" up their arm in regular sequence, like a 
tiny rabbit bounding gleefully upon their nervous system. That is, they 
felt taps in between the areas that were actually being stimulated that 
altered the sequence in their brains. 
(Everything2.com, 2012)
We can interpret these findings in numerous ways, and many of these interpre-
tations depend on whether we intend to smuggle an implied dualism into 
the Cartesian theater. Paul Churchland, in Mind and Consciousness (1984), 
suggests that we use Occam's Razor as the first line of defence against dual-
ist interpretations. From this perspective we should remain wary of com-
plex arguments that give the brain a new and additional ability to time-shift 
chains of perceptions before presenting them to consciousness. Like the 
invention of phlogiston, these suggestions may simply attempt to solve one 
mystery by inventing another.
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Daniel Dennett explains the results of all of these experiments by proposing an 
entirely different model of consciousness that also aims to meet Church-
land's requirement of not introducing new elements to explain difficulties. 
He terms this the Multiple Drafts model, basing the name on the practice of 
academic communities in circulating drafts of papers among many scholars, 
and then modifying the paper in light of comments, with the consequence 
that multiple drafts of a paper may circulate through a community at any 
time, right up until the final publication of the paper in an academic journal.
Dennett points to evidence suggesting that processes in the brain operate in a local-
ised manner, and do not take place under the control of a central scrutiniser. 
He suggests that I will experience an event in many different ways, and my 
brain will interpret these parallel experiences over multiple time spans. Dur-
ing these processes, different neural activities will assert more or less control 
at different times, and the resulting consciousness simply reflects the fact of 
some (but not all) activity resulting in actions, and thus becoming facts in the 
world available to memory. In other words, consciousness does not consist of
presentations (in the Cartesian Theater) but judgments about how it 
seems to the subject, judgments that the subject himself can go on to 
interpret, act upon, remember... These events fix interpretations of what 
the subject experiences, and thus provide fixed points in the subjective 
sequence. 
(Dennett, 1991, p169-170)
When I observe an event my brain will generate many internal actions and pro-
duce many internal interpretations and reactions which will compete for 
attention until one of them finally gets "published" in the form of a ver-
bal response or a physical action. I may find myself standing up, having 
pushed my chair back and knocked it over, shouting "how dare you say that 
about my wife!", and suddenly become aware that what I just heard had 
made me angry. Importantly, the discovery that I feel angry will occur when 
I find myself standing up, just as the simplest face-value interpretation of 
the results of Libet's experiments suggests it will. I do not become conscious 
that I have become angry, cogitate about what course of action to take, and 
then, when I have made up my mind, stand up in a fury. My consciousness 
of feeling angry, my judgement that at that time I felt angry, forms part of a 
narrative that I tell myself when I think back on the situation. At the moment 
that the incident occurs I become too all-absorbed in generating my anger 
to have any capacity (or any need) to become conscious that I feel angry. I 
will do that later (moments, seconds or milliseconds later), when my anger 
has peaked, and I can step back from my absorption to make a judgement 
about what just happened.
17.5. The Multiple Drafts Model:
   Consciousness as an Abstraction
We can best view consciousness, then, as an abstraction and not as a 
"thing" that scientists can identify and locate. Dennett offers an analogy 
that likens consciousness to the human voice.
We say 'I hear a voice', 'he has a tenor voice', 'you will strain your 
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voice', and 'I have lost my voice'. Now is a voice a thing? If so, just 
what thing is a voice? The voice we strain may seem as unproblematic a 
physical part of the body as the back or eyes we strain, perhaps the 
vocal cords; but surely one does not have tenor vocal cords... or lose 
one's vocal cords. 
(Dennett, 1969, p27)
Dennett points here to the fact that we use the word 'voice' to mean several overlap-
ping aspects of a phenomenon: the physical apparatus that makes sounds 
in the throat, the sounds themselves, and various characteristics of those 
sounds. We do not get confused about these overlapping uses and nor do 
we confuse ourselves into thinking that we could find an actual object called 
a voice located somewhere in the human body. We know that the body, in 
fact, contains no voice-object, only organs capable of producing the sounds 
that we conventionally label a human voice. This, Dennett argues, puts us 
in the same position that we find ourselves in when we consider the human 
mind and human consciousness, although all too often we choose not to 
recognise it.
Our notions of consciousness operate as abstractions that make discussion sim-
pler, just as the idea that the body has a centre of gravity operates as a use-
ful abstraction that makes certain calculations easier. Surgeons will never 
operate on my centre of gravity, just as they will never operate on my con-
sciousness. We can view consciousness, in Dennett's phrase, as "a centre 
of narrative gravity": an abstraction that we can usefully use to describe the 
ongoing story that we tell ourselves about our experiences.
To complete the Multiple Drafts model Dennett tackles the idea of qualia - a term 
proposed by Clarence Irving Lewis, in his book Mind and the World Order 
(1929) for the idea that when we experience redness we can define a unit of 
experience that represents the redness that we can experience. Lewis and 
others have defined this as "the 'what it's like' character of mental states. 
The way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a 
rose, etc." (Eliasmith & Mandik, 2004). Dennett argues that
The infallibilist line on qualia treats them as properties of one's 
experience one cannot in principle misdiscover, and this is a mysteri-
ous doctrine (at least as mysterious as papal infallibility) unless we 
shift the emphasis a little and treat qualia as logical constructs out 
of subjects' qualia-judgments: a subject's experience has the quale F if 
and only if the subject judges his experience to have quale F. We can 
then treat such judgings as constitutive acts, in effect, bringing the 
quale into existence by the same sort of license as novelists have to 
determine the hair color of their characters by fiat. We do not ask how 
Dostoevski knows that Raskolnikov's hair is light brown. 
(Dennett, 1988)
Dennett insists again that we would do better to see what philosophers usually 
treat as aspects of consciousness as judgements within brain processes. 
From this perspective we can explain our perceptions in terms of how they 
affect us, without needing to posit an extra entity, the quale, whose nature 
and reality will cause us endless grief as soon as we try to analyse it.
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So when we look one last time at our original characterization of 
qualia, as ineffable, intrinsic, private, directly apprehensible prop-
erties of experience, we find that there is nothing to fill the bill. In 
their place are relatively or practically ineffable public properties we 
can refer to indirectly via reference to our private property-detectors 
-- private only in the sense of idiosyncratic. And insofar as we wish 
to cling to our subjective authority about the occurrence within us of 
states of certain types or with certain properties, we can have some 
authority -- not infallibility or incorrigibility, but something better 
than sheer guessing -- but only if we restrict ourselves to relational, 
extrinsic properties like the power of certain internal states of ours 
to provoke acts of apparent re-identification. So contrary to what seems 
obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all. 
(Dennett, 1988)
The Multiple Drafts model, then, tells us that what we have traditionally called 
consciousness equates to a benign user illusion: a useful abstraction that 
enables us to bundle together our memories of our experiences and our 
experiences of our memories. The model also implies that consciousness 
has a gappy nature, and that we misjudge how often, and when, we have 
an awareness of feeling conscious. At a moment of fury we feel furious. 
We only become conscious of being furious later. In a similar vein, Sartre 
pointed out that, when we run to catch a moving vehicle, we have no con-
sciousness of anything because our entire being remains focused on the 
all-consuming act of running for the bus. He suggests that "When I run 
after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in looking at a 
portrait, no I is present. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-
be-caught, etc., and non-positional consciousness of that consciousness." 
(Sartre, 1936, pp48-49) If we wish to describe our state of consciousness at 
this point we can describe it, at best, as pre-reflective.
Dennett would deny that pre-reflection equates to consciousness at all in any mean-
ingful sense. Instead he points to a number of experiments that demonstrate 
that we do not have the seamless access to the world that we believe we 
have. Our vision, for example, has neither temporal nor locational conti-
nuity, and nor does our brain continually fill-in the missing parts. We can 
see this by looking at the many experiments and optical illusions related 
to the scotoma, the blind spot we all have in our vision. Although we can 
easily achieve an experiential awareness of the scotoma, when we see it 
demonstrated, we remain completely unconscious, in our daily lives, of a 
hole in our vision. In daily life it seems likely that, during our neural activ-
ities, we make judgements about what we expect to find in our range of 
vision while focusing our attention on something specific. Illusions, such 
as the Cornsweet illusion in which identical colours appear different to our 
eyes, also demonstrate that our access to the world never takes the form of 
unmediated access to raw data but always involves a form of judgement.
If we concentrate on looking at a tree we will see the tree and remain unaware 
that we have a hole in our vision. If we switch our gaze to a person walking 
in the distance we will begin to make out some details of which we were 
previously unaware. Dennett argues that something very similar happens 
with our consciousness. If we ask ourselves, "What am I thinking?" we will 
always provide ourselves with an answer, and we will almost always believe 
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that the answer counts as a true account of what thoughts we had in our 
mind when we asked. If we ask ourselves, "Am I conscious right now?" we 
will always supply ourselves with an answer that suggests an affirmative 
answer. From this we extrapolate that we think all the time and thus always 
remain conscious. Dennett argues that we should regard this as an unjus-
tified assumption, because we have no way to check its truth value, and no 
reason to assume that its truth value would turn out as positive.
We can, in truth, say nor more than we have behaviours, that we can observe our-
selves having these behaviours, that we observe others apparently exhibit-
ing similar behaviours, that these behaviours include the abilities to think 
and to think about thinking, that we compose life-narratives from self-ob-
serving and observing others; and that for the sake of simplifying (internal 
and external) discourse we conventionally refer to the totality of this experi-
ence as "being conscious".
Consciousness then does not act as a driver but rather sits with us as an additional 
passenger; a benign user illusion that we encourage ourselves (and others) 
to treat as real.
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In 1859 Charles Darwin published his book On the Origin of Species. In this 
he laid out a theory of evolution that others have fine-tuned and tweaked 
since, but never disproved or overturned.
As Charles Darwin described it, evolution requires three factors: variation, selec-
tion, and retention. It requires something copyable, with a process for cop-
ying that permits the making of less-than-perfect copies. This provides the 
mechanism through which mutation occurs. It requires an environment in 
which not everything can survive, and therefore not all variations will have 
an equal chance to survive. This provides the mechanism through which 
some variations achieve dominance over time. It requires some mechanism 
of inheritance which allows the passing on of successful variations. This 
provides the means through which adaptations and mutations can evolve 
over more than one generation.
Darwin and his successors have provided detailed descriptions of these mecha-
nisms in action to the extent that only the wilfully blind refuse to acknowl-
edge the explanatory power of the theory. However, although Darwin's 
applied his theories to the genetic structure of living creatures, to explain 
biological evolution, people have long noted that the rules that he eluci-
dated could have more general applications. We have grown up accept-
ing the arguments for evolution in the natural world, but the other possible 
applications of the theory still strike many of us as counter-intuitive.
(1
5
9
)
18.1. Universal Darwinism
Early attempts to widen the application of Darwin's ideas received harsh 
criticism as weak analogies or metaphors. Social Darwinism, for exam-
ple, took the idea of "the survival of the fittest" and attempted to apply it 
to group behaviour. Within a year of Darwin's publication, Herbert Spen-
cer published The Social Organism, in which he argued that society evolves 
in a way analogous to a living organism. The primary problem with this 
argument, and subsequent developments of it, lay in the fact that the anal-
ogy remained just that. No Social Darwinist managed to discover a causal 
mechanism through which society must inevitably evolve, and the fact that 
human beings appear to have choices, and thus a role in deciding their own 
fate, made the analogy a weak one. Even where several tribes or countries 
find themselves in conflict over scarce resources, they have the ability to 
proceed along several different lines. They can go to war. They can negoti-
ate. They can migrate. They can amalgamate. They can set about altering 
the situation in many different ways. The several species of insects or birds 
needing access to the same scarce resources cannot avail themselves of 
these options. Instead, according to Darwin, some have inherited charac-
teristics that enable them to live long enough to produce offspring, while 
others die before they mate and so, over time, the range of wildlife in the 
habitat changes.
In its original formulation people viewed the theory of evolution in the biological 
world as suggesting a way in which living things bettered themselves. In 
1976 Richard Dawkins published The Selfish Gene in which he proposed 
a completely different view: that the evolution did not exist to benefit the 
insects, fish, birds and animals that evolved successfully, but rather to ben-
efit the creatures' genes. Dawkins suggested that we can see genes as rep-
licators, concerned only with copying themselves. From this perspective, 
living creatures merely form the vehicles which genes have used and devel-
oped to do this.
When Dawkins uses the word 'selfish' to describe the actions of genes he does 
not mean to imply that they have intelligence or make moral (or any other) 
choices. He simply intends the phrase to serve as useful shorthand for a pro-
cess that we might describe as self-interested if we adopted the intentional 
stance. In other words, he suggests that we can understand the process best 
if we imagine that "it is as if" genes act selfishly. He says that "we must 
not think of genes as conscious, purposeful agents.  Blind natural selection, 
however, makes them behave rather *as if* they were purposeful, and it has 
been convenient, as a shorthand, to refer to genes in the language of pur-
pose.  For example, when we say 'genes are trying to increase their numbers 
in future gene pools', what we really mean is 'those genes that behave in 
such a way as to increase their numbers in future gene pools tend to be the 
genes whose effects we see in the world'." (Dawkins, 1976, Chap 11)
As a consequence of genes 'trying to increase their numbers in future gene pools', 
the interests of the genes and the interests of the host creature may not 
always align themselves, and indeed the self-interests of the gene might 
sometimes conflict with the self-interests of the host creature. The impor-
tance of this observation lies in the fact that we cannot now make any asser-
tion that animals evolve towards anything. Animals do not get "better" since 
evolution has no goal and so no yardstick against which anyone can define 
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a creature as better or worse. Instead living organisms and their environ-
ment change and adapt in tandem. Evolving organisms have only one goal-
like tendency we can observe: a tendency towards complexity. Evolution 
begins with unicellular creatures and proceeds by adding additional func-
tionality. This continues through a process of addition and over time the 
world has filled with creatures that have become more and more complex.
(I acknowledge that human beings have the vestigial remains of tails, and that 
ostriches, penguins and other flightless birds still have vestigial wings. 
However the underlying point remains. Each of these creatures forms a 
more complex organism than the organisms from which they evolved. The 
vestigial parts currently in the process of disappearing no longer serve any 
purpose: they have had their functions superseded by functions of greater 
complexity. No examples exist of overall de-evolution in which a complex 
creature evolves back into something much simpler: something that natu-
ralists would place lower on the ladder of evolution.)
Richard Dawkins pointed out that we need not limit the mechanisms that Darwin 
described to an analysis of the way that biological creatures change and grow 
more complex over time. He suggested that Darwin had outlined a much more 
general principle that delineates the three aspects necessary for any replica-
tors to flourish. Once we have acknowledged the concept at the root of the 
selfish gene theory - the idea of replicators and host vehicles - then we might 
usefully posit a Universal Darwinism, in which the evolution of life on Earth 
serves as one specific example of a much more general principle. We might 
then look for other replicators, not on the grounds that we could claim them 
as analogous to genes, in the way that social Darwinism attempted to claim 
social behaviour as analogous to genetic behaviour, but on the grounds that 
we could identify them as distinctive and 'selfish' replicators with unknowing 
hosts, following the same general principles outlined by Darwin.
18.2 Memes as Replicators
Dawkins suggested that memes provided an example of such a replicator, 
and that scientists could usefully explore memes using approaches drawn 
from Universal Darwinism. "Just as we have found it convenient to think of 
genes as active agents, working purposefully for their own survival, per-
haps it might be convenient to think of memes in the same way.  In neither 
case must we get mystical about it. In both cases the idea of purpose is only 
a metaphor, but we have already seen what a fruitful metaphor it is in the 
case of genes." (Dawkins, 1976, Chap 11)
Describing what he meant by memes, Dawkins argued that
Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes' fashions, 
and ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate 
themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or 
eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from 
brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called 
imitation. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passed 
it on to his colleagues and students.  He mentions it in his articles 
and his lectures. If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate 
itself, spreading from brain to brain. 
(Dawkins, 1976, Chap 11)
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Dawkins made it clear from the beginning that he regarded the idea that memes 
acted as replicators literally. He did not suggest that we could look at 
memes "as if" they functioned in the same way as genes; he said that they 
actually did function in the same way. He noted that
my colleague N.K. Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this 
chapter: `... memes should be regarded as living structures, not just 
metaphorically but technically. When you plant a fertile meme in my 
mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for 
the meme's propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the 
genetic mechanism of a host cell.  And this isn't just a way of talking 
-- the meme for, say, "belief in life after death" is actually realized 
physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous sys-
tems of individual men the world over. 
(Dawkins, 1976, Chap 11)
Dawkins makes this distinction so explicitly because he does not want the argu-
ment to take genetic advantage as its starting point. Social Darwinists 
always rooted their arguments in a supposed "biological advantage" con-
ferred by one form of social organisation over another, or conferred by one 
invention over another. Dawkins, in contrast, says that if we regard memes 
as an example of a second replicator at work, then we should analyse their 
spread in terms of the advantages that it confers on them, and not on any 
advantages that they might fortuitously confer on either their human hosts 
or the genes also carried by their hosts.
If we look at memes as possible replicators in their own right then questions arise 
immediately. Why do memes reproduce? What do we get out of it? How 
does it happen? 
We can understand the first question in several different ways. We might wish for 
a technical explanation of why memes reproduce, in a similar way to a 
child asking why water boils and gaining satisfaction from an explanation 
about heat and steam. However we might mean something considerably 
more slippery. We might want to know what it means to say that a piece of 
information - a song or a recipe - would want to reproduce. We can answer 
this simply by saying that they don't. Rather we use terms like "want" and 
"selfish" as shorthand in exactly the way biologists use them about genes. 
Genes do not have intentions, they do not (as far as we can see) exhibit sen-
tient awareness. Nonetheless they have a persistent existence which sug-
gests that we should not regard them as tools owned by the creatures within 
which they exist, but rather as replicators that have caused more and more 
complex hosts to evolve around them. This idea follows from the internal 
logic of the theory of evolution, as Dawkins suggests, and we can therefore 
apply it to any replicator whose constitution and behaviour falls under the 
general heading of Universal Darwinism. The suggestion that memes also 
"want" to replicate and seek to do so for their own "selfish" reasons follows, 
then, as soon as we see them as replicators in their own right.
We can answer the second question, concerning what we get out of the process, 
relatively easily. If we accept that replicators appear to act in their own 
interests, then in the cases of both genes and memes, we should view what-
ever benefits we derive from hosting them as accidental and fortuitous. We 
live in a world in which water boils, and in which genes and memes use 
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whatever means necessary to reproduce; and we experience that as "what 
it is like to be" us. Put another way, for the purposes of this inquiry at least, 
we should accept all of these processes as constituent properties of what 
we experience as "what it is like to be" a human being, recognising that if 
these processes ceased then so would we.
Susan Blackmore has explored the third question, the question of how memes rep-
licate, in great detail. She suggests that one of the primary characteristics 
that differentiate human beings from other animals hinges on our appar-
ently innate ability to imitate, and to take delight in doing so. Babies learn 
to imitate whenever adults engage them by smiling or waving or making 
noises, and the way that they do this, and the results of their developing 
skills in so doing, differ in crucial ways from the mechanisms through which 
animals learn, although we tend to mask these differences by the fact that 
we use the word "learning" in many different ways.
We use the word 'learning' for simple association or 'classical condi-
tioning' (which almost all animals can do), for learning by trial or 
error or 'operant conditioning' (which many animals can do), and for 
learning by imitation (which almost none can do). 
(Blackmore, 1999, p4)
Once we stop to reflect, it becomes clear that imitation lies at the heart of most 
aspects of human life. Almost all parents of young children regularly hear, 
"I know how to do it myself" or "Why can't I do that?” Children have an 
insatiable appetite for imitation, for doing what they see others doing, and 
singing and saying what they have heard others sing and say. This does not 
stop naturally in adulthood, although the dominant modes of socialisation, 
the games we play, make it less apparent. When a catchy new tune appears 
on the radio, people will soon begin singing, whistling or humming to them-
selves. A painter, photographer, or potter, surprised and delighted by an 
effect that somebody else has created will want to know "how it is done". 
We do not just feel idle curiosity at moments like this: we feel a need to gain 
the capacity to imitate what we see in front of us. Wanting to know "how 
it is done", so that we gain the ability to do it ourselves, forms a large part 
of "what it is like to be" us, in part because we, in contrast to most other 
animals, all possess a theory of mind: a sense of another person as an inten-
tional agent, and an ability to imagine, however imperfectly, that agent's 
motivations and thought patterns. Imitation, in the sense Blackmore uses it, 
means more than mere copying of an artefact or effect. It involves an attempt 
to copy the intentions behind the making process. A baby does not learn to 
say hello in the same way as a budgerigar. The bird learns to make the noise 
whereas the baby learns the intentions behind the noise and so, even though 
the baby may initially reproduce the sounds less accurately than the bird, 
she learns to produce them at appropriate times and in the correct contexts.
Before looking at the range of activities we can define as memes, we need to clarify 
exactly when we do, and when we do not, encounter memes. Not everything 
that we see, hear or learn involves memes. Immediate sensory input does 
not involve memes, although the thought that follows soon after ("What a 
nice red apple!") almost certainly does. It follows that not everything we 
learn involves memes, since some learning occurs via sensory input. When 
a small child touches the flame of a candle, burns himself, cries, and learns 
(1
6
3
)
to approach candles with caution, the learning process does not involve 
memes. The bodily response to the burn - the pain and the subsequent 
blister that remains sore for the rest of the day - can act as a teacher though 
simple operant conditioning, even if the child never seeks help or tells any-
one else of their experience. We may view this kind of learning as examples 
of the undermind at work: the network of brain processes that guide us 
through our daily existence without us being aware of them. This oper-
ates in a much more powerful way that folk wisdom suggests. Guy Craxton 
details a wide range of experiments demonstrating that we "are more in 
touch with, and more influenced by, the world around us than we know". 
(Craxton, 1998, p100) However, almost everything that we actually com-
municate to somebody else does involve the transmission of memes, in one 
way or another.
When a child reacts by withdrawing her hand from the flame of a candle she uses 
her inherited instinct. A cat or dog would do the same, or similar. When the 
child subsequently moves her hand across the table in a way that avoids the 
flame she makes use of her undermind. Some animals would do this while 
some would not. However if the child who burned herself on the candle 
goes to her mother for comfort, she will learn something in addition to the 
lesson she has already learned. She will become a player in a family game 
that might invoke many aspects of the family's relationships with each 
other, and with their individual and group histories. Her mother will seem 
sympathetic and practical, or she will seem brusque and dismissive, or she 
will seem over-protective and domineering. As a result the child will get a 
short lesson on heat and fire, or will be told she "is" stupid, or will watch 
as her mother puts all the candles out and worries about how they will 
now see to read. Her mother's reaction may, as Eric Berne suggested, arise 
from her own Parent, Adult or Child, themselves socially constructed from 
the games she learned in her own childhood. We can now see all of these 
games as the results of memes; as chunks of information that have success-
fully propagated through several generations of one or more families, and 
that, having triggered them by burning her finger and crying, the child now 
learns (and will later imitate).
We can characterise almost everything that we learn socially as memetically 
driven. Memes do not just appear in small fragments of verbal communica-
tion, such as songs and jokes. They include the larger learned environment: 
the language in which the jokes get expressed, and the musical structures 
within which the tunes take form. This socially learned environment forms 
an important part of what Perls has called the contact-boundary: it serves 
to delimit our reality by directing our attention in certain directions and 
away from others. As we have seen, one structure for our language can 
make it possible for us to worry about whether or not barbers who shave 
only those who do not shave themselves can shave themselves, while, using 
another linguistic structure, this fear simply never arises.
Memes need not take verbal form. They may also appear in identifiable patterns 
of behaviour, such as a characteristic way of walking or gesturing ("He 
walks just like his father"), a predictable response to unexpected happen-
ings ("He's always so pessimistic"), or the social games that Berne has 
described. People learn these and other behaviours during childhood, from 
parents, other role models and peers; and all of them may then get passed 
on from parent to child.
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18.3. Memes Unmasked
This raises the question of exactly how we can quantify a meme. When we 
watch someone slouching along in a distinctive manner, with their head 
down and their mouth moving as though they had gum to chew, do we see 
one, two or three memes in action? Do we count Beethoven's Fifth Sym-
phony as a meme, since it has successfully propagated itself across a large 
part of the world for several centuries, or do we count the first four or eight 
notes as a meme, since they have managed to spread themselves in ways 
that the complete symphony has not? Both Blackmore and Dawkins suggest 
that we adopt a pragmatic position and do not stop to worry about this, and 
they give several reasons.
Firstly, they note that the science of genetics began long before researchers had 
a clear idea of any of the details of the structure of genes, and one of its 
initial tasks involved identifying these. Secondly, even today scientists can-
not define the gene in a consistent way that everyone will accept. Instead 
the ways in which scientists identify genes depend in part on their tasks at 
hand: they identify them partly by convention and partly by their specific 
pragmatic requirements. (Moran, 2007)
No single, universal definition of a gene exists. The Rat Genome Database defines a 
gene as "the DNA sequence necessary and sufficient to express the complete 
complement of functional products derived from a unit of transcription". 
The Report of ASHG- NW Gene Nomenclature Workshop says that a "gene 
can be defined as an abstraction that is useful for the purposes of nomen-
clature and for the assignment of a symbol. It was originally described as a 
'unit of inheritance' and more recently as a 'set of features on the genome 
that can produce a functional unit'" (in http://www.genomicglossaries.
com/content/Gene_def.asp) Laurence Moran, Professor in the Department 
of Biochemistry at the University of Toronto, disagrees vehemently with 
Dawkins' definition, which he describes as "involving hand-waving", and 
argues that the "most reasonable definition of gene is that it is a piece of 
DNA that is transcribed but there are exceptions to everything in biology. 
Some genes are made of RNA, for example, and sometimes it's better to 
define a gene in terms of the protein it encodes." (Moran, 2007) We might 
note that, even here, when trying to pin down a definition in reaction to the 
one that Dawkins gives, Moran offers three very different definitions in the 
space of two sentences.
The importance of this point, and the reason I raise it in such detail, lies in the fact 
that the words "gene" and "genetic" have entered popular discourse, and 
therefore a lot of people simply assume that they have clear definitions and 
"mean something", and then feel free to argue against the idea of meme 
theory on the grounds that "we don't even know what a meme consists of". 
Historic precedence, in terms of research into genetics, suggests that we 
could do well to adopt a tentative definition, recognising its inherent vague-
ness, precisely so that we can probe the issues to see if further research can 
lead us to more nuanced and detailed definitions. 
At present, then, our definition of a meme must remain somewhat fuzzy, but we 
may still use the concept to raise pertinent questions. One such question 
revolves around what we might mean when we refer to memes rather than 
decisions. What does it mean to describe the spread of an opinion, or a 
fashion, or a popular craze, as a meme, rather than ascribing it to a con-
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scious or unconscious act of will that we might label anything from 'peer 
pressure' to 'false consciousness'?
Malcom Gladwell, for example, has produced a popular analysis of the spread of 
crazes which strongly implies that certain definable groups of network-
ers spread information about something that catches their fancy to much 
larger groups of people who stand in awe of them, and therefore receive 
the information and act upon it. He divides people into collectors, mavens 
and salesmen, and relates them to Stanley Millgram's answer to the "small 
world" problem to produce what he terms "the Law of the Few" (Gladwell, 
2000). This kind of description does little more than outline the mecha-
nism through which this transmission allegedly happens. It might explain 
the middle part of a three stage process, offering a demonstration of how 
information about new fashions reaches people, but it does not explain the 
first and third parts. It does not explain why information about shoes, soft 
drinks or a new taste in food would interest anybody in the first place. It 
cannot explain why followers would choose to follow the lead of trendsetter 
- except by a circular argument that declares in effect that followers follow 
because that forms "what it is like to be" a follower.
Gladwell begins his book with a conventional view of human nature. He appears 
to accept the idea that we think, plan and talk as individuals and then, as 
self-made people, sometimes allow ourselves to become influenced by ideas 
when others present them to us in forceful and persuasive ways. However, 
as he tells the story of his research, he also discovers that "mimicry... is 
also one of the ways in which we infect each other with our emotions. In 
other words, if I smile and you see me and smile in response... it’s not just 
you imitating or empathizing with me. It may also be a way that I can pass 
on my happiness to you." (Gladwell, 200, p84) He discovers that emotional 
communication - communication through the undermind - can go in both 
directions, just as rational communication involving the transmission of 
memes can travel both ways. 
This still leaves us with a problem, though. Should we expect a meme to have 
a particular configuration, or does the term simply describe a bundle of 
observable patterns, wherever and however they occur?  Blackmore and 
Dawkins correctly point to the fact that Darwin knew nothing of genes and 
yet much he, and his successors, carried out much important research on 
evolution. The idea of genes arose initially as a tentative hypothesis and, 
even by 1933, the geneticist T.H. Morgan "could claim that 'there is no con-
sensus opinion among geneticists as to what genes are - whether they are 
real or purely fictitious.' To many, genes were only a name for the Men-
delian patterns of inheritance that people were observing in biology labs" 
(Aunger, 2002, p323). Only in 1953, when Watson and Crick demonstrated 
the molecular nature of DNA, did genes achieve a materiality.
Robert Aunger has suggested that Blackmore and Dennett seem too easily satis-
fied with the vagueness of their definition, and that this creates problems 
for both communication and research. He proposes a more restrictive, but 
clearer and empirically testable definition. He produces a complex argu-
ment to demonstrate that memes take the form of replicable states in cells 
in the human cortex, which have a virus-like ability to spread by infection. 
He suggests that this definition of what he terms neuromemes "provides us 
with a testable mechanism of replication that is consistent both with other 
sciences and with the expectation that culture evolves through the descent 
(1
6
6
)
of replicators" (Aunger, 2002, p330). The importance of this lies in the fact 
that it provides a clear and describable model of meme transmission, and 
meme evolution. Aunger claims that memes must require a habitat, and 
that their habitat must have restrictions, and that the human brain offers 
an ideal habitat, and stands as the only viable candidate. In saying this, he 
argues against treating symphonies, libraries or cathedrals as memes, and 
suggests instead that we view them as artefacts created by memes as part 
of a strategy to replicate.
Artefacts and behaviours fail the replicator test. Only brain states 
have the necessary qualities to replicate: they can cause similar 
entities to arise through information transfer. So memes should be in 
the brain. Does the brain have the qualities to harbor replicators like 
memes? Yes. It’s an isolated, energy-rich environment housed inside the 
braincase, holding a soup of cells and chemicals. 
(Aunger, 2002, p324)
Memes began as brain viruses replicating inside individual brains. They evolved 
means of infecting other brains through the use of signals and signs. Firstly 
this happened through the development of language and intentional imita-
tion. Later they evolved the means to spread at a distance, both geograph-
ically and temporally, through the evolution of more, and more complex, 
tools and artefacts. "Signals began as neural communicators, then social 
ones. Most recently, however, they have learned to involve artefacts in their 
travels. Artefacts are abiotic substrates for signals located in the macroen-
vironment" (Aunger, 2002, p328).  In this view, then, we should define arte-
facts such as books, churches, popular tunes and statues not as memes, but 
as something more like the extended phenotypes generated by memes.
Aunger suggests that human history and human culture has thus developed upon a 
triadic model that required the simultaneous evolution of genes, memes and 
tools. Tools have evolved as part of the extended replication cycle of memes, 
to which they remain tightly bound in a symbiotic relationship. Memes in 
turn have evolved in a symbiotic relationship with genes. Any discussion of 
memes must therefore include artefacts, media and tools, as a central focus, 
although they do not, however, themselves constitute memes, as Dawkins, 
Dennett and Blackmore would have us believe.
18.4. Language and Narrative Gravity
We have seen that consciousness always operates socially and that when 
we imagine that we start as individuals and then later become social, we 
have everything the wrong way round. We do not have single unified con-
sciousnesses that operate in the ways that thinkers from Descartes to 
Freud imagined they did. Instead we have only our bodies and their organs, 
including our brains. Much of what we do occurs without us thinking 
about it; not because it happens 'pre-consciously', nor because it happens 
'unconsciously', but because consciousness simply never enters into it. 
Some of the information that our brains receive gets dealt with by hard-
wired, genetically imprinted instincts. The processes in our brains that Guy 
Chilton terms the undermind deal with much of the rest of the informa-
tion we receive without any need for consciousness. We become conscious 
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in the act of judging our actions (often within milliseconds of performing 
them), in telling the story of what we have done, and in fitting that story into 
the ongoing narrative that forms "what it is like to be" us. As noted earlier, 
Daniel Dennett describes people, not as solid objects, but as abstractions; 
as "centres of narrative gravity".
Many disparate stories comprise each centre of narrative gravity. Usually they have 
become subsumed under one major narrative arc, although we carry with 
us a recognition that this may become subject to rewriting at any point. We 
do not, for example, usually register surprise when someone reinterprets 
earlier events in the light of what has just happened. Indeed, when some-
body (in real life or in fiction) tells us that "I can see now how everything 
was leading up to this moment", we get ready to hear a story in which 
an unfortunate event in the past, viewed earlier as a life-destroying trag-
edy, now gets recast as a painful but necessary step on a journey to tri-
umph. This process of rewriting does not just occur when we face trau-
matic events, it operates all the time. My earliest clear memory, for example, 
involves being on a tram in Liverpool at the age of three with my grand-
mother. Or does it? I clearly remember, at the age of eight or nine, a teacher 
at school asking the class about our earliest memories - and I remember 
replying with the story about the tram. Or rather I clearly remember talking 
about the incident at school ten years later at university, when someone 
there asked me about my earliest memory. On each occasion, and on other 
occasions subsequently, I offered details about the tram ride and the pre-
vious occasions that I had talked about it, along with details of the aspects 
that I could remember, such as sitting on my grandmother's knees. I no 
longer have any way of knowing which of these details I claim to remember 
actually happened as I now remember them, and which have evolved into 
vivid, and thus 'real' memories through the retelling of the story at intervals 
over fifty years.
Susan Blackmore suggests that our ability to imitate, and to learn by imitating, and 
the pleasure that we take in imitation, stands at the heart of "what it is like 
to be" us. Imitation distinguishes human beings from all other animals. She 
argues that initially imitation offered evolutionary advantages in that imita-
tion offered the possibility of faster adaptation through learning by observa-
tion. This, in turn, gave the genes for imitation advantages for survival that 
would lead to their spreading through the gene pool. Complex imitation, prov-
ing to have even more survival advantages than simple imitation, would then 
also spread. Once imitative skills spread and became more complex, imitation 
could advance from observation alone to the development of language.
The development of language brings with it a second replicator: a unit of cultural 
imitation, the meme. Memes get spread from person to person by imita-
tion, and most of them die out very quickly. Someone says something to a 
group of people and nobody else in the group finds it either interesting or 
amusing. Five minutes later everyone has forgotten it and the meme has 
died. Someone else says something to a group of people and half of them 
burst into prolonged laughter. They repeat it to their friends later and half of 
them burst into prolonged laughter. Their friends then repeat it, a replicable 
pattern gets imprinted in their brains, and the meme has burst into life. How 
long it will last, and how widely it will spread, depends on many factors. 
Urban legends provide one example of memes that have taken on lives of 
their own. Allegedly historical figures (such as King Arthur or Robin Hood), 
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whose stories have accumulated a neat moral framework, provide another.
We receive information from others and pass some of it on. This information wants 
to get passed on, not for our sake but for its own. It has parallel selfish 
needs to the gene: it needs to spread to stay alive. However, as with genes, 
not all memes have the same power, the same ability to spread from brain 
to brain. With reference to Gladwell's "law of the few", we should note that 
it makes little sense to picture this process as human agents choosing to 
pass on their opinions in a lifeless environment. Rather we should see figure 
and ground shifting, with the memes themselves often playing the role of 
the figure, while their human vehicles form shifting parts of a (very alive and 
very lively) ground.
Remembering that thinking and talking designate two forms of the same phenom-
enon, we can hypothesise that memes form the framework for almost all 
of our mental lives. We perpetuate memes especially, as Berne reminds us, 
those we absorb uncritically as children, and we tell and retell our story to 
others. The story we tell ourselves about "what it is like to be" us lives on in 
our minds as bundles of memes, chanted silently in our heads like mantras. 
We communicate with others and, by this route, memes may spread geo-
graphically. In spinning our personal narratives, rewriting and editing them 
to give them the kind of consistency we currently prize, we also commu-
nicate with our past selves. By this means memes may spread temporally. 
We look back at our past and remember selected parts of it, keeping those 
memes alive and nurturing them, and giving them the potential to replicate, 
and possibly mutate, with each internal retelling, until one day we may give 
voice to them in conversation and they get a chance to spread. It goes with-
out saying that the many memes that we draw from our past and pass onto 
our future will die with us unless they become vocalised in ways that allow 
them to spread successfully to other brains.
Charles Darwin pointed out that, once the conditions for evolution become estab-
lished, the process will start inevitably and, once started, continue. We can 
regard evolution as an algorithmic process: once set in motion it proceeds, 
with no intelligence needed, to a conclusion. Evolution occurs in this way 
using genes, which form the replicators necessary to make the system work. 
Once human brains reach a size and complexity sufficient to accommodate 
similar processes of replication, memes become the means by which a new 
kind of cultural replication can occur, and cultural evolution by means of 
the transmission of memes from one brain to another becomes inevitable.
We can recognise memes as the mental habits which Charles Sanders Peirce 
pointed out formed the desired resting points for our thinking.
18.5. Memes and Consciousness
We possess several different layers of action and response, and the nar-
ratives we spin about ourselves form only one layer. We think much less 
than we think we do, for if we thought as much as we think we do then 
we would never get anything done. We have two separate kinds of brain-
process-leading-to-action, one fast and one slow (Kahneman, 2001). We 
call the slow one "consciousness", and that process involves what Dennett 
terms judgement. We analyse and ponder, and turn things over in our mind 
until we reach a conclusion. The fast one occurs in the undermind before 
we become aware of it. Sometimes we describe it as a reflex action, and 
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sometimes we call it intuition. This process does not only occur during unu-
sually dramatic or heightened events. It happens to us all the time, whether 
we notice or not. A tennis player does not think during her game. She enters 
'the zone' and acts and reacts faster than the speed of thought. Her thinking 
occurs before the match when she plans her strategy and after the match 
when she tells herself how the game went. At these moments she might 
think about the game; but while playing she simply plays (cf Kramer, 2011).
This process of action without thought does not relate solely to the physical aspects 
of our lives. A stand-up comedian, for example, does not think about how 
to respond to a heckler. The heckler shouts and the comedian responds 
and the interaction proceeds so quickly and smoothly that someone watch-
ing it later on film might assume that somebody had scripted the incident. 
Although we may not usually notice it, this same process occurs in almost 
every relaxed conversation between friends. The subject matter changes 
without notice but the conversational flow continues. People express beliefs 
before thinking about them, and then talk them into shape. Often a conver-
sation within a group will take the form of Person A introducing a topic; B 
making a statement of belief in the form "Ah, you're wrong there. The real 
problem is..."; B getting challenged by other members of the group; and 
then negotiating through a series of statements like "All right, I'll give you 
that, but..."; until finally everyone in the group has settled the matter of 
what B believes and everybody, including B, now believes that this consti-
tutes his sincerely held opinion.
Only in formal situations, or situations in which we feel under stress, do we con-
sciously think before talking, and this almost always results in slow and 
stilted conversation in which the participants use meaningless placeholder 
expressions to buy themselves time to think. People start their contributions 
in such situations with a formula of the sort "I do understand what you are 
saying, and I do take your point, but I think perhaps we might also...” We 
learn to make these phrases predictably long-winded and clichéd because 
they serve to enable the speaker to keep noise coming out of his mouth 
while his brain attempts to process what he actual intends to say, and they 
need to last as long as the speaker needs for this processing.
Thinking can serve to undermine smooth interaction. Most of the time, we walk 
down the street or across a hall without thinking for even an instant about 
how we do it. If we think at all while we walk, we think about something 
else. The actual business of walking just happens. However, if we notice 
somebody watching us, or if we have to walk across a hall to make a 
speech, or to meet someone important and influential, and especially if we 
do this with a crowd watching, we become self-conscious - and once we 
become self-conscious, we do think about walking, and once we do that we 
can no longer walk the way we usually do. In these circumstances we can 
find ourselves trying to do a kind of self-impersonation. Exactly the same 
thing happens if we ever find ourselves thinking about riding a bicycle while 
actually riding a bicycle. We get caught up in thinking about how to do what 
we should just do, with the result that the usually simple task gets harder 
and harder.
We can demonstrate the extent to which thinking inhibits action with a thought 
experiment. Imagine placing a plank on the floor and asking people to 
walk along it. Almost everyone will do it without hesitation. Posited as a 
game, walking along a plank without falling off will appear too simple to 
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bother with: a literal case of "anyone can do it". Now try placing the same 
plank two metres off the ground between two scaffolding towers. People's 
perception of the game will change. Place the plank between the towers 
twenty metres above the ground and now people's perception of the game 
will change radically. Why does this change in attitude happen? The task 
remains precisely the same: walking along a plank wide enough that "any-
one can do it". The difference lies solely in the fact that, for most people, the 
realisation that they must walk two or twenty metres above the ground will 
cause them to fear that that they will injure themselves, possibly badly, if 
they fall. This will make it impossible for them to walk the plank without at 
the same time thinking about their actions, and their recognition from expe-
rience that thinking about doing something will inevitably interfere with 
doing it, will cause them to become frightened. Feeling and knowing this, 
they will lose their competence and become temporarily incapable.
Contrary to what we may think, we do not live by thinking but rather we bring our 
thinking abilities to bear on problems when our undermind finds a problem 
it cannot cope with, or when we need to reach a judgement, or when we 
wish to erase doubt. The contents of the minds we use to perform these 
thought-actions reach us, in large part, through socially transmitted memes 
which we arrange and manipulate like building blocks. Memes form the 
essential toolkit without which we could not function as human beings.
Memes gave humanity its first tools for the simple reason that mankind used the 
memes it gained from language to construct its first tools. Mankind never 
experienced any unmediated golden age of "direct communication", 
because all communication takes place within language (within which we 
include body language), and all language gets composed from mediated 
and memetic processes.
If we want to know "what it is like to be" us: we could do no better than to acknowl-
edge that "we are stories all the way down".
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practice. What difference does it make to how we view online worlds, or 
how we view life in general, to say that "we are stories all the way down"? 
Does this merely constitute a (more or less) interesting observation, or does 
it have ramifications for how we might act in the world? To understand how 
meme theory changes the way we view the world and our roles within it, 
we will need to map the relationships between language and truth; the ten-
sions between different categories of truths; and the relationships between 
memes, truth and human agency.
19.1. To Be or Not To Be
We noted earlier the problems that Bertram Russell had with language, and 
how the structure of language created apparent paradoxes whose resolu-
tion depending upon realising that not all sentences that make sense for-
mally make sense-in-the-world.
Friedrich Nietzsche had earlier observed the ill-effects this category error could 
cause. He pointed out that
people separate the lightning from its flash, and interpret the latter as 
a thing done, as the working of a subject which is called lightning... 
But there is no such substratum, there is no "being" behind doing, work-
ing, becoming; "the doer" is a mere appendage to the action. The action 
is everything. In point of fact, the people duplicate the doing, when 
they make the lightning lighten, that is a "doing-doing"; they make the 
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same phenomenon first a cause, and then, secondly, the effect of that 
cause. The scientists fail to improve matters when they say, "Force 
moves, force causes," and so on. Our whole science is still, in spite of 
all its coldness, of all its freedom from passion, a dupe of the tricks 
of language, and has never succeeded in getting rid of that supersti-
tious changeling "the subject" (the atom, to give another instance, is 
such a changeling, just as the Kantian "Thing-in-itself"). 
(Nietzsche, 1887, pp28-29)
Alfred Korzybski and David Bourland would later explore this and related problems 
in considerable detail, and propose practical solutions (Korzybski, 1933; 
Bourland & Dennithorne, 1991). Their arguments traversed some of the 
same terrain as those proposed by Charles Sanders Peirce. They argued that 
the structure of language, as used both in scientific discourse and casual 
conversation, disguised the location of agency within the descriptions peo-
ple gave, and led us into a series of disastrous errors, often springing from 
the misuse of what Korzybski referred to as the is-of-identity.
Other people explored the same area as its importance became increasingly clear. 
George Santayana encapsulated the problem thus:
The little word 'is' has its tragedies; it marries and identifies differ-
ent things with the greatest innocence; and yet no two are ever identi-
cal, and if therein lies the charm of wedding them and calling them one, 
therein too lies the danger. Whenever I use the word 'is,' except in 
sheer tautology, I deeply misuse it; and when I discover my error, the 
world seems to fall asunder and the members of my family no longer know 
one another. 
(Santayana, 2009, p78)
The use of the is-of-identity serves to remove an action or an event from its con-
text and to hide the agency implicated in the action. In Peirce's terms it 
attempts to reduce a triadic action to a dyad, by sleight of hand; with the 
effect of providing a spurious element of self-justification that we might not 
even notice. The sentence "Ivar Giaever is a Nobel prize winner and he is a 
climate-change sceptic", for example, carries an air of spurious authority 
that lessens when we recast it as "Ivar Giaever shared a Nobel Prize in 1973 
for discoveries related to tunnelling phenomena in solids and, although a 
layman in climatological matters, he has expressed scepticism about global 
warming". (Sceptical Science, July 2012). In the first version Giaever "is" 
a Nobel Prize winner, a formulation that invites us to assign him a high 
status and prepare to listen to what he tells us about climate change. The 
second version describes a train of events that contextualise Giaever's field 
of expertise while making clear that he received the prize a long time ago 
as part of a team researching into a subject that has no bearing on cli-
mate change. The second version also makes it clear that Gaiever's position 
might conceivably change in the future because it positions him as having 
expressed scepticism rather than claiming that he "is" a climate sceptic.
As Korzybski said, "whatever we say something is; it is not". By way of demonstra-
tion he suggested a thought experiment.
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Let us take three pails of water: the first at the temperature of ten 
degrees centigrade the second at thirty degrees, and the third at fifty 
degrees. Let us put the left hand in the first pail and the right hand in 
the third. If we presently withdraw the left hand from the first pail and 
put it in the second we feel how nicely warm the water is. But, if we 
withdraw the right hand from the third pail and put it in the second, we 
notice how cold the water is 
(Korzybski, 1933, p372).
Not only do the contexts of our actions, and out descriptions of them, take place 
in space, they also become time-bound. Our experience of the water in the 
second bucket, and hence our description of it, depends upon which of sev-
eral possible actions we made previously. Our description of the water in 
the second bucket, even if given honestly, will change dramatically accord-
ing to which bucket we placed our hand in previously. 
We see exactly the same process in action when we hear that someone "is an art-
ist" or "is a film maker" or "is a murderer". Each use of the is-of-identity 
calls upon us to assign the person being labelled to a particular status, on 
the grounds that somebody whose identity we do not know, has previously 
defined them thusly, rather than inviting us to consider them as the agent 
of many activities and events, and to consider the wider contexts within 
which they enacted their agency. The repeated use of the passive tense, and 
the missing subject, in academic and political discourse also works in the 
same way.  Phrases such as "The subjects were told..." "The experiments 
were designed as..." "The project began in..." all claim a general authority 
through the deliberate withholding of a specific subject. This happens so 
often that we usually do not notice it, but forms a platform of passivity that 
prevents us abstracting in a correct way and removes all context from the 
world we try to make sense of. Kellogg and Bourland explain it thus:
Listen to almost any news program, and you'll hear reports of political, 
social, and environmental crises. These problems do not originate "out-
side" of us, but from the beginning have stemmed from the short-sight-
edness of human beings going about their daily tasks using a two-valued, 
true-or-false, Aristotelian orientation: an orientation that has proven 
itself woefully inadequate to solving the complex problems of the twen-
tieth century. 
(Kellogg & Bourland, 1990, p376)
Kellogg and Bourland extends Korzybski's analyse to create E-Prime, the Language 
framework that I have adopted to write this dissertation. They describe 
E-Prime as a linguistic discipline (Kellogg & Bourland, 1990, p377), with one 
obvious characteristic. They suggest that
one could describe E-Prime simply as English without the verb "to be," 
such a definition misses the profound transformation in personal orien-
tation resulting from such a change. In essence, E-Prime consists of a 
more descriptive and extensionally oriented derivative of English, one 
that automatically tends to bring the user back to the level of first 
person experience. In his book, Language, Thought and Reality, Benjamin 
Lee Whorf gives numerous examples of languages and cultures that support 
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his "principle of linguistic relativity" which states that the structure 
of the language we use influences the way we perceive "reality ", as well 
as how we behave with respect to that perceived reality.
For example, if you saw a man, reeking of whiskey, stagger down the 
street and then collapse, you might think (in ordinary English) "He is 
drunk." In E-Prime you would think instead "He acts drunk, or "He looks 
drunk”. After all, you might have encountered an actor (practicing the 
part of a drunken man), or a man who had spilled alcohol on himself 
undergoing a seizure of some kind, etc. Instead of simply walking by, 
you might look more carefully and send for an ambulance.
Although E-Prime usually reduces hidden assumptions, it does not neces-
sarily exclude them. For example, you may have seen a woman, or a robot, 
or an extra-terrestrial, etc. ., that looked like a man and acted drunk. 
E-Prime fosters a worldview in which the user perceives situations as 
changeable rather than static, and in which verbal formulations derived 
from experience indicate possibilities rather than certainties. 
(Kellogg & Bourland, 1990, p378)
Any attempt to explore the consequences of meme theory will run up against ques-
tions of agency, and so any successful attempt will need a linguistic dis-
cipline that can make headway in avoiding the traps of dualism. We need 
to avoid getting bogged down in nonsensical questions such as "who is in 
charge, the memes or us?", and to do that we need a linguistic discipline 
that can point out why we should find these questions nonsense. We need 
to make sure that we have questions that seem reliably relevant, and the 
means to formulate answers to them. 
The physicist David Bohm wrote about this problem in Wholeness and the Impli-
cate Order.
In scientific inquiries a crucial step is to ask the right question. Indeed, each ques-
tion contains presuppositions, largely implicit. If these presuppositions are 
wrong or confused, then the question itself is wrong, in the sense that to try 
to answer it has no meaning. One has thus to inquire into the appropriate-
ness of the question.
In fact, truly original discoveries in science and in other fields have generally 
involved such inquiry into old questions, leading to a perception of their 
inappropriateness, and in this way allowing for the putting forth of new 
questions. To do this is often very difficult, as these presuppositions tend to 
be hidden very deep in the structure of our thought. (For example, Einstein 
saw that questions having to do with space and time and the particle nature 
of matter, as commonly accepted in the physics of his day, involved con-
fused presuppositions that had to be dropped, and thus he was able to come 
to ask new questions leading to radically different notions on the subject.)
What, then, will be our question, as we engage in this inquiry into our language 
(and thought)? We begin with the fact of general fragmentation. We can ask 
in a preliminary way whether there are any features of the commonly used 
language which tend to sustain and propagate this fragmentation, as well 
as, perhaps, to reflect it. A cursory examination shows that a very important 
feature of this kind is the subject-verb-object structure of sentences, which 
is common to the grammar and syntax of modern languages. This struc-
ture implies that all action arises in a separate entity, the subject, and that, 
in cases described by a transitive verb, this action crosses over the space 
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between them to another separate entity, the object. (Bohm, 1980, p36)
We will deal with this issue of fragmentation next.
19.2. Fragmentation and Truth
David Bohm spent a great deal of time contemplating how best to create 
what Kellogg and Bourland called a linguistic discipline. Bohm referred to it 
as an art. To their concern with the disruptive influence of the verb to be on 
our thinking, he added a warning about the corrosive effect of nouns.
Clearly, the act of apprehending relevance or irrelevance cannot be 
reduced to a technique or a method, determined by some set of rules. 
Rather, this is an art, both in the sense of requiring creative percep-
tion and in the sense that this perception has to develop further in a 
kind of skill (as in the work of the artisan). Thus it is not right, 
for example, to regard the division between relevance and irrelevance 
as a form of accumulated knowledge of properties belonging to state-
ments (e.g., by saying that certain statements 'possess' relevance while 
others do not). Rather, in each case, the statement of relevance or 
irrelevance is communicating a perception taking place at the moment of 
expression, and is the individual context indicated in that moment. As 
the context in question changes, a statement that was initially relevant 
may thus cease to be so, or vice versa. Moreover, one cannot even say 
that a given statement is either relevant or irrelevant, and that this 
covers all the possibilities.
Thus, in many cases, the total context may be such that one 
cannot clearly perceive whether the statement has bearing or not. This 
means that one has to learn more, and that the issue is, as it were, in a 
state of flux. So when relevance or irrelevance is communicated, one has 
to understand that this is not a hard and fast division between opposing 
categories but, rather, an expression of an ever-changing perception, in 
which it is possible, for the moment, to see a fit or non-fit between the 
content lifted into attention and the context to which it refers.
At present, the question of fitting or non-fitting is discussed 
through a language structure in which nouns are taken as basic (e.g., by 
saying 'this notion is relevant'). Such a structure does indeed formally 
imply a hard and fast division between relevance and irrelevance. So 
the form of the language is continually introducing a tendency toward 
fragmentation, even in those very features whose function is to call 
attention to the wholeness of language and the context in which it is 
being used.
(Bohm, 1980 pp42-43)
Bohm argued, as indeed did Kellogg and Bourland, that the development of a scien-
tific language in the form of subject-verb-object has had the effect of making 
us think in terms of fragmented elements visible against an inert backdrop. 
"The sun is 93 million miles away". "The rain fell on us". All of these things 
appear discrete. Object A fell upon Objects B and C. This kind of language 
invites us to view ourselves as actively doing things to the world or allowing 
ourselves to be done to. As with Russell's paradox, this effect springs from 
the nature of the language we use and not from the nature of the world. 
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Alan Watts had this in mind when he suggested (Watts, 1966) that we experiment 
with replacing the sentence "Human beings began to evolve on Earth sixty 
five million years ago" with "Sixty five million years ago the world began to 
people". ("To people", in this context, acts as the same kind of verb as "to 
rain".) Recasting human evolution in this way causes us to pause and may 
even bring us to see the inherent fragmentation in the either/or of linguis-
tic dualism. Watts did not intend that we replace one formulation with the 
other. Rather he pointed to the fact that we can view our observations, and 
the abstractions and truths that we derive from them, from many differ-
ent perspectives, each of which will reveal different aspects of a seamless 
whole; a whole that he likened to the dance of Shiva in its timelessness and 
the fact that we can never fully grasp it.
In a similar vein, the English theologian Don Cuppitt has argued that the realisation 
that we live inside language constitutes the great discovery of our age. He 
has described this process as coming to terms with the fact that we live in 
an outsideless world of language and that therefore asking what lies outside 
language no longer makes any sense. We have, in his terms, simply had to 
become non-realists.
After Kant we began more and more to see that all of our knowledge and 
our language are only human. In all our knowing, the mind conditions what 
it knows: the facts are profoundly shaped by the theories under which 
we view them and the language in which we describe them. We are always 
inside our own language and our own human standpoint, and can never 
directly compare our vision of the world with the way the world is abso-
lutely. We are only human. In short, we cannot claim to have purely-ob-
jective knowledge of THE world, but we can claim to have many very useful 
ideas about OUR world, which is the world we see and the 'life-world' we 
inhabit. For us, the only world is the human world, the world of 'life', 
and our beliefs are not pictures of the world, but tools for living.
So, very briefly: realists think that mathematical truth is dis-
covered, whereas non-realists about maths think that maths is a complex 
collection of useful games invented by us. Realists think that scien-
tists discover 'the laws of Nature', readymade and out there, whereas 
non-realists think that scientists invent theories that help us to tell 
stories about why things go the way they do, and to predict outcomes 
successfully.
Today, a realist is the sort of person who, when his ship crosses 
the Equator, looks overboard, expecting to see a big black line across 
the ocean. Realism always wishes to turn cultural fictions into objec-
tive facts. A non-realist sees the whole system of lines of latitude and 
longitude as a framework imposed upon the Earth by us; a framework that 
helps us to define locations and to find our way around. For a realist 
Truth exists ready-made out there; for a non-realist we are the only 
makers of truth, and truth is only the current consensus amongst us. We 
cannot any longer suppose that our knowledge is validated by something 
wholly extra-human.
In brief, we don't know and we cannot know THE world, absolutely. 
We can know only OUR world, a world shaped by our ideas, seen from our 
perspective, and built by us with our needs in view.  
(DonCuppitt.com)
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Without mentioning it by name Cuppitt here describes a version of postmodern 
theory which, according to Roland Chia, "transformed the role of language 
in human culture so that now its role is no longer perceived as the signifier 
of reality, but as social constructs which constitute what is believed to be 
real. Postmodern epistemology assumes therefore that all explanations of 
reality are actually just constructions which are not objectively true, but 
which are determined by the social matrix from which the rules of the var-
ious language games are set. At the same time, postmodern epistemology 
also assumes that it is impossible for one to step outside of these construc-
tions; the 'reality' which we create through our language games imprisons 
us (Chia, 1997, p7)".
Many people, Chia included, have decried this as relativism, which they assume we 
will agree to regard as a very bad thing. They seem to believe that relativism 
means that you have no right to criticise me for what I believe, and that you 
must accept my beliefs as true for me, even when they appear to fly in the 
face of all available evidence. Referring to the current position of the Chris-
tian Church, Chia suggests that postmodernism means that the "Christian 
metaphysic which postulates a certain ontological framework, like any 
other such grand narrative, can no longer be considered to be determinative. 
It can at best exist alongside other accounts (Chia, 1997, p8)." Relativism 
might indeed mean something like this if we start from a dyadic perspective 
in which we, as individuals, have just two choices: absolutism or relativism. 
However, as we have established, human affairs take place mostly within a 
triadic framework that begins with the social and not the individual.
Unless we really believe that all knowledge exists "out there", waiting for us to dis-
cover it, and that therefore one day we will know everything about everything, 
and science will have nothing left to do, we must realise that even absolut-
ism exists socially, and requires continuous negotiation. The absolutism that 
Chia wishes to uphold differs greatly from the absolutism of a medieval pope. 
At some point in time between the two, demonic possession and witchcraft 
(among many other things) fell off the wagon. No longer generally perceived 
as divinely ordained absolute facts, they linger on in the minds of a relatively 
few whose existence embarrasses the conventionally faithful.
From a triadic perspective we have many more than two choices. From a memetic 
perspective we concern ourselves not with external truths and lies, but with 
self-propagating ideas that gain traction to various degrees and remain 
active as memes for various lengths of time. This point of view raises several 
questions concerning the contextual and genre-related nature of outside-
lessness, which we can best discuss with three practical examples. The first 
returns us briefly to Marinetta to look at the way layers of truth both gen-
erate, and relate to, different contexts. The second looks very briefly at two 
writers, whose fiction addressed these issues. The third looks at the way in 
which Philip K. Dick tried to incorporate a series of traumatic events into his 
life and his fiction, uncertain about the truth value of the Black Iron Prison 
but unwilling to dismiss it.
19.3. Contextual Overlapping
The first example concerns the island of Rosario in Second Life. In 2009, 
Catharina Gröndahl raised several questions about choices that we had 
made during the Marinetta Ombro project, and about the contexts within 
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which we had made them. She asked permission to pursue a project of her 
own devising, which became her thesis project (Gröndahl, 2010); and in 
subsequent discussions she raised a series of questions that went straight 
to the core of the entire project. Her research unearthed a much more radi-
cal critique of the Marinetta Ombro project than even she intended. Her pri-
mary interest lay in building and creating and she proposed that we allow 
her to delete everything on the island in Second Life, and let her rebuild 
it. She wanted to determine whether we would have built the island any 
differently, if we had known at the beginning what we knew at the end. 
She ended up writing a thesis that concentrated on the technical aspects 
of building because she feared the philosophical issues would prove too 
difficult to write. However, the questions she asked along the way remained 
valuable in their own right.
She asked a series of practical questions rooted in the idea that Second Life did not 
model real life, or anything like it, but served as a working diagram of some 
version of heaven. These questions included:
1. What purpose do buildings serve in a world without weather of any 
kind and without heat and cold? 
2. For technical reasons to do with the virtual camera that gives each 
avatar its point of view, buildings and walls cannot guarantee privacy. 
Why, then, would residents choose buildings in preference to hidden 
skyboxes? 
3. In a world in which anything will hover if you place it in the sky, 
why would people choose to "live" at ground level rather than in sky-
boxes at an altitude of their choice?
4. Why would people use stairs rather than build teleporters to act as 
virtual elevators?
5. What purposes would galleries and museums serve in a world designed 
in such a way that theft does exist, and stealing cannot take place?
6. How would people use lakes and seas in a world in which everyone can 
breathe underwater and depth poses no problems?
The design of Second Life imposes its own presuppositions on everyone who enters 
it. Gröndahl suggested that we could not expect to situate Marinetta Ombro 
inside a simulation of heaven unless we accepted that we would inevita-
bly have to allow the rules of heaven to guide the sociality of Marinetta. 
She argued that we had had two different, overlapping sets of "true" stories 
at play. She then compared what we had done with the histories of other 
virtual cultures in Second Life, regions such as New Caledon and Midian 
City (see Bäcke, 2011 for descriptions of these), and pointed out ways in 
which they had aligned these two sets of truths, and we had not. The pri-
mary "truth" consisted of all the environmental factors put in place by the 
designers of the software running Second Life. This determined that ava-
tars could sustain no physical damage, and that each avatar could pluck 
unlimited building materials from thin air at no cost. This determined the 
selective nature of gravity and avatars' lack of bodily requirements or food, 
rest or air. The secondary layer of "truth" consisted of the story that we 
had created to justify the look and feel of the island, and to suggest modes 
of behaviour within the island. In contrast to Rosario, Caledon existed as a 
steampunk republic and it required its inhabitants to adhere to a steampunk 
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interest in the real world, and in online forums, the inhabitants of Caledon 
joined because of a pre-existing interest, and held regular meetings on Cal-
edon to further this interest. Caledon became a living (and liveable) exam-
ple of what already existed in books and in discussion forums, and since 
steam-powered rockets and hovering islands already existed within the lit-
erature the governing body in Caledon could keep the two layers of story 
closely aligned. In contrast we had accidentally created a tension between 
these two layers of truth that visitors found difficult to negotiate.
From these observations Gröndahl suggested that she should also try to align the 
two overlapping levels of "truth" in Rosario. She built an island in which 
there were very few buildings. Instead of meeting rooms, gatherings would 
take place outdoors in specially equipped wooded areas. Instead of galleries, 
photographic exhibitions would take place on hoardings around the central 
area of Marinetta. She built a central area that felt like a city although, on 
closer inspection, it had many decorative walls to divide spaces, but very 
few actual buildings. She relocated the cinema that screened student films 
from a cinema building to the bottom of a lake where neatly programmed 
fish swam in and out of view.
This process served as a practical confirmation of several strands of thinking. 
Firstly, we can never view the environment as a neutral background. The 
ground exerts as much force on the figures within it as the figures exert 
on the ground. In the real world this can remain unnoticed, or people can 
downplay or dismiss it. In the simplified and artificial environment of Second 
Life its power becomes more obvious as its effects become more exagger-
 A screening at the underwater cinema
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ated. Even here, though, we had managed to underplay its importance for 
the duration of the main project. Secondly, our success in overlaying several 
different narrative imperatives will depend on whether we notice the results 
of our activities, and what we do if (or when) we make this observation. If 
the process of overlaying causes incongruence then we will have to work 
harder to achieve our goals. If we can create a congruent alignment then 
we will achieve more much more easily. Thirdly the "truth" of a diagram 
can exist at many different levels, from the physical details to the emotional 
feelings it generates. The small city that Catharina Gröndahl built felt like 
a place with its own idiosyncratic characteristics, even though most of the 
walls simply divided spaces and most of the few buildings served as psycho-
logical decoration. She solved all the technical issues around making realis-
tic buildings in Second Life by not making them, and in doing this moved the 
level at which Marinetta functioned as a diagram of a Mediterranean town 
from an attempted verisimilitude to a more abstract representation.
We asked a number of people to visit the new island and comment on it. All agreed 
that it worked better than the original versions, and some said that they 
had not even noticed the lack of habitable buildings. We held meetings in 
the wooded areas and, again, everyone reacted favourably. At a technical 
level people found it easier to control their avatar in an unconfined space. 
At a psychological level people felt the environment as more congenial to 
thought and discussion. In terms of the Rosarian narrative, a member of 
staff said
In my opinion this is what the island would have looked like if these 
people had spent two thousand years living on an island which operates 
like Second Life. It still feels it is in the Mediterranean, just not 
our Mediterranean!
This provided a valuable empirical coda, while also raising questions about how we 
should understand overlapping narratives that appear to combine to create 
a unified truth, and what status we should regard that "truth" as having. It 
also pointed to the fact that, despite our research, we had become infected, 
and fenced in, by our own language in ways we failed to grasp at the time.
19.4. Language as a Virus
The second example begins by noting that Don Cuppitt has spoken of the 
way in which our language environment encloses us and how, upon coming 
to realise this, we begin to live in a state of outsidelessness. Writers and 
artists have discovered, explored and played with this state for much of the 
twentieth century. In 1939, James Joyce published Finnegans Wake, after 
seventeen years of writing. Joyce intended the book as both a commen-
tary on language and an example of living inside language. In it he details 
human history, not as a comprehensible narrative, but as a free-flowing 
series of puns, allusions, and dilations of time passing.
History in Finnegans Wake is a world of its own. The entire history 
of the human race flows pastwith the waters of the Liffey in an order 
logically concomitant with Joyce's structural plan, though contemptu-
ous of mundane concepts of chronology - "riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, 
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from swerve of shore to bend of bay" (3.1-2) - in a Viconian circle 
that Joyce the Artificer has successfully squared: "eggburst, eggblend, 
eggburial and hatch-as-hatch can" (614. 32-33). Thus the flow of compre-
hensive but inarticulate history courses through all levels of the book 
like Anna Livia herself: "babbling, bubbling, chattering to herself, 
deloothering the fields on their elbows leaning with the sloothering 
slide of her, giddygaddy, grannyma, gossipaceous Anna Livia." (195. 1-4)
(Benstock, 1965, p43)
Joyce concerns himself with the effects of the ground of language upon the fig-
ures in the book, but also with the effects of industrialised media upon the 
thoughts and actions of these figures. He describes celebrity, for example, 
as "foamous homely brew"  (Joyce, 1939, p370), which froths up on the top 
and then rapidly dissipates. He also addresses the effects of then-contem-
porary media directly in his use of the word pastcast, which occurs more 
than once, through which he alludes to the ability of both radio broadcasts 
and cinema to summon the past into the present. This process, he suggests, 
"has ringround as worldwise eve her sins (pip, pip, pip) willpip futurepip 
feature apip footloose pastcast with spareshins and flash substittles of 
noirse-made-earsy" (Joyce, 1939, pp420-421).
Joyce effectively removed himself from any ordinary role in the evolution of litera-
ture with Finnegan's Wake. Seamus Deane describes this, in the introduc-
tion to the Penguin edition, as a process through which Joyce "surrendered 
the 'ordinary' world, the world as represented in the great tradition of the 
realistic novel, for a world of capricious fantasy and inexhaustible word-
play."  However the work has had cultural impacts of a wider range than his 
contemporaries predicted. Murray Gell-Mann named the quantum particle 
the quark after the phrase "Three quarks for Muster Mark" (Joyce, 1939, 
p383). Marshall McLuhan used references from Finnegan's Wake regularly 
in his writing and, indeed, the entire structure of War & Peace in the Global 
Village (McLuhan, Agel & Fiore, 1968) hinges upon quotations from it, to 
the extent that one might reasonably view it as an extended meditation on 
themes first raised in Finnegan's Wake.
Joyce deliberately set out to show how language takes us over, and how it forms 
and uses us as much as we form and use it. William Burroughs went further 
and described language explicitly as a virus.
My general theory since 1971 has been that the word is literally a 
virus, and that it has not been recognized as such because it has 
achieved a state of relatively stable symbiosis with its human host; 
that is to say, the word virus (the Other Half) has established itself 
so firmly as an accepted part of the human organism that it can now sneer 
at gangster viruses like smallpox and turn them in to the Pasteur Insti-
tute. But the Word clearly bears the single identifying feature of a 
virus: it's an organism with no internal function other than to repli-
cate itself. 
(Burroughs, 1985, p48)
In this short paragraph Burroughs, in effect, describes what others later called the 
meme. He noticed a structural arrangement in the world, and reported it 
within a literary context well before philosophers and social scientists had 
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begun to take the idea seriously. This should not surprise us. Not only did 
McLuhan state that this kind of frontier scouting constituted the primary 
role of the artist, but one could reasonably expect that writers and poets 
would notice earlier than most the narrative nature of existence and the 
fact that our selves seem to hinge upon narrative; the relationship that we 
therefore have with language; and the fact that language appears to act 
as though it has a mind of its own. We should also expect them to explore 
the consequences of these observations for the notion of truth in our life-
worlds.
19.5. The Black Iron Prison
The third example concerns the later work of Philip K Dick, who spent the 
last years of his life worried about the consequences of overlaying differ-
ent layers of truth, and about how truth arrived in our heads; and he con-
structed a thousand page exegesis in which he tried to work out the con-
sequences of a series of visions he had experienced, which (he claimed) 
contained knowledge he could not have known, and which (he claimed) 
caused him to take his young son to hospital where doctors saved him from 
a fatal condition that nobody had suspected he had. This experience took 
the form of a "bizarre and powerful series of dreams, visions, and voices 
that flooded Dick's consciousness in February and March 1974 (or "2-3-
74," Dick's shorthand for that period) and stood for him as the central -- 
and, ultimately, inexplicable -- event of his life" (Sutin, 1999, p9). He wrote:
Where (or when) is (or was) the Black Iron world? I was there but am 
here now. How came I here? Did that world go out of existence? Did this 
one replace it? Is this world somehow irreal, maybe stretched like a 
skin over (and concealing) the other? In which case can the black iron 
world come back? 
(Jackson & Lethem, 2011, p256)
Dick attempted to make sense of his series of visions, not by believing them, but by 
modelling them.
Evidently our world is like a movie, the supralunar world is like sev-
eral stills which do not permutate into one another (change) but remain 
indefinitely until replaced: a sort of eternal place. All these thousands 
of years the Urwelt here has been the black iron prison pierced by His 
advent! Two mutually irreconcilable elements of a freeze frame.
Another model, our world as sphere in motion over "squares" of 
an unchanging (intrinsically) landscape: Showing our world now "above" 
the palm tree world, having passed 1974 our time, the moment of inter-
vention. A penetration to the core, now, to the hidden real landscape 
"below" would reveal it, not the black iron prison. And there would now 
be a print-out re the second advent (i.e., "Santa Sophia will be born 
again").
Dick 'modelled' in two parallel senses. He created models in the form of diagram-
matic schema to try to explain what had happened, and what it might 
mean. This process included the creation of actual drawn diagrams, as 
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these beliefs in the sense of trying them on and wearing them to see if they 
fitted. John Lilly had recommended just such an approach when he wrote
In the province of the mind, what one believes to be true is true or 
becomes true, within certain limits to be found experientially and 
experimentally. These limits are further beliefs to be transcended.
(Lilly, 1972)
Lilly did not suggest that one should believe anything, but rather the opposite. From 
his research in isolation tanks, he suggested a contingent phenomenology. 
He concluded that one should wear all beliefs lightly while treating new and 
unexplained phenomena as-if one should believe them, and then observing 
the results of this contingent believing. Dick attempted to do this in several 
different ways. He attempted to understand what the phenomena meant, by 
historical research into philosophy and theology. Through this he came to 
understand that 
Real time ceased in 70ce with the fall of the temple at Jerusalem. It 
began again in 1974ce. The intervening period was a perfect spurious 
interpolation aping the creation of the mind. "The Empire Never Ended", 
but in 1974 a cypher was sent out as a signal that the Age of Iron was 
over; the cypher consisted of two words: KING FELIX, which refers to the 
Happy (or Rightful) King.
A diagram taken from the exegesis of Philip K. Dick
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In doing this he provided such a clear explication of Gnosticism that an afterword 
in later editions of the translation of the Nag Hammadi gospels (Robinson, 
1977), he receives a credit as one of the leading twentieth century scholars 
of Gnosticism. In this way, behaving as-if he regarded the manifestations 
as true provided the basis for acquiring, processing and communicating a 
range of new ideas. He also used parts of this bank of ideas as the starting 
point for his final series of increasingly autobiographical novels: Valis, Divine 
Invasion, The Transmigration of Timothy Archer, and Radio Free Albemuth.
One might argue about where "truth" lies in this process but that argument consti-
tutes, in part, the point I wish to make. Driven by a series of uncontrollable 
events (whether a series of revelations or a psychotic interlude) Dick had 
to step outside his life-world in order to try to make sense of what had 
happened. In doing this he chose not to opt for a dualistic "is/is not" expla-
nation, nor to try to find out if his experience "was true". Instead he delved 
into questions about what truth might mean in this context, and in so doing 
he constructed a set of elaborate diagrams, many of which contradicted 
others in the set. He tried them on, never feeling completely comfortable in 
any of them and, according to several friends played with his almost-beliefs 
in an amused and self-mocking way.  The writer Thomas M Disch said "I 
thought: interesting - a masterful con that works. He's a professional enter-
tainer of beliefs - in other words a con-man. He wants to turn everything he 
imagines into a system. And there was his delight in making you believe. He 
LOVED to make you believe." (Sutin, 1989, p226), From this he drew inspi-
ration while never losing his ability or willingness to act in the consensual 
world, and never deviating from this belief that he would never uncover "the 
truth", but could continue his explorations until he died. Which he did.
19.6. Truth out of Nothing
Charles Sanders Peirce does not define truth, but instead offers a "doctrine 
of fallibilism. It holds that because truth is what would be believed at the 
end of an indefinitely prolonged inquiry, we cannot be sure that any current 
belief of ours is true. What we now take to be true and what our inquiries 
are now concerned with might be very different from what is taken to be 
true and interesting as inquiry progresses. Hence the final beliefs are inde-
pendent of us." (Misak, 1991, p132) The importance of Philip K Dick's rev-
elations, then, do not lie in their objective truth, or lack of such, but in how 
they affected his actions, and how these actions impacted on the world. 
We should view them as something that might have seemed true to Dick at 
the time, and might have disconcerted him enough to cause him to embark 
upon an inquiry into their origins. Dick, quite reasonably, felt plunged into 
doubt. Peirce believed that 
Doubt and belief, although they do have psychological aspects, such as 
making the inquirer feel comfortable or uncomfortable, are best thought 
of in terms of habits. A 'belief-habit' manifests itself as an expec-
tation: if we believe H, then we habitually expect the consequences or 
predictions we derive from H to come about when the appropriate occasion 
arises. Thus inquirers are thrown into doubt when a recalcitrant experi-
ence upsets or disrupts the smooth working of a belief or expectation. 
As soon as the inquirer is thrown into doubt, inquiry is ignited and 
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continues until a belief or habit of expectation is re-established. So 
Peirce characterizes the path of inquiry as follows: belief --- surprise 
--- doubt --- inquiry --- belief. 
(Misak, 1991, p48)
Susan Blackmore might describe Peirce's belief-habits as 'memeplexes' (Black-
more, 1999); settled bundles of memes that together provide stable stories 
for dealing with our life-world.  We can see that the original hallucina-
tions caused Dick to lose equilibrium by rendering his current belief-habits 
or memeplexes unsatisfactory as life-explanations and thus unstable. To 
return to stability Dick had to embark upon a process of inquiry until he 
could reacquire a habit of expectation. If we accept this then we can see 
that the "truth" of the original phenomena simply could not matter to Dick 
and those around him; only their ability to shatter Dick's habits of belief 
mattered. Moreover the result of Dick achieving a new habit of belief (albeit 
a new habit that engendered lifelong religious and philosophical explora-
tion) included the creation of his finest novel, Valis (Dick, 1981), which itself 
housed, or embodied, an influential literary meme that continues to cast 
influence.
We can see a clear example of this in practice in the work of Garret Kramer, an 
internationally renowned sports coach. He helped lead athletes' training 
regimes away from concentrating solely on physical exercise into the men-
tal areas of "the inner game" and "being in the zone". In doing this he began 
to explore how these internal processes worked for athletes and he coined 
the term stillpower (Kramer, 2011) to describe his conclusions. He has come 
to believe that relying less on thinking rationally, and relying more upon 
rapid System 1 intuitive action (Kahneman, 2011), the undermind, improves 
performance and increases consistency. In creating training systems based 
upon this he has also created a successful company with an international 
array of clients. His beliefs align with much of the recent research into con-
sciousness and his company's clients' successes offer an informal proof of 
this research. However, what interests me about his work in the context of 
this dissertation, revolves around the sources for his beliefs. At the end of 
his book he writes that 
About forty years ago, Sydney Banks had that aha moment. He had a spec-
tacular revelation about the human experience... Now Syd's revelation is 
not a technique or theoretical model. Quite the opposite. The principles 
of mind, consciousness and thought rest deep within all of us and can 
never be taken away. Syd realized this enduring message and perceptive 
thinkers like George Pransky later ran with it. 
(Kramer, 2011, p152)
According to Wikipedia which, in this particular case, seems a suitable vehicle for 
this information,
The "Three Principles" of Mind, Consciousness and Thought were first 
articulated by Sydney Banks, a 9th-grade educated welder, born in Scot-
land, living in British Columbia, Canada in the early 1970s... Accord-
ing to Banks' verbal accounts, as recorded at lectures, he realized 
the three principles while attending a marriage seminar held on Cortes 
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Island, in British Columbia, Canada.
The seminar encouraged couples to let their feelings out, be 
honest, and argue with one another. Discouraged with the process, Banks 
and his wife prepared to leave the seminar. As they were doing so, Banks 
became engaged in conversation with a therapist also attending the sem-
inar.
Describing himself as an insecure mess at that time, Banks began 
elaborating on all the ways in which he felt insecure. The therapist's 
response, I've never heard such nonsense in all my life, was a revela-
tion to Banks: What I heard was: there's no such thing as insecurity, 
it's only Thought. All my insecurity was only my own thoughts! It was 
like a bomb going off in my head ... It was so enlightening! It was 
unbelievable ... [And after that,] there was such beauty coming into my 
life.
Subsequently Banks wrote a number of books, but they make no attempt to explain 
this revelation, or to situate it within any larger discourse. Indeed, the book 
that Garret Kramer calls "one of Sydney Banks most poignant books, The 
Missing Link" and which "sits on both my writing desk and my nightstand 
at home" (Kramer, 2011, p153) consists of a short series of epigrams. Page 
thirteen, for example, contains the following three paragraphs:
Words are merely a form. Listen
not to words, but to that which
words attempt to convey.
Remember... it is not the clay that
represents the sculpture, but the
form the artist has molded it into.
Just like the clay of the sculpture,
thought is not reality. However,
our personal realities are molded
via our thoughts
These words, and another hundred pages or so of paragraphs like them, apparently 
drawn from thin air, have succeeded in enabling Garret Kramer to train 
international athletes and, more impressively, to enable him to help athletes 
who have lost their form to recover their self-belief and return to winning. In 
addition "the Three Principles" have inspired a large international therapy 
movement named Health Realization, developed in the 1980s by Roger C. 
Mills and George Pransky and still growing.
The results of Philip K Dick's and Sydney Bank's personal revelations differed 
greatly. Dick drove himself to link them to other events and belief systems, 
and to try to locate them within broader frameworks. They led him to a 
quest that he himself acknowledged could never end. Sydney Banks, on the 
other hand, seemed to ask very few questions about what had happened 
to him and to give lectures wherever he could to tell people the message 
he had received. Viewed as memes, though, both entered the public world 
and both achieved influence and continue to influence people after their 
creators' deaths. As stories that incite others to actions in the world, that 
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have effects, and whose effects multiply and mutate as they spread, they 
appear to have arisen from nothing, whatever their truth value, and to have 
achieved a life of their own.
19.7. When Silence Enters the Room
When we view ideas and truths, within our life-worlds, as memes and 
interactions between memes, either directly or through signals housed in 
artefacts, we can make an important advance in the way that we speak of 
things. We speak of other people influencing us, and of the ways that we 
influence them. When we say this we make use of shorthand that, in real-
ity, describes a network of interactions between you, me and our shared 
life-reality. When we speak of "you" and "me" we again describe networks 
of interactions: in this case between our habits of thought, the memes that 
influence them, and our analytical minds that reflect upon these. Habitually 
we regard you and I as figures and our shared life-reality as the ground upon 
which we interact. However, as we have seen earlier, figure and ground per-
form an endlessly shifting dance in which each can take the other's place. 
Parts of the ground can rise up to become figures while some figures can 
move into the background. 
We define ourselves, and others we recognise as like us, as actors; as agents who 
can act upon us. We define ourselves as actors because we believe that we 
can act upon others. In both cases acting upon implies the ability to cause 
a definable and observable change in the other. I act upon you by fright-
ening you, causing you to go pale and jump backwards. You act upon me 
by getting angry because I frightened you, causing me to apologise. If we 
bring over from computer games the concept of the non-player character, 
we might see that it makes a useful sense to adopt the intentional stance 
towards certain persistent memeplexes, and to treat them as-if we regard 
them as actors. Daniel Dennett defines the intentional stance as
the strategy of interpreting the actions of an entity (person, animal, 
artefact, whatever)  by treating it as if it were a rational agent who 
governed its "choice" of "action" by  "consideration" of its "beliefs" 
and "desires". These terms in scare quotes have been stretched out of 
their home use in what's often called "folk psychology”, the everyday 
psychological discourse that we use to discuss the mental lives of our 
fellow human beings. The intentional stance is the attitude or perspec-
tive we routinely adopt toward one another, so adopting the intentional 
stance toward something else seems to be deliberately anthropomorphising 
it... 
(Dennett, 1996, p27)
Music acts upon us in a similar way to those that we habitually define as actors or 
agents. It can make us cry, it can make us feel united. Usually, though, we 
feel that we may not have the ability to act reciprocally upon Music. The 
musician and composer Robert Fripp believes that we do have the ability to 
act upon Music, and also upon Silence.
Music is Silence, speaking. In developing an instrumental facility, a 
musical capacity, we become increasingly available to give Silence a 
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voice. The more we are able to be quietly present, the more directly 
and truly we are able to speak for Silence; and, at a certain point, to 
speak as Silence.
It is quite an experience to feel Music entering the notes we are 
playing. Something like, a good Friend entering the room, approaching 
and embracing us. 
(RF online diary, 29/04/2014)
He suggests that:
when the qualitative world enters that of the quantitative; when the 
(non-existent) barrier between perception and actuality falls away - in 
an instant – and there we are: where we are. Occupying a moment in time, 
while out of time. Sitting with a Presence which is not constrained by 
time, but which enters the time-stream to visit, reminding those of us 
who live mostly-here that we are ourselves only visiting.
...the act of music is primarily social. Something remarkable acts 
through Music, moving from outside the time stream into the flow of 
events. This provides an energy, a certain something, that is available 
within the performance and becomes available to the audience. 
(RF online diary, 30/04/2014)
From the perspective of traditional, dualistic thinking this might seem fanciful and 
even pompous. From a triadic and memetic perspective this might appear 
to offer us new ways of approaching the memes that surround us, and an 
approach to reconfiguring or expanding the idea of figure and ground to 
include the third element that makes the temporary differences between fig-
ure and ground possible.
19.8. The Self as Stories
As I have tried to demonstrate in an admittedly short series of sketches, 
research into human consciousness during the last thirty years has showed 
that we think less than we think we do, and that thinking does not have the 
leading role in our actions that we usually ascribe to it. A number of books 
have gathered this research together in a much fuller form than I could here 
(Nørretranders, 1991; Claxton, 1998; Hood, 2011; Kahneman, 2011). Tor 
Nørretranders, for one, described the situation like this.
In recent years, scientific investigations into the phenomenon of con-
sciousness have demonstrated the people experience far more than their 
consciousness perceives; that they interact far more with the world and 
with each other than their consciousness thinks they do; that the control 
of actions that consciousness feels it exercises forms a “user illusion” 
(Nørretranders, 1991, pIX).
Consciousness plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has 
tended to believe.
Historical research shows that the phenomenon of consciousness as we 
know it is probably no more than three thousand years old. The concept 
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of a central "experiencer" and decisions-maker, a conscious I, has pre-
vailed for only a hundred generations. 
(Nørretranders, 1991, pIX)
Current evidence indicates that we possess two parallel mechanisms for thinking. 
System 1 acts in a fast, intuitive and emotional manner, while System 2 
operates slowly and deliberately, in ways that seem rational although retro-
spective (Kahneman, 2011). If I stand up suddenly at a dinner party, turn red, 
raise my fists and shout, "Don't you ever talk to me like that!" my actions 
spring from System 1, or what Guy Claxton has termed the undermind 
(Claxton, 1998). Later, when I have calmed down and apologise, offering 
the excuse that the sequence of events triggered off an over-reaction based 
upon a childhood experience, then my rational mind, my consciousness, 
has taken momentary control. In the first instance I acted intuitively, with no 
time to check the appropriateness of my action; and in the second instance, 
after my mind has had time for retrospective reflection, I created a rational 
explanation for my actions, one that fits the action appropriately into the 
narrative that I tell myself and others about "what it is like to be" me. In this 
way I author myself. However, behind this realisation, the harder problem
is that we are not the authors of ourselves. That we are not is a reli-
gious perspective, but also a biological and a social one. Each of us has 
had many authors, and each of us is engaged, for better or worse, in that 
same authorship. We could say that the human race is a great co-author-
ship in which we are collaborating with god and nature in the making of 
ourselves and one another. From this there is no escape... This is by 
way of saying that by ourselves we have no meaning and no dignity; by 
ourselves we are outside the human definition, outside our identity. "More 
and more", Mary Catharine Bateson wrote in With A Daughter's Eye, "it has 
seemed to me that the idea of an individual, the idea that there is some-
one to be known, separate from the relationships, is simply an error." 
(Berry, 2002, p138)
This accords with the observations of Peirce, McLuhan, Watts and others that we 
cannot know objects, only the relationships between objects. We live inside 
narrative. As Don Cuppitt has pointed out “life is time and we are time… 
For a moment, one enjoys eternal happiness while still living in time…Given 
that we are what we are, time-bound talking animals pretty much in love 
with language, that’s the nearest to ‘heaven’ or a state of state of eternal 
beatitude that we can ever hope to get.” (Cuppitt, 2005, p87).
If memes form the fuel that powers our reflective thinking, then our apparently 
private worlds of though and emotion have their origins in the time-bound 
social world. The memes we get infected with from the moment of birth 
(Blackmore, 2005) arise from interactions between people, and our personal 
role in this continuous dance involves receiving memes, ingesting them, and 
then sometimes transmitting them to others in the same form we received 
them or slightly mutated. We do this directly, or through signals embedded 
in artefacts. According to Bruce Hood the "self illusion depends on stored 
information that has been acquired during a lifetime. These are our mem-
ories that are constructed as we interpret the world. That interpretation is 
guided by mechanisms that seek out certain information in the world but 
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also by those around us who help to make sense of it all. In this way we are 
continually shaped by those around us."  (Hood, 2011, p214)
Bruce Hood also addresses the question of how this all begins, and the vexed ques-
tion "if we are born without a self then how do we get one?" When observ-
ing young babies moving their eyes and taking differing degrees of inter-
est in various elements of their environment, Hood decided that "it seemed 
unlikely that they had models of the world already encoded in their brains 
that predicted where they would look next. Rather, at the very beginning 
everything must be driven by what existed already in the environment to be 
seen. It is the properties of the external world that compete for the atten-
tions of the eye movement systems in the baby's brain. There was no need 
for a self in control. Rather, the brain mechanisms that they are born with 
have evolved to seek out information from the external world and then keep 
a record of those experiences (Hood, 2011, p213)”. From this beginning a 
complex interactive system emerges and this system, thinking about its own 
thinking, eventually invents the person it claims does the thinking.
Jerome Bruner explained that as "our experience of the natural world tends to imi-
tate the categories of familiar science, so our experience of human affairs 
comes to take the forms of the narratives we use in telling about them 
(Bruner, 1996, p133). The "we" that we imagine "we are" consists, then, 
nothing but stories: stories that we received uncritically as children; stories 
we tell about ourselves and each other; stories we receive from others about 
us; and stories we receive from others about others. In the words of Daniel 
Dennett, we occupy "centres of narrative gravity".
We consist of stories all the way down. We have no self to call our own; even 
though we find, on many occasions, that it simplifies our lives to pretend 
that we do. From the Rosarian point of view, then, each of us springs from, 
and embodies, an awe-inspiring mighty fiction.
(1
91
)

This part of the dissertation describes the outcome of a lengthy period 
of reading and reflection. It does this in a series of chapters that attempt 
to present the findings as a coherent argument. It goes without saying 
that the process of research itself happened in a much more chaotic 
way, with many detours and dead-ends.
Language and Tools (196)
Transmitting and Receiving (205)
Ambient Learning (219)
Tools for Self Authorship (228)
This part of the dissertation addresses several questions that arise from 
the theoretical view of consciousness proposed in Part 2.
1. Does the analysis in Part 2 have any practical outcome? 
2. How can people most effectively learn in a so-called 
learning society with ubiquitous media and information?
3. What could it mean to live in a learning society? 
4. What could we do if we found out that we lived there?
It addresses these by providing a justification and a set of blue-
prints for a number of practical psychophysical tools that build upon 
what we have learned and offer ways in which we can guard against 
the black iron prison and train ourselves as meme-prosumers, with 
the aim of attaining autonomy, which “is manifested by the release or 
recovery of three capacities: awareness, spontaneity and intimacy” 
(Berne, 1964, p158).
It finishes with some practical proposals, and a set of hypotheses 
by which we might test the value of these proposals.
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We have seen that people, in the way that we usually think about them, 
do not exist. What we refer to as "an individual" consists of complex net-
works of processes and actions, centred on a physical body which houses 
the mechanisms through which these processes and actions become man-
ifest. We use "person" as a convenient label. Arthur Eddington, the British 
physicist, has said that
The term "particle" survives in modern physics but very little of its 
classical meaning remains. A particle can now best be described as the 
conceptual carrier of a set of variates... It is also conceived as the 
occupant of a state defined by the same set of variates... It might seem 
desirable to distinguish the "mathematical fictions" from the "actual 
particles"; but it is difficult to find a logical base for any such dis-
tinction. Discovering a particle means observing certain effects which 
are accepted as proof of its existence. 
(quoted in Vedral, 2010, p201)
We can recognise in Eddington's description of how we should regard particles 
what Daniel Dennett means when he describes people as "narrative cen-
tres of gravity". He does not mean that they do not exist; he means that the 
metaphors of Newtonian physics have become as outdated with regard to 
people as they have with regard to particles. Physicists no longer think of 
atoms as tiny, but solid and separate, billiard balls bouncing off each other, 
they view them as the occupants of a state described by a set of variates. 
These occupants continue to behave as if they existed but their existence 
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no longer has any solidity. If we accept the memetic view of human culture, 
and the people inside it, then we should view human beings as continuing 
to exist, in the sense that we can name them and observe the results of their 
actions, but we should not regard their existence as having any solidity. We 
may acknowledge them as real, without needing to claim them as really real.
This means, among many other things, that we will no longer find any human 
activity, any human thought, which we can sensibly regard as unmediated. 
We have no "we" that existed prior to our absorption of the memes that 
form the fundaments of our culture, and the "we" that we think of as us 
does not sit outside language, because we can know of no outside. We live, 
in Don Cuppitt’s term, in a state of outsidelessness. 
We cannot know an outside because stepping outside would involve shedding 
everything that labels us as people in the first place. Vlatko Vedral explains 
this with regard to electrons, which he claims exist only as labels. An elec-
tron, he writes,
...is ultimately a 'label' to describe the various sorts of behaviour 
that electrons exhibit when we try to interact with them and manipulate 
them. Without this label we would have to call an electron something 
like "You know that particle that does X when we test Y and does P when 
we look at it in Q and so on'. In this way we can see that labels are 
awfully convenient and efficient. But Buddhism tells us that we should 
not confuse the label with the object. More importantly, just because we 
have a label for something, does not mean that this something is real.
(Vedral, 2010, p200)
If people do not have a pre-existing essence but arise as nodes from within net-
works of culture, fuelled by memes, then we need to teach ourselves how to 
understand this, for understanding will prove a necessary prerequisite for 
proper action within these networks. Marshall McLuhan pointed out that 
not only do people make their tools, but that these tools in turn remake 
their users. We need to understand how this works in order to understand 
how we can live our lives in a world in which everything works in this, and 
only this, way.
What scientists discovered almost one hundred years ago about the constituency 
of matter, we later began to realise applies equally to the constituency of 
consciousness, and the people within which consciousness dwells. This 
raises questions about how the meanings by which we define ourselves 
arise, and what part in the process we do, or could, play. We need to look 
at the nature of tools, what they teach us about the nature of people, and 
then see whether we can devise tools that will enable people to participate 
meaningfully in their own co-authorship.
20.1. Language as the Proto-Meme
With the advent of language, people gained the ability to extend their voices 
through space and time. Many animals can capably warn of danger and 
successfully summon help, but these warnings and distress signals all need 
to happen over relatively short distances in real time, in the now. With the 
addition of communally shared language humans became able to refer 
to absent objects and events rather than to merely gesture towards those 
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objects and events currently in view; and thus to persuade others by refer-
ence to events in the past, to warn of possible dangers in the distance out 
of sight, and to summon help for a specified time in the future. In addition 
disagreement and argument became possible. Animals without language 
can obey a warning cry or not. Humans with language can debate the need 
to flee or propose and agree upon an alternative strategy. It thus became 
possible for a speaker in a language group to extend their influence geo-
graphically and temporally, as well as within their own group. Only with 
language does the possibility of social fluidity based on group assessment 
become feasible.
Language, in the sense that I use it here, has several defining characteristics. Susan 
Blackmore suggests that we need to 
distinguish between true language and other forms of communication. For 
example, vervet monkeys make at least three different alarm calls to 
warn others about different kinds of danger. Bees make elaborate dances 
to communicate information about food sources and distances, and male 
birds inform others of their impressive status by the length and variety 
of their songs. These and many other kinds of communication are critical 
to these animals' lives, but these signals have fixed meanings and cannot 
be recombined to make new ones. In true language, arbitrary sounds or 
signs are combined in a potentially infinite number of ways to produce 
an equally vast number of possible meanings. These new copies are then 
memes that can be copied from one person to another. 
(Blackmore, 2003, p157)
Language, then, hinges upon its ability to be recombined into novel forms. We can 
extend its definition beyond verbal utterances to include body language, 
and the codified ways in which we choose to decorate our bodies: tempo-
rarily in the form of 'fashion', and more permanently in the forms of hair-
cuts, piercings and tattoos.
The advent of language, however it happened, created an apparently unbridgeable 
gulf between humanity and other mammals precisely because it created a 
completely new range of opportunities that other species failed to grasp. 
Language became the first medium: a proto-tool that introduced new scales 
into interaction between humans, and between humans and their environ-
ment. Marshall McLuhan has noted that "language is a mass medium in all 
senses. Nobody in particular made it. Yet individuals have always to think 
and dream and feel in terms of this mass medium". (McLuhan, 2003, p16)
Language became the first tool used by memes, spreading itself between groups of 
early humanity or pre-humanity, and giving those groups abilities of collec-
tive improvisation hitherto unavailable to any creatures on Earth. We might 
note, at this point, that human beings have always lived within, and as part 
of, social groups. People have always gained a sense of individuality (to the 
extent that they have) after becoming socialised into a group, and not all 
groups have required the same feelings of individuality from their members as 
our contemporary society. All social groups, however, live within language, for 
language (whatever language) forms the currency of their social interaction.
McLuhan notes that "language is a mass medium in all senses". What we think of as 
humanity, what we think of as human culture, evolved within the medium of 
language. We must therefore put aside any notion that there exists now, or 
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existed at any time in human history, the possibility of unmediated commu-
nication of any complexity. (I phrase it this way because we may find plau-
sible arguments concerning the possibility of simple unmediated communi-
cation at the very boundaries of sociality, as when a mother comforts a three 
month old baby by cooing and stroking as part of its preparation for entering 
the social world, or when watching relatives murmur and stroke someone 
semi-conscious and dying, as a way of helping them leave the social world.) 
We have not arrived at a point in history where we live mediated lives; on 
the contrary, all people throughout history have always lived at that point. 
Throughout the entire history of what we recognise as humanity, people 
have always perceived the “natural” through processes of mediation.
20.2. Writing & the Invention of 
   Individuality
If the invention and rapid adoption of language created a mass medium 
through which conversations could travel, and opinions could gain cur-
rency by calling forth an echoed assent from distant listeners, we might 
expect the invention of writing to have an equal or even more profound 
effect. Writing passed through many stages from so-called proto-writing 
to the initial alphabets created in Mesopotamia, around 3200 BCE, and 
Mesoamerica sometime around 600 BCE. The creation of the Ancient Greek 
alphabet, however, signalled a radical break with all previous cultures. The 
Greeks modified the Phoenician alphabet to include both vowels and conso-
nants, and in so doing invented the first completely abstracted medium for 
codifying human communications.
The Greek alphabet enabled its users to store thoughts, ideas and orders in one 
place and time and then retrieved and accurately decoded in almost any 
place and at any time later. This process required no direct or immediate 
link from the speaker to the hearer. Moreover the literate had the ability to 
store their own thoughts and ideas for later retrieval, and so to external-
ise their own memories and keep them safe from forgetfulness. Individuals 
could now seek to immortalise their own thoughts, which they could differ-
entiate from the thoughts of others.
Out of these abilities, and the habits of mind they engendered, developed the con-
cept of the individual self. As Ivan Illich and Barry Sanders have pointed out, 
the "self is as much an alphabetic construct as word and memory, thought 
and history, lie and narration. Narration and the self in the twentieth cen-
tury have become as inseparable as the epos and its singer in oral times: the 
writer spins the story as part of his self." (Illich & Sanders, 1988, p71) Mar-
shall McLuhan argued something very similar when he noted that one of 
"the strange implications of the phonetic alphabet is private identity. Before 
phonetic literacy, there had been no private identity. There had only been 
the tribal group. Homer knows nothing about private identity; Homer's 
world is that of the acoustic epic, the tribal encyclopaedia of memorized 
wisdom".  (McLuhan, 2003, p229)
Homer did not write the Iliad and the Odyssey. Others transcribed them after his 
death, and they formed some of the first transcriptions to follow the inven-
tion of the Greek alphabet. At the time of their composition only constant 
retelling could keep oral poetry alive. If an epic ever fell from favour, or 
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people forgot it or stopped telling it then it would fade away, never to reap-
pear. Only with their transcription into the new writing could poems have 
an autonomous and guaranteed life of their own, regardless of how often 
people thought of them. Only after scribes had noted them down did they 
become fixed, with an approved text with clearly demarcated boundaries. 
In the older oral tradition poets constructed their poems using formulaic 
phrases that both the orator and the audience could remember and that 
the orator could use as the basis of extemporisation. In the newer written 
tradition, memory plays no part, and therefore emphasis gets placed on the 
unusual and evocative phrase, and the unique individual poetic voice. Writ-
ing, with its single correct reading, favours the individual turn of phrase, 
and thus helps create the individual.
 
In this way, people also developed fixed boundaries and correct readings when 
their rulers began to govern by use of literacy. What people previously gave 
and received orally, while subject to the gradual decay of human forgetful-
ness, became permanently written down, and available for a further reading 
whenever an authority called one its members to account.
20.3. Extending Ourselves
With writing, the social landscape changed dramatically and the balance of 
human possibilities altered significantly. Those in authority extended their 
voices across their lands and, through their ability to have their decrees 
heard verbatim wherever they wished, they extended their personal influ-
ence. McLuhan has suggested that this process of extension has applied to 
every medium invented since writing. "Any medium of communication is, 
like an art form, an extension of one or more of our senses. Speech alone is 
an extension of all of our senses at once. The mix or proportion of senses 
made external to us..., the ratio or proportion or mix of our senses involved 
in speech or radio or photography, imposes non-verbally the parameters or 
frame of all human operations. The unspoken and even subliminal assump-
tions in any pattern of human association are dictated by the available means 
of codifying experience and of moving information. (McLuhan, 2003, p17)
McLuhan makes three key arguments here. Firstly he suggests that we should 
regard "technologies as extensions of our own bodies, of our own facul-
ties, whether clothing, housing, [or] the more familiar kinds of technologies 
like wheels, stirrups, extensions of various parts of the body." Secondly, 
to explain why we should regard them in this way, he suggests that our 
"need to amplify the human powers in order to cope with various environ-
ments brings on these extensions". Thirdly, looking at the consequences of 
technologies, he suggests that each extension of human capacity "at once 
rearranges patterns of human association and, in effect, really creates a 
new environment which is perhaps most felt although not most noticed in 
changing sensory ratios and sensory patterns." (McLuhan, 2003, p57)
McLuhan regards the implicit relationship between man and tools as "the deifi-
cation of man". Ernst Cassirer also noted the almost religious significance 
given to tools. "As soon as man employs a tool, he views it not as a mere 
artefact of which he is the recognized maker, but as a Being in its own right, 
endowed with powers of its own. Instead of being governed by his will, it 
becomes a god or daemon on whose will he depends - to which he feels 
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Especially the ax and the hammer seem to have attained such religious 
significance in earliest times". (Cassirer, 1946, p59) In extending aspects 
of human ability, then, a sense of confusion sets in as the tools begin to 
appear to embody an external "deified" power, and cultures thus come to 
live in awe and fear of their own artefacts. As we have noted previously, fig-
ure and ground affect each other in a reciprocal dance.
This should not surprise us if we consider McLuhan's concept of the human senso-
rium; his realisation that we do not use our senses in the same ways and to 
the same extent in all contexts, and at all times in history. This in turn relies 
upon our understanding that we can view thought and activity, as Charles 
Sanders Peirce suggested, largely as a set of habits. We absorb many of 
these habits in the form of memes, and these govern what, in usual circum-
stances, we regard as common sense. Having thrown part of ourselves out 
onto the ground, we easily forget what we have done, and regard our exter-
nalised power as a genuine object ready-at-hand that wields power over us.
McLuhan makes a subtle point that many people have mistaken for technological 
determinism (cf Stearn, 1967). Although sometimes accused of doing so, 
he does not suggest that media, whether writing, television or the internet, 
"determine" our thoughts or "make us" do things. He argues, rather, that 
the media we create change the ratios in which we use our senses, prior-
itising one or two over the others, and thus change and shift the nature of 
our lived-world; both the social landscape which we inhabit and the ground 
upon which we walk as figures. Given that usually, in our everyday dealings, 
we treat this ground as invisible, we almost always fail to notice the particu-
(2
0
2
)
lar effects our sensorium exerts on us, or the changes brought to bear on 
the sensorium. The nature of writing, for example, requires that one charac-
ter, and one word, follow another. This linear nature, McLuhan argued, gave 
rise to certain habits of mind that also privileged linearity. Chains of cause 
and effect, and rhetorical points constructed from logic that proceeds step 
by step, seem self-evident and normal to cultures steeped in literacy, while 
simply not appearing at all in many orally based, tribal cultures whose rea-
soning proceeds along very different paths.
20.4. Tools, Emotions & Reason
Very rarely has a tool ever served only one purpose. Nor do tools necessarily 
have the effect that people intend or expect. Van Dyke Parks illustrated this 
neatly when he described meeting the silent movie star Lillian Gish as a boy. 
I said, "Ms. Gish, weren't you apprehensive when you heard that talk-
ies were coming?”... She turned and said, "That's a very good question. 
Actually, when we heard that sound was coming to film we didn't call them 
talkies. We all just assumed that when sound came to film, it would all 
be music." 
(Mojo, 2011: online reference)
The silent movie industry welcomed the coming of sound because they guessed 
wrong. They thought this new tool would enhance their art. Instead, within 
a couple of years, it destroyed it, and created a new method of film-making 
with a new balance between the senses and an entirely new grammar.
Tools evolve as people find new ways of using them, or as their very use suggests 
new problems that invite further invention. As the proto-meme and the orig-
inal tool, language has always developed and evolved. Dialects, slang and 
specialist vocabularies all come and go over time. These changes can often 
reveal underlying changes in the surrounding culture, as Raymond Wil-
liams noticed when he plotted the historical developments in the meanings 
and use of a set of key political and social terms in the book Keywords. He 
described this as "the record of an inquiry into a vocabulary: a shared body 
of words and meanings in our most general discussions, in English, of the 
practices and institutions which we group as culture and society." (Williams, 
1976, p15) He aimed to demonstrate the ways in which words ranging from 
art to work had changed, and sometimes inverted their meanings, over peri-
ods of time; and how we can use this knowledge to analyse changes in 
thinking and underlying social beliefs. However, he makes it clear that he 
does not "mean that the language simply reflects the processes of society 
and history. On the contrary ... important social and historical processes 
occur within language, in ways which indicate how integral the problems of 
meanings and of relationships really are. (Williams, 1976, p22)"
More recently the theologian Don Cuppitt has attempted to plot changes in con-
temporary religious and spiritual belief by examining the ways that peo-
ple use key phrases in their everyday speech (Cuppitt, 1999; 1999; 2000). 
He "collected and analysed a number of new idioms occurring in everyday 
speech, all having to do with 'life'. He contends that our very vocabulary 
illustrates how, unconsciously, we are already moving from a God-centred 
to a Life-centred religion. In other words, without our realising what is hap-
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pening, we are creating and enunciating through our everyday language a 
new theology of life." (Geering, 1999)
Williams and Cuppitt had different purposes in mind for their explorations. Wil-
liams wanted to inform and deepen a theoretical debate on the English 
socialist left, whereas Cuppitt had a more action-based and bottom-up pro-
ject in mind. He wanted to find out what people actually believe, which may 
differ greatly from what they say they believe when questioned, in order 
to demonstrate that the most interesting post-religious developments cur-
rently occur outside the arenas of theoretical debate. To put this another 
way, Williams believed that one needed a theory to begin the process of 
research and analysis, whereas Cuppitt believes that one can develop theo-
ries during and as part of the process of research. He points out that
Ordinary-language philosophy was prominent in Britain for a short period 
after the Second World War, the leading practitioners being Wittgen-
stein, Gilbert Ryle and J L Austin. Wittgenstein in particular intro-
duced the idea that there is nothing deeper than ordinary language. It 
already presupposes - it already has built into it - our basic, commu-
nally-evolved sense of ourselves, our lives, our world, our knowledge, 
and time and space. 
(Cuppitt, 2000, p1)
Adopting this approach for our own purposes we can discover something curi-
ous about the ways in which people use language when speaking about 
their emotions and feelings. We can notice that, in conversation, people 
almost always use a language to describe their emotional relationships with 
other people as though they wished to map them onto a three dimensional 
landscape. The language people use to describe their social relationships 
involves a pervading sense of depth and distance. People have "close" 
friends and feel a need to "get closer" to potential friends and lovers. When 
they "fall" in love, they might describe themselves as feeling as "close as 
two people can get". Similarly, people claim that they feel "distanced" from 
someone they no longer feel much in common with, and may describe 
how the two of them have "grown apart". People describe moments of joy, 
ecstasy and reverie as "feeling high" and they describe depression as "feel-
ing low". They experience "deep depressions". They have "peak experi-
ences" and suffer "troughs of despair". People "grow" spiritually, or they 
simply "grow up".
On the other hand, people talk about matters of logic and rational information 
using the language of flat, two dimensional space. You can, perhaps, find 
the planned car-park shown "at the bottom left hand corner" of the map; 
and the applicable rate of value added tax shown in "the fourth column". 
We use two-dimensional constructs as metaphors, as when we describe a 
co-worker as performing her tasks so well that she "is off the chart". When 
trying to advance our ideas in an organisation we may feel "boxed in" or 
"cornered". We may need to find a new "angle", and we may thus feel a 
need to think "out of the box". In English the words high and low feature 
in both two dimensional and three dimensional analyses, and so they also 
appear here. We talk of people being "higher-ups" when they occupy a 
position near the "top" of a hierarchy, and we would describe a child as 
"bottom" of the class if they have the "lowest" scores in a test. 
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Our emotional intelligence, then, seems to raise within us feelings of spatiality best 
described in the language of 3D, while our rational and logical interactions 
seem planar, and best dealt with in the language of 2D. We may conclude, 
following the example of Don Cuppitt, that this discrepancy has signifi-
cance. In our case we may presume that this significance concerns not just 
the ways that we use language differently in each case, but also how these 
differences will lead us to approach, and find uses for, other tools, including 
emerging tools such as synthetic worlds.
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dium. Ivan Illich traced a similar trajectory as McLuhan from the creation of 
language to the writing of computer programs, although he referred to what 
resulted at each stage not as media but as tools. Both Illich and McLuhan 
referred to the same sets of interlocking social phenomena: the gradual out-
sourcing of human capacities to physical machines or social arrangements, 
and the subsequent feeling that these have appeared to us as objects ready-
at-hand in the environment. Illich notes that "tools are intrinsic to social 
relationships. An individual relates himself in action to his society through 
the use of tools he actively masters, or by which he is passively acted upon. 
To the degree that he masters his tools, he can invest the world with his 
meaning; to the degree that he is mastered by his tools, the shape of his tool 
determines his own self-image." (Illich, 1973, p34)
21.1. Industrial Media, Industrial Tools
People live with their tools and their world in a triadic bonding. People cre-
ate tools to deal with perceived problems or issues within their environ-
ment. Successful tools then become absorbed into the social environment 
where they change at least part of the ground of existence. This ground, as 
it shifts and changes, privileges some human perceptions and human hab-
its, bringing them to the foreground, while diminishing others. Thus people 
create tools, which bring forth new social landscapes, which change the 
people who live in them, who in turn create new tools to deal with the new 
problems they now perceive.
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Neil Postman echoed this view that technology changes society in ways that people 
do not recognise. 
Anyone who has studied the history of technology knows that technologi-
cal change is always a Faustian bargain: Technology giveth and technol-
ogy taketh away, and not always in equal measure. A new technology some-
times creates more than it destroys. Sometimes, it destroys more than it 
creates. But it is never one-sided. The invention of the printing press 
is an excellent example. Printing fostered the modern idea of indi-
viduality but it destroyed the medieval sense of community and social 
integration. Printing created prose but made poetry into an exotic and 
elitist form of expression. Printing made modern science possible but 
transformed religious sensibility into an exercise in superstition. 
Printing assisted in the growth of the nation-state but, in so doing, 
made patriotism into a sordid if not a murderous emotion.  
(Postman, in Clough et al, 2013, p8)
Both McLuhan and Illich use their chosen terminology in ways that extend beyond 
the standard colloquial usages. Both regard organised social arrangements 
as obeying the same rules as manufactured devices, seeing the institution 
of compulsory formal education, for example, as a mass medium and an 
industrial tool, respectively. The term 'formal education' describes a bun-
dle of ideas that have successfully replicated and mutated themselves 
across time and space for nearly two hundred years. We can view all other 
mass media and industrial tools, whether physical objects or institutional 
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arrangements, in the same way. We can thus fairly use the term "extended 
phenotype of a meme" to describe both what McLuhan viewed as media 
and Illich viewed as tools.
Marshall McLuhan noted that "the personal and social consequences of any 
medium - that is, of any extension of us - result from the new scale that is 
introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new 
technology". (McLuhan, 1964, p15) The last two hundred years have seen 
the largest and most rapid changes of scale in human affairs in recorded his-
tory. The industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century introduced not just 
new production methods but new patterns of consumption in which people 
learned to want the goods and services best suited to industrial production. 
As Charles Sanders Peirce noted, "Modern science, with its microscopes 
and telescopes, with its chemistry and electricity, and with its entirely new 
appliances of life, has put us into quite another world; almost as much as if 
it had transported our race to another planet." (Buchler, 1940, p297)
The effects of this new electric world spread rapidly the growth of industrial 
machinery to the development of new industrialised social arrangements, as 
people learned to depend on the new professions, from engineers to teach-
ers. McLuhan pointed out that "A.N. Whitehead was fond of saying that 
the great discovery of the nineteenth century was not this or that invention 
but the discovery of the technique of invention... Namely, begin with the 
solution to the problem, and then find out what steps lead to the solution.in 
other words, work backwards."  (McLuhan, 2003, p29)
In 1875, for example, in Russia, the 'Yablochkov candle' successfully demonstrated 
the possibility of street lighting, and by 1880 three cities had working street 
lighting. By 1890 over 130,000 arc lamps lit streets in the USA, while Paris 
and London also had thousands. Electric lighting abolished the difference 
between day and night in a way that gas lights never had, and began what 
McLuhan termed the 'electric age'. The information age which we currently 
inhabit began in Newcastle upon Tyne, Cleveland, Ohio, and Wabash, Indi-
ana when public lighting combined with private lighting to change people's 
habits and to push the effects of the Earth's rotation and the passing of light 
and dark to the peripheries of cultural life. Darkness became a choice. Fac-
tory workers, bartenders, taxi-drivers, and millions of others, could now try 
to find work at any time of day or night.
Like the railroads before, and the industrialised highway systems later, electric 
lighting only made sense if organised on an industrial scale. These sys-
tems did not just provide the services that formed their superficial purpose; 
they also provided an incontrovertible argument for increasingly large-scale 
organisation. They all had the unintended consequence of imposing them-
selves on the social environment as what Illich termed 'radical monopo-
lies'.  Once a highway system has exists it becomes impossible not to use 
it because it will increasingly replace more local facilities with bigger and 
better facilities situated further away. Shopkeepers will take advantage of 
the highway system to expand to bigger and cheaper premises on the edge 
of town, encouraging and then later forcing customers to drive rather than 
walk there. Illich defines a radical monopoly as "one product that goes far 
beyond what the concept of monopoly usually implies. Generally we mean 
by 'monopoly' the exclusive control by one corporation over the means of 
producing (or selling) a commodity or service... By 'radical monopoly' I 
mean the dominance of one type of product rather than the dominance of 
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one brand. I speak about radical monopoly when one industrial produc-
tion process exercises an exclusive control over the satisfaction of a press-
ing need, and excludes non-industrial activities from competition". (Illich, 
1973, p65-66)
Industrialised health services and education have gone through just such a trans-
formation into radical monopolies. Most workers in the twenty first century 
cannot take time off work if or when they feel sick. Instead they have to 
travel to a licensed professional and pay to have themselves declared offi-
cially sick, or else they risk losing their job. Whereas people once attended 
university because they wished to learn or to join a community of learners, 
today people have to sign up for a university degree course in order to get a 
certificate that qualifies them to join a workforce whose purpose may have 
little in common with the university department where they studied. In the 
terms that Illich delineated, these people no longer use these public tools 
for their own benefits but rather they get pushed into these institutions as 
raw material and then become shaped and defined by them. Illich points out 
that a characteristic shift from verbs to nouns has accompanied this tran-
sition: "the salaried employees, whether workers or bureaucrats, say that 
they have work, the peasants say that they do it... Not only what men do but 
also what men want is [now] designated by a noun. 'Housing' designates 
a commodity rather than an activity. People acquire knowledge, mobility, 
even sensitivity or health. They have not only work or fun, but even sex." 
(Illich, 1973, p114) Certainly during "the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury we have witnessed a considerable shift within public language - mani-
fested in an obsession to convert verbs in to nouns" (Boulting, 2006, p127) 
This reflects the deification of industrial tools and the resulting attempt to 
describe our lives in terms of mechanical components. We accept that we 
need to "get an education" rather than learn what we need. We "get a job" 
rather than work to live. Nouns thus replace verbs in our discourse and, as 
noted earlier, this imposes drastic changes on how we think, and feel able 
to act, within our life-world.
21.2. The Education Industry
In Deschooling Society Ivan Illich argued that "the institutionalization of val-
ues leads inevitably to physical pollution, social polarization, and psycho-
logical impotence: three dimensions in a process of global degradation and 
modernized misery.” He demonstrated the ways in which "this process of 
degradation is accelerated when nonmaterial needs are transformed into 
demands for commodities; when health, education, personal mobility, wel-
fare, or psychological healing are defined as the result of services or treat-
ments (Illich, 1971, p1)." He suggested that "Neither new attitudes of teach-
ers toward their pupils nor the proliferation of educational hardware or 
software (in classroom or bedroom), nor finally the attempt to expand the 
pedagogue's responsibility until it engulfs his pupils' lifetimes will deliver 
universal education. The current search for new educational funnels must 
be reversed into the search for their institutional inverse: educational webs 
which heighten the opportunity for each one to transform each moment of 
his living into one of learning, sharing, and caring (Illich, 1971, pIV)." He 
regarded education as an industry, and he regarded that industry as impos-
ing a radical monopoly on vital aspects of people's life-worlds.
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Education became fully industrialised in the early years of the twentieth century, 
as part of a second wave of taylorism. Taylorism aimed to replace the pro-
cesses of manufacture undertaken informally using inherited skills by pre-
planned automated processes using unskilled labour. Initially this happened 
in manufacturing industries. Frederick Taylor laid down the four underlying 
principles of this approach in his 1911 book Principles of Scientific Manage-
ment where he stated that
First. They develop a science for each element of a man's work, which 
replaces the old rule-of-thumb method.
Second. They scientifically select and then train, teach, and develop the 
workman, whereas in the past he chose his own work and trained himself 
as best he could.
Third. They heartily cooperate with the men so as to insure all of the 
work being done in accordance with the principles of the science which 
has been developed.
Fourth. There is an almost equal division of the work and the responsi-
bility between the management and the workmen. The management take over 
all work for which they are better fitted than the workmen, while in the 
past almost all of the work and the greater part of the responsibility 
were thrown upon the men. 
(Taylor, 1911, pp36-37)
Taylor received much praise for "bringing science into the workplace", and for help-
ing complete the transition from the old-fashioned rural ways of life to the 
machine-led future. Many businessmen, and the equivalent administrators 
in public services, began looking eagerly for other places where they might 
apply his theories. Indeed Taylor's assistant Morris Cooke made specific 
efforts to insert his methods into public services. Their only real success lay 
in education, where Cooke managed to get schools to start subcontracting 
their faculty, thus initiating the "adjunct professor" movement.
In a paper written in 2001 Jonathan Rees said that
In 1962, the historian Raymond Callahan wrote the best-known account of 
how scientific management has affected American schools. Much of his book 
recounts the influence of Taylor's ideas on educational administration -- 
everything from how to make better use of buildings and classroom space 
to how to standardize the work of janitors. Other aspects of scientific 
management in education treated students like workers. "The ability to 
add at a speed of 65 combinations per minute, with an accuracy of 94 
percent," wrote one reformer, "is as definite a specification as can be set 
up for any aspect of the work of the steel plant" (John Franklin Bobbitt 
quoted in Callahan, 1962: 81). Another line of reforms required teachers 
to document their teaching activities in order to minimize "waste.”...
The best example of Frederick Taylor's ideas at work in education 
today are high-stakes standardized tests -- tests which have a significant 
effect on funding for schools and the careers of individual students.
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The growing acceptance that schools formed an effective site of industry, and that 
administrators could view pupils as raw material they employed staff to 
reshape, according to the short but complete instructions from the planning 
room, led to the anti-school movement of the 1960s and the later home 
schooling movements. We can view these as attempts to reclaim a lived-
world where learners can produce as well as consume their own lives, and 
as early attempts to separate learning from education.
The growth of a multinational education industry serves as one example of what 
Neil Postman has described as a technopoly, a kind of social arrangement 
where the majority of people believe that "the only goal of human labour 
and thought is efficiency; that technical calculation is in all respects supe-
rior to human judgment; that in fact human judgment cannot be trusted, 
because it is plagued by laxity, ambiguity and unnecessary complexity; that 
subjectivity is an obstacle to clear thinking; that what cannot be measured 
either does not exist or is of no value; and that the affairs of citizens are best 
guided and conducted by 'experts'." (Postman, 1992, p51)
McLuhan, Illich and Postman all recognised the same sets of social changes, and 
analysed their causes in broadly similar ways. They disagreed sharply in the 
ways they felt about these changes. McLuhan saw himself as an explorer, 
claiming that "I am an investigator. I make probes. I have no point of view. I 
do not stay in one position." (Stearns, 1967, pxii) Illich concentrated on per-
suading the third world to avoid the industrialising errors of the West, sug-
gesting that, once started, the errors would prove almost impossible to undo. 
Postman appeared to counsel despair and, where possible, withdrawal.
The responses of Illich and Postman have in common a belief that the situation, 
as they saw it, would simply get stronger and bigger unless, or until, it col-
lapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. As Illich correctly noted 
nothing ever gets uninvented and the genie, once out of the bottle, never 
gets put back. The invention of nuclear weaponry and, later, nuclear power 
illustrates this clearly. A world with no knowledge that nuclear weaponry 
might one day exist differs profoundly from one where treaties have abol-
ished nuclear weapons. In the former, nuclear weapons occupy the same 
fantasy space as time travel. In the latter, not possessing nuclear weapons 
forms a political or social choice. Not stockpiling them differs radically from 
not knowing how to make them; and once invented, nothing can ever make 
nuclear weapons a fantasy again. Illich concentrated his work in the Third 
World because he believed that radical monopolies, once established, take 
on a life of their own and develop through their own internal logic, outside 
of human control. He believed that the only hope lay in preventing radical 
monopolies from becoming established where they did not already exist.
Given this, what can we make of our current situation from the perspectives of Illich 
and Postman? We might say that their prophesies have proved more accurate 
than they could have imagined and that the system they described has indeed 
collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. They described a system 
that organised itself around ever-larger mechanical devices which demanded 
monopoly rights over scarce resources, imposed uniformity on users and 
non-users alike, and constrained choice. In the last thirty years we have, in 
the words of Nicholas Negroponte (1995), begun the move from "atoms to 
bits", and perhaps many (but definitely not all) of the rules have changed.
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21.3. From Industry to Information
The emerging digital world does not constitute a whole new beginning as 
some have argued (cf Rabinovitz & Geil, 2004); rather we should see it as the 
third stage of McLuhan's 'electric age', itself an extension of the nineteenth 
century programme of mass industrialisation. We have passed through the 
radio phase, with its emphasis on the auditory which saw the introduction 
of recorded music. We have passed through the television phase, with its 
emphasis on one-directional communication organised and supervised by 
licensed professionals. We have now moved into the internet phase, where 
communication has grown chaotic, frenetic and multi-directional. The 
introduction of networked computing, and the increasing capacity of data 
storage have had profound effects on the memes that governed industri-
alisation, and continue to wreak havoc with the business, educational and 
political assumptions that professionals have grown up with and absorbed 
as common sense. This new system relies on abundance and redundancy, 
not scarcity. It works against custodians and guardians and privileges direct 
access. It works against the limited edition and privileges the unlimited and 
indistinguishable copy. It bends and challenges previously accepted ideas 
of intellectual property.
McLuhan noticed this very early on. He prophesied the end of work and the rein-
stating of roles which "in effect, means having more than one job. A house-
wife is a role-player because she has many jobs, as do farmers and many 
other people in the community. They are not essentially job-holders but 
role-players." (McLuhan, 2003, p190) This results, in large part, from the 
human sensorium shifting away from several centuries of the visual and 
linear (back) into a more auditory and tribal culture. This, he said, meant 
that "we are moving into an age of play which will bring many new patterns 
of work and learning". (McLuhan, 2003, p190) He argued that, among these 
changes, we would see the functions of producers and consumers merge, 
especially in the cultural sphere, since "the inevitable mode of the elec-
tronic forms of information movement and of ensuing patterns of human 
expression and association are decisively producer-oriented. The audience 
is increasingly involved in the creative act, to the scandal of elites who for 
so long have assumed a consumer orientation to the arts."(McLuhan, 2003, 
p31) Alvin Toffler named these new active audiences "prosumers" and pre-
dicted their rise thus:
Producer and consumer, divorced by the industrial revolution, are reu-
nited in the cycle of wealth creation, with the customer contributing 
not just money but market and design information vital for the produc-
tion process. Buyer and supplier share data, information, and knowledge. 
Someday, customers may also push buttons that activate remote production 
processes. Consumer and producer fuse into a prosumer. 
(Toffler, 1990, p233)
Much of this has happened and much more seems on the verge of happening. Most 
people in Europe, North America and Asia now live in a condition of steady-
state learning, which largely takes place informally within communities. 
Within the last five years, for example, people have taught each other how 
to operate smartphones, and how to upgrade their operating systems. They 
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have come to understand the term 'app store' and found out how to use 
their phones to navigate round one, and how to find and download apps. 
People have learned to rely on social networks to keep in contact with fam-
ily and friends, and also to make new friends. The fact that Facebook only 
opened internationally in October 2005, and then only to twenty one uni-
versities in the United Kingdom, indicates the speed of these changes. It 
did not make itself available to the wider public until September 26, 2006, 
at which point the company allowed anyone aged thirteen or older with a 
valid email address to join. On April 24, 2012, less than five and a half years 
after it began, Facebook claimed to have over 900,000,000 active users.
 
Facebook represents the tip of a huge iceberg, as "being digital" moves rapidly from 
a niche activity mainly pursued by young people to a mainstream activity 
both at work and at home. In January 2012 a survey suggested that 81% 
of Americans had banked online in the preceding twelve months. 12% of 
American adults now do their reading using e-readers, and Amazon has 
reported that in the UK, at the end of 2011, its downloadable eBooks outsold 
its physical hardbacks and paperbacks. In formal education serious gaming 
(games-based or game-like learning tools) constitutes an industry worth at 
least two billion dollars a year. (Hypergrid Business, online ref)
21.4. Remixing the World
Some have argued that these shifts actually cause changes in the structure 
of the brains of young people (cf Prensky, 2001a, 2001b); a claim that oth-
(21
3
)
ers have strongly disputed as a misunderstanding of neurological research. 
However, others have advanced a more plausible claim: that these shifts 
cause changes in the social attitudes and willingness for risk-taking in the 
minds of young people, especially those with long-term exposure to online 
gaming. Beck and Wade (2006), for example, argue that exposure to mul-
tiplayer combat games leads people to value learning by failure as a viable 
strategy, whereas those brought up in a linear, rational environment have 
learned to disparage this. Gamers also appear much more willing to say 
"let's just do it and see what happens" than non-gamers.
These effects should not surprise us. Rather it should surprise us if some such 
effects do not appear as the sensory landscape in which people lives 
changes dramatically in a very short period of time. As the human life-
world changes rapidly some memes prove better than others at adapting 
and replicating. Some ideas therefore stop seeming like common sense and 
start seeming like the kind of ancient mythology that we can safely ignore. 
The effects of the changes we live through affect us socially as much, or 
more than, they affect us individually; and mentally much more than phys-
ically.  We can see this in the movement of hacking culture from the cul-
tural periphery to a much more central position. Hacking has existed almost 
as long as electric technology, with the first recorded example occurring 
in 1903 at a demonstration by Marconi (New Scientist, 2011, online refer-
ence). The two founders of Apple Computers first achieved prominence in 
the hacking world as members of California's Homebrew Computer Club 
where they developed "blue boxes," devices used to hack into the phone 
system more easily than the children's whistles that the legendary hacker 
John "Captain Crunch" Draper had previously used. Hacking began as an 
interest in tinkering for its own sake, and as an obsessive activity for do-ers; 
occupying a similar space on the cultural margins as custom-car building in 
previous decades. Captain Crunch had much more interest in playing with 
the telephone system, and beating the game, than he had in actually getting 
free long distance phone calls.
Hacking grew from a desire to "open up the box" and see what the insides looked 
like; to treat an electric system as a toy and play with it. The open source 
movement had a parallel growth during the same time period, and came 
from the same roots. Before computers became commoditised one could 
make little sensible distinction between the users and the producers, and 
all enthusiasts acted as prosumers. In 1980, for example, Clive Sinclair 
launched the Sinclair ZX80, one of the first home computers in Europe, as a 
kit that purchasers assembled and soldered together themselves. This form 
of delivery naturally led to experimentation and, given the marginal status 
this acquired, to sharing knowledge. Richard Stallman organised the Free 
Software Movement in 1983, and outside of this many amateur program-
mers shared programs and games written in Basic on bulletin boards, in 
large part because it proved much simpler to share the source code than to 
distribute applications.
Aspects of this practice have gradually moved into the mainstream at the same time 
as others try to establish digital monopolies. The term "hacker" has by now 
become attached to a wide range of activities and techniques far removed 
from its original usage. Many start-up companies, for example, now 
employ growth hackers, who differ (in their view) from marketers because 
they defined themselves as "a person whose true north is growth... Every 
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decision that a growth hacker makes is informed by growth. Every strat-
egy, every tactic, and every initiative, is attempted in the hopes of grow-
ing. Growth is the sun that a growth hacker revolves around. Of course, 
traditional marketers care about growth too, but not to the same extent. 
Remember, the power of a growth hacker is in their obsessive focus on a 
singular goal. By ignoring almost everything, they can achieve the one task 
that matters most early on." (Patel & Taylor, 2013, p8) From this perspective 
hacking has become a general term to describe approaches and techniques 
formed from long exposure to the kind of digital environments that Beck and 
Wade described. The wider effects of the open source movement, such as 
the growth of the Creative Commons movement, have a similar background, 
and have arisen for similar reasons.
They represent a paradox at the heart of the emerging digital world: the conflict 
between radical monopolies and the commons.
21.5. Radical Monopolies
In the beginning each innovation, each new medium or tool, has an unclear 
future. It has more than one potential use, and it can affect the current sen-
sorium in more than one way. At the beginning of every adoption process, 
then, we can find a window of opportunity where the normal or customary 
use of a new tool lies undefined. Thomas Edison demonstrated the pho-
nograph in 1877, at the offices of the Scientific American, but the machine 
that he demonstrated could both record and play back sound. It functioned, 
in effect, as a dictation machine. He never envisaged this leading to the 
mass production of vinyl albums and compact discs. Edison did not intend 
to invent the recorded music industry, any more than Marconi intended to 
invent the disc jockey. These phenomena arose because of the particular 
ways in which producers and consumers adopted these technologies and 
thus the effects they had on the human sensorium. The phonograph and 
radio both ended up enabling performance-in-sound at a distance, both in 
time and space. They both ended up establishing a plethora of new profes-
sions, each concerned in one way or another with widening or strengthen-
ing the gap between producers and consumers.
The entertainment and information industries sought to establish radical monop-
olies to entrench their position, and "radical monopoly imposes compul-
sory consumption and thereby restricts personal autonomy. It constitutes 
a special kind of social control because it is enforced by the imposed con-
sumption of a standard product that only large institutions can provide" 
(Illich, 1973, p67). However, the ability of the cultural industries to enforce 
these monopolies has diminished considerably since the advent of digital 
technology, as we can see from the moral panics over "piracy" and the dra-
conian attempts to extend the laws of copyright well beyond their original 
intended purpose.
150 years of industrialised capitalism suited the spread of radical monopolies very 
well. The system depended upon scarcity, and the development of more 
and more complex machinery generated several new kinds of scarcity. The 
expense of buying machinery, the technical knowledge needed to operate 
and maintain it, the space it needed, all served to raise the cost of entry into 
the marketplace. Efficiencies of scale served to consolidate ownership into 
fewer and fewer hands. Television and radio's use of bandwidth served to 
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missions to more and more consumers. Corporations have now begun to 
attempt to extend these familiar tactics to the internet and to other aspects 
of the emergent digital world. We should note that nothing inherent in the 
invention of the world wide web leads us inexorably towards the dominance 
of Facebook, any more than anything inherent in Edison's demonstration of 
the phonograph led to the dominance of global music labels like UMG.
The founders of Facebook appear to wish to establish a radical monopoly: their 
concerted attempts to develop Facebook as a platform makes that clear. 
As early as 2007, Katie Germinder, the director of user experience at Face-
book, wrote "With this evolution of Facebook Platform, we've made it so 
that any developer can build the same applications that we can. And by 
that, we mean that they can integrate their application into Facebook--into 
the social graph." (Facebook, 2007, online reference) In other words, they 
have long planned to run an intermediary service in which other developers 
run profitable services on top of theirs. The business value of this approach 
lies in persuading other developers to see Facebook as a utility, like the 
electricity grid, and compete among themselves to provide services on top 
of the grid, all of which provide data that Facebook can access, analyse and 
sell on. If they succeed they will become what people mean when they talk 
about social networking, just as the highway system has become what peo-
ple mean when they talk about travelling. However, Facebook will only have 
succeeded in establishing this kind of radical monopoly on the internet if 
and when people have come to see what happens on there as synonymous 
with online social networking, and have thus become unable to imagine any 
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other way that online social networking might happen. We may still plausi-
bly regard this as less than inevitable.
Facebook, indeed, may face a harder struggle to establish such a radical monopoly 
than previous cultural industries such as the record industry did, because 
they might have much more trouble generating scarcity than record labels 
or publishers did. They might also have more trouble generating consensus 
than they would have done in the old mechanical age. People accepted scar-
city as natural fifty years ago, in the sense that it seemed self-evident that if I 
lent you a book then I no longer had possession of the book. I could not avail 
myself of its contents until you returned it. The frantic efforts of the “content 
industries” to prevent “piracy” demonstrate that this no longer holds true. 
I can make a copy of my eBook and give it to you and, if we so desire, we 
can both read it simultaneously. In this scenario I have replicated my book 
because I retain my copy while you gain a newly-created copy; and you will 
not return your copy to me, but throw it away when you have finished with it. 
Whenever a corporation attempts to insert scarcity into this scenario they do so by 
artificial means. They deliberately add additional, and unnecessary, com-
ponents to the eBook in order to make it difficult for me to copy or for you 
to read once copied. This, of course, usually backfires because the so-called 
copy-protection serves to set up exactly the kind of intellectual puzzle that 
fascinated Captain Crunch and Steve Jobs thirty to forty years ago; and so 
we can expect that people just like them will try to open the toy to see how 
it works, even if they have no real interest in the book itself.
The consensus that Facebook, and similar corporations, will need to establish rad-
ical monopolies in the digital age, may elude them, then, because attempts 
to create artificial scarcity by crippling digital goods can easily bring forth 
the hacker ethic; because that can remind us that we might well find open 
source equivalents; and because of these two factors we might tend to see 
digital goods more easily as part of the Commons.
21.6. The Commons
The idea of the Commons pre-dates the emergent digital world by at least 
three hundred and fifty years. During the reign of Oliver Cromwell, after the 
English Civil War, Gerrard Winstanley led the True Levellers opposing the 
unprecedented attempts to create privately owned 'enclosures', by fencing in 
what large areas that people had previously known as common land. In April 
1649 he published The True Leveller's Standard Advanced, in which he declared
And hereupon, The Earth (which was made to be a Common Treasury of 
relief for all, both Beasts and Men) was hedged in to In-closures by 
the teachers and rulers, and the others were made Servants and Slaves: 
And that Earth that is within this Creation made a Common Store-house 
for all, is bought and sold, and kept in the hands of a few, whereby 
the great Creator is mightily dishonoured, as if he were a respector of 
persons, delighting in the comfortable Livelihoods of some, and rejoyc-
ing in the miserable povertie and straits of others. From the beginning 
it was not so. 
(Hill 1973, p78)
Winstanley did not write this as a philosophical treatise. Rather he wrote it from 
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bitter experience, as part of an ongoing struggle to prevent the earth itself 
becoming private property.
On Sunday, April 1st, 1649, a plot of "wasteland" near Walton-on-Thames, 
known as St. George's Hill, was the site of one of England's earliest 
communist uprisings. Led by discharged New Model Army soldier William 
Everard, and former cloth-merchant Gerrard Winstanley, a dozen land-
less men and their families invoked their God given right to till the 
earth, and began digging, and fertilizing the common. In an age when 
land and its products were the primary form of wealth, the actions of 
these "Diggers," and others like them throughout England posed a serious 
a challenge to the ruling elites of their day. If the poor began taking 
the matter of famine into their own hands, establishing their own commu-
nities, free of the social, religious, economic, and legal constraints 
that kept the aristocracy in power, the aristocracy's demise would 
surely be imminent. 
(Spritzler, 2003, p5)
The Levellers based their definition of the commons on their belief that large "por-
tions of England were uncultivated wastes and commons which had been 
enclosed or claimed by gentry or large landowners. Diggers proposed to dig 
up, manure, and sow corn upon the common waste ground". (Stratman, 
1991, p238) For religious as well as political reasons, they refused to believe 
that anyone could claim to own the earth or what grew on it.
This definition lies at the root of all discussions of the commons since. In Capitalism 
3.0, Peter Barnes defined the Commons as "the gifts of nature and society 
we inherit and create together...  Each of us is the joint recipient of a vast 
inheritance. This shared inheritance includes air and water, habitats and 
ecosystems, languages and cultures, science and technologies, social and 
political systems, and quite a bit more." He added that "Common wealth is 
like the dark matter of the economic universe--it's everywhere, but we don't 
see it. One reason we don't see it is that much of it is, literally, invisible. 
Who can spot the air, an aquifer, or the social trust that underlies financial 
markets? The more relevant reason is our own blindness" (Barnes, 2006, 
p66-67). His definition begins at the same place but notably broadens the 
definition to include matters of culture. This broadening, and the explicit 
inclusion of "languages and cultures, science and technologies, social and 
political systems" clearly places memes and wider meme-based systems 
within the commons.
This has profound importance. Small groups have fought the battle between radical 
monopoly - the black iron prison - and the commons for at least three hun-
dred and fifty years, since the radical monopoly of the church over the lives 
of Europeans began to crack when the printing press and other mechanical 
technologies made new choices and social arrangements possible.  During 
the mechanical age the advantage lay with the centralising and monopolis-
ing tendencies. During the last century we learned that everything we see, 
think and feel arises from, and subsequently forms part of a never-ending 
story that we tell and retell ourselves and each other. We do this through 
memes, which have the same importance to us, as human beings, as air 
and water. Memes play a vital role in binding us together into society, and 
society makes us human.
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In the emergent digital age, where cultural artefacts have no in-built scarcity and 
ideas can travel the globe in seconds, the balance may shift. More accu-
rately: we may have the capacity to shift it. To do this we will have to think 
about the tools we need, and draw up blueprints to guide us in building them.
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In the past people learned for several reasons. The wealthy learned for reli-
gious reasons, to celebrate creation and better admire the work of the cre-
ator; for exploratory reasons, to discover more for the pleasure of knowing; 
and for strategic reasons, to advantage themselves. The poorer learned a 
trade - they became apprenticed to a baker or a blacksmith - in order to 
earn a living. They did this knowing that once they had mastered their craft, 
they would have a set of skills that would last them their whole life, and 
that they would have, in McLuhan's terms, a role that would serve to place 
them within their community. As industrialisation took hold, people con-
tinued to learn trades - they trained as plumbers and later as electricians - 
although they now came to recognise that their skills would need adding to, 
or upgrading, at several points in their working lives as the technology with 
which they worked evolved. They also began to work in jobs, rather than 
roles, and to live lives that increasingly split into separate work and leisure 
times in which they behaved differently and mingled with different groups.
22.1. Necessary Learning
Today people continue to learn for all of these reasons, and many people, at 
adult education classes, continue even when they no longer have to learn. 
Allen Tough, like many others, believed that the question "of why men and 
women learn is extremely important, for it is hard to develop better help for 
adult learners without understanding their reasons for learning. The ques-
tion has been discussed by many writers, going as far back as Socrates" 
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(Tough, 1971, p45). Tough compiled a list of these reasons as they related to 
voluntary adult learners (Tough, 1971, pp59-61):
1. Satisfying curiosity, puzzlement, or a question
2. Enjoyment from the content itself
3. Enjoyment from practising the skill
4. The activity of learning
5. Learning successfully
6. Completing unfinished learning
7. Aspects unrelated to learning
In the twenty first century we have a new and compelling reason to learn that we 
can add to this list. We have clear evidence that the digital age will depend, 
for the foreseeable future, upon incessant change and innovation. Nothing 
around us has a final form and the ground shifts constantly beneath our 
feet. In the last twenty years, as noted earlier, the telephone system has 
changed completely. Line phones have almost disappeared. Not only have 
phones changed as physical objects, but their uses, and the social conven-
tions surrounding those uses, have changed too; as have the objects that 
used to accompany phones. Telephone directories, for example, no longer 
serve any obvious function, even when you can still find them. They contain 
nothing that you cannot find through the search function on the phone itself. 
Moreover, not only have people of all ages had to learn how to use several 
successive generations of mobile phones, each different and more power-
ful than the one before, but they have also had to negotiate new conven-
tions for using them.  Changing technology has altered social expectations 
and rituals. Thirty years ago, for example, only businesses had answering 
machines. If you had telephoned me in 1984 at a time when I had gone 
shopping then I would not have received your call and, moreover, I would 
not know that you had called. Today you almost certainly expect me to have 
my phone with me, and if I don't answer it you will send me a text message. 
If I don't answer that then you may start drawing conclusions about my 
reliability, or our relationship.
The telephone provides one easily recognised example of regular disruptive 
change. So too do computer operating systems, which receive upgrades that 
leave many people feeling confused and upset that they need to learn to 
use their computer all over again (Keizer, 2009). We can also find other less 
immediately obvious examples. Technical standards change with increas-
ing rapidity, rendering digital apparatus and digital data obsolete. Fifteen 
years ago I brought all my computer data with me from England to Finland 
on Zip disks. I still have the disks, and the disk drive, but no obvious way 
to connect them to any modern computer. If I do manage to connect them 
then I strongly suspect that much of the more valuable data would require 
me to locate obsolete applications and a computer system able to run them. 
We may also note that Apple's introduction of the iPad in April 2010 began 
a move to modern tablets, and the rapid adoption of these has changed 
the way people use laptop and desktop computers, and phones; as well 
as changing the ways that increasing numbers of people obtain news and 
read newspapers, magazine, books, comics and working papers, as well as 
watching movies and television programmes.
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22.2. Taught by Tools
Unless we assume that this kind of relentless change will suddenly cease 
(and I can find no believable evidence that suggests this will happen) then 
we must prepare ourselves for a world in which our knowledge and skills 
regularly pass their use-by date. In this world we will need, above all, to 
learn how to learn. We will need to learn strategies for generalising our 
knowledge and techniques for mapping our existing knowledge onto new 
domains. This differs from what Allen Tough terms "the activity of learn-
ing". He uses this term to describe the process of "pleasure, self-esteem, 
and impressing others [that] may arise from the activity of learning - from 
the mere fact that the person is, at that particular time, engaged in learning 
rather than in some other activity" (Tough, 1971, p60). Learning to learn 
differs from this in that it involves acquiring a set of meta-strategies to 
inhibit frustration and increase the desire to explore.
We live now in a world of ambient learning in which, increasingly, the tools we use 
teach us how to learn them and we, in turn, pass this knowledge on. Digi-
tal devices have built-in help screens and software regularly offers us "tool 
tips". In this way, objects previously at-hand in the background now move 
into the foreground at times of their own choosing to inform and teach us. 
This now forms an increasing part of the ground over which we move; and 
the act of learning how to learn becomes a necessary response to an envi-
ronment that will not stop teaching us, and that requires that we absorb this 
teaching in order to continue to function. We have to keep moving in order 
to stand still.
In this way learning has begun to become decoupled from education in the lives of 
increasing numbers of people. Not only do people need to learn continually, 
with no end in sight, but they need to do this in a completely idiosyncratic 
manner. Nobody attends a formal class on how to live in a twenty-first cen-
tury house, or how to shop today. Yet every new washing machine has new 
functions, and supermarkets have begun introducing self-service checkouts 
that require the shopper to scan his own goods. Importantly every person 
comes across an unpredictable range of these services in an unpredictable 
order, and so no formal body could develop a curriculum that depends on 
devising pre-ordained sequences of teaching. In this situation people need 
the ability to generalise from previous knowledge in a way that proves use-
ful to them. To do this they need, firstly, to know how to approach each 
new problem; in other words, they need to learn how to learn. Secondly, 
they need to remain in the learning pool, because the ability to generalise 
depends in large part on the ability to recognise similarities; and this, in 
turn, depends upon a degree of familiarity with what we approach. People 
who upgrade their phones every year receive incremental upgrades, where 
the familiar features reassuringly outnumber the new, whereas people 
who purchase a new phone for the first time in a decade tend to receive an 
unwelcome shock.
I should note in passing that I do not intend this to stand as an argument for con-
stant or increased consumption, because the important issue does not 
revolve around ownership of a contemporary phone, so much as access to 
contemporary knowledge about the state of development of phones. If, at 
the moment, we find that the only way we can keep abreast of contempo-
rary knowledge necessarily involves continuous consumption, then we can 
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treat this as a sign of a radical monopoly that acts to keep us locked into the 
role of consumer. A radical monopoly of this kind need not take the form of 
a traditional conspiracy and it does not need to have conscious conspira-
tors. It evolves under its own imperatives or, rather, once we agree to rede-
fine activities as services we establish a logical chain - a cycle of memetic 
replication - that favours turning neighbouring activities into services, and 
propagates the view that we should regard such services as natural and 
accept our role as consumers of these services as a sign of progress.
As noted earlier, digital tools increasingly have the ability to act as teachers. 
Whereas industrial machinery, from washing machines to cars, used to 
come with separate manuals, digital tools tend to come with 'wizards' to 
get the user through the set-up process; pop-up dialog boxes to introduce 
users to new features and explain, in context, how to access and use them; 
and onscreen help that users can access from within the tool itself. Hardware 
manufacturers, such as Apple, assist this process by issuing strict guide-
lines to software developers that aim to ensure that the end user can gener-
alise their knowledge from one app to another, by preventing the develop-
ment of idiosyncratic or indecipherable interfaces. This process constitutes 
a powerful form of gamification (McGonigal, 2011), which mimics the mech-
anisms underlying the demo levels in computer games. Designers devel-
oped these to replace instruction books, and to enable the gamer to begin 
playing immediately. By incorporating the instructions into the first level of 
the game, the user starts playing and learns at their own pace. The demo 
level counts as part of the game yet introduces all the elements the player 
will need to understand one by one in a logical sequence that feels reward-
ing. The player wakes up in an office, for example, learns how to open the 
door, and then learns how to drive the car she finds outside in the empty 
car-park, before learning how to search for objects by finding the keys to 
unlock the car-park gate, and then learning to use the navigation system in 
the car which in turn triggers a simple mission to drive to another location. 
At each stage the player feels occupied in a meaningful task, and by the end 
of the level she has learned everything she needs to play the game. In the 
introductory level no enemies or obstacles appear to hinder her progress. 
They will appear once the game begins properly with level two.
For most complex computer games this kind of learning-by-doing has replaced the 
previous instruction manuals which, where they still exist, have become 
reference books. A similar gamification process has occurred with digital 
devices. Here the user also begins using a new tool immediately, and learns 
the complexity of the device step by step through a stage-managed series 
of help screens or animations that she can ignore until needed. Objects 
increasingly send out signals to indicate their current state. I can remember 
my surprise, for example, when I first sat in a car that told me, in a loud 
voice, the distance between my car and the car behind when I reversed to 
park. "Three metres, two metres, one metre, Warning!" In a world that has 
begun to behave in this way, people increasingly learn how to operate their 
tools in small, discrete lessons that they receive from their environment 
itself, and this I refer to as ambient learning. I use this term to mean some-
thing similar to Brian Eno's definition of ambient music: "Ambient Music 
must be able to accommodate many levels of listening attention without 
enforcing one in particular; it must be as ignorable as it is interesting" (Eno, 
1978). Ambient learning, then, lies embedded unobtrusively within some-
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body's environment; invites but does not insist upon attention; and remains 
constantly available in the background until called forward by someone 
wishing to avail themselves of what it offers.
Ambient learning does not require teachers, although it does require designers. The 
designers cannot know anything about the learners who they will guide. 
They can have no knowledge of the users' previous learning experience, or 
anything about the precise context within which the learning will take place. 
They must assume that the learner has a willingness to learn; that the user 
probably seeks a specific answer to a specific question, rather than wanting 
to "learn more" about their device in a general way. They must assume, 
like games designers, that the user will get bored or confused if they feel 
overwhelmed with information. This kind of learning does not replace con-
ventional learning, whether that takes place through an institution or infor-
mally, because it does not deal in generalities. Ambient learning will not 
teach you electrical engineering; rather your new Smart TV will show you 
how best to use it, to the extent that you wish it to. Ambient learning takes 
place when people use tools that perform two tasks: their primary task 
(to receive and display electronic signals, in the case of a smart TV) and 
a secondary task of feeding back information to the user about how they 
should use the tool, as they use it. When people use enough of these tools, 
and when these tools develop a third function of communicating informa-
tion about the user to each other, then our lived-worlds will become active 
learning networks.
22.3 An Ambient Learning Triad
We can make a strong case for three forms of ambient learning. In the first 
type, described above, we appear to learn from the environment, although 
in reality what we can learn arises through human design and program-
ming. In the second type we learn with the environment, through sharing 
our opinions and knowledge through services such as Foursquare. Here we 
find ourselves involved in peer-to-peer learning networks that can never 
give users more or better information than other users have previously 
inputted. This kind of user-generated content makes each of us a part of the 
other users’ environment. I figure in their lives not as a friend but rather as 
part of the ground from which they draw their decisions. My opinion of a 
coffee shop or a restaurant gets aggregated with other opinions to provide 
a groundswell of judgement that may lead somebody I may never know to 
choose one venue over another. We might regard this process as establish-
ing a particular and peculiar kind of network; recognising that, as the novel-
ist Kurt Vonnegut pointed out before the world wide web existed, “humanity 
is organised into teams, teams that do God’s will without ever discovering 
what they are doing. Such a team is called a karass by Bokonon” (Vonnegut, 
1963, p2), who, according to Vonnegut, created a religion founded entirely 
upon “harmless untruths”.
The third form of ambient learning involves learning about the environment from 
our tools, and this has already had largely unnoticed social consequences. 
My younger daughter once indicated to me that she had little understanding 
of the concept of “getting lost”, at least in the way that I understand it. She 
regarded the idea as something she read about in old stories: to her getting 
lost happened to people who walked through dark forests in fairy tales or 
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ran from monsters in adventure stories. She had had a phone ever since she 
had travelled anywhere on her own, and her phone had had mapping soft-
ware, and therefore in her experience you answered the question “where 
am I?” by checking your phone and then possibly googling. I realised that 
her world differed greatly from mine because she carried with her, and took 
for granted, tools that always knew her position and could always tell her 
about her environment
Taken together, this triad constitutes a new active environment that serves to cre-
ate another triad by allowing us to expand the notion of figure and ground 
to include the relationship of figure, ground and environment, where we 
define environment as the totality of perception within which both figure 
and ground shift and dance.
22.4. Privatising Language
We should not regard either tools or learning networks as value-free or 
value-neutral. Every tool and network embodies the conscious and uncon-
scious biases of its creators. As we saw earlier, users' experiences in Second 
Life take the forms they do as a result of the designers' original choices. 
Players there would act differently if their avatar needed food or sleep, or 
could receive, and suffer the results of, injuries or illnesses. Players would 
behave differently if they had to traverse distances, and if water required 
skills or equipment to cross. As we move into a gamified digital age, more of 
the "real" world appears to us as the result of human design decisions, and 
thus more and more of the world arrives before us pre-loaded with unstated 
game-like values that lay below the surface.
We can observe the ways values get embedded in this way by looking at a large-
scale study the EU commissioned in 2004, entitled Ambient, multimodal 
and context-sensitive lifelong learning (eTEN 510749). The group published 
their final report, Ambient Learning, in January 2006. The authors began by 
declaring that, in a society
where information is becoming a strategic raw material and knowledge a 
fundamental production factor, how this resource is used is critical 
for the performance potential of companies and of employees. Due to a 
falling "half-life" for knowledge, how up-to-date information is rapidly 
becoming a crucial factor in competition. 
The new information and communication media provide the necessary 
technology to make knowledge available world-wide, but at the same time 
create an unprecedented abundance of data. The increasingly extensive 
range of digital content often leads to an excessive amount of infor-
mation. To respond to individual needs, it is becoming increasingly 
important to select information and to systematise knowledge. In times 
of increasing globalisation and networking, flexible access to informa-
tion must be guaranteed anywhere and at any time.
The manner in which those searching for information have selected 
the offerings relevant to them up until now is, however, still a long 
way from being able to satisfy a rising number of requirements. If you 
think about how little current content offers are tailored to specific 
user context, today's approaches will seem primitive in a few years' 
time. The gradual development of context-sensitive technologies is, at 
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least in the medium-term, the foundation for providing information which 
is tailored to users' requirements.
(Kölmel et al, 2006, p7)
In a related presentation the authors described ambient learning as "a highly inno-
vative Integrated Knowledge and Learning Management System, which 
merges the e-Learning provision with context- based Knowledge Manage-
ment" (Ambient Learning Positioning, slide 6). For this group, then, the 
changing environment presents a new business opportunity, and, reading 
the report, it becomes clear that they regard this opportunity as one for 
producers to seize. We might note that this opportunity consists almost 
entirely of nouns, as becomes clear from the description of "the architecture 
of the Ambient Learning service" that they propose: This architecture, they 
write, will
enable further training which is location independent and related to 
the respective user context and to guarantee the supply of high-quality 
knowledge units, the Ambient Learning service integrates the features 
of context sensitivity and content integration and combines them with a 
multi-model broadband access which enables users to access a number of 
terminals in the medium-term. 
(Kölmel et al, 2006, p12)
We have already seen what this kind of reliance on nouns means in practice: it 
signals a (conscious or unconscious) intention to eviscerate human agency, 
and human relationships, from a discussion: to replace a triadic relation-
ship with a binary division. In this case the language itself seeks to priva-
tise the process of communication and to enforce linguistically the division 
between producer and consumer. It appears to indicate that the authors 
clearly want to carry over an old industrial monopoly into the new digital 
arrangements by establishing the web as a broadcast medium. Their "archi-
tecture" intends to enable trained professionals to distribute their content 
in ways that will allow users to consume "context-sensitive paid content" 
(p94) at any time in any place. This diagram from the accompanying web-
site makes this even clearer.
Here we can see that the content in this system emanates from international pub-
lishers and institutions, and that the purpose of this system revolves around 
allowing them to repurpose and repackage their copyrighted material in 
order to sell it on the new gadgets that consumers have already purchased. 
The user features in this imagined system only as a passive consumer, and 
not even as the prosumer that Toffler predicted. This approach sees the 
emergent digital world as something to mould into the old, familiar forms. 
It aims to extend the radical monopoly of the industrial broadcast media to 
the digital age. 
Whatever one thinks about the intentions of this project its assumptions seem 
almost quaintly old-fashioned. They fly in the face of most of the practical 
developments on the web in the last decade including, somewhat ironically 
given what I explained earlier, the growth of Facebook. Most development 
has occurred in the areas of distributed and user-generated content. Much 
of this has, in effect, advocated for the evolution of prosumers, whether as 
bloggers, photographers or curators, with the result that even "old media" 
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websites have rethought their relationship with their audience, increased 
their comments pages, and begun to use the comments posted as raw 
material from which to build new articles.
Prosumers have also begun to feature in the development cycle of a growing 
amount of software as developers have begun to use web-based forums to 
establish positive feedback loops with their most engaged customers. Get-
Satisfaction.com have even formalised this process by establishing a service 
in which users of a product can establish a forum and invite other users, 
and company representatives to join in. In this system customers provide 
information that directly feeds into the development of the product, and 
the developer becomes a consumer of the directly expressed wishes and 
opinions of her customers as a well as producer of the actual product. In a 
producer-based system the users teach the developer who then produces 
a product that, in addition to its primary function, teaches the users how 
to use it, in a cycle that potentially never ends. The constant availability of 
user feedback, when developed to allow innovative suggestions from users, 
forms a background of ambient learning for the developer.
Ambient learning, in the sense that the EU apparently uses it, creates or perpetuates 
radical monopoly. Ambient learning, in the sense that I mean the term, moves 
towards recognising a distributed commons in information and learning. 
22.5. Ambience and Memes
The examples above make it clear that while people continue to make 
choices for us alternative systems have evolved and already work effec-
From an EU report: content integration operability
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tively; and that we therefore need to choose which system we want to con-
tinue. The digital age has not yet fully formed or fully taken shape. As I noted 
above, we still have a window of opportunity before "everybody knows" 
how things work, and new radical monopolies sink below the threshold of 
attention, turn invisible, and become the new common sense.
We began this chapter by looking at Allen Tough's list of reasons to learn. We now 
need to add one final point to this: one that arises from our recognition that 
"we are stories all the way down". If we accept that memes constitute the 
difference between human-beings-in-society and human-like animals, and 
that we receive and transmit these memes, then we have a clear choice. We 
can choose to learn how we can rise to the challenge of co-authorship; we 
can decide to let things take their course in the belief that training will do 
no good; or we can accept that others will author the memes that we will 
consume. Only the first two choices offer us a chance to help create the life-
world which we experience, and if we therefore rule out the third choice as 
defeatist, our choice becomes much simpler. A decision to "let things take 
their course" misses out on a voyage of discovery in favour of learning after 
the event about the voyages of others. The only positive, life-loving position 
we can adopt involves learning how, and to what extent, we can co-author 
our own selves.
If we consist entirely of stories then we surely need to learn how to read, critique, 
edit and write them. In a media landscape that favours ambient learning, 
we need to begin to act as prosumers in the business of authoring both our-
selves and the life-world we inhabit.
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Before we can begin to identify tools to assist us in the process of co-au-
thoring our lives, we will need to identify both what we mean by co-author-
ship in this context, and what techniques that we might usefully employ in 
the service of co-authorship. However, before we do that we will need to 
consider briefly two final areas: positive psychology and ludic learning.
23.1. Creating Tools
In part two we considered a number of approaches to the question of self, 
including therapeutic approaches from the work of Freud to Transactional 
Analysis and Gestalt Therapy. Despite their major differences, these all have 
a single end-point in common. They assume (and in some cases explicitly 
state) that, at the end of therapy, a patient becomes whole, or complete, or 
integrated. They share a similar teleological project with Karl Marx, in that 
they believe that we can reach an end-point through a process of remov-
ing layers of bad stuff, and that the removal of those layers of bad stuff will 
by definition constitute the end-point. In this view, the end-point has very 
few qualities of its own: rather it reveals the "natural" person (or in Marx's 
case the "natural" human society) that finally stands naked with its sins 
removed. Eric Berne, in a half-page final chapter titled After Games, What?, 
describes his particular version of this end-point:
For certain fortunate people there is something which transcends all 
classifications of behaviour, and that is awareness; something which 
arises above the programming of the past, and that is spontaneity; and 
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something that is more rewarding than games, and that is intimacy.
(Berne, 1964, p162)
Once the games have stopped, and the neuroses have healed, the "authentic" per-
son stands there revealed. This, as said earlier in a discussion of Freud's 
outlook, implies a profoundly pessimistic variation of a medieval religious 
outlook that ultimately focuses almost exclusively on a negative view of 
life in which we journey from absolute freezing in an attempt to scale the 
heights to zero, with no belief that we will find anything above that. These 
therapies all offer ways to diagnose many different types of negative feel-
ings and behaviours, of various degrees of severity, but only one kind of 
positive position; one that apparently exists so rarely or so fleetingly that 
we can describe it only in the vaguest of terms. It seems to involve aware-
ness, spontaneity and intimacy, but it doesn't get any better, or any more 
specific, than that.
Positive psychology proceeds from a different starting point. It assumes that we 
ought to find as many positive states as negative states, and that "well" 
people could still improve their lives; and make a serious attempt to climb 
beyond zero towards a hypothetical boiling point. In researching this, Mar-
tin Seligman has stated his desire to "reclaim the study of character and 
virtue as legitimate topics of psychological inquiry and informed societal 
discourse" (Seligman & Peterson, 2004, p4). Seligman has compiled a set of 
twenty four psychological strengths, divided into six "virtue clusters":
1. Wisdom and knowledge
2. Courage
3. Humanity and love
4. Justice
5. Temperance
6. Transcendence
He has used these as the basis of programmes of practical exercises (Seligman, 
2003), as well as surveys and self-administered questionnaires (Authentic 
Happiness, web reference). This work provides an important lesson that 
we need to apply to our search for tools. We should spend as much, if not 
more, time trying to determine how to improve our strengths as we do try-
ing to overcome our weaknesses. Good health has as many variations and 
degrees of resilience and severity as bad health. This suggests that we will 
need to identify methods for developing strengths such as relaxation and 
focusing exercises, possibly using emotional workouts as well as meditative 
techniques.
In addition to positive psychology we also need to take into consideration the area 
of ludic learning. Johan Huizinga has asserted that play "is older than cul-
ture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always presupposes human 
society, and animals have not waited for man to teach them their playing" 
(Huizinga, 1949, p1). He further argued that
A play-community generally tends to become permanent even after the 
game is over. Of course, not every game of marbles or every bridge-
party leads to the founding of a club. But the feeling of being "apart 
together" in an exceptional situation, of sharing something important, 
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of mutually withdrawing from the rest of the world and rejecting the 
usual norms, retains its magic beyond the duration of the individual 
game. The club pertains to play as the hat to the head. It would be rash 
to explain all the associations which the anthropologist calls "phra-
tria" -e.g. clans, brotherhoods, etc.-simply as play-communities; nev-
ertheless it has been shown again and again how difficult it is to draw 
the line between, on the one hand, permanent social groupings particu-
larly in archaic cultures with their extremely important, solemn, indeed 
sacred customs-and the sphere of play on the other.
(Huizinga, 1949, p12)
From this perspective we can understand that the adult learning communities that 
Allen Tough described operated as forms of play for at least some of the vol-
untary participants. Some participants may have had immediate benefits in 
mind, at work or at home, and for them learning might have seemed a "seri-
ous" activity. Those who learned for other reasons, though, might well have 
felt the time they spent learning as a form of play, just as Captain Crunch 
and other hackers engaged in their puzzle-solving playfully. In the past 
decade a growing number of people have advanced the idea of gamification, 
of harnessing individuals' desire to play for larger group projects (cf McGo-
nigal, 2011). During the same period a parallel movement has advocated the 
use of computerised brain-training exercises, to increase brain fitness. The 
website Lumosity.com, which I discuss in more detail later, funds research 
into brain training while offering a range of exercises by subscription on the 
web and on mobile devices.
Taken together these form a backdrop for the development of tools for memetic 
co-authorship, a ground upon which such tools can develop. However, 
viewed together, they all seem to have a bias towards the universal. They all 
assume that your mind, to all intents and purposes, operates in the same 
way as mine. They all assume that what will help me will, by definition, help 
you. Lumosity.com, for example, offers approximately forty brain-train-
ing exercises and, with only a slight variation based upon self-selected 
goals, offers all of them to everyone. This might work with our fast System 
1 minds, our intuitive pre-conscious skills and abilities, because evidence 
suggests that people may inherit these genetically and thus may not trans-
mit or receive them memetically. However we may have less reason to trust 
global solutions for those skills, points of view, biases and abilities that we 
do receive and transmit memetically.
If these form a backdrop, what stands in front of them? What do we really mean 
by co-authorship? I quoted the American author and farmer Wendell Berry 
earlier as pointing to something that Mary Catherine Bateson wrote to the 
effect that "it has seemed to me that the idea of an individual, the idea that 
there is someone to be known, separate from the relationships, is simply 
an error." (Berry, 202, p138) and I have demonstrated why we can agree 
with her. These relationships remain in us as stored memories, some or all 
of which take the form of memes. "Until recently it was thought that newly 
learned material is transformed into stable, solid chunks of long-term mem-
ory through a one-time process of protein generation known as consolida-
tion. This is no longer believed to be the case. Instead long-term memories 
become chemically unstable every time they are retrieved. In this fragile 
state long-term memories can easily be altered or disrupted (Aunger, 2002, 
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p204)". This forms the basis of all techniques of self-authorship, ancient 
and modern. By reflecting we bring certain stories from the past, stored as 
long-term memories, to the foreground where, for a short while, they once 
again become plastic; and by redefining our relationship with them before 
they become reconsolidated we can change their nature and their relative 
power. By doing this consistently we can preference some stories, enhanc-
ing their power within the coalitions of memes that occupy our brains, and 
weaken others, lessening their powers within their coalitions. In this way 
we can work in a triadic relationship with other agents and the culture envi-
ronment - the media landscape - that we share with them to co-author 
ourselves.
These techniques for self-authorship do not necessarily lend themselves to uni-
versal production as apps or generalised instructions. I had to confront this 
issue head-on when several students at Arcada asked: how can we make 
a universal immersive world for people to meditate in when different peo-
ple have different imaginary worlds, and different scenarios (outer space, 
pirate's cove, etc.) resonate differently for different people? I had asked 
them to carry out some preliminary work on one of the ideas described in 
the blueprints below. Specifically I had asked them to construct a test world 
in the form of three interconnected islands, each representing the parent, 
adult and child states in Transactional Analysis. They had begun by try-
ing to identify symbolic representations of child states. They made informal 
surveys to gather data from other students about how they might represent 
a "world of the child" in 3D. The responses they got, and their report on 
this, caused us to understand that we had created the problem ourselves by 
misunderstanding the original goal. I and they had assumed, without ever 
thinking explicitly about it, that we would end up making a product that we 
would then try to distribute. We would end up with something like a down-
loadable package to use on a computer, or an app to use on a tablet; and 
this had led me to pose the problem as though the answer should take the 
form of a universal solution. I had accepted and internalised a definition of 
distribution that, if challenged, I would claim not to support or believe in. I 
had absorbed an industrialised definition of distribution through which we 
would create something and other people, including millions unknown to 
us, would buy it or accept it for free, paying us in money or prestige.
I decided that we should instead start with ourselves. We should ask ourselves 
how we would personally depict a child-world for our own use, and then 
we should make it, and experiment with it ourselves until we had decided 
whether it has proved useful or not to us. We should not attempt to build a 
universal tool, for that attempt merely echoes the procedures of the indus-
trial age. We should test a tool meant solely for ourselves and then, if we 
found the tool useful, we should offer a toolkit to enable others to make 
tools of their own. We should not aim to monetarise our idea and build a 
Facebook or an Amazon; rather we should hold close to the idea of suffi-
ciency. We have identified our problem, and we will attempt to solve it. If 
we manage this, then we will explain what we have done, how and why. We 
will use an open source model in which we take responsibility for begin-
ning the process and persuading people of the benefits of the idea, and then 
allow whoever wants to join in for form a playful club around the idea.
The very nature of memes, and the extended phenotypes they create, ensures that 
we all have many things in common, and that we share many beliefs, ideas, 
(2
3
2
)
information and points of view. The specific ways in which we manifest 
these, though, may incorporate idiosyncrasies of interpretation and meta-
phor, of maps and signs. Building a product will not work because we can-
not view co-authorship as a market without inverting our intentions in our 
search for it. As Osho put it, "Things can be copyrighted, thoughts cannot 
be copyrighted, and certainly meditations cannot be copyrighted. They are 
not things of the marketplace. Nobody can monopolize anything. But per-
haps the West cannot understand the difference between an objective com-
modity and an inner experience." (Osho, 1988, p239) The argument put 
forward by Osho takes us back to Illich's point that either people use their 
tools or their tools use them. What Osho refers to here as "the marketplace" 
Illich labels "radical monopoly". For both of them our relationship to objec-
tive commodities help define the limits of our inner experience and, from 
this perspective, any idea of a global panacea for self authorship stands 
revealed as a contradiction in terms. We need freely available, and freely 
distributed, tools that operate at a human scale.
Indeed, my original mis-thinking itself suggests why we will benefit from tools for 
autonomous community and authentic self-authorship.
23.2. Others Stood Here First
I do not intend any of what I have written to imply that I imagine or believe 
that we have somehow invented the idea of developing mental tools. Tools 
for assisting the process of learning, and for improving consciousness, have 
existed for two thousand years or more, and when thinking about potential 
future tools we can learn much from this history. Below, I provide thumbnail 
sketches of some of those who stood on this ground first.
Palace of Memory
The Ancient Greeks and Romans developed the "method of loci", more usu-
ally known as the palace of memory. This allegedly originated in approxi-
mately 500BC 
with a lucky escape from a collapsing banquet hall by the Ancient 
Greek poet Simonides, who realised that by visualizing the room where 
the accident happened, he could perfectly recall the names of all his 
squashed fellow revellers. He later found a less morbid use for this 
discovery, by associating things he wanted to remember with walks 
through buildings he knew well.
Nowadays, this technique is used by "mental athletes", who com-
pete in memory championships all over the world. They combine imagined 
strolls through childhood homes or familiar streets with vivid men-
tal images, the cruder and stranger the better, associating them with 
strings of random words, names and faces, shuffled cards, and binary num-
bers, to staggering effect. In 2010, Germany's Simon Reinhard memorised 
300 words in 15 minutes. That's one word every three seconds. 
(Cornish, 2014)
The Greeks also developed memory techniques based on their discovery of the 
value of mnemonics; techniques which many people still use today. Every 
good boy deserves favour represents the notes on the lines of the treble 
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clef, for those people learning to read music; something that I learned at 
school and later taught my daughter when she started playing the cello. 
Similar mnemonics exist in many other areas of study, where people need to 
memorise lists or sets of information from the colours of the rainbow to the 
correct order of biological classification.
Commonplacing
These techniques act as extensions to the human memory. As tools, they 
have the ability to fold a large amount of sometimes unrelated information 
into a much smaller and more manageable space. Commonplacing, and the 
use of commonplace books, on the other hand, offers a tool for remem-
bering and re-encountering older versions of one's self, with the ability to 
thereby reflect upon the difference between then and now. "John Locke, 
Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Coleridge and Jonathan Swift all kept such books, 
copying down proverbs, poems and other wisdom they encountered while 
reading. So did many women, often excluded from public discourse at the 
time." (Burkeman, 2010) Commonplace books were "cobbled together by 
literate people... [and] served as repositories for whatever someone thought 
fit to record: medical recipes, jokes, verse, prayers, mathematical tables, 
aphorisms, and especially passages from letters, poems, or books." (Krys-
tal, 2011, p50) 
Once they had finished the last page of their book, many people adopted a policy 
of reading it through and copying the passages that still resonated with 
them into a new book, which they then filled with further entries; repeating 
the process when they finished that book. In this way people used com-
monplace books as tools for self-reflection. Looking back at things they had 
deemed important enough to copy several years ago gave them a self-con-
structed commentary on their past interests and values. The editing process 
involved in deciding which entries to copy again into the new book gave 
them a tool for contacting and judging their previous selves (cf Kelly, 2009). 
Meditation & Mindfulness
The eastern traditions of meditation have also provided tools for mental or 
spiritual development, since the Vedic tradition in India began in approx-
imately 1500 BC. Later Chinese and Japanese practices built upon these 
beginnings. 
The word meditation entered the English language in the twelfth century, 
when it meant "a thinking over". Although that sense still continues (in 
sentences like "he meditated gloomily on his prospects of winning") we 
use it more often today in a completely contrary sense: to describe a 
state in which thinking appears to cease altogether. Alan Watts described 
both the process and its lasting appeal by saying that we "are sick with 
fascination for the useful tools of names and numbers, of symbols, signs, 
conceptions and ideas. Meditation is therefore the art of suspending 
verbal and symbolic thinking for a time, somewhat as a courteous audience 
will stop talking when a concert is about to begin".
Advocates say that meditation quietens the mind. Meditators find a 
place in which the mind becomes so quiet that for some time it appears to 
disappear altogether. Many make great claims for this, and suggest that 
we all would benefit from regular contact with the state of no-mind.
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Traditionally meditative practices have required many years of devotion, 
and have often become entwined with an asceticism that positions the con-
templative life as a polar opposite of worldly enjoyment, as a religious 
sacrifice that involves rejection of the social world. However, during the 
twentieth century psychologists and gurus have both suggested that this 
constitutes a misunderstanding. While those wishing to achieve no-mind 
should conceive the process as one of lifelong learning, they should also 
recognise that they can incorporate it into a full and social life. 
(Kelly, 2011, p4)
In the past century many of these reinterpretations have become absorbed into Euro-
pean and American practices, aided by both European interpreters (cf Watts, 
1961) and by Indian practitioners (cf Osho, 1979). Today, much adapted, 
they form the foundation for the teaching and learning of mindfulness. 
Mindfulness is a way of directing one's attention that originates in 
Eastern meditation traditions. When utilizing or adapting mindful-
ness-based practices in secular contexts, such as education, it is 
important to remember the origins and treat it respectfully... [The] key 
features of mindfulness include a focus on the breath, paying attention 
to the events occurring within one's mind and body, and bearing witness 
to one's own experience... In essence, the literature reviewed suggests 
that mindfulness training teaches individuals a different way of being. 
While engaged in mindfulness practice, individuals pay open-minded and 
open-hearted attention to thoughts or events as they unfold. Mindful-
ness involves paying attention to both the thoughts themselves and one's 
reaction to them. By utilizing a mindfulness-based technique such as 
a body-scan meditation, individuals have an opportunity to view their 
reactions simply and nonjudgmentally, like ships passing on a river, 
rather than truths that need to be accepted and acted upon. 
(Remple, 2012, pp203-204)
Jon Kabat-Zinn, Professor of Medicine Emeritus at the Massachusetts Medical 
School, has popularised mindfulness-based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 
2005), which he developed out of his own experiences meditating and prac-
tising hatha yoga and zen.
Flotation Tanks
In 1954, while working at the National Institute for Mental Health as a 
researcher, John Lilly developed the first sensory-deprivation tank. In 1956 
he wrote the first paper on the topic, in which he also "reviewed the history 
of solitary sailors, of people who have lived in the Polar night alone... These 
accounts bore out practically everything I had experienced in the tank. I was 
able to say in the paper that these experiences were very common among 
people in solitude and I owned up to one little hallucination, or as we now 
call it, visual display. It is a much less loaded term. Hallucinations have the 
connotation that you get caught in them, and that you begin to believe them, 
not as if real but as real." (Lilly, 1995, p4) In creating the flotation tank, Lilly 
had invented a literally immersive world that people could use for the explo-
ration of the human mind and senses. Like all immersive worlds the flota-
tion tank modelled or simulated a specific environment. Unlike Second Life, 
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which simulated heaven, the flotation tank modelled nothingness, the void.
Flotation tanks offer a clear demonstration of the fact that human consciousness 
creates patterns and narratives out of whatever material lies at hand, even 
when nothing at all except the workings of the human body itself lies at 
hand (cf Lilly, 1995; Kelly, 2011) In 2011, for the first time since the nine-
teen seventies, I underwent a course of flotation tank experiments, spending 
three or four hours per session in a tank. 
When I first lay in the tank and closed the door I went through a lengthy 
period of itching. My attention focused on different parts of my body 
and was immediately drawn to any minute sensation. The slightest itch 
would become a magnet for attention.
I then made a conscious attempt to stop this by focusing on silently 
chanting the mantra I was given forty years ago while being trained in 
Transcendental Meditation. This worked insofar as I stopped concentrat-
ing on my skin, but My attention also kept slipping away from the man-
tra. I began to have fleeting thoughts that passed rapidly in and out of 
view. They sped up in a way that felt increasingly uncomfortable until I 
switched my focus completely and was simply lying in a warm bath.
I found that I could readily switch from one mode or level, of experi-
ence to another. I could be a boy in a bath, experiencing floating in a 
liquid that made sinking impossible. In this mode I looked around and 
felt like a child at bath time. I could switch to being intensely aware 
of surface activity and monitor my skin and hair. I could sink into rev-
eries of fleeting thought. I could drift as though on the edge of sleep. 
I could switch between these almost at will. More accurately, perhaps, 
I found that whenever I became bored or uncomfortable I did switch lev-
els, although there were times when I became aware that I was deciding 
whether to stay with what I was experiencing or switch. 
(Kelly, 2011, p10)
Later during the session, the process "felt close to the dreaming or fantasising that 
occurs as you drift into or drift out of sleep" (Kelly, 2011, p11) Research in 
Sweden has confirmed that these feelings occur in most users and "that 
floating is a method generally perceived as pleasant and comfortable, that 
actual pain relief may be achieved, and that very deep relaxation may be 
obtained. Furthermore, we showed that altered states of consciousness 
(ASC) are induced during the session. Examples of experiences during ASC 
are visual imagery, acoustic, perceptual phenomena, an altered sense of 
time, a changed bodily sense, perinatal experiences of the foetal stage and 
birth, and even transpersonal experiences. Some of these experiences may 
be both powerful and profound, but they are most often viewed as positive 
and desirable." (Kjellgren, Lyden & Norlander, 2008)
John Lilly defined the ontological status of these ASC early in his research, when he 
stated that “In the province of the mind what one believes to be true, either 
is true or becomes true within certain limits. These limits are to be found 
experimentally and experientially. When so found these limits turn out to be 
further beliefs to be transcended. In the province of the mind there are no 
limits. However, in the province of the body there are definite limits not to be 
transcended." (Lilly, 1972, p6)
We may usefully view Lilly's flotation tank as an analogue immersive world with 
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much to teach us about the possibilities of subsequent synthetic worlds.
Lateral Thinking
In 1970 Edward de Bono published Lateral Thinking, in which he invented or 
collated sets of techniques to enable people to "step outside themselves", 
escape what they experienced as the limitations of their normal thinking, 
and practise creativity from a new perspective. He explained that although 
"the information handling system called mind is highly effective it has cer-
tain characteristic limitations. These limitations are inseparable from the 
advantages of the system since both arise directly from the nature of the 
system. It would be impossible to have the advantages without the disad-
vantages. Lateral thinking is an attempt to compensate for these disadvan-
tages while one still enjoys the advantages." (de Bono, 1970, p18)
From this beginning de Bono grew an entire industry, introducing PO, the Six Hats 
method of discussion, and latterly CoRT. He premises his work entirely on 
the belief that everybody can and should learn to think and solve problems 
more efficiently, more effectively and more imaginatively, and that habits of 
mind prevent people doing this.
Along similar lines, although with far less evidence to support him, Tony Buzan 
claims to have invented mind-mapping, which builds upon methods of 
visual mapping that have a history stretching back at least as far as the 
third century when Porphyry of Tyros created a "mind map" of the concepts 
of Aristotle.  Whatever his status as its inventor, and however sceptically we 
may regard the claims he has made for it, Buzan has undoubtedly popular-
ised mind-mapping as a current learning technique. He first presented it in 
1974 during a BBC series he presented called Use Your Head. In the accom-
panying book, he argued that by observing "that the brain handles infor-
mation better if the information is designed to 'slot in', and observing also 
the information from this chapter about the dimensional nature of the mind 
it follows that notes which are themselves more 'holographic' and creative 
will be far more readily understood, appreciated and recalled" Buzan, 1974, 
p 109). From this he grew an industry that continues to this day.
David Allen and others have applied this kind of thinking to the organisation of 
existing information. Getting Things Done (Allen, 2001) offers a technique 
for busy professionals to process all the information that gets thrown at 
them without losing concentration or focus. Allen specifically invokes zen 
practice in this. "In karate there is an image that's used to define the posi-
tion of perfect readiness: 'mind like water.' Imagine throwing a pebble into 
a still pond. How does the water respond? The answer is, totally appropri-
ately to the force and mass of the input; then it returns to calm. It doesn't 
overreact or underreact... Anything that causes you to overreact or under-
react can control you, and often does. Responding inappropriately to your 
e-mail, your staff, your projects, your unread magazines, your thoughts 
about what you need to do, your children, or your boss will lead to less 
effective results than you'd like. Most people give either more or less atten-
tion to things than they deserve, simply because they don't operate with a 
'mind like water.' (Allen, 2001, pp10-11)"
Brain-training
Some of these initiatives have attracted accusations of peddling pseudo-sci-
ence in that they make claims that they cannot justify with scientifically 
(2
3
7
)
acceptable research results. Lumosity.com, which offers brain fitness train-
ing courses online "to improve human cognition through brain plasticity" 
(Lumosity, 2014) and through apps on tablets and other mobile devices, 
has tried to get round this problem by commissioning research. To this end, 
they have established the Human Cognition Project which gives grants to 
enable educational users of Lumosity to carry out scientifically valid trials. 
To this end, "University-based researchers, educators, clinicians, and study 
volunteers have joined the HCP network to understand and explore human 
cognitive abilities. HCP collaborators benefit from free use of Lumosity's 
tools and, in certain cases, limited access to select portions of Lumosity's 
database of cognitive game performance. (Lumosity, 2014)
For example, Lumosity's website states that if "you're an educator or educational 
researcher, we invite you to apply for the Lumosity Education Access Pro-
gram (LEAP), which over 325 schools have received access to. You can read 
the requirements below. If accepted, you'll receive free Lumosity member-
ships for your students. You can incorporate Lumosity into your curriculum 
in any way - we simply ask that you contribute to the HCP by measuring and 
sharing information about the efficacy of Lumosity use among your students 
(Lumosity, 2014)". In this way the team at Lumosity attempt to jump the 
gun: to develop tools that they believe will work (but cannot yet convincingly 
demonstrate as working beyond doubt); to sell those tools to individuals 
while offering them free to institutions in exchange for data that will either 
help them argue their case, further develop their tools, or change direction.
And more...
Many software developers have become interested in this area, and 
travel in the wake of these larger groups. One can find literally hundreds 
of brain-training games on the Apple AppStore and Google Play. They all 
access different parts of the overall ideas, from Gratitude diaries to men-
tal alertness games and meditation aids. These, and many other people, 
have stood on various parts of this ground, at different points in time, and 
have built up an important and useful toolkit there for exploring, exercising, 
developing and (dare one say) expanding our consciousness.
23.3. Maps and Toolkits
As we have seen, tools already exist to help us with all kinds of mental exer-
cise. Lateral thinking helps us with problems that arise from our slow thinking: 
problems that require rational solutions. Meditation and flotation tanks can 
help us with our intuitive fast thinking by enabling us to step back from our-
selves. Mindfulness and services like Lumosity claim to help us integrate our 
different modes of thinking. Flotation tanks and commonplacing help us expe-
rience ourselves as our selves with the aim of meta-programming our mental 
habits. Why, then, should we need, or desire, to create more tools? Why will 
we benefit from them? What do we believe missing from our current toolbox? 
People have asked me these questions a lot but, to my mind, they address the issue 
from the wrong end. It does, indeed, make very little sense to look at the 
range of tools and techniques currently available and then decide to make 
another one, unless you have a specific reason for doing so. You might have 
a financial reason, in that you believe that you can create a market for your 
tool (albeit with the provisos and problems noted earlier), or you might 
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have a belief that the current tools all lack some important feature. I sug-
gest, though, that we approach the issue rather differently.
In working with Second Life, and more recently with OpenSim, its open source near-
clone, we have come to conclusions spelled out earlier about what draws 
people to it, and how they use it. We have argued that Second Life addresses 
people's emotional and interpersonal needs much more strongly than it 
works as an augmented meeting space. We can see this demonstrated in the 
fact that, although several companies have tried to build businesses offering 
"virtual meeting spaces", most of them have failed to generate enough cus-
tom to stay in business. Of the leading companies in this area, only Venue-
gen still carries on although its emphasis has switched in recent years from 
trying to attract international companies to trying to attract American K-12 
schools. Project Wonderland has moved from being a company designed to 
earn a profit to an open source project. Teleplace, arguably once the biggest 
company in this area, opened in 2007 and closed in 2011. 3D ICC, the com-
pany that bought its intellectual property still exists, but has hardly become 
a household name. Currently it promotes a product called Terf that features 
"unified collaboration, gaming technology, and 3D virtual locations... [and] 
combines these three features to provide a more natural and impactful tool. 
Your associates, customers, partners, colleagues live and work in the real 
world. Contextually accurate locations provide critical advantage when you 
are delivering customer services, active training or distributed teaming sup-
port. It simply isn't enough to screen share or little panels of video." (3dicc, 
online) Unfortunately for the companies trying to operate in this field, it 
turns out that most people agree with our findings and do find themselves 
able and willing to deal with rational decision-making in a flat 2D environ-
ment, layered with group video chat where necessary. Much more rational 
discussion takes place using Skype, Google Hangout or Acrobat Connect, 
than takes place in "3D virtual locations" because, as our research shows, 
the strengths of synthetic worlds lie elsewhere.
Having said that, we can find examples of people successfully using online worlds 
for specific teaching and training purposes. AppState University, for exam-
ple, has run a distance learning programme for teachers, primarily in 
ActiveWorlds, for over a decade. However, AppState had a very specific 
problem in that their students all had full time jobs and mostly lived several 
hours drive from the campus. They felt glad of an opportunity to study from 
home after work and accepted the synthetic world as a necessary tool for 
their learning, in their specific circumstances. In return the team at AppState 
recast the entire course as a series of gamified challenges that demanded 
collaborative work and exploration within the environment itself. The envi-
ronments they used, including a small Wild West town, did not resemble a 
university campus, and the students' avatars did not sit at lectures in "vir-
tual classrooms". Rather, the environment that the students entered became 
part of the narrative structure that would guide their experience through 
each module. AppState's enduring success shows that successful attempts 
to teach within immersive worlds also depart dramatically from the stand-
ard model of "virtual buildings" where avatars enter classrooms or meeting 
rooms and sit at tables to participate in discussion using their own names. 
(Riedl, 2004; Sanders & Tashner, 2006)
To approach the issue differently, we should start by noticing that immersive worlds 
have certain strengths, and that these strengths relate to intuitive and emo-
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tional fast thinking, and to the ways in which people perceive themselves 
and interact with others. Immersive worlds seem good at fostering playful-
ness, which takes many forms including experimenting with self-presenta-
tion. Research shows that "communicators in virtual worlds adopt different 
stances towards their avatar in response to various personal and situa-
tional stimuli that emanate from both their real and 'second' life. Further-
more, they cycle through a variety of avatar-self couples, particularly on 
the telepresence dimension." (Schultze & Leahy, 2009, p14). Immersion and 
augmentation, then, form a continuum that itself forms only one dimension 
of a multi-dimensional experience. These kinds of experiences offer, among 
other things, a chance to experiment with identity, personae, and self-pres-
entation and, in fact, immersive worlds seem extraordinarily good at ena-
bling these kinds of experiments.
We have also observed that recent research indicates that our consciousness exists 
largely as a user illusion and that we actively construct ourselves and each 
other through the stories that we tell. Readers should understand stories 
here in an extended sense that includes visual storytelling of the kind that 
gets conveyed through facial expression, gesture, and unconscious body 
language, and not just the words we speak and the ancillary noises that 
we make. The narratives that form us range from the historical (the stories 
that exist in the environment when we enter it), the personal (stories we tell 
about ourselves, others and our life-world) and the social (stories that oth-
ers tell about us, others and their life-worlds). They span stories from near 
and far geographically, and increasingly from around the globe; and stories 
from the past, present and future. These stories originate in human minds 
and not all of them emerge into the world. Some remain private, some pass-
ing fleetingly through our brain and get forgotten. Others get shared and, 
in this process, gain the opportunity to replicate memetically. People pass 
these along and, when memes gain traction, people may store them in arte-
facts, such as books, paintings, music and digital data, and as artefacts 
such as churches, football stadiums and shopping malls. Ideas spread as 
stories and these ideas, as embodied in memes, became replicators in their 
own right; a second example of what Richard Dawkins has termed universal 
Darwinism.
Daniel Dennett argues that, not only do memes, as replicators, act in their own 
self-interest; they also come in three distinct kinds. He says that we should 
"consider a meme as like a parasite which commandeers an organism for 
its own replicative benefit, but we should remember that symbionts can be 
classified into three fundamental categories:
Parasites, whose presence lowers the fitness of their host;
Commensals, whose presence is neutral (though, as the etymology reminds 
us, they "share the same table"); and
Mutualists, whose presence enhances the fitness of both host and guest 
(Dennett, 1998, p429),
In this picture, we face infection by memes on a daily basis, many of which will 
work to our benefit, and others of which will harm us. "One way to defend 
oneself against painful or manipulative memes is to construct what Den-
nett [1995] refers to as a meme-immunological system; that is, formulate 
new memes specifically to deflect memetic antigens" (Gabora, 1997, p580). 
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One way of achieving this involves the use of traditional and contemporary 
mind-altering and mind-washing tools, such as the ones discussed above. 
Meme theory suggests that these practices have more importance than we 
might have previously thought, since the ancient belief that we need to clear 
our heads and correct our balance from time to time now appears vindi-
cated; that when 
we have learned to put excessive reliance upon central vision, upon the 
sharp spotlight of the eyes and mind, we cannot regain the powers of 
peripheral vision unless the sharp and staring kind of sight is first 
relaxed. The mental or psychological equivalent of this is the special 
kind of stupidity to which Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu so often refer. It is 
not simply calmness of mind, but "non-graspingness" of mind. In Chuang-
tzu's words, 
The perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It grasps nothing;
it refuses nothing. It receives, but does not keep.
One might almost say that it "fuzzes" itself a little to compensate for 
too harsh a clarity" 
(Watts, 1957, p36). 
The apparent strengths of immersive worlds thus become very important if we look 
at them from a meme-eye view, and I contend we would benefit from explor-
ing these to see what beneficial uses we can make of them and whether we 
can use them to develop our meme-immunological systems. We need to 
develop techniques to strengthen some memes within us and dampen down 
others. As Daniel Dennett describes it, "My brain harbours the memes for 
celibacy and chastity (I couldn't write about them otherwise), but they 
never managed to get into the driver's seat in me. My brain also harbours 
the meme for fasting or dieting, and I wish I could get it more often into the 
driver's seat (so that I could more wholeheartedly diet), but, for one reason 
or another, the coalitions of memes that would incorporate the meme for 
dieting into my whole 'heart' seldom form a government with long-term 
stability. No one meme rules anybody; what makes a person the person he 
or she is are the coalitions of memes that govern - that play the long-term 
roles in determining which decisions are made along the way" (Dennett, 
1995, pp367-368).
23.4. Blueprints
Knowing that our relationship to the memes that occupy us does not hinge 
upon rationality, we must devise techniques or tools to approach them indi-
rectly; tools to support and advance the governing abilities of some meme 
coalitions that we judge beneficial. The process cannot hinge upon rationality 
because the "we" that would support and advance some meme coalitions 
itself consists solely of coalitions of memes. As we have seen in Part 2, my 
brain does not contain an "I" that can make rational judgements about the 
memes it contains. Rather my brain contains memes, some of which form 
coalitions that think of themselves as me. This forms the riddle at the centre of 
all practices of meditation, and this riddle, the circular motion of a cat chas-
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ing its own tail, has always required techniques and technologies that enable 
one to approach it indirectly. The flotation tank offers one such technology 
by creating an immersive world that models the zero point, the void. In expe-
riencing nothing we may begin to experiences ourselves at work acting out 
ourselves. Flotation tanks need a lot of space and regular maintenance, how-
ever, whereas other more portable immersive worlds do not, which suggests 
strongly that we should begin to explore their efficacy in this area.
In doing this, we may find that we need no additional tools at all, but merely dif-
ferent techniques for using the ones we already have. In Transcendental 
Meditation, for example, the teacher will advise the pupil to sit in a relaxed 
position, close their eyes, and chant a mantra to themselves under their 
breath, without making any noise. This uses no physical tools, just inter-
nalised talking; and one could view it as just one particular way of using a 
chair. We should observe, not the chair, but the technique used while sitting 
in the chair. We may find the same with immersive worlds; that we do not 
need new kinds of worlds using new technology, but rather that we can 
develop new techniques for using immersive worlds, as they exist today, 
that will enable us to clear ourselves, to quieten the internal chatter of the 
memes we house, and to talk our selves into self-awareness and wellness.
In the last two years I have begun to sketch out some approaches to this, a number 
of which I have begun to test in practice. I have based these upon Open-
Sim, the open source equivalent of Second Life, which has several technical 
advantages. 
1. Ener Hax has devised Sim-On-A-Stick which offers a "standalone, 
single user Windows package of OpenSim that runs on a USB flash drive 
or other convenient location. In addition to the OpenSimulator server, 
it contains the Apache web server, MySQL, and PHP in order to create a 
'portable' server." (SoaS, 2014, web reference) Using this, I have con-
structed several one-person pocket worlds, which I have carried with me 
and used wherever and whenever I wanted. 
2. Crista Lopes, professor of informatics at University of California, 
Irvine, has devised a system that permits avatars to travel between 
different OpenSim grids. This system of so-called hypergrids works on a 
federated basis. Groups of grid-owners can agree to allow traffic between 
their worlds to form larger clusters. This will allow for voluntary 
experiments on social interaction of a much finer-grained kind than 
Second Life makes possible. In the future it will also allow for users 
of personal pocket worlds to open up their personal spaces to other 
users, under their own control and according to their own rules. This 
will allow for immersive feedback loops and the development of reflective 
self-presentation games.
3. The open source nature of OpenSim means that one can add additional 
functionality if it proves necessary. OpenSim has already been forked 
several times, for specialised needs, including experiments at the Uni-
versity of Oulu, and we can expect to see it forked again.
Pocket World 
I have begun experimenting with using a single-user pocket world as a 
meditative toy. At this initial stage my concern lay solely in seeing if the 
small world engaged me in any way, or if it quickly became dull or tiresome. 
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I quite literally played a hunch, and initially I just logged into the world 
and did whatever came to mind. During this process I became aware that 
although building inside the world interested me in its own right, my build-
ing activities might not lead me towards any specific goal.  After a few ses-
sions I found that this made the play seem somewhat arbitrary, and aimless 
in an unenjoyable way. I then divided an island into three, with each third 
standing in for one of the parent | adult | child triad in Transactional Analy-
sis, as described above, in an attempt to amuse myself by dividing the world 
into functional areas. The division proved extremely useful because it gave 
me three playgrounds with very loosely defined rules, and the existence of 
these three gave me a set of relationships, and these in turn proved crucial 
to my exploration. Now, if I felt unhappy with one area, I felt unhappy about 
it in relation to one or both of the others, and I had the choice to improve the 
area I felt unhappy about or move to one of the other two.
I extended this process by developing an exercise called Pac Squared, which resem-
bled some of the conceptual exercises that we used at the very beginning 
of the Marinetta Ombro project when we spent time trying to imagine the 
world into existence. I have a technique that enables me to layer three 
islands on top of each other in such a way that the user can effectively 
travel in time as well as space. These layers represent the island at the child, 
adult and parent times. Each of these points in time contains an island with 
three sections: parent, adult and child. This gives a three by three matrix, 
as follows.
This enables the user to map out their own, unique matrix of feelings and visceral 
impressions. The top row shows the child island. In this row we can enter 
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children. The second row reflects the users' opinions, as an adult, of chil-
dren, other adults and authority figures. The bottom row shows the users' 
parent-like responses to other parental figures, unattached adults, and chil-
dren and adults in subservient positions. In one round of this game I filled in 
the matrix as follows:
This served to reveal quite a lot about my index of feelings towards others through 
contemplating an imaginary world that I intended to build. It resembled the 
process we went through into imagining Rosarian history and the culture 
that evolved through that. In a very similar way to our experiences with the 
Marinetta Ombro project, it pointed towards useful techniques for using an 
immersive world as a modelling tool before that world even exists. It also 
pointed towards the pleasures available through activities of creative plan-
ning. In this case, I took the fact that I experienced something viscerally that 
I already knew theoretically to mean that the experiment might have some 
value. From that point I have divided my time between devising ways of 
using the idea of the pocket world to create conceptual games, and spending 
time in twenty minutes sessions making something or arranging something 
on one part of the current version of the island. I have experimented with 
introducing a photographic gallery, based on photographs that I take every 
day, and then moving the placards containing the photos to various places 
on the island. I group them according to subjectively felt relationships and 
then regroup them until they "feel right". In this way I can visualise recent 
experiences as closer or further from me, and I can adjust my position on 
the island in order to observe and process the events from different points 
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of view. I have placed these in the Adult section of each island, and have 
also made experiments in observing how differently I assemble and display 
materials for the gallery in the different time zones.
Currently I have begun to program an oracle that will ask questions when I enter 
the world and, based on my answers, set the time of day or night to reflect 
my perceived mood. As part of this I intend to program trees, flowers and 
lanterns that will change visibly according to the time of day. These exper-
iments build upon some similar experiments that I conducted on Rosario 
eight years ago when I successfully created both times and seasons pro-
grammatically. I intend these to provide a visible and audible feedback sys-
tem for my mood upon entering the pocket world.
Snowcastle Valley
I claimed earlier that we become human beings through a meme-driven 
process that begins socially and only later attains a subjective feeling of 
individuality. My decision to begin experimenting with a single-user pro-
ject does not change that. In the end we will need both. Indeed I began my 
experiments with an example of each: the pocket worlds project for individ-
ual self-reflection and self-experimentation, and a project called Snowcastle 
Valley, intended as a social world for children that would improve their soft 
skills while giving them opportunities to interact with each other through 
a set of never-ending social games, based around three parameters: heart, 
power and magic. I put this aside for various reasons, including the fact 
that I came to believe that I should begin by developing something entirely 
personal before attempting to involve other people as either designers or 
subjects. I intend to return to Snowcastle Valley in the future.
The reason for adopting this approach takes us back to an argument in Chapter 
7, where I discussed the ways in which technical limitations in the soft-
ware we used to develop Marinetta had effects in the aesthetic and narrative 
development of the world. We made up reasons inside the story to turn the 
technical limitations into natural phenomena within the immersive world. 
In playing with early versions of the pocket world I find myself coming up 
against both limitations within OpenSim and within my own abilities, and I 
find myself designing and programming around them. As this process con-
tinues I will gradually build up a set of software components – both syn-
thetic artefacts and scripted actions – that will later prove useful in assem-
bling both single user and social tools. 
For the moment, then, the pocket world constitutes an open-ended personal set 
of experiments in which I intend to experience using this world in this way 
before forming any specific hypotheses to test. I report it here as a very 
brief outline of where such experiments might lead, and how they might get 
there. My work in this area has only just begun and currently proceeds by 
a process of autophenomenology in which I create and play in the hope of 
finding a fact that needs explaining. However, as a result of the work to date, 
I now know why my original intuitions bore fruit; I know what to look for 
and approximately where to find it. I know that it will resemble art and cre-
ative play at least as much as it resembles science, but that the play should 
leave traces that can serve as the basis for building scientific hypotheses.
In fact, I contend that the process of creating tools for co-authorship needs to begin 
with creative play - with art research - and only when we have achieved 
our creative goals should it move forward to more scientific testing. First we 
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need to create; secondly we need to play; and thirdly we need to move out-
side our selves and test. Testing will involve the creation of a set of hypoth-
eses in the form of questions or statements that we can prove or disprove 
through repeatable experiments. By way of demonstration, I will conclude 
with a set of hypotheses that we might use to test a finished pocket world 
to determine whether or not people other than the original designers will 
derive benefits from it.
23.5. Hypotheses
In this thesis I have intended to demonstrate that this area has a genuine 
importance for anyone concerned with autonomously directed yet social 
lived self-growth. Synthetic worlds offer us an opportunity to develop new 
and more effective strategies for observing the stories that we tell about our-
selves, in order to continually remake ourselves, and to enter consciously 
into this process and become our own co-authors. If we consist of stories all 
the way down then we need urgently to find tools to enable us to read our 
stories more closely and teach us to write ourselves better stories. I believe 
that we need to learn to co-author ourselves and the life-world we inhabit, 
a life-world that has become a ground of ubiquitous ambient learning.
This, however, raises the question: how will we know when we have built useful 
tools? We can answer this by saying that we will test them, but to do this we 
will need to have a set of testable hypotheses. In other words we will need 
to have some questions, and a means of getting answers to those questions 
that we can trust, and a process for getting those answers that other people 
can duplicate. This will take us beyond lone-wolf autophenomenology to 
the beginnings of an objective proof.
Based on what I have written so far, I propose the following hypotheses, to serve 
to both guide the development of self authoring tools such as the pocket 
world, and test their efficacy:
1. If someone uses a pocket world for 15 minutes a day every day for 4 
weeks they will begin to develop personal rituals for using it.
2. If a user records their uses of the pocket world in a journal they 
will begin to observe ritualistic patterns in their usage.
3. If an observer experiments with their observed patterns they will 
gain the ability to explore and modify them.
4. If an explorer modifies their rituals inside the pocket world in a 
desired direction, they will experience congruent behavioural shifts in 
the real world.
5. An experienced observer will gain the ability to utilise their pocket 
world, their lived experience, and the journal that links them as a tri-
adic tool for self authorship.
We can test these in three stages. In the first stage we can accept reports from 
test subjects using a framework based upon heterophenomenology. In the 
second stage we can seek out more numerically-based criteria for judging 
the reported effects. These might use some of the questionnaires devised 
by Martin Seligman and colleagues to measure aspects of happiness and 
well-being. We might expect readings to change over a defined period of 
time if the subjects report the tools as helpful. In the third stage we can con-
duct wider tests in which different groups receive different instructions with 
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regard to both the use and purpose of the worlds. We would look at this 
stage at whether the subjects' experiences depended to any extent on their 
understanding of the purpose of the experiment, and whether their experi-
ences varied according to the regularity, the time of day, and the length of 
their daily sessions.
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This thesis has twenty three chapters, and each chapter represents a 
step in a single argument. Each chapter draws from empirical exper-
iments or from existing research, and each builds upon the preceding 
steps. I have summarised the argument here in a series of numbered 
paragraphs. Following Stephen Toulmin's model of argument (Toulmin, 
1958), one might say that these paragraphs together form both a syn-
opsis of the overall narrative of the thesis and a description of the claim 
that I make in the thesis. I elucidate the support or ground for this claim 
step-by-step in the twenty three main chapters of the thesis, with the 
warrants spelled out explicitly in Hypotheses, the final section of the 
final chapter.
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The Claim: Part 1
1  In 2002 the Media Department at Arcada decided to institute "courses inside 
projects" rather than "projects inside courses". To this end the multime-
dia team investigated different options for a suitable umbrella project and 
chose to start an immersive world, and a virtual culture, which we opted to 
house inside Second Life. We called the island Rosario, and the capital of 
the island Marinetta.
2 In building the history of the island we developed a set of story-telling tech-
niques that enabled us to insert the history of the island in to the gaps in the 
accepted historical narrative. These included the specifically Rosarian concept 
of the mighty fiction: a story true in one sense and false in another that consti-
tuted an audacious, insupportable yet useful explanation for something.
3  The most valuable educational resource we found in Second Life consisted of 
the other users, whose behaviours and desires provided us with the means 
to simulate real-life client and customer relationships. They also provided 
us with valuable creative interference since they had their own reasons for 
being in Second Life, no reason to privilege ours, and the ability (and some-
times the inclination) to co-author our project by hampering certain activi-
ties and opening up new and unexpected opportunities.
4  We discovered a regular pattern in the ways that our students and staff 
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approached Second Life. Some approached it as themselves, making avatars 
that reflected their own self-image. Some approached it as actors playing a 
part in an ongoing adventure story, making avatars that fitted the role they 
wanted to play. A smaller third group approached it as though everything, 
including the avatars, functioned as a customisable part in a construction 
set, and sought no continuity in, or relationship with, their avatars at all.
5  Using these factors, we created several courses, both for our own students 
and cross-disciplinary courses, which used the dynamics of Second Life to 
foster processes of self-assessment and self-reflection. In this way, partic-
ipating in Second Life, and taking advantage of its strengths, caused us to 
restructure some or our 'real life' courses.
6 It became clear to us that Second Life functioned as a "place" where people 
told stories to each other; that it acted as the scaffolding upon which thou-
sands of people erected stories of their own devising. One could never fully 
corroborate these stories, and so one could choose to experience Second 
Life itself as a mighty fiction.
The Claim: Part 2
7 We began to reflect theoretically, in part, because we became aware of 
other universities attempting to use Second Life as a distance learning tool 
without, from our perspective, attempting to form any understanding of its 
strengths and weaknesses, and of how it worked for its users. This caused 
us to ask questions about why it worked as it did, and these led us to ask 
further questions about the people who used it, what they learned there, 
and finally how all this related to "what it is like to be" a person.
8 We began by defining our terms and gathering a conceptual tool-kit. This 
took in the diagrammatic mapping of Charles Sanders Peirce which caused 
us to question the applicability of dualistic binary logic to our research.
9 Binary logic has severe limitations and Peirce suggests that it cannot apply 
to events or actions in which human agency plays a determining part. 
These, he claims, we must view from a triadic perspective. Viewed from this 
perspective, the mind / body split seems illusory and questions about the 
nature of human consciousness open up.
10 Daniel Dennett has proposed a non-dualistic view of human consciousness 
which has radical implications for the way we see ourselves. Much experi-
mental evidence bears out his view that we contain no Central Scrutiniser, 
but instead have minds that result from a continual battle between compet-
ing ideas that circulate in our brains until one manages to get published, 
and becomes the one we remember thinking and acting upon.
11 Meme theory provides an explanation for how this multiple drafts model of 
consciousness might self-organise. This theory arose from Richard Dawk-
in's observation that Darwinism has general implications outside biologi-
cal evolution, and a universal Darwinism suggests a mechanism by which 
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other replicators might arise. Dawkins proposed that memes, units of cul-
tural information, might act just as "selfishly" as genes, and that we might 
regard human brains as sites of meme infection.
12 The details of this theory suggest that we should view our sense of pos-
sessing a continuous consciousness as nothing more than a benign user 
illusion. We feel and tolerate this illusion because it simplifies our daily lives 
and makes social routines smoother.  We live a mighty fiction, because, in 
reality, we seem to consist not of a single unified consciousness, but rather 
of stories all the way down: stories that we learn from those who came 
before us, stories other people tell us, and stories we tell ourselves.
The Claim: Part 3
13 We can view language both as the first human tool and the proto-meme. All 
of what we regard as human culture builds upon this.
14 All tools and media form extensions of human senses and different arrays 
of tools create different media landscapes. This privilege some senses over 
others, and serve to shape our experienced life-worlds. They help determine 
what questions we ask of our environment, and what answers we expect.
15 Complex tools have led to social organisations that have exhibited tenden-
cies towards radical monopolies, in which one class of industrialised ser-
vices crowds out all other possibilities, as when the design of it city makes it 
impossible to walk to work, and the imposition of professional "standards" 
makes it impossible to do certain tasks oneself. People have attempted to 
counter this tendency, with varying degrees of success by moves to estab-
lish and maintain a commons: a pool of resources that exist for the common 
good and have no ready economic exchange value. Marshall McLuhan and 
Ivan Illich have pointed out how these tendencies have affected human life 
possibilities, and how these have changed as part of the development of 
newer tools.
16 The emerging digital age changes the human sensorium yet again and pro-
vides a new set of threats and opportunities which will exist only until the 
new media landscape becomes normalised once more. The current tenden-
cies towards radical digital monopoly appear to seek to privatise the men-
tal commons; to turn everything about our lives and our relationships into 
data, a commodity that corporations can buy and sell, and use to sell things 
back to us.
17 Parallel to this, we can see an environment of ambient learning arising, in 
which digital tools carry out their primary functions while also performing 
a secondary function of teaching us how to use them, while we use them. In 
this media landscape we easily become prosumers, teaching others what to 
produce for us next.
18 Since the emerging digital age has not yet fully taken shape, we have an 
opportunity to intervene to help determine its final form. However, since each 
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member of that "we" consists of coalitions of memes, we urgently need to 
learn skills of memetic self-authorship.
19 Self-authorship, by which I mean the deliberate cultivation of tools for 
self-reflection and techniques for incorporating the results into conscious 
personality development, has a long history that ranges from the use of 
the palace of memory techniques in Ancient Greece to commonplacing in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. This kind of technique largely 
disappeared during the period of mass production, to begin to return again 
recently in new guises. These techniques have, as noted earlier, a crucial 
importance in the evolving information age.
20 For a range of reasons, immersive worlds seem particularly useful as train-
ing tools in this field, because they appear to engage us at a pre-conscious, 
visceral level. They stand on the shoulders of a wide range of previous tools 
for internal quiet, reflection and self-improvement.
21 We need to begin the process of discovering their real capabilities by lone-
wolf autophenomenological exploration, in order to abduce a set of hypoth-
eses that we can then subject to valid testing. In other words, we need to 
begin with a creative process of art research, before moving on to a process 
of scientific validation. We have arrived at a situation in which we must 
necessarily play before we can get serious.
22 The study concludes with a skeletal blueprint for one possible single-user 
pocket world that the owner can use as a meditation chamber, a digital 
commonplace book and a tool for three dimensional diagramming.
23 This world derives its core abilities from conceptual and technical lessons 
learned during the empirical phase of the Marinetta Ombro project. It has 
the status of a proposal for a new field of research that seeks to use artistic 
techniques to create tools for self authorship, and then to validate these 
using methods recognised as scientific.
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